



Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process - A Reference Guide (2022-2023)



BURMA NEWS INTERNATIONAL



MYANMAR PEACE MONITOR

Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process - A Reference Guide (2022-2023)

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About Us

The Burma News International - Myanmar Peace Monitor (BNI-MPM) is a program of BNI, a network of 15 ethnic media organizations. The program aims to provide up-to-date and accurate information, analysis and research on the peace process and conflict dynamics in Myanmar by monitoring daily developments related to the peace process and conflicts in Myanmar.

BNI-MPM monitors and documents conflict incidents, activities and information as well as developments in the peace process through the lens of trusted domestic and international media outlets, and uncovers news and conducts interviews on the peace process and conflicts through a network of local reporters based in the states and regions of the country.

Since 2013, BNI-MPM has produced yearly reference guides titled "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process," aiming to provide greater clarity and understanding of the issues, events, actors and stakeholders involved in the ongoing peace process.

"Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process - A Reference Guide (2022-2023)" is the seventh volume in this series.

In addition to the daily news and interviews published on www.mmpeacemonitor.org and <https://www.facebook.com/mmpeacemonitor>, BNI-MPM also regularly publishes weekly news reviews, monthly peace and conflict dashboards, and research papers on the peace process.

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Our special thanks go to all the contributors and staff of BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor (BNI-MPM) who have dedicatedly undertaken various tasks to make this "Peace Process Reference Guide (2022-2023)" possible.

We express our sincere appreciation to all BNI staff who have collectively contributed, whether verbally or physically, to overcome the challenges and difficulties faced in each BNI-MPM's activity. Additionally, we sincerely acknowledge all the donors who supported and made possible the implementation of BNI-MPM's activities.

Note to readers

Since 2013, Burma News International-Myanmar Peace Monitor (BNI-MPM) has annually compiled and published the findings on conflict and peace process developments in Myanmar into a "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process – A Reference Guide". Based on the evolving political, military, and peace contexts, it selectively documents relevant events, facts, and information in an inclusive and engaging manner.

This edition of "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process – A Reference Guide 2022-2023" is the second such book produced during the military coup. Therefore, compared to the previous Reference Guide 2021-2022, it contains more content and issues related to the conflict and peace process, providing clearer insight into the roles, significance, positions, and goals of the actors involved.

Readers will learn more about the new actors, the intensity of the armed resistance, the military council's intensified airstrikes, the scale of civilian displacement, and the current peace process and its direction during military

rule. It also covers issues such as massacres by state and region, the role of international governments and organizations, and the direction of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs).

While we have endeavored to compile a comprehensive account of Myanmar's peace process and conflict dynamics based on reliable sources, we acknowledge some limitations may remain and apologize in advance to readers.

We believe that the content in this book will prove useful for researchers, academics, media, and international organizations studying Myanmar's fluid political, military, and peace developments under the military rule.

Executive Summary

Since the military coup on 1 February 2021, the peace process under the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) has stalled after more than two and a half years of military rule. Although the military, which seized power by detaining the government leaders elected by the people, is trying to revive the NCA, it remains unrecognized by the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), which are determined to end all forms of tyranny, including military dictatorship.

The military council, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, has tried to persuade some ERO alliances to hold a peace conference. While still clinging to the NCA and 2008 Constitution, the regime has dangled amending the 2008 Constitution towards a democratic federal system to EROs.

The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) declared the abolition of the 2008 Constitution, while the NCA was rendered invalid on 21 April 2021, with some signatories leaving it behind and others sticking to it. For pro-federal democracy forces, "drafting a new constitution based on a federal system takes precedence" over the NCA.

New paths in the peace process under the military rule include engaging in talks with the authoritarian military council and coordinating among pro-democracy revolutionary forces to build a federal democratic union. This depends on the choices of the individual EROs.

The armed resistance of the Spring Revolution forces has reached a peak. From April 2022 to March 2023, there were 1,637 days of clashes nationwide – 58 percent (695 days) more than the same period last year. In 2023, the number of days of monthly clashes are exceptionally high, exceeding 100 days per month. This is due either to the "One-Year Plan" for 2023 being developed by ERO leaders and Spring Revolution forces, including the National Unity Government (NUG), or the effect of the Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) established in September 2021 by the NUG Ministry of Defense and four EROs.

Data indicates that in 2023, military cooperation among the Spring Revolution forces has markedly improved, while Myanmar army offensives have expanded throughout the country. Therefore, the momentum of armed resistance against the military regime is likely continue to strengthen.

According to Burma News International (BNI) -Myanmar Peace Monitor data, the number of days of airstrikes by the military council in the first six months of 2023 exceeded the previous two years, 2021-22. The correlation between military deaths, camp seizures, and airstrikes has also been found. Retaliatory airstrikes were found to have increased as military council soldiers were increasingly killed and their territories lost.

In addition to the new peace paths, armed resistance, and military council airstrikes covered above, this book includes information on internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2022-2023 in the midst of the conflict, mass killings of five or more people by state and region, and the role of the international community. The book also maps the conflict locations and provides underlying causes, data, and organizational presence related to the conflicts.

This reference aims to help all those involved in the peace process, including individuals, organizations, academics, students, international groups, and the media, to navigate the current military, political, and peace landscape.

An aerial photograph of a snow-covered mountain slope. A dark shadow is cast across the snow from the top left towards the bottom right, creating a strong diagonal line. The snow is bright white, and the shadow is a deep, dark blue-grey. The overall scene is serene and minimalist.

**Looking towards
a new landscape
of the peace process**

Looking towards a new landscape of the peace process

It has been reported in the Reference Book on Peace Process (2021-2022) published by the Burma News International (BNI)-Myanmar Peace Monitor that if the ultimate goal of internal peace is to build a federal democratic union that guarantees autonomy, self-determination and equality, it is directly related to the victory of the Spring Revolution.¹

The peace process that started under the tenure of President U Thein Sein in 2011 left only three parts of the Union Accord along with the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The 1 February 2021 military coup brought the entire peace process to a halt.

Even though the illegal military group has been trying every possible way to revive the peace talks during the military coup, there have been some informal talks with some Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs).

The Kachin Independence Organization/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA), Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA), the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF), Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) issued statements which denied the peace invitation offered by coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on 22 April 2022, giving various reasons. Three Brotherhood Alliance, namely Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)-Kokang, the Ta'ang National Liberation

1 Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process-A Reference Guide 2021-2022, <http://rb.gy/5bzpf>

Army (TNLA) and the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) responded that they would not attend the meeting individually, but only with the decision of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC).²

The Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Pa-O National Liberation Organization/Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLO/PNLA), the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)-Peace Council, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) responded to the military council's National Solidarity and Peace-making Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) that it accepted the coup leader's peace invitation. The United Wa State Party/United Wa State Army (UWSP/UWSA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)-Mongla and the Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) decided to meet with the military leadership.

That is to say, the military council led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing held talks only with the EROs which have not clashed with the army as the EROs which are making the strongest resistance against the military group in cooperation with the Spring Revolution forces which defy the military coup, decisively rejected the regime leader's invitation for peace.

In the third week of July 2023, the spokesperson of the SSPP/SSA, who met informally with the junta for fifth time, said: "We don't have big hopes, but we are doing it as a priority to ensure peace and stability in our area."³

Lt-Col Sai Hsu, spokesperson of the SSPP/SSA claimed that the military council wanted to hold a peace conference and asked the opinions of discussion partners, the EROs. The UWSP/UWSA, the NDAA and the SSPP/

2 Can Peace-Labelled Divide-and-Rule Strategy Work, Weekly News Review, Issue-53, May 2022, BNI-MPM, <https://bit.ly/3UD5mk4>

3 An interview with Lt-Col Sai Hsu, Spokesperson of SSPP. <http://rb.gy/4aw8x>

SSA said they are not ready to participate in the peace conference if it is to be held now.

Each of the EROs which are holding informal talks with the regime has different interests and expectations. It is found that their demands include the designation of state-level status and self-administered zone, regional development and the survival of organizations. So, we need to be aware of the fact whether or not their demands are identical to the public's desire to root out the military dictatorship.

It must be said that the EROs are not in a position to hold talks based on the NCA which is held by the military. The public representation is limited due to the above-mentioned interests and expectations of organizations although they will discuss a plan to build up a federal democratic union. In addition, it is necessary to take into account whether the dialogue with the military leadership can undermine the agreements of the Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong made following the path laid out in the NCA. It must be said that the compromise and agreements that will be obtained from the peace-labelled dialogue with the coup leader, without the elected government and parliamentary groups, cannot guarantee the building of a future federal democratic union aspired by the forces of the Spring Revolution.

On the side of the forces of Spring Revolution which are using various methods such as military, political, diplomacy and public strike, the EROs' cooperation, support and engagement in the forces such as the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), the NUG and the People's Defense Force/ Local Defense Forces (PDFs/LDFs) are clearly visible. Especially, the KIO/KIA and the KNU/KNLA provided several military training courses for the PDFs under the NUG. It is recorded in the State of the People's Defense prepared

by the NUG Ministry of Defense that is closely cooperating with six allied EROs for the resistance war of the Spring Revolution. ⁴

In September, 2021, the NUG's Defense Ministry formed the Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) in cooperation with and four allied EROs. The C3C includes the chairs and military chiefs from the member organizations, who can make political and military decisions. The Union Minister for Defense, the Deputy Defense Minister, the Union Minister for Home Affairs and the Union Minister for Immigration and Population are also included in the C3C, representing the NUG.


Based on geographical position, military and alliance affairs, top military officials of relevant allied EROs are appointed as "military commander of the military regions. They are commanding on the ground through a "unified chain of command" system. ⁵



The NUG held a virtual meeting with the ULA/AA on 16 May, 2022.

4 The State of the People's Defense prepared by the Ministry of Defense under the NUG, Page-41, <http://rb.gy/lmnr4>

5 The State of the People's Defense prepared by the Ministry of Defense under the NUG, Page-37-39, <http://rb.gy/lmnr5>



The Alliance Relations Committee (ARC) formed by the NUG on 4 January, 2022, held separate meetings with the EROs, political parties, revolutionary forces and advisory councils. They are working together extensively in the sectors of military, defense, health and education including humanitarian assistance.⁶

On 16 May 2023, the ARC held an online talk with the ULA/AA, with the attendance of 88 Generation leader U Min Ko Naing, the NUG's Union Ministers and Deputy Ministers, Chair of the ULA/AA Major General Twan Mrat Naing and General Secretary Dr. Nyo Twan Awng.

"Our ARC made offers and held informal meetings and held meetings with the EROs. There are still to discuss. We continue to discuss with the groups that have been discussed. We are working on a strategy of how to implement the things to be done together," said U Kyaw Zaw, the spokesperson of the NUG President's Office.⁷

⁶ Report to the public on the anniversary of the formation of the National Unity Government, 3 May 2023, <http://rb.gy/5jnwd>

⁷ An interview with U Kyaw Zaw, Spokesperson of the NUG President Office on the use of "Wa" special region (2) as Wa state by the National Unity Government. <http://rb.gy/cqg0r>

To sum up, if we look at the new landscape of the peace process that was found during the military coup, we can see two paths—the landscape from the side of the Spring Revolution forces and the landscape from the side of the military.

During the 2021 military coup, the relevant forces expressed and confirmed that they would cooperate politically and militarily to end all forms of tyranny, including military dictatorship, and create a federal democratic union.

A dialogue sponsored by the military regime includes informal meetings with each group and aims to hold a peace conference without the actors who oppose the military council.

On the side of the Spring Revolution forces, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and the NUG, which are marching towards the end of all tyranny, including military dictatorship, and the creation of a federal democratic union, are inviting all EROs, while there has also been military and political cooperation through an alliance.

As part of the military-sponsored talks, the regime is trying to revive the path based on the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), and envisions a peace conference that leaves out the EROs which oppose the military coup.

Currently, the NUG is preparing the One Year Plan for the people's revolution in consultation with the allied groups. According to the plan, the government is fighting the junta on six fronts – political, economic, foreign affairs, psychological warfare, public relations, and governance.⁸

On the other side, the regime is struggling in the face of the above-mentioned fronts staged by the Spring Revolution forces. It should be reasonable to note that after more than two years since the coup, the

8 State of People's Defense, Ministry of Defense, National Unity Government, Page 42, <http://rb.gy/lmnr>

provision in the military council's five-point road map to "adhere to and implement the agreed points of the NCA as much as possible" has not produced any tangible results.

In the current dialogue agenda, the military council has invited the EROs in particular. Notably, some of the EROs that have participated in the informal meetings with the regime are found to have no military conflict with the junta. As for the EROs that are cooperating with the Spring Revolution forces such as the NUG and the PDFs-LDFs, the coup leader has vowed to take decisive action against them.⁹

The Spring Revolution forces have proclaimed 2023 as the decisive year. In order to be able to avoid the dialogue agenda that the junta is likely to come up with pre-set agendas and outcomes predetermined to suit their interests, there should be an agreed upon plan and strategies among the Spring Revolution forces and be prepared to present them to the international community and the public. The Spring Revolution forces are marching according to the 12 points of the roadmap and their goal of building a democratic union will most likely not come through a dialogue sponsored by the military council.

The military regime continues to cling to the NCA and the 2008 Constitution while mentioning the building a "democratic federal union", and at the same time trying to expand its role in political, administrative and legislative spheres. On the side of the Spring Revolution forces, the NUCC and NUG seek a federal democratic union (i.e., system change) – not a regime change that keeps the dictatorship alive.¹⁰

The NUCC and NUG also vowed to march steadfastly alongside all ethnic nationalities who have persevered in the revolutionary struggle, until the

9 Keep a watch out for military-sponsored dialogue - Issue 115, BNI-MPM,
<http://rb.gy/u53qq>

10 10 Joint statement of the common position of revolutionary groups in the Spring
Revolution <http://rb.gy/4dsrn>

overarching goal of establishing political processes that ensure the creation of a federal democratic union with collective leadership and collective responsibility that equality is achieved.

Looking at the new landscape of the peace process during the military coup, the military regime trying to make its coup attempt succeed and the Spring Revolution forces resisting the coup are still in the process of luring the EROs into different directions, incentives and assurances. Therefore, it would be safe to assert that the new landscape of the peace process rests heavily on the choice of each ERO.

National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (NUG)

Established	16 April 2022
President	- U Win Myint (being detained by the military council)
Vice President (Acting President)	- Duwa Lashi La
State Counsellor	- Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (being detained by the military council)
Prime Minister	- Mahn Win Khaing Than
Union Minister	- 17
Deputy Union Minister	- 16
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/NUGmyanmar
Website	- https://gov.nugmyanmar.org/my/about-nug-my/

The Interim National Unity Government, in coordination with the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), practically implements the objectives, aims and the steps of the political road map which are included in the Part-1 of the Federal Democracy Charter. The NUG shall be held accountable for the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH).

The NUG is working on international relations, military and the people's embrace processes, Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) measures, the implementation of interim local public administration, public services such as education and health, financial and economic activities. In particular, it formed the Alliance Relations Committee (ARC) and held separate discussions with political parties, revolutionary forces, advisory councils and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs). They are working together extensively in the military, defense, health and education sectors, including humanitarian aid affairs, according to the report of the second anniversary of the formation of the National Unity Government.¹¹

State Administration Council (SAC)

Chair	- Senior General Min Aung Hlaing
Vice-Chair	- Vice-Senior General Soe Win
Secretary	- Lt-Gen Aung Lin Dwe
Joint Secretary	- Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo
Member	- 14

The military council is led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who seized power illegally on 1 February 2021. The failed coup attempt was extended by another six months on 31 July 2023, under the pretext that "the situation is not yet normal". The 2008 constitution allows the military to rule the country under a state of emergency for one year, with two possible six-month extensions. Former general U Myint Swe granted the fourth six-month extension. After the extension of the state of emergency, the junta reshuffled the military council and the cabinet. It is prepared to drag out his failed coup attempt.

11 Reporting to the public on the 2nd anniversary of the formation of the National Unity Government. <http://rb.gy/is6cp>

It is found that Lt-Gen Yar Pyae, chair of the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC), which was reformed on 1 February 2021, was added as a member of the military council. Lt-Gen Yar Pyae who was appointed as the Union Minister for Union Government Office and the national security advisor to the military council, was assigned to the Union Minister for Home Affairs on 3 August 2023. Of five future tasks of the military council, it is questionable whether there will be the substitution of the persons who will manage the important peace process and operational changes.

Peace Process Steering Team (PPST)

Established	-	26 March 2016
Headquarters	-	Chiang Mai
Leader	-	Colonel Khun Okkar (PNLO)
Deputy leader	-	Saw Mra Yarzar Lin (ALP)
Representing members	-	5

The military coup led by by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has had a major impact on the PPST, which is composed of representatives from the ten EROs that signed the NCA. The Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) and the Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA) within the PPST are actively working with the Spring Revolution forces to create a federal democratic union. Although the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF) remains involved in the PPST, it has conducted military operations in cooperation with the resistance forces and declined the military leader's invitation to peace talks.

On the one hand, the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) has stepped back from the leadership role of the PPST and is less

actively participating in the committee. Nevertheless, there have been talks between the regime and the RCSS. On 3 April 2022, Nai Aung Min of the New Mon State Party (NMSP) assumed the leadership of the PPST. In a statement released on 3 April 2022, the PPST said it would continue to work for the end of chauvinism and dictatorship, national equality, self-determination, and the development of a genuine federal democracy.

The NMSP also submitted a letter of withdrawal from the PPST after the 20-21 April 2023 meeting. The meeting with the coup leader in the third week of June 2023 was attended only by the five members of the committee now headed by Colonel Khun Okkar. These five members of the PPST include the Pa-O National Liberation Organization/ Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLO/ PNLA), the Arakan Liberation Party/Arakan Liberation Army (ALP /ALA), the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the KNU/KNLA Peace Council (KPC), and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU).

In other words, the PPST, which is composed of representatives from the ten EROs that signed the NCA, has undergone a change in leadership, while the divergent opinions and interests of its members have been further exposed by the military coup.

The Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC)

Established - 15-19 April 2017

Members - UWSP/UWSA, KIO/KIA, SSPP/SSA, MNTJP/MNDAA, NDAA/ESS, PSLF/TNLA, ULA/AA

Chairman (1) - U Bao Youxiang (UWSP/UWSA)

Chairman (2) - General N'Ban La (KIO/KIA)


Secretary - U Bao Youyi

It would be safe to assume that the FPNCC deviated from its policy following the 2021 military coup. All members must work together to find a path different from that of the NCA. The National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State (NDAA-ESS) and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), including the United Wa State Party/United Wa State Army (UWSP/UWSA), which holds Chairman (1) of the committee. It could not refuse the military council's invitation to peace talks in Nay Pyi Taw.

At the intervention of the Chinese government, other members such as the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA), Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), and the United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army (ULA /AA) met with the regime in Mongla in early June 2023. However, the meeting broke down on the second day without reaching an agreement.¹² The Three Brotherhood Alliance also supports other resistance groups such as the Bamar People's Liberation Army (BPLA) and the Student Armed Force (SAF), which are waging a war of resistance against the military regime.

The Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), which holds Chairman (2) of the FPNCC, is also determined to stand alongside the Spring Revolution forces. Therefore, the FPNCC's role in the new landscape of peace process spans both directions.

¹² Meeting between junta and three Northern Alliance groups ended without agreement
<http://rb.gy/1uqsk>

An aerial photograph of a coastline, showing a dark blue sea on the left and a white sandy beach on the right. The text is centered in the white area.

**New Actors
during the Coup**

The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC)

Established	- 8 March 2021
Groups/organizations by sector	- 5
Member organizations	- 27
Special observer	- 1
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/nucc.federal
Website	- https://nucc-federal.org/my/

Union Vision

To build a peaceful federal democratic union which guarantees freedom, justice and equality.

Union core value

To build the union and believe and accept fundamental human rights, democratic rights, minority rights, equality and self-determination, collective leadership, pluralism, mutual respect and mutual recognition, unity in diversity, gender equality and non-discrimination (race, religion, language, literature, culture, gender, disability and sexual orientation) as the core value.

Members of Parliament Union (Burma) – MPU

Established	- 1996
Member	- 34 elected representatives from the 1990 General Election.
Spokesperson	- Dr. Tint Swe, U Bo Hla Tint, U Maung Maung Aye and U Bo Thaug.
Participating groups/organizations	- Elected candidates of the NUCC.

Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)

Established - 5 February 2021

Chairman - U Aung Kyi Nyunt

Member of the Secretariat - U Tun Myint, Daw Phyu Phyu Thin, Mai La Min Tun.

Member - 20

Participating groups/organizations - NUCC's elected members of parliament.

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/crph.official.mm>

Website - <https://crphmyanmar.org/my/>

Political objectives

- To end military dictatorship.
- To ensure the release of all detainees, including the President and the State Counsellor.
- To fully enjoy democracy.
- To draft and emerge a new constitution based on the federal system after the annulment of the 2008 Constitution.

Undertakings

On 1 March 2021, the military council was declared a terrorist group.

On 17 March 2021, the removal of EROs from the list of terrorist organizations and unlawful associations was announced in order for all ethnic groups to participate in the building of a future federal democratic union.

The annulment of the 2008 Constitution was announced on 31 March, 2021.

On 16 April 2021, the National Unity Government (NUG) was formed.

Up to 12 sectoral affairs committees such as legal affairs, federal affairs, security and defense affairs, international relation affairs and NUCC affairs were formed.

Eight laws, including the State Counsellor Law and the Myanmar Police Force Disciplinary Law, were amended.

To abolish the laws that were not compatible with federal democratic standards in the current period and review the constitution needed in building a strong federal and democratic system. Other laws and policies under the leadership of the legal affairs committee, the federal affairs committee and the NUCC affairs committee, were discussed.¹³

From the first emergency session of Third Parliament on 5 February 2021 up to 2 February 2023, the Union Parliamentary Meetings were held up to five times.

Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS)

Established	- 14 October 1988
Chairman	- Comrade Aung Moe Zaw
Participating groups/organizations	- NUCC's political parties
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/officialdpns
Website	- https://www.dpnsburmese.org/

As a political party, the Democratic Party for a New Society which was born out of the 1988 Pro-Democracy Uprising, is actively participating in the Spring Revolution in which Myanmar people of all races are involved to root out the military dictatorship during the 1 February 2021 military coup.

13 The CRPH's work report. <http://rb.gy/6p7f8>

Anti-junta Forces Coordination Committee (AFCC-Mandalay)

Established - 11 February 2021

Member organizations - 18¹⁴

Participating groups/organizations - NUCC's the civil society organizations, including unions, women, youths and minorities concerned groups, the CDM organizations against dictatorship, and mass movement strike organizations.

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/AFCCMandalay>

The AFCC-Mandalay was formed with 31 representatives from monks, religious organizations, student unions/organizations, workers' and farmers' unions/organizations, civil servants who opposed the coup, political parties, CSOs and strike forces. The AFCC-Mandalay is determined to fight for anti-coup movement and democracy in various means.¹⁵

Myanmar Labour Alliance (MLA)

Established - 2019

Member organizations - 16

Participating groups/organizations - NUCC's the civil society organizations, including unions, women, youths and minorities concerned groups, the CDM organizations against dictatorship, and mass movement strike organizations.

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/myanmarlaboralliance>

In order to effectively serve the social interests of workers and farmers in Myanmar, the MLA was organized by labor federations and organizations that are active in labor issues throughout the country. It has promised that it will continue to participate in the efforts to root out all forms of dictatorship

14 The CRPH's work report. <http://rb.gy/6p7f8>

15 Anti-junta Forces Coordination Committee (AFCC)- Mandalay. <http://rb.gy/sj18u>

together with the people. The MLA has demanded three points—Signing the provisions on basic rules and rights at work, including the ILO Convention (98), fixing the minimum wage in accordance with the law and implementing transitional justice for the workers, private staff (CDM), and civil servants (CDMs), who were affected during the Spring Revolution.¹⁶

General Strike Coordination Body (GSCB)

Established - 30 March 2021

Member organizations - 37

Established - The NUCC's the civil society organizations, including unions, women, youths and minorities concerned groups, the CDM organizations against dictatorship, and mass movement strike organizations.

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/gscbmyanmar>

The GSCB comprises 37 anti-coup organizations nationwide, with the objectives—rooting out the military dictatorship, unconditional cancellation of the 2008 Constitution, building up the federal democratic union and the immediate release of the detained political leaders and student activists.

General Strike Committee of Basic and Higher Education (GSCBHE)

Established - 4 May 2021

Member organizations - 20

Participating groups/organizations - The NUCC the civil society organizations, including unions, women, youths and minorities concerned groups, the CDM organizations against dictatorship, and mass movement strike organizations.

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/gscbhe>

¹⁶ A message sent to the 133rd International Workers' Day. <http://rb.gy/o05mo>

The GSCBHE has set three objectives— to fight together with the NUG and the CRPH for the end to the military dictatorship and the establishment of a federal democratic union, to effectively support the educational staff from the basic and higher education sectors by holding the weapon of CDM strike and to continue to fight by raising the flag of the education struggle to the peak, by means of various strike struggles, together with strike committees across the country, including the GSCB. If the interim measures are successfully completed, it will help protect the rights of education workers in basic and higher education sectors and deal with their losses and try to strengthen the federal education system that guarantees the right to self-determination by standing as the federation of education unions of Myanmar.

General Strike Committee (GSC)

Established - 20 February 2021

Participating groups/organizations - The NUCC the civil society organizations, including unions, women, youths and minorities concerned groups, the CDM organizations against dictatorship, and mass movement strike organizations.

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStrikeCommittee/>

The GSC has demanded three points—end the military dictatorship, abolish the 2008 Constitution and establish a genuine federal democratic union. The GSC also supports and welcomes the NUG. The GSC announced that it will make an all-round effort to ensure that it can stand as a more effective and inclusive government.

General Strike Collaboration Committee (GSCC)

Established - 8 February 2021

Participating groups/organizations - The NUCC the civil society organizations, including unions, women, youths and minorities concerned groups, the CDM organizations against dictatorship, and mass movement strike organizations.

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStrikeCollaborationCommittee>

It was formed with the aim of cooperating with public movements against the military dictatorship. It is found that the GSCC is working on the continued implementation by sharing strike methods and activity patterns to ensure that public voices are uniform throughout the country. The GSCC fully supported four political objectives set by the CRPH and believed that the emergence of a constitution based on a federal system would solve Myanmar's political problem.

General Strike Committee of Nationalities (GSCN)

Established - 11 February 2021

Participating groups/organizations - The NUCC the civil society organizations, including unions, women, youths and minorities concerned groups, the CDM organizations against dictatorship, and mass movement strike organizations.

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/GSCNStrike>

On the anniversary of the formation of the GSCN, it announced that it wants a union based on self-determination, autonomy and equality of ethnic groups and absolutely has no faith in fake peace talks, including the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which will help the perpetuation of the military dictators as well as all the dictators. The GSCN has called on those who really

want the federal democratic union to shun the military council's fake peace talks, object to the fake election, stand with the entire revolutionary people and continue to participate in the Spring Revolution until the federal democratic union can be built.

The 88 Generation (Peace and Open Society)

Established - 2013

Leadership - U Min Ko Naing, U Kyaw Min Yu (aka) U Jimmy

Participating groups/organizations - the NUCC the civil society organizations, including unions, women, youths and minorities concerned groups, the CDM organizations against dictatorship, and mass movement strike organizations.

Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/The88Generation>

It is a political organization that brings together 88 Generation student leaders to promote peace and the role of civil society organizations. It was originally organized in a collective leadership style, including famous people such as U Min Ko Naing, U Ko Ko Gyi, U Kyaw Min Yu (aka) Ko Jimmy and U Mya Aye. Later, U Ko Ko Gyi and some leaders established the political party while U Mya Aye, who had another political aim, withdrew from the 88 Generation (Peace and Open Society). It declared the anti-coup non-violent movement during the 2021 military coup. It released three processes— to continue the parliamentary process under the leadership of the CRPH, to ensure that all civil servants go on strike without going to work and to carry out a synchronized nationwide campaign, through township/village/street-wise non-violent movements.¹⁷

¹⁷ Three processes. <http://rb.gy/evzhj>

Myanmar Teachers' Federation (MTF)

Established - 3 May 2015

Central Committee Members - 11 members (Interim Central Committee members)

Participating groups/organizations Unions under the NUCC, women's, youths and ethnic minority organizations, civil society organizations, CDM-related and public strike-related groups

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100066260394798>

The Myanmar Teachers' Federation (Interim), which was formed in 2014, was abolished and the MTF was re-formed after the first conference held in early March 2015. MTF is an independent organization formed by teachers from higher education, basic education, private education and monastic schools. On 1 February 2021, the MTF strongly opposed the military coup, demanded unconditional release of all detained persons, and called for implementation of the 2020 election results. The MTF with seven central executive members and 61 executive members was abolished on 26 April 2021. According to the MTF central executive committee's resolution made at the MTF meeting held on 27 April 2021, an 11-member MTF interim central committee was formed and assigned duties on 29 April 2021.¹⁸

Technological Teachers' Federation (TTF)

Established - 7 August 2017

Central Committee Members - 67 members

Participating groups/organizations - Unions under the NUCC, women's, youths and ethnic minority organizations, civil society organizations, CDM-related and public strike-related groups

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/technologicalteachersfederation>

¹⁸ Central Committee's Statement No. 3/2021 <http://rb.gy/6m0e6>

The Technological Teachers' Federation (TTF), initially formed with 35 members including teachers, researchers and staff from technological universities, computer universities and related research departments across Myanmar, aims to support and assist in building a modern education system that can compete regionally and internationally, and to support the implementation of the government's National Education Strategic Plan (2016-2020). The TTF strongly opposed the military coup on 1 February 2021, foreseeing it would halt the progress of the education sector in Myanmar.¹⁹ The federation affirmed its full support for the federal democratic charter and notified it would abide by the governance of the National Unity Government (NUG).

Women's League of Burma (WLB)

Established - 9 December 1999

General Secretary - Nan Moh Moh

Members organizations - 12 members

Participating groups/organizations - Unions under the NUCC, women's, youths and ethnic minority organizations, civil society organizations, CDM-related and public strike-related groups

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/wlbpower>

Website - <https://www.womenofburma.org/>

WLB was formed to increase women's participation in democracy and human rights, promote women's participation in the national reconciliation processes, and enhance the role of women. The WLB has also organized campaigns related to women's issues in addition to publishing reports on women's participation in Myanmar's anti-junta Spring Revolution. In the 11th conference held in December, WLB decided to prioritize ending all forms of

¹⁹ Technological Teachers' Federation's Announcement No. 3/2021 of <http://rb.gy/i8uch>

tyranny including military dictatorship, violence, oppression and discrimination, achieving gender equality, peace, justice, transitional justice, national reconciliation and emergence of a federal democratic union in line with WLB's political vision and mission.

Monywa People's Strike Steering Committee (MonywaPSSC)

Established - 9 February 2021

Member organizations - 7 members

Participating groups/organizations - Unions under the NUCC, women's, youths and ethnic minority organizations, civil society organizations, CDM-related and public strike-related groups

Website <https://www.facebook.com/MonywaPSSC>

The Monywa Public Strike Commanding Committee (MonywaPSSC) announced it will stand together with the public using diverse forms of protest to end the military dictatorship and build a federal democratic union. The committee's slogans are "Uproot the fake Unionism. Build a new federal democratic union." So far, the committee has been conducting non-violent protests in various ways against the military coup.

Synergy Social Harmony Organization

Established - 2017

Participating groups/organizations - Unions under the NUCC, women's, youths and ethnic minority organizations, civil society organizations, CDM-related and public strike-related groups

Website - <https://www.facebook.com/SYNERGYSHO>

Women's Peace Network (WPN)

Established - 2013

Participating groups/organizations - Unions under the NUCC, women's, youths and ethnic minority organizations, civil society organizations, CDM-related and public strike-related groups

Website - <https://www.womenspeacenet.org/>

Women Advocacy Coalition-Myanmar (WAC-M)

Established - 13 September 2021

Participating groups/organizations - Unions under the NUCC, women's, youths and ethnic minority organizations, civil society organizations, CDM-related and public strike-related groups

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/WACMyanmar2021>

The Women Advocacy Coalition-Myanmar (WAC-M) consists of women's rights activists, women peacebuilders, women's rights organizations and networks in Myanmar. It aims to end all forms of military dictatorship and build a gender-responsive federal democracy. WAC Myanmar has issued statements, position papers, closed letters, and open letters to regional and international stakeholders. As an alliance member, it continues to engage whenever possible to raise awareness about the situation of women and gender equality in Myanmar.

Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC)

Established - 13 April 2021

Participating groups/organizations - Unions under the NUCC, women's, youths and ethnic minority organizations, civil society organizations, CDM-related and public strike-related groups

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/icncc>

Formed with the aim of ending military dictatorship, establishing a federal democratic union and reconstructing the Chin State, the Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC) came together as a Chin political force to work collectively during the resistance period. ICNCC has been seen collaborating in various leadership roles with other states, federal units, and revolutionary organizations including the NUCC, the NUG and others, which is crucial for drafting and adopting the federal democracy charter. ICNCC aims to keep striving for self-determination and building a federal democratic union that guarantees the establishment of Chin State and equality.

Mon State Federal Council (MSFC)

Established - February 2021

Council members - 25 members

Participating groups/organizations - Interim state/federal unit representatives/ committees under the NUCC

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/monstatefederalcouncil>

The Mon State Interim Coordination Committee (MSICC) formed to represent Mon State and its people in order to dismantle all forms of tyranny, including military dictatorship. It transformed into the Mon State Federal Council (MSFC) on 15 January 2023 to become a state-level federal unit. Designated as a state-based Mon federal unit, the first conference of MSFC

was held on 22 January 2023, attended by Mon political forces, Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), civil society organizations, women's organizations, youth groups, and diaspora Mon and Pa-O communities. During the conference, documents related to the three powers stipulated in the MSFC constitutional framework were approved. As a state unit during the resistance period/interim period, MSFC was able to formulate three processes for building a federal democratic union.²⁰

Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC)

Established - 9 April 2023

Council members - 11 members

Executive members - 7 members

Participating groups/organizations - Interim state/federal unit representatives/ committees under the NUCC

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100069442572761>

Formed with the goal of living side by side with other ethnic groups in a just, democratic and fully self-determined federal union, the Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC) brought together elected representatives from the 2020 general election, political parties, EROs, civil society organizations, youth and women's groups, and experts, from the interim period until the establishment of a federal union. Under KSCC's leadership, the Karenni State Police (KSP) was formed on 25 August 2021 with 320 CDM police officers. The Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), which is fighting against the military council's army, is also under the supervision of KSCC and cooperating with the Karenni Army (KA). Through collective leadership, the Interim Executive Council of Karenni State (IEC) was formed on 6 June 2023 to administer an interim state government, to maintain checks and balances

²⁰ Mon State Federal Council's (1st Conference) Statement <http://rb.gy/2vh0d>

among legislative, administrative and judiciary sectors. It ensures state stability and peace, and enables practical cooperation between various forces in the state.²¹

Pa-O National Federal Council (PNFC)

Established - 11 December 2023

Chairman - Khun Myint Tun

Council members - 15 members

Participating groups/organizations - Interim state/federal unit representatives/committees under the NUCC

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/Paonationalfederalcouncilpnfc>

The Pa-O National Federal Council (PNFC) was formed through the Pa-O national federal conference on the 72nd anniversary of armed resistance against feudalism after forming the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO). The PNFC has stated it will work together with the multi-ethnic nationalities to resist various forms of military dictatorship and authoritarianism through various means, protect people from loss of lives and livelihoods, human rights violations, and destruction of land and natural resources. It wants to establish a federal democratic system that allows the emergence of new states guaranteeing national equality and self-determination. Fully taking on the PNFC's political leadership, the currently active Pa-O People's Defense Force (Kham Dom) and (Kham Kaung) have merged and combined military operations under the command of EROs.

21 Introduction of Interim Executive Council of Karenni State (IEC) formation

<http://rb.gy/5amex>

Ta'ang Political Consultative Committee (TPCC)

Established - 18 April 2021

General Secretary - Nai Aung Mai

Participating groups/organizations - Interim state/federal unit representatives/committees under the NUCC

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100072494673782>

The Ta'ang Political Consultative Council (TPCC) was formed in February and March 2021 after meetings between Ta'ang political forces to represent and lead the Ta'ang people politically. The TPCC aims to work together with all allied organizations to end military dictatorship, free the Ta'ang people from oppression, achieve ethnic equality and self-determination, and build a federal democratic union.²² As part of TPCC's process, the Interim Ta'ang Regional People's Administration was formed per CRPH's guidance.

Student Union Representatives Committee (SURC)

Established - 21 April 2021

Member organizations - 210 organizations (initially formed with 171 organizations)

Participating groups/organizations - Special observer groups under the NUCC

Facebook - [https://www.facebook.com / Student Union Representatives Committee](https://www.facebook.com/StudentUnionRepresentativesCommittee)

Based on the charter ratified on 28 December 2021, the SURC has set four basic policies - overthrowing the authoritarian system, promoting federal democracy, federal democratic education, and protecting students' rights.

²² Ta'ang Political Consultative Council's Statement No. 01/2021 <http://rb.gy/1dgt1>

The SURC has set the following aims as it operates as a force during the Spring Revolution period – to unite student unions to thoroughly defeat the authoritarian system, participate in promoting federal democracy with student power, assist in dismantling the fascist education system and building a federal democratic education system, and strive for full realization of students' rights.²³

In the statement released after the 2nd SURC conference on 2 July 2022, it presented 6 points on the future process - expanding coordination between domestic and international revolutionary forces, blocking the military council's planned 2023 election through various means, continuing the CDM educational initiatives, and obtaining specific and fair guarantees.²⁴

Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF)

Established	- 31 May 2021
Chairman	- Khun Be Du
Military strategy	- 6 strategies
Number of battalions	- 22
Participating groups/organizations	- KSCC, IEC

Khun Be Du, chairman of the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), has pledged that the KNDF will cooperate with the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), National Unity Government (NUG), and Central Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) in building the future democratic union, and at the state level with the Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC) for the emergence of a state government, protecting the Karenni

23 Student Unions' Charter Announcement <http://rb.gy/8lm1s>

24 SURC's 2nd Conference Statement <http://rb.gy/asdtl>

people, and carrying out other public services such as education and health for the Karenni people.

Khun Be Du has recognized the military leadership of the Karenni Army (KA) over the two years of Spring Revolution; that there is high mutual understanding between the KA, the KNDF, and other armed groups, which have helped overcome challenges. Additionally, the invaluable military assistance from the three Northern Alliance members – the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA), Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), and United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) – is the reason they have reached so far, politically and militarily. Khun Be Du also said they have gained access to many military trainings and tactics from the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA).²⁵

The KNDF chairman also currently serves as vice-chairman in the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC).

Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team (KPICT)

Established - 11 March 2021

Secretary - Gum San Nsang

Members - 5

Facebook - <https://www.facebook.com/KachinPICT>

The Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team (KPICT) was formed during a meeting of domestic and diaspora Kachin organizations from 9 to 11 March 2021. Based on the prevailing political climate, KPICT announced three

25 KNDF's 2nd anniversary message regarding situation in Karenni State <http://rb.gy/8pnp7>

objectives: "to affirm that national sovereignty is derived from the people; to end authoritarianism and to promulgate a genuine Federal Union; and to partner with domestic and international organizations that share our political goals."

The KPICT and NUG have started implementing the Treasury bonds program following the financial, administrative and banking systems of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). However, in July 2022, KPICT withdrew as a permanent member of NUCC, citing reasons such as there being some ambiguities in the interpretation of the Federal Democracy Charter, and the need to consult further with the Kachin people.

KPICT Secretary Gum San Nsang said, while some KPICT representatives continue to participate in the NUG, they are ready to rejoin NUCC when the time is right.

An aerial photograph of a coastline, showing a dark blue sea on the left and a wide, white sandy beach on the right. The water's edge is irregular, with small inlets and peninsulas. The overall scene is bright and clear.

The Role of the Vanguard of the Spring Revolution or the NUCC

The Role of the Vanguard of the Spring Revolution or the NUCC

Some people believe that the Spring Revolution knows only two ways - the 'good way' and the 'bad way'. Some see dialogue with the military council as the only solution. Others believe that it is necessary to purge the military regime in order to build a future federal democracy, based on their experiences of observing the behaviour and mindsets of the previous military dictators who ruled the country.

The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) was established with the goal of ending all forms of dictatorship and building a federal democratic union. The NUCC can thus be called the vanguard of the Spring Revolution.

What is the NUCC?

The NUCC was established on 8 March 2021, with 56 representatives from 28 organizations. On 16 November 2021, the council announced that its membership includes five groups: the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), which received de jure legitimacy in the 2020 parliamentary elections; ethnic resistance organizations (EROs), which operate government mechanisms in self-controlled areas with public support; state or federal units; political parties; consultative councils, youth and women's organizations against the dictatorship, trade unions, civil society organizations, participants in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), strike committees, and Spring Revolution forces based on ethnicity and coming from different social strata. Following the first People's Assembly, held from 27-29 January 2022, eight resolutions were adopted, including the establishment of the NUCC with 33

Five groups	Total	Organization names
Elected Members of Parliament (MPs)	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw – CRPH • Delegate of MPs of the 1990 general election
Political parties	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratic Party for a New Society - DPNS
Unions, civil society organizations, including women, youth and minority organizations; CDM participants, including civil servants participating in anti-authoritarianism; public strike movement groups	16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-junta Forces Coordination Committee – AFCC (Mandalay) • Significant activities • Myanmar Labour Alliance - LA • General Strike Coordination Body - GSCB • General Strike Committee of Basic and Higher Education - GSCBHE • General Strike Committee - GSC • General Strike Collaboration Committee - GSCC • General Strike Committee of Nationalities - GSCN • 88 Generation Peace and Open Society - 88 • Myanmar Teachers Federation - MTF • Technological Teachers' Federation - TTF • Women's League of Burma - WLB • Monywa People's Strike Steering Committee • Synergy Social Harmony Organization • Women Peace Network - WPN • Women Advocacy Coalition - WAC-M
Ethnic resistance organizations (EROs)	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Karenni National Progressive Party - KNPP • Karen National Union - KNU • All Burma Students' Democratic Front – ABSDF
Interim State/Federal Unit Representative Groups/Committees	5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interim Chin National Consultative Council - ICNCC • Mon State Interim Coordination Committee - MSICC • Karenni State Consultative Council-KSCC • Pao National Federal Council - PNFC • Ta'ang Political Consultative Committee – TPCC
Special Observer Groups	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Student Union Representatives Committee - SURC

member organizations, Parts one and two of the Federal Democracy Charter for interim constitutional measures, the commitment to put the Federal Democracy Charter into practice, and the reconfirmation of the National Unity Government (NUG) established by the NUCC in the motion of the CRPH on 16 April 2021.

A statement was released by the NUCC on 30 January 2022, after the first People's Assembly, which was attended by 388 people from various NUCC groups, including international guests and observers. The statement said that the People's Assembly condemned the arbitrary arrest, torture, and killing of innocent people throughout the country by the military council. It alleged that the military council has committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, and would seek action against the regime at the International Criminal Court (ICC) through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

What is the NUCC doing?

Under Part two of the Federal Democracy Charter, the NUCC has formed nine coordination committees in various areas, including foreign affairs, education, health, gender affairs, CDM affairs, and federal affairs. The council is also implementing step by step the 12 points of the implementation process (or political roadmap) set out in Part 1 of the Federal Democracy Charter.

No.	Implementation process or political road map: 12 points	Nine Coordination Committees
1.	Advocating, encouraging and supporting to continuously carry out public general strike activities, including CDM, in order to end the military dictatorship and establish a federal democratic union.	Coordination committee for strategic planning to end all dictatorship, including military dictatorship, and build a federal democratic union
2.	Forming parliamentary representative committees with elected members of parliament and working together according to sector.	Foreign affairs coordination committee

3. Develop an environment in which civil society organizations, including youth, women, and minority organizations, partner parties, EROs, and trade unions can work together to negotiate and adopt policy agreements and implement future processes.	Coordination committee for preparations for the creation of a federal democratic union
4. Drafting and ratification of the federal democracy charter.	Coordination committee for gender policy
5. Establishment of legislative and judicial institutions, and Interim National Unity Government in accordance with the charter.	Coordination committee for healthcare
6. Convening a People's Assembly that includes all forces with a common goal for the permanent end of authoritarianism and the establishment of a federal democratic union.	Coordination committee for federal democratic education
7. Implementation of a strategy for building a federal democratic union, eradication of authoritarianism, abolition of the 2008 Constitution.	Committee for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
8. Drafting a transitional constitution.	Coordination committee for CDM
9. Formation of transitional government.	Coordination committee for transitional justice
10. Convening the Constitutional Assembly and drafting and approving the constitution of the federal democratic union.	
11. Holding a referendum on the federal democratic constitution drafted and approved by the Constitutional Assembly and holding elections.	
12. Establishment of administrative, executive, and judicial branches under the constitution and exercising in accordance with constitutionalism.	

The NUCC established the transitional draft constitution working group on 11 July 2022, for the 8th phase of the political roadmap. On 26 August 2022, it was announced that the working group consisted of 24 relevant members, including members of the NUCC, representatives of member organizations, representatives of the NUG, the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, and the Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team (KPICT).

On 25 August 2022, the NUCC reportedly discussed overthrowing the dictatorship, repealing the 2008 Constitution, and adopting a draft federal strategy for building a democratic union. The draft was prepared by the coordinating committee for the strategic planning of federal democratic union building (Joint Coordination Committee- JCC Strategy) to end all authoritarian regimes, including military dictatorship. The JCC Strategy is the 7th phase of the political roadmap and was established on 22 October 2021.



Findings

The NUCC - originally organized since March 2021 - was not able to officially announce its formation and activity until 16 November 2021, eight months after its creation. Thus, it is clear that the council has a weakness in

the area of press releases. It is even more evident that the NUCC social media page was not set up until 14 June 2022, and its official website (nucc-federal.org) did not go online until 22 July 2022. It can be seen that the NUCC needs to strengthen its information and mass communication activities.

After the first People's Assembly, the NUCC began to focus more on monitoring the activities of the military regime and publishing its viewpoints during the Spring Revolution.

On 6 May 2022, the NUCC issued a statement calling the "peace dialogues" hosted by the military council chairman himself a "sham peace invitation". "The invitation of military dictator Min Aung Hlaing to personally meet and discuss with the leaders of the ethnic resistance organizations is only an invitation under the false pretext of peace talks, as it faces difficulties from all sides, including political and military, into crisis and is an attempt to temporarily resolve diplomatic and economic difficulties," said the statement.

The NUCC has said that the military regime's sham peace invitation with its intention to reinstate the 2008 Constitution is invalid, and has called on all resistance forces in the country to continue to stand with the people and do their part to put an end to all tyranny, including military dictatorship.

On 12 February 2022, the 75th anniversary of the signing of the Panglong Agreement, the NUCC issued a seven-point statement saying that "successive governments have violated the obligations of the Panglong Agreement and that the NUCC deeply apologizes to all ethnic nationalities for the brutal discrimination and oppression throughout history.". It also said that the NUCC is determined to make unremitting efforts until a genuine federal democratic union can be built by bringing about the implementation of the promises and the end of chauvinism.

The consultative body has also strongly condemned the execution of political prisoners in Insein Prison and the bombing of the school in Let Yet Kone village, Sagaing Region, by the military regime.

These findings are based only on official NUCC press releases, and other developments and declines in the NUCC could not yet be researched. The 33 organizations from the five groups named in the statement released after the first People's Assembly have not yet been named in the NUCC's official press release channel.

The NUCC's statement on October 3 that the second People's Assembly, scheduled for July 2022, could not be convened within the specified time also said that the second People's Assembly would be held only after preparations were made to strengthen the revolution, without giving a specific date.

Review

The 1 February 2021 military coup has shrouded Myanmar's future in darkness as the country struggles to emerge from this troubling situation that has deteriorated in all aspects. Nevertheless, the counter-movements of all ethnic groups from different social strata, both in urban and rural areas, have brought out the light of the new future Myanmar. Youth-led activities against the dictatorship continues to thrive in various ways.

The path of the Spring Revolution aims to create a federal democratic union that distinguishes right from wrong, justice from injustice, and moves toward the overthrow of the military dictatorship. To achieve this, the NUCC must stand firm as the vanguard of the Spring Revolution; it must not be weak. It should be noted that it is especially important for all member organizations of the NUCC to put aside their personal interests and pride, in order to achieve genuine cooperation, strong ties, and organisational strength.


All groups following the same path have begun to work together with the NUCC to end all forms of authoritarianism, including military dictatorship, and to build a federal democratic union. It is advisable to join hands firmly until the end of the journey so as not to be left behind midway.

An aerial photograph of a coastline, showing dark blue water on the left and right edges, and a wide, white sandy beach in the center. The text is centered on the white sand area.

**Battle situations
throughout Myanmar**

Battle situations throughout Myanmar

According to the record by the BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor, 1,637 days of clashes were recorded across Myanmar from April 2022 to March 2023. It is found that the number of clash days increased by 58 percent (695 days) compared to the same period last year. The number of battles may be higher than that as the clashes in townships are recorded by day.



Taking a look at the month-by-month battle situations from April 2022 to March 2023, November 2022 topped the list of battles, followed by September 2022. March 2023 was recorded as the month with the third most battles.

The total days of clashes from April 2022 to March 2023.



Having a look at the battles in the three-month period which saw the most battle, 341 days of clashes were recorded between the military council forces and the People's Defense Forces/Local Defense Forces (PDFs/LDFs), 176 days between the military council forces and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), five days between the EROs, three days between the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) and the Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), one day between the RCSS/SSA and the Pa-O National Liberation Organization/Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLO/PNLA) and one day between the Shan-ni Nationalities Army (SNA) and the Kachin Independence Organization/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA).

It can be said that the forces of Spring Revolution, which are marching with the goal of rooting out the military dictatorship and building up the federal democratic union, could promote cooperation and partnership. The step-by-step connection and command between the PDFs/LDFs, EROs and the National Unity Government (NUG) are found to be more articulated.

Taking a look at the battle situations across the country from April 2022 to March 2023, compared to the same period in the past, all the mountainous and plain areas saw more and more fighting. In particular, we notice that clashes have spread even to the Nay Pyi Taw Council area where the junta is headquartered.

Comparison of battles in respective areas during two years.




Sagaing Region is a resistance stronghold. The number of clashes increased by more than double (447 days) compared to the same period last year. It is found that there has been a widespread increase in fighting across the mountainous and plain areas ranging from Magway, Karen (Kayin), Karenni (Kayah), Chin, Tanintharyi, Mon, Arakan (Rakhine) and Shan (south), Mandalay to Bago (east).

In addition, the significant fact is fighting resumed between the ULA/AA and the military council, which made a ceasefire a few months before the 2021 military coup. The number of clashes declined in Kachin State and Shan State (north) compared to the same period last year.

Kachin and northern Shan States is where the Kachin Independence Organisation/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), the Palaung State


Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) and the military council operates. Thanks to the Chinese government's intervention, fighting may decrease. It can also be viewed as the fact that even those EROs themselves open new military fronts and deploy troops through the connection, control and command of the forces of Spring Revolution.



According to the record by the BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor, fighting between the military council troops and the PDFs/LDFs accounts for more than 70 percent of the total number of clash days (1,158 days) from April 2022 to March 2023. It is crystal-clear that the intensification of civil war throughout Myanmar is the result of the coup attempt by the Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.

During one year, there were 197 days of clashes between the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) and the military council forces, 111 days between the KIO/KIA and the military council forces, 90 days between the ULA/AA and the military council forces and 25 days between the Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) and the military council forces.

The total days of clashes during six months from January to June, 2023.



Taking a look at battle situations from January to June 2023, there were 768 days of clashes. March 2023 was on record as the month with the most fighting.

In addition, each month of 2023 has seen more than 100 days of clashes due to the impact of “One-year Project” for 2023 which is initiated by leaders of EROs and the forces of Spring Revolution, including the NUG and the activities of the Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) formed by the NUG’s Defense Ministry and its ally—four EROs in September 2021.


In his state-of-the-union address delivered on 1 January 2023, NUG’s Acting President Duwa Lashi La said: “In 2022, the National Unity Government was able to build more trust and practical cooperation with the EROs and establish connections with all the EROs and military and political cooperation with important organizations. At the same time, in addition to strategic cooperation with the EROs, it was able to make stronger connections with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) from home and abroad and enfeeble the military council on all fronts.

As the resistance war of the Spring Revolution could expand at the fastest pace, the affairs of the IDPs should be taken into account in advance. The resistance forces need to be aware of the military council's airstrikes, indiscriminate shootings and shelling and the burning of houses and buildings and to find ways to prevent it.

According to the daily monitoring records, observations and findings by our BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor, the military cooperation between the forces of the Spring Revolution has been significantly strengthened in 2023.

The resistance forces are making armed resistance against the military council by opening new military fronts across the country. Therefore, it is considered that the momentum of the resistance war against the junta will continue to intensify.


2020 April - 2021 March



0 - 0
 0 - 10
 10 - 20
 20 - 30
 30 - 41

State and Region	Number Of Clash Days
Shan	41
Arakan	38
Kachin	10
Karen	7
Chin	4
Mandalay	3
Bago	2
Karenni	1
Sagaing	1


2021 April - 2022 March



0 - 0
 0 - 50
 50 - 100
 100 - 150
 150 - 206

State and Region	Number Of Clash Days
Sagaing	206
Shan	154
Kachin	120
Chin	103
Kayin	83
Magway	71
Kayah	66
Mon	43
Mandalay	28
Tanintharyi	27
Yangon	19
Bago	11
Nay Pyi Taw	4
Rakhine	4
Ayeyarwady	3

2022 April - 2023 March



0 - 0
 0 - 150
 150 - 300
 300 - 450

State and Region	Number Of Clash Days
Sagaing	447
Magway	170
Shan	145
Kayin	141
Kayah	132
Chin	116
Tanintharyi	106
Mon	87
Kachin	80
Bago	79
Rakhine	72
Mandalay	47
Yangon	11
Ayeyarwady	4

Clashes by actor from April 2020 - March 2021, April 2021 - March 2022, April 2022 - March 2023

Actor 1	Actor 2	2020 Apr - 2021 Mar	2021 Apr - 2022 Mar	2022 Apr - 2023 Mar
MA	ABSDF			3
MA	ARSA	1	2	
MA	CNF		1	1
MA	DKBA	1	4	
MA	Kaw Thoo Lei Army			5
MA	KIO/KIA	23	140	111
MA	KNPP	1	8	25
MA	KNU	7	103	197
MA	MNDAA	1	47	17
MA	NA-B		4	1
MA	PDF		577	1158
MA	RCSS/SSA	10	4	
MA	SNA	1	6	1
MA	SSPP/SSA			8
MA	TNLA	9	10	10
MA	ULA/AA	41	5	90
KNU	Kaw Thoo Lei Army			2
KNU/KNLA (PC)	NMSP	1		
RCSS/SSA	TNLA	7	4	
RCSS/SSA	SSPP/SSA	4	23	4
RCSS/SSA	NA-B		2	
RCSS/SSA	UWSA			1
RCSS/SSA	PNLO			1
SNA	KIO/KIA			1
SNA	PDF			1
ZRO/ZRA	CNF		1	
ZRO/ZRA	PDF		1	
Total		107	942	1637

An aerial photograph of a coastline, showing a dark blue sea on the left and a wide, white sandy beach on the right. The text is centered in the white area.

The situation of IDPs



The situation of IDPs

The number of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) is increasing day by day due to the military council's ground and aerial operations, arsons, arrests, killings, tortures and the use of civilians as human shields.

According to a UNOCHA report released on 21 March, the number of displaced people has increased by more than 1.4 million across the country since the military coup. The total number of IDPs has reached 1.7 million when over 300,000 existing IDPs are added. The number of IDPs has increased in conflict-affected Kachin State, Karenni State, Shan State and eastern Bago Region. ²⁶

According to the Myanmar Peace Monitor report, the number of the IDPs has increased by one million from April 2022 to March 2023, with over 500,000 reported in Sagaing Region, over 140,000 each in Magway and Bago Regions, over 220,000 each in Karenni and Karen States and over 40,000 each in Mon State and Tanintharyi Region.

²⁶ https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/nationwide-refugee-increased-within-fort-night-03222023073118.html




Difficulties faced by the IDPs (from April, 2022 to March, 2023)

The IDPs are taking shelter in monasteries, plantations and forests due to the military council's arson of civilian properties and oil and gas pipelines. This includes the killing of domestic animals. It also includes ground and

aerial operations in resistance areas across the country. In addition to the basic necessities such as food, water and medicine, the IDPs also are in need of houses, shelters, and clothing.

They face a shortage of food and drinking water. As a consequence, the IDPs are suffering from diarrhea, skin disease, malnutrition and malaria. Some IDPs die while fleeing the war.²⁷ Most snakebite victims are IDPs living in snake-infested areas of Sagaing Region. Three out of the total 38 IDPs, who were bitten by snakes, died due to a lack of antivenom. Due to transportation bans and the lack of timely access to medicines, the number of snakebite deaths has increased.²⁸ Unlike the people in the border areas such as Karen State, Arakan State, Chin State and Karenni State, the refugees in landlocked central Myanmar have nowhere to go to escape. The IDPs in



27 https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/sagaing-kayah-refugee-children-health-problem-03242023060957.html

28 <https://www.rfa.org/burmese/news/snakes-bites-kanbalu-11232022051430.html>

central Myanmar are hit hard by airstrikes as there are no forests and ravines to hide in. On the other hand, those who go to neighboring countries to seek refuge also face various crises. Myanmar refugees fleeing to Thailand and India are not recognized by the authorities. They face expulsion, detentions and restrictions.²⁹

In January 2023, the Indian authorities arrested over 80 Myanmar refugees taking shelter in Manipur. The total number of Myanmar detainees reached about 300 over the last two years. They were threatened with refoulement, and there was no organization to help them.³⁰

Domestic and international aid

Due to the above-mentioned conditions, it is impossible for refugees to work and earn their living. It can also be seen that the number of displaced people is increasing day-by-day and domestic aid is decreasing due to longer dependence on donations.³¹ The IDPs in Sagaing and Magway Regions in central Myanmar do not receive international aid and have to receive assistance from citizens and nearby villagers. Later, due to the raids on nearby villages, even these villagers were displaced from their homes. The number of helpless IDPs has increased. The IDPs received donations through the online banking system until the phone and internet lines were shut down. Due to the military council's internet shutdowns, donations are no longer an option.

Therefore, there is an urgent need for local and international organizations to get the necessary support to these regions. It is seen that the IDPs in the rest of the regions and states receive some aid from international organizations. However, aid does not reach those who really need it. In Karenni State where

29 <https://tinyurl.com/2ews6k9h/>

30 <https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/13869/>

31 <https://www.bbc.com/burmese/burma-61058460>


there are hundreds of thousands of refugees, under the arrangement of ASEAN and the UN, the support of the World Food Programme came through the military council in 2022. However, the aid only reaches the areas close to the city and does not reach the local people who really need it and the IDP camps.³² U Banya of the Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC) also noted that such support is cover only 10 percent of the refugees.³³

The IDPs have not been able to get news from the towns and villages as the military council has cut off phone and internet lines in conflict-affected areas. It is not easy for them to report their difficulties to donors and receive cash assistance. In addition to this, aid cannot reach the IDPs when they need it due to the military council's arrests and killings of those who help them, the destruction of relief materials and restrictions on the transportation of rice and fuel.

To sum up, the number of IDPs has increased daily after the coup. The fact that international aid has not reached those who need it most has become a crisis for the survival of the displaced people. Therefore, domestic and foreign aid organizations need to consider and find solutions using all methods in order that aid can reach the IDPs who really need it. It needs to provide more cross-border aid in coordination with neighbouring governments for the IDPs and refugees at the border. There is an urgent need to work together with organizations that have territorial control to help the IDPs.

32 <https://www.bbc.com/burmese/burma-61775666>

33 <https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/11518/>


An aerial photograph of a coastline, showing the dark blue ocean on the left and the white sandy beach on the right. The text is centered in the white area.

**The record of military
council's airstrikes during
the military coup**

The record of military council's airstrikes during the military coup

From 1 February 2021 till 30 June 2023, the military council carried out airstrikes for 471 days in the townships across the country.³⁴ According to the daily news coverage, the number of airstrikes may be higher than that as three to more than 10 airstrikes are recorded in a single day.

Military council's airstrikes by year since the coup




According to media coverage, the number of airstrikes may be higher than the 3-10 airstrikes carried out in one single day.

According to the record by the BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor, the number of airstrikes in the first six months of 2023 are higher than the combined figures in 2021 and 2022. April 2023 was recorded as the month with the most airstrikes.

³⁴ Military Regime's Airstrikes in Myanmar (1 Feb 2021 – 30 Jun 2023) <http://rb.gy/rqs2r>

Military council's airstrikes from 1 February 2021 to June 2023 since the coup




Taking a look at the military council's airstrikes in townships up to the end of June 2023, the it conducted airstrikes in 68 townships across the country. Demoso Township in Karenni (Kayah) state topped the list of airstrikes, with 23 days. The townships which saw more than 10 days of airstrikes by the military council are: Kawkareik, Myawaddy, Kyarinseikgyi Townships in Karen State, Thantlang Township in Chin State and Pekon Township in southern Shan State.³⁵

Up to 93 townships experienced the military council's aerial bombardments since the military coup. Myawaddy Township in Karen State topped the list of aerial bombardments with 42 days. The townships which experienced up to 20 days of airstrikes are: Demoso Township in Karenni (Kayah) state, along with Hpapun and Kawkareik Townships in Karen State.³⁶

35 Military Regime's Airstrikes in Myanmar (1 Feb 2021 – 30 Jun 2023) <http://rb.gy/rqs2r>

36 Military Regime's Airstrikes in Myanmar (1 Feb 2021 – 30 Jun 2023) <http://rb.gy/rqs2r>

Military council's airstrikes from 1 February 2021 to June 2023 since the coup




Taking a look at the military council's aerial bombardments in regions and states, Sagaing Region stood first on the list of airstrikes, with 123 days, followed by Karen State with 108 days, Karenni (Kayah) state, with 54 days, Kachin State with 47 days and Chin State with 39 days. During the military coup, only Yangon Region and Ayeyarwady Region remain as the regions that have not experienced the military council's airstrikes.

As a result of the coup attempt, the military council forces are faced with the opening of military fronts by resistance forces across the country. Air offensives of the military council are found in the mountainous and plain areas where the resistance war is fierce. Especially, it can be said that Sagaing Region, Karen State, Karenni (Kayah) State and Chin State, where the resistance war was fierce, experienced more airstrikes by the military council.

The chart shows the correlation between airstrikes and the deaths of military council soldiers.

Military casualties related to airstrikes




According to the findings by our BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor, it is surprising to see that the deaths of military council soldiers, camp capturing and airstrikes during the Spring Revolution are correlated. It is found that during the resistance war of the Spring Revolution forces whose aim is to root out the military dictatorship, the more the military council soldiers die, the more the ability to dominate the territory declines, the more the military council conducts air offensive attacks. The above-mentioned chart shows the comparison of airstrike days and junta soldier deaths. It does not account for all the deaths of military council soldiers across the country.

The military council's deadly aerial bombardments such as the aerial bombardment in Pazigy village, Kanbalu Township of Sagaing Region, where hundreds of civilians lost their lives and aerial bombardment in ANang Pa village in Hpakant Township of Kachin State, are not related to the deaths of military council soldiers. There are also deliberate targeted attacks on the civilians.

The military council's airstrikes have threatened the lives of children and helpless Internally Displaced People (IDPs) from a school in Letyetkone

Military council's airstrikes and targeted attacks by year since the coup



village, Depayin Township of Sagaing Region and an IDP camp in Karenni (Kayah) State.³⁷

Taking a look at the aerial bombardments and targeted attacks during six months of 2023, the PDFs/LDFs experienced the most targeted attack and civilians, the second most targeted attack. Among the EROs, the KNU/KNLA faced the most targeted airstrikes by the military council.

In 2022, the military council's airstrikes mainly targeted the civilians. PDFs/LDFs became the second target. Among the EROs, the KNU/KNLA was faced with the most targeted airstrikes by the military council.


Taking a look at the military council's targeted airstrikes up to 30 June 2023, the military council targeted the civilians the most and the People's Defense Forces/Local Defense Forces (PDFs/LDFs), the second most.

However, the military council conducted targeted airstrikes on all the EROs which are extending a helping hand to and engaging in the Spring Revolution for 177 days. This is higher than the days of targeted airstrikes on the civilians.

Of these EROs, the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) experienced 84 days of airstrikes, Kachin Independence

³⁷ What Lies Behind Increased Airstrikes, WNR Issue 105, <http://rb.gy/k383j>

Military council's targeted airstrikes since the coup



Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA) for 45 days, Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA) and United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) for 13 days each and Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) for eight days.


With the intensification of the resistance war of the Spring Revolution, it is reviewed that the military council may step up aerial bombardments. It can be said that the military council carried out more targeted airstrikes on unarmed civilians rather than resistance forces.


Even though the Spring Revolution forces, which are marching with the support of the public, are still unable to protect themselves from the military council's airstrikes. They should cautiously prepare to avoid intensified targeted airstrikes by the military council. International governments including the United Nations should make efforts to stop the military council's aerial bombardments.

Record of military council's airstrikes from 1 February 2021 to March 2023 following the coup

Year_Month	Actor	Days of Airstrike	Year_Month	Actor	Days of Airstrike
2021-Mar	KIO/KIA	2	2022-Aug	PDF	2
2021-Mar	Local Community	4	2022-Aug	ULA/AA	1
2021-Apr	KIO/KIA	4	2022-Sep	KIO/KIA	2
2021-Apr	Local Community	1	2022-Sep	KNU	1
2021-May	KIO/KIA	9	2022-Sep	Local Community	7
2021-May	KNU	4	2022-Sep	PDF	2
2021-Jun	ULA/AA	1	2022-Sep	ULA/AA	5
2021-Jul	PDF	4	2022-Oct	Local Community	8
2021-Sep	PDF	1	2022-Oct	PDF	5
2021-Oct	KIO/KIA	1	2022-Oct	ULA/AA	2
2021-Oct	PDF	2	2022-Nov	CDF	6
2021-Nov	KIO/KIA	1	2022-Nov	KIO/KIA	1
2021-Nov	Local Community	2	2022-Nov	KNU	11
2021-Nov	PDF	1	2022-Nov	Local Community	9
2021-Dec	KNU	3	2022-Nov	PDF	5
2021-Dec	Local Community	4	2022-Nov	ULA/AA	3
2021-Dec	MNDAA	1	2022-Dec	KIO/KIA	4
2021-Dec	PDF	1	2022-Dec	KNU	4
2022-Jan	DKBA	1	2022-Dec	Local Community	3
2022-Jan	KNPP	1	2022-Dec	MNDAA	1
2022-Jan	KNU	1	2022-Dec	PDF	2
2022-Jan	Local Community	16	2023-Jan	ABSDF	2
2022-Jan	PDF	3	2023-Jan	CNF	2
2022-Feb	KIO/KIA	3	2023-Jan	DKBA	1
2022-Feb	KNU	2	2023-Jan	KIO/KIA	1
2022-Feb	Local Community	11	2023-Jan	KNDF	2
2022-Feb	NA-B	1	2023-Jan	KNU	12
2022-Feb	PDF	5	2023-Jan	Local Community	7
2022-Mar	KNU	3	2023-Jan	PDF	2
2022-Mar	Local Community	6	2023-Feb	CDF	1
2022-Apr	KNU	2	2023-Feb	CNF	3
2022-Apr	Local Community	7	2023-Feb	KIO/KIA	2
2022-Apr	PDF	2	2023-Feb	KNDF	1
2022-May	KNU	1	2023-Feb	KNPP	1
2022-May	Local Community	3	2023-Feb	KNU	9
2022-May	PDF	6	2023-Feb	Local Community	6
2022-Jun	KNU	4	2023-Feb	PDF	7
2022-Jun	PDF	1	2023-Feb	TNLA	2
2022-Jul	KIO/KIA	2	2023-Mar	CDF	1
2022-Jul	Local Community	6	2023-Mar	KIO/KIA	4
2022-Jul	PDF	2	2023-Mar	KNPP	4
2022-Jul	ULA/AA	1	2023-Mar	KNU	2
2022-Aug	KIO/KIA	2	2023-Mar	Local Community	8
2022-Aug	KNU	6	2023-Mar	PDF	17
2022-Aug	Local Community	5			

Map of military council's airstrikes from 1 February 2021 to March 2023 following the coup



An aerial photograph of a snowy mountain slope. The snow is bright white, and the sky is a clear, pale blue. The terrain is rugged, with shadows cast by the snowdrifts and ridges. The text is centered in the lower half of the image.

**The situations of meetings
and talks which took place from
April 2022 to March 2023**

The situations of meetings and talks which took place from April 2022 to March 2023

This is an excerpt from the BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor's dataset about meetings and peace talks between Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) and between the military council and the EROs. It was found that there were clashes between the military council and the revolutionary forces, including some EROs, from April 2022 to March 2023.³⁸

The military council forces carried out violent attacks not only on the EROs and revolutionary forces but also on the civilians through aerial and ground operations, destroying civilian houses and food rations.³⁹

However, on the other hand, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing invited some EROs to the peace talk, uttering the word "peace". The EROs he invited included the signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and some non-NCA signatories. It is found that some armed groups were met at least three times.⁴⁰

Of the EROs which were invited to the junta-sponsored peace talk, the Pa-O National Liberation Of the EROs which were invited to the junta-sponsored peace talk, the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO), Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council

38 There were 341 battles in 2022, killing 979 military council soldiers and 65

KNDF members, according to the statement by the KNDF. <https://tinyurl.com/2mfx9pcn>

39 The number of displaced children in Myanmar has surpassed half a million in 2022.

<https://tinyurl.com/2ogmsft4>

40 Military council meets members of Northern Alliance including SSPP in Nay Pyi Taw.

<https://tinyurl.com/2mthkexs>

(KNU/KNLA-PC), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA), United Wa State Party (UWSP), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)-Mongla and Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) attended the peace talks.⁴¹

The NCA signatories invited to the peace talks held a special meeting to discuss whether or not they should attend. Although the special meeting was aimed at adopting the same stance by collecting different views and opinions, there were disagreements among the groups. Of the EROs which were invited to the talk, only the PNLO, the DKBA, the KNU/KNLA-PC, the NMSP and the ALP attended the meeting.⁴²

In addition, the military council invited and held talks with non-NCA signatories. The military council provided them with regional development incentives. A meeting between the United Wa State Party (UWSP), a non-NCA signatory, and the military council mainly focused on granting Wa statehood. The military council agreed in principle to grant Wa statehood.⁴³

The meetings with other groups mainly focused on peace building, the establishment of a federal union, the continued implementation of the peace path based on the 2008 Constitution, the NCA and regional development.

The Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) held its meeting in the last year.⁴⁴ China's new special envoy to Myanmar Mr. Deng Xijun met seven EAOs based in northern Myanmar, in Yunnan Province of China. However, most of these meetings were found to be related to the military council's invitation to peace talks and the military council-sponsored elections.⁴⁵

41 Delegates from Wa, Mongla and SSPP meet junta leader, both sides discuss non-secession. <https://tinyurl.com/226zqxyl>

42 Disagreement occurs within the PPST regarding the meeting with the terrorist junta leader, only five groups will attend the meeting. <https://tinyurl.com/29jor4up>

43 Military council has agreed in principle to grant Wa statehood, UWSP liaison officer says. <https://tinyurl.com/28joqqym>

44 FPNCC members meet in Wa. <https://tinyurl.com/2qhgg4n8>

45 Political observers say that the meeting between seven northern EAO groups and the Chinese envoy aims to ask their attitudes towards the election.

Although there were peace meetings between the EROs and the military council, ground battles between the military council and some EROs which attended the meetings continued.

On 21 January 2023, the military council's aerial bombardment on No.2 military strategy headquarters of the DKBA based in Kyeinchaung (Layloephalo) village in Kyarinseikgyi Township in Karen State, burned down houses and some office buildings of the DKBA and destroyed the free community clinic and the village church.⁴⁶

On 17 September 2022, fighting took place between the SSPP/SSA and the military council as the it launched an offensive against Hwaykham ridge in Wanohn village-tract in Moemake Township in northern Shan State, where the SSPP/SSA is stationed.⁴⁷

The NUG and the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) officially held an online meeting over one year after the coup. They discussed the situation on-the-ground and exchanged views.⁴⁸

Although there were no other meetings between the NUG and EROs, it was found that there was cooperation between them.

The NUG's Defense Ministry formed the Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) in September 2021, in cooperation with four EROs. The C3C is composed of the chairs and military chiefs of the member organizations, who are tasked with making political and military decisions. The NUG's Defense Minister, Deputy Minister, Home Affairs Minister and Immigration and Population Minister are also included in the C3C, representing the NUG.⁴⁹

46 Military council bombards headquarters of Major A One of DKBA which has signed the NCA. <https://tinyurl.com/2nxqxfoz>

47 Fighting between SSPP and military council in Moemake Township results in casualties. <https://tinyurl.com/2e296p3f>

48 NUG government and AA leaders discuss for the first time. <https://tinyurl.com/2cuxhjp3>

49 "All the roads----to Nay Pyi Taw" (or) A study of southern military regional command. <http://rb.gy/8076v>

Dialogue situation table

Date	Subject	Location	Excerpt
6-5-2022	PPST's invitation to NCA signatories to a special meeting. ⁵⁰	Online	PPST said there had been discussions among the NCA signatories to attend the peace talks invited by the military coup leader, but due to disagreements, only five groups will travel to Nay Pyi Taw for the talks. Those which will attend the meeting include PNLO, DKBA, KNU/KNLA-PC, NMSP, and ALP.
20-5-2022	Meeting between RCSS/SSA leader General Yawd Serk and military council leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. ⁵¹	Nay Pyi Taw	The meeting covered discussions implementing peace at all costs, building mutual trust, and building a federal union by bringing together all ethnic peoples. The RCSS/SSA was the first EAO to attend the military council-sponsored peace dialogue.
16-5-2022	Meeting between NUG and ULA/AA after more than one year since the coup. ⁵²	Online	Senior NUG and ULA/AA leaders attended the meeting. ULA/AA spokesman U Khaing Thukha said the two sides exchanged views on the ongoing situation.
16-6-2022	Meeting between delegates led by PNLO Vice-chair Khun Tun Tin and military council leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. ⁵³	Nay Pyi Taw	The meeting covered general discussions about building a federal democratic union and regional development. No mutual discussion on the ongoing political crisis.
1-6-2022	Meeting between UWSP and military council's peace negotiation team. ⁵⁴	Nay Pyi Taw	The two sides discussed building a federal democratic union and official designation as Wa State. The military council agreed to the designation as Wa State in principle.

50 Disagreement among PPST members; only 5 groups will attend

<https://tinyurl.com/29jor4up>

51 Military council discusses building federal democratic union with RCSS

<https://tinyurl.com/y3n3wu8r>

52 NUG, AA leaders meet for first time <https://tinyurl.com/2cuxhjp3>

53 Military council leader meets PNLO <https://tinyurl.com/25bkvdk6>

54 UWSA information official says military council agrees to recognize Wa State status in principle <https://tinyurl.com/28jqqqym>

19-6-2022	Meeting between DKBA and military council leader. ⁵⁵	Nay Taw	Pyi	Military council and DKBA officials discussed the multi-party democratic system and other federal issues.
22-8-2022	Meeting between three NCA-S EAOs and military council leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. ⁵⁶	Nay Taw	Pyi	PNLO Chair Khun Thu Rein, LDU Chairman Kyar Salmon, ALP Vice-Chairman Daw Saw Mra Raza Lin attended the meeting, and discussed formulating a practical peace plan to foster nationwide peace and development. It was the second meeting between the three parties and the coup maker. The first meeting took place in May 2022.
19-9-2022	Meeting between UWSA and AA in Wa-administered Panghsang. ⁵⁷	Panghsang		Arakan Army (AA) deputy military chief Brigadier General Dr. Nyo Twan Aung said the meeting produced good results. The AA is trying to gradually improve itself and the meeting will be very beneficial for the future, he added.
26-9-2022	Second meeting between military council leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and UWSP, NDAA, and SSPP. ⁵⁸	Nay Taw	Pyi	The meeting covered discussions on conditions of the three EAOs maintaining non-disintegration of the Union, national solidarity, and perpetuation of national sovereignty through non-secession; peaceful resolution of differences of opinion without resorting to armed fighting, regional stability and development, building a union based on democracy and federalism. The first meetings with UWSP took place on 30 May 2022, with NDAA on 4 June 2022, with SSPP on 4 August 2022.

55 DKBA said to always join hands with Myanmar military <https://tinyurl.com/2ydkoqsq>

56 Three EAOs meet with junta leader; explains appearance of white elephant as good omen <https://tinyurl.com/2aqwg4a8>

57 AA deputy chief says meeting with UWSA produced good results <https://tinyurl.com/2oe39qfj>

58 Wa, Mongla, SSPP delegates meet with junta leader; discusses non-secession <https://tinyurl.com/226zqxyl>

16-9-2022	Meeting of FPNCC member EAOs in an undisclosed location in Wa region. ⁵⁹	Wa region	The meeting was organized as a preliminary negotiation prior to the military leader's participation in the peace talks. FPNCC members – UWSA, MNDAA, NDAA, TNLA, SSPP/SSA, and AA attended the meeting.
11-10-2022	Meeting between NMSP delegates and military council leader. ⁶⁰	Nay Pyi Taw	At the meeting, NMSP said it aims to achieve nationwide peace; it has consistently participated in the path towards achieving peace; it supports resolution of political disagreements only through political means.
27-12-2022	Meeting between five NCA-S EAOs and military council officials. ⁶¹	Nay Pyi Taw	Seven NCA-S EAOs – ALP, PNLO, DKBA, KNU-KNLA-PC, NMSP, and RCSS were invited to the meeting. However, NMSP and RCSS skipped the round. Regarding the gathering, spokesman for the seven armed groups Colonel Saw Kyaw Nyunt explained each participant attended the meeting of their own free will, not representing the seven EAOs.
29-12-2022	Meeting between Chinese special envoy to Myanmar Deng Xijun and seven northern EAOs. ⁶²	Yunnan Province, China	It was reportedly an introductory meeting. Political analysts said the Chinese envoy might have inquired about the opinions of those groups in order to gain a better understanding of the planned election by the military council in Myanmar. UWSA, KIA, NDAA, SSPP, AA, TNLA, and MNDAA attended the meeting.
4-2-2023	Nippon Foundation Chairman Mr. Sasakawa's trip to Mrauk-U of Arakan State and meeting with AA. ⁶³	Mrauk-U, Arakan State	Mr. Sasakawa and AA's political representative engaged in discussions for about 15 minutes, but details of the discussion were not made public.

59 FPNCC members gather in Wa region <https://tinyurl.com/2qhgg4n8>

60 NMSP delegates meet with military council leader <https://tinyurl.com/27grtd95>

61 Five EAOs incl. ALP discuss charter amendment in Nay Pyi Taw <https://tinyurl.com/2hesvr9o>

62 Analysts say meeting between 7 northern EAOs and Chinese envoy likely about opinions on election <https://tinyurl.com/2gu3jrk3>

63 Mr. Sasakawa visits Mrauk-U, meets with AA political representative <https://tinyurl.com/287t3fyn>

29-12-2022	Meeting between Chinese special envoy to Myanmar Deng Xijun and seven northern EAOs. ⁶²	Yunnan Province, China	It was reportedly an introductory meeting. Political analysts said the Chinese envoy might have inquired about the opinions of those groups in order to gain a better understanding of the planned election by the military council in Myanmar. UWSA, KIA, NDAA, SSPP, AA, TNLA, and MNDAA attended the meeting.
4-2-2023	Nippon Foundation Chairman Mr. Sasakawa's trip to Mrauk-U of Arakan State and meeting with AA. ⁶³	Mrauk-U, Arakan State	Mr. Sasakawa and AA's political representative engaged in discussions for about 15 minutes, but details of the discussion were not made public.
16-3-2-23	Meeting of some Northern Alliance in UWSA-administered Panghsang. ⁶⁴	Panghsang	SSPP/SSA spokesman Major Phone Han clarified the meeting was not in representation of FPNCC. Some Northern Alliance members, including SSPP/SSA, participated in the meeting, but their names were not made public. The seven northern EAOs include UWSA, NDAA, AA, TNLA, MNDAA, KIA, and SSPP/SSA.
22-3-2023	Meeting between military council-led NSPNC and SSPP/SSA. ⁶⁵	Nay Pyi Taw	The meeting covered discussions about the planned election by the military council, amendment proposals for the 2008 Constitution by EAOs, and the peace process. It was the third meeting between NSPNC and SSPP/SSA. Among those attending the gathering were UWSA and NDAA. The first and second rounds of meetings between NSPNC and SSPP/SSA took place in September and August 2022.
28-3-2023	Informal meeting between seven NCA-S EAOs and NSPNC in Nay Pyi Taw. ⁶⁶	Nay Pyi Taw	The seven NCA-S EAOs discussed emergence of political dialogue involving all stakeholders; informally discussed such topics as step-by-step process towards achieving peace and basic federal principles.

64 SSPP and Northern Alliance members meet in Panghsang <https://tinyurl.com/2o34s2pc>

65 Northern Alliance members incl. SSPP meet with junta leader in Nay Pyi Taw <https://tinyurl.com/2mthkexs>

66 Seven ceasefire signatories and NSPNC informally meet in Nay Pyi Taw <https://tinyurl.com/2olhkjaj>

Overview of EAOs

All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)

Arakan Liberation Party / Arakan Liberation Army (ALP/ALA)

Arakan National Council/Arakan Army (ANC/AA)

Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA)

Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA)

Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)

Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA)

Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA)

Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army

– Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC) (KPC)

Lahu Democratic Union (LDU)

Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA) - Kokang Army

National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla) -Eastern Shan State (NDAA/ESS)

New Mon State Party (NMSP)

National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K)

Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO)

Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA)

Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA)

Shan State Progressive Party/ Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA)

United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA)

United Wa State Party/United Wa State Army (UWSP/UWSA)

All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)

Established	-	1 November 1988
Headquarters	-	KNU-controlled territories
Active territories	-	KIA- and KNU-controlled territories
Strength	-	More than 1500
Chair	-	Comrade Than Khae
Vice-Chair	-	Comrade Myo Win
General Secretary	-	Comrade Sonny



The ABSDF, which was born out of the democratic uprising in 1988, signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on 15 October 2015, and participated in the peace process. The ABSDF faced a lot of criticism as it attended a ceremony to mark the sixth anniversary of the NCA held by the military council. It issued a statement on 24 October 2021, saying that attending the ceremony was not the central committee's decision.

At around 5 pm on 2 November 2021, the military council soldiers and police members arrived at the liaison office of the ABSDF in Myawaddy and then arrested four people, including leaders Aung Baw and Tin Soe. Regarding the military council's invitation for peace, the ABSDF chair has said that peace cannot be achieved through dialogue with the ethnic armed resistance organizations. The ABSDF's name is included in the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), which is working towards the end of military dictatorship, with the union vision of building a peaceful federal democratic union which guarantees freedom, justice and equality.

In its statement on the 34th anniversary of the establishment on 1 November 2022, it has trained and grouped the new generation comrades and is fighting the military council together with its allies. Acting President of the NUG Duwa Lashi La praised and honoured the ABSDF for teaching military tactics and strategies for the new generation during the Spring Revolution

and the handover of advantages and disadvantages to the revolutionary armed forces.

In his speech delivered at the ABSDF's 34th anniversary celebration held at Daung Taman camp on 1 November 2022, ABSDF Chairman, Comrade Than Khae said that at present it must stand with the public and the Spring Revolution and establish a new country that is free from the military dictatorship for future generations.

On the 35th anniversary of the 8888 Democracy Uprising on 8 August 2023, the ABSDF issued a statement saying that it regards the armed revolution as a main struggle of the current Spring Revolution and called on all the forces that are fighting against the military dictatorship to work in unity. In the current Spring Revolution, the ABSDF has already established links with Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), including the National Unity Government (NUG).

Clashes with the military council forces	There was one clash in 2012 and five till August, 2023. The ABSDF, which openly participates in the Spring Revolution, has been waging a resistance war against the military council forces in cooperation with the People's Defense Forces/Local Defense Forces (PDF/LDF).
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Ceasefires and Peace Process

Signed NCA - October 15, 2015

Fighting after signing NCA

2015-16 - unknown

Official Representative Team

U Myo Win (UPDJC)

Salai Yaw Aung (JMC)

Liaison offices

1. Myawaddy

2. Muse

3. Proposed - Loikaw, Kalay, Phayathonsu and Myeik

Alliances

ABSDF northern

Myanmar camps are in KIA controlled area

Contact

Email : absdfinfo@gmail.com

CEC Members

1. Comrade Than Khe - Chairman
2. Comrade Myo Win - Vice Chairman
3. Comrade Sonny - General Secretary
4. Comrade Myint Oo - Secretary 1
5. Comrade Htut @ Hla Htay - Secretary 2
6. Comrade Lwan Ni - CEC
7. Comrade Mi Su Pwint @ Ma Lay Lone - CEC
8. Comrade Maung Oo - CEC
9. Comrade Salai Yaw Aung - CEC



Arakan Liberation Party / Arakan Liberation Army (ALP/ALA)

Established - 9 April 1967 (First time), 1 June 1974 (Second time)

Headquarters - India-Myanmar border

Active territories - Northern Arakan State, Karen State

Strength - Around 100

Chairman - Khaing Ye Khaing

Military chief - Brig-Gen Khaing Min Soe

General secretary - Khaing Kyaw Khaing

Informal meetings have taken place between the Arakan Liberation Party/Arakan Liberation Army (ALP/ALA) and the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Committee (NSPNC) of the military council since the coup. Delegations led by Vice-Chairman Daw Saw Mra Razar Lin attended events such as Union Day celebrations, including the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which was spearheaded by the military council.

However, on 5 March 2023, Daw Saw Mra Yazar Lin declared the reorganization of the ALP, citing "differences over the path forward". She assumed the role of chairperson in the new grouping, with Khaing Ni Yaung as vice-chairperson and a group of secretaries consisting of U Aung Lwin, Major Khaing Thurein, Major Khaing Hla Myint, and Major Saw Su Sonedi Aung.

On 20 March 2023, Khaing Kyaw Khaing, the ALP general secretary, issued a statement to clarify that Daw Saw Mra Yazar Lin's party reorganization had no legitimacy. On 16 February 2023, without accepting the suspension of her duties as head of the political negotiation committee and the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) to investigate the arrest of ALP/ALA's deputy military chief Brig-Gen Khaing Min Soe and two other soldiers by the military regime, she had declared the "reorganization of the party." Therefore, ALP

General Secretary Khaing Kyaw Khaing clarified in the statement that Daw Saw Mra Yazar Lin was no longer affiliated with the ALP.

On 1 July 2023, outside the University of Sittwe, three members of the faction headed by Daw Saw Mra Yazar Lin – Vice-chair Khaing Ni Yong, battalion commander Khaing Kyaw Min and soldier Kyaw Kyaw Naing from Battalion (101) – were killed. The assassins have not yet been identified.

The current situation within the ALP/ALA remains complicated. Former chairperson Daw Saw Mra Yazar Lin remains part of the PPST representing the ALP and continues to engage in talks with the military council. At the same time, the role and activities of the original ALP/ALA which endorsed the formation of the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC) will also have to be monitored.

Ceasefires and Peace Process

State/Union-Level Ceasefire - April 5, 2012

Peace Negotiations

NCA - Signing: October 15, 2015

Official Representative Team

Daw Saw Mya Yar Zar Lin (UPDJC)/ Armed Wing - Arakan Liberation Army (ALA)

Military Affairs

Military Chief-Khaing Ye Khaing, Lt-Col Khaing Soe Naing, Major Khaing Myo Win

Major Khaing Phone Myint Zaw (Commander of Ramawaddy Battalion)

Major Khaing Nay Min (Deputy Commander of Ramawaddy Battalion)

Daw Saw Mya Yazar Lin is a former member of the NCCT.

Liaison Offices

1. Kyauktaw (Arakan State), 3 October 2012., 2. Paletwa (Chin State) - applied

Contact

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Arakan National Council/Arakan Army (ANC/AA)

Established - 2004, 2010

Headquarters - KNU Brigade-5 territory, Karen State

Active territories - inside Karen State

Strength - More than 350

Chair, Commander-in-Chief - Colonel Min Tun (aka) Min Zan Wai

Enabling all Arakan people to have the right to create their own destiny, and to preserve their national identity and cultural heritage, along with the liberation from tyranny of all ethnic groups and citizens in Myanmar are the objectives of the ANC/AA.

Following the 1 February 2021 military coup, the ANC/AA allied with the KNU's Brigade-5 to resist the military junta forces. The Commander-in-Chief of the ANC/AA said the ANC/AA welcomed the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG) and is ready to collaborate with any organizations in an effort to build a federal democratic union and establish the federal army. Colonel Min Tun, head of the ANC/AA, attended the first public conference of the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) which started on 27 January 2022.

On 31 March 2023, the ANC/AA sent a congratulatory message to the ceremony to mark the second anniversary of the Federal Democracy Charter (FDC) and encouraged the NUCC members to develop the capacity of all democratic and ethnic revolutionary forces that have not yet participated in the drafting and approval of the federal democratic charter.

Clashes with the military council force As the ANC/AA is fighting against the military council forces in alliance with the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), there is no information about the fighting.

Ceasefire

None

Alliance

KNU/KNLA, DKBA, UNFC
member

Contact

anc.hq1@gmail.com

FB/anc.arakannationalcouncil

Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA)

Established	-	20 March 1988
Headquarters	-	Thantlang (Camp Victoria) in Chin State
Active territories	-	Thantlang, Hakha, Tedim, Matupi and Paletwa Townships in Chin State
Strength	-	More than 1500(Auxiliary Force-More than 10,000)
Chair	-	Pu Zing Cung
General Secretary	-	Salai Thla Hei



The Chin National Front (CNF) issued a statement at its seventh conference in 2020. Three political goals—regaining the right to self-determination, establishing a federal union with political equality and building a democratic system—were adopted at the conference. The CNF stands with the Chin people, participates in the Spring Revolution, and makes armed resistance against the military council forces. It also cooperates with the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC). Vice-Chair of the CNF Dr. Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong serves as the Minister for Federal Union Affairs under the National Unity Government (NUG). Salai Htet Ni, Assistant General Secretary of the CNF works as the General Secretary of the Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC) which is a member of the NUCC.

Salai Thla Hei, General Secretary of the CNF serves as the chair of the Chinland Joint Defense Committee (CJDC) which is formed with 18 Chinland Defense Forces (CDFs) during the Spring Revolution. The CNF is active in armed resistance against the military council forces. He called for a "Chin Nation-Building Year" in 2023 and asked Chin people to assist in the construction of a Chin union.⁶⁷

The CNF/CNA firmly adheres to the Spring Revolution and fights alongside

67 New Year greeting speech for 2023 by Chinland Joint Defense Committee Chair Salai Thla Hei. <http://rb.gy/wuuba>

any group, organization, or people with the same political goal in eradicating the military dictatorship and building a federal democratic union, according to its statement released on the 35th Anniversary of the Chin Revolution Day.⁶⁸

Clashes with the military council forces	One clash with the military council in 2021 and 15 in 2023 (up to July). The CNF/CNA takes a leading role in the CJDC grouping and is fighting against the military council forces in collaboration with the Chinland Defense Forces (CDFs) which are the members of the CJDC.
Clashes with EROs	One clash with the Zomi Revolutionary Organization/Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRO/ ZRA) in 2021.

68 Statement on 35th anniversary of the Chin Revolution Day. <http://rb.gy/t9oy7>

Ceasefires and Peace Process

- 11th EAO to sign a ceasefire with the government
- Step 1 - State-level Ceasefire Agreement (January 6, 2012)
- Step 2 - Union-level ceasefire Agreement (May 7, 2012)
- Step 3 - Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (October 15, 2015)

Official Ceasefire Team

A 20 - member committee has been chosen from the Central Executive Committee, Central Committee and Supreme Council members.

Union - level bilateral agreement 2012 May.
Chin State stability and peace committee member 24 - 31 August 2012

Liaison Offices

1. Teedim (25/09/2012)
2. Thantlang (29/06/2012)
3. Matupi (23/06/2012)

Business Liaison Offices

1. Paletwa (19/10/2013)
2. Yangon
3. Indo-Myanmar Boarder
4. Falam (Get permission on 9 June, 2014)
6. Mindat (Get permission on 9 June, 2014)

Contact

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Phone: +9189741215887
(supreme council)

1. Pu Thang Yen
2. Salai Kipp Kho Lian
3. Dr. Za Hlei Thang
4. Pu Lian Uk
5. Bawi Lian Mang
6. Pu Hau Kang
7. Pu Lalramlawma
8. Pu Naing Thoung
9. Pu Mang Ling
10. Pu Vung Za Khai
11. Pu Aung Ling Thang

Local Committee

1. Pu Bawi Cung
2. Pu Thla Peng
3. Pu Ngun Cung Lian
4. Salai Pa Hmun
5. Pu Tawk Ceu

ဒီမိုကရေစီတို့အတွက်အေးချမ်းရေး



Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA)

Established - 8 November 2010

Headquarters - Sonesee Myaing, Myawaddy Township
in Karen State.

Active territories - Kyarinseikgyi-Phayathonesu valley in
Hlaingbwe Township, Kawkareik Township and
Myawaddy Township

Strength - Nearly 3000

Military chief - General Saw Steel

Quartermaster General - Colonel Saw Sein Win

On 23 September 2021, Lieutenant General Saw Steel, the DKBA Deputy Chief of Staff, was appointed to replace Commander-in-Chief General Saw Mo Shay, who died while receiving medical treatment on 21 July 2021. On 26 April 2022, more than 200 DKBA troops led by Bo Salone defected to the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) forces led by Brigadier General Saw Ner Dah Bo Mya under the Karen National Union (KNU).⁶⁹ At a meeting with the locals together with the military council force and the Border Guard Force (BGF) in Falugyi village in Myawaddy Township on 4 June 2022, General Saw Steel accused those involved in armed conflict in the Lay Kay Kaw area of waging war with financial support from Myanmar expats.⁷⁰ On 3 August 2022, a meeting was held between some top leaders including Chief of Staff General Saw Johnny of the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) and DKBA Commander in Chief General Saw Steel. At the meeting, the both sides reached an agreement, including the issue of

69 A welcoming ceremony was held for the DKBA troops led by Bo Salone, who defected to the KNDO. <http://rb.gy/mlck5>

70 DKBA Military Chief accused that those involved in the armed resistance against the military council, are waging war with financial support from Myanmar expats. <http://rb.gy/h0i1s>

reunification.⁷¹ At around 12 midnight on 6 September 2022, there was a drone bombing attack on General Saw Steel's residence in the compound of Sone See Myaing camp. The organization which carried out the drone attack has yet to be confirmed.⁷²

Although there was a change in leadership within the organization, the DKBA continues to cooperate as a member of the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST), as well as to hold informal meetings with the military council. It can be said that until now, there has been no connection between the DKBA and the Spring Revolution forces who are opposing the military council.

Clashes with the military council forces	There were four clashes between the DKBA and the military council in 2021. However, there have been no battles in 2022 and 2023.
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Ceasefires and Peace Process

3 rd EAO signing a ceasefire with the government

Step 1 - State-level ceasefire agreement (November 3, 2011)

Step 2 - Union - Level Ceasefire agreement (December 11, 2011)

Step 3 - Nationwide Ceasefire agreement (October, 15, 2015)

Liaison Offices -

Hpa-An (Opened in November, 2011)

Myawaddy (Opened in November, 2011)

Kyarinseikgyi, Kyaikdone, Phayathonesu and Myainggyingu (applied)

Alliance

DKBA is a member of NCCT.

71 Some DKBA troops began using the chest badges named "Kawthoolei Army."

<http://rb.gy/hqp24>

72 DKBA Commander-in-Chief General Saw Steel's residence was bombed by a drone.

<http://rb.gy/rbym9>



Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)

Established	- 5 February 1961
Headquarters	- Laiza, Kachin State
Active territories	- Kachin State and northern Shan State
Strength	- More than 12,000 (eight brigades)
Chairman	- General N'Ban La
Vice chairman	- Gam Shawng
General secretary	- Kumhtat Hting Nan

The Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/ KIA), which signed a ceasefire agreement with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) on 24 February 1994, has been continuously engaged in armed clashes with the military from 9 June 2011 under President Thein Sein's administration up until now. While adhering to the policy of inclusion of all Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), the KIO rejected President Thein Sein's overture to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA).

The KIO withdrew its membership from the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) at the second UNFC congress which took place from 20-23 June 2017. It joined the Federal Political Negotiation Consultative Committee (FPNCC) formed on 19 April 2017 and led by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which consists of seven ethnic armed groups from northern Myanmar, seeking peace and political dialogue. On 31 August 2019, representatives of the four members of the Northern Alliance led by the KIO and representatives of the National Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC) met in Kengtung, Shan State, discussed ways to quickly end fighting and reach a bilateral ceasefire agreement. The two sides agreed to continue negotiations for the NCA, only after signing a bilateral ceasefire agreement.

During the military coup, KIO leader N'Ban La has stated he stands for the righteous cause and urged others to do the same. On 22 April 2022, in

response to the military leader's invitation for peace talks, and the military council's letter on 2 May 2022 requesting a meeting, the KIO declined, stating "We will only participate when the time comes that all stakeholders can participate and discuss the affairs of the nation on an equal footing."⁷³

The KIO is also cooperating with the National Unity Government (NUG)'s treasury bond sales during the Spring Revolution. Additionally, in the education sector, it has jointly established Kachin State Comprehensive University (KSCU) with the NUG.⁷⁴ As the KIO is fully cooperating with the Central Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and the NUG, according to the Kachin Independence Council (KIC) Vice Chairman Lieutenant General Gun Maw. It is also participating in the Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) coalition on the military front in order to end the military dictatorship.⁷⁵

On 23 October 2022 at 8:30 pm, the military council attacked with fighter jets when civilians were jointly celebrating the 62nd anniversary of the KIO in the ANang Pa area, killing and injuring many civilians and KIO members. In response to the airstrike, the KIO Central Committee issued a statement that they would escalate the resistance against the military council.⁷⁶

On the 48th Kachin Martyrs Day on 10 August 2023, KIO Chairman General N'Ban La said that the current Spring Revolution is between the military council and the people, and KIO staff are clearly standing with the people, while warning other EROs and individuals looking out for their own interests to avoid helping the regime to find a way out.⁷⁷

73 Statement (2/2022) <http://rb.gy/ea284>

74 Graduation ceremony of first batch of KSCU jointly established by KIO and NUG
<http://rb.gy/6t01f>

75 Military council finding it increasingly difficult to survive long-term: Lt-Gen Gun Maw
<http://rb.gy/675rv>

76 Statement (3/2022) <http://rb.gy/i4ynd>

77 Long-awaited goal of people now in sight: KIO Chairman General N'Ban La
<http://rb.gy/odk9s>

Clashes with Myanmar army troops	13 clashes in 2019, seven clashes in 2020, 138 clashes in 2021, 90 clashes in 2022, and 38 clashes in 2023 (as of March). Most notably, the KIO collaborated with local PDFs to attack the military council troops in 2022 and 2023.
Clashes with EROs	One clash with the Shanni Nationalities Army (SNA) in 2022.

Ceasefire and Peace Process

- Peace Negotiations and Meetings
- Former Ceasefire - February 24, 1994
- Union level Bilateral agreement (for Conflict reduction) - October, 10, 2013
- Conflict Resolution Team (CRT) formed after the 2013 agreement.

CRT team members

five members from Government's representative and -

1. Brigadier General Zau Htaung (Leader)
2. Lieutenant Colonel Naw Li
3. U Dau Kha
4. U La Rip
5. Min Zai Dau Liam

Liaison offices

Technical Advisory Office
(Myitkyina)

Alliances

2009 to 2015 -
UNFC, NCCT, SD, DPN and
2017 to current - FPNCC,
Northern Alliance - Burma

Contact

Website: <http://kachinnet.net>
Email: kachinnet.net@outlook.com

Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA)



Date of the KA's establishment	- 17 August 1948
Date of the KNPP's establishment	- 2 May 1957
Headquarters	- Nyarmu, Shadaw Township, Karenni (Kayah) State
Active territories	- Loikaw, Demoso, Hpruso, Shadaw, Hpasawng, Mese, Mawchee and Bawlakhe Townships in Karenni (Kayah) State.
Strength	- More than 2,000
Chair	- Khu Oo Reh
Vice Chair	- Khun Abel Tweed
Secretary-1	- Khu Daniel
KA's Military Chief	- Brig-Gen Aung Myat

The KNPP signed a 16-point ceasefire agreement with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) on 21 March 1995. However, three months later, on 29 June, fighting between the two sides broke out, and the ceasefire agreement was voided. In the time of the U Thein Sein administration, it participated in the peace process together with the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). In March and June 2012, the state-level and union-level ceasefire agreements were signed. At the time of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015, it refused to sign. It held true to the principle of including all ethnic armed resistance groups. The KNPP issued a three-point statement on 24 December 2018, calling on the government and the Tatmadaw (the Military) to declare the nationwide ceasefire in order to end all armed conflicts in the country and find a solution through political dialogue, to promote all-inclusiveness in the peace process based on mutual recognition and equality.

In September 2021, the KNPP/KA cooperated in the Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) formed with the Ministry of Defense and the Home Affairs Ministry under the National Unity Government (NUG) and four allied Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs). Together with the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) and the NUG, it formed the Joint Coordination Committee (J2C) and Joint Operation Command (JOC) in Karen (Kayin) State, Karenni (Kayah) State, Mon State, Tanintharyi Region, Ayeyarwady Region, Yangon Region and Bago Region and the southern military region which covers the central Myanmar areas such as Nay Pyi Taw. It is cooperating with member organizations and the persons who are mainly responsible for political and military affairs. Political and military strategies and policies are coordinated and adopted by the J2C while the joint ground military commands and military operations are carried out by the JOC.⁷⁸

It is cooperating with the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) through the Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC). KNPP Chair Khu Oo Reh himself serves as the chair of the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC) organized according to the KSCC's interim plan. The KNPP/KA is leading and guiding the armed forces that are waging a war of resistance against the military council. In administrative matters, it is cooperating with women's organizations, youth organizations and political groups.

Total number of battles with the military council troops	One in 2020, eight in 2021, four in 2022 and 21 till March 2023. According to news reports, there were very few fighting between the KNPP/KA and the military council. It is leading and supervising the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF).
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78 "All Roads to Nay Pyi Taw" or A Study of Southern Military Regional Command."

<http://rb.gy/kcpor>

Ceasefire and Peace Process

Peace Negotiations

- 10th EAO to sign a ceasefire with the government
- Step 1 - State-level ceasefire agreement (March 7, 2012)
- Step 2 - Union-level ceasefire agreement (June 9, 2012)
- Official Representative Team - rotating

Military leaders

Commander-in-Chief -

General Bee Htoo

Deputy Commander-in-Chief-

Major General Aung Myat

Adjutant-General:

Colonel Phone Naing

Liaison Offices

1. Loikaw (opened 25/07/2012)

2.Shadow (opened 01/08/2012)

Alliances

UNFC, NCCT and DPN member

Contact

Website: <https://www.knpqh.org/>

Email: knpqh2013@gmail.com



Karen National Union/

Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA)

Established - 5 February 1947

Headquarters - Kaloyawlay, Hpa-An District, Karen State

Active territories - Across Karen State, Thaton, Bilin and Kyaikto Townships in Mon State, Kyaukgyi, Shwekyin and Mone Townships in Bago Region and Myeik and Dawei Township in Tanintharyi Region.

Strength - More than 10,000

Chair - Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win

Vice-Chair - Padoh Saw Hsel Gay

General Secretary - Padoh Saw Ta Doh Moo

Military chief of KNU/KNLA - General Saw Jaw Ni

Deputy military chief of KNU/KNLA - Lt-Gen Baw Kyaw Heh

KNDO's military chief - Brig-Gen Saw Shee Lay

Saw Ba U Gyi's four principles—For us, surrender is out of the question, we shall retain our arms, the recognition of the Karen country must be complete and we shall decide our own political destiny—are still held as the guiding principles of the Karen National Union. For the fight against the dominance of military dictator and democratic affairs and peace affairs and building a genuine federal democratic union, the Democratic Alliance of Burma, led by the KNU, signed five-points on the establishment of the Federal Union of Myanmar - Manerplaw Agreement with the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the National League for Democracy (Liberated Areas) and the National Democratic Front, which had

been revolutionizing the military since 31 July 1992 in the era of the State Law and Order Restoration Council.⁷⁹

During the peace process under the President U Thein Sein administration, the KNU played a leading role in the peace process and signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) together with seven Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs). During the tenure of the government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, the KNU took a leading role in the peace activities established under the NCA. However, on 26 January 2019, the KNU issued a statement calling for a common ground between either the Tatmadaw and the government to discuss the challenges faced in the peace process and the misinterpretation of the NCA. During the peace process under the NCA, there were repeated clashes with the Tatmadaw over the KNU's activities, and over the Tatmadaw's construction of roads under the pretext of regional development. The KNU helped support civil servants who joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and stood with the Spring Revolution forces to oppose the military coup. It also cooperates with the EROs group under the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC). In September 2021, the KNU/KNLA cooperated in the Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) formed with the Ministry of Defense and the Home Affairs Ministry under the National Unity Government (NUG) and four allied Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs). In cooperation with the Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) and the National Unity Government (NUG), it formed the Joint Coordination Committee (J2C) and Joint Operation Command (JOC) in the southern Myanmar such as Karen (Kayin) State, Karenni (Kayah) State, Mon State, Tanintharyi Region, Ayeyarwady Region, Yangon Region and Bago Region and the southern military region which covers the central Myanmar areas such as Nay Pyi Taw. It is cooperating with member organizations and the persons who are mainly

79 Manerplaw Agreement. <http://rb.gy/6qh1i>

responsible for political and military affairs. Political and military strategies and policies are coordinated and adopted by the J2C while the joint ground military commands and operations are carried out by the JOC.⁸⁰

At the 17th KNU Congress held from 24 April to 4 May 2023, the new Central Executive Committee led by Padoh Saw Kwel Htoo Win was elected.⁸¹ At the press conference titled “First 100 Days: KNU in a New Era” on 10 August, Padoh Saw Ta Doh Moo, the General Secretary of the KNU announced four political goals—build the military, which has absolutely no right to participate in Myanmar's politics, draft a new federal democratic constitution, agree and implement transitional justice processes and agree to the international's participatory role at all stages of building a new nation. The KNU declared the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) null and void due to the military coup. He said the KNU continues to hold on to the principle of ensuring justice, equality, self-determination and the emergence of a federal democratic union. He added that the KNU will work towards forming a Kawthoolei federal unit that embodies the principles of self-determination, following the removal of the military council.⁸²

Battles with the military council troops	Three battles in 2019, seven in 2020, 85 in 2021, 167 in 2022 and 53 in 2023 (up to March). In the battles in 2022 and 2023, the KNU/KNLA is most often found to have attacked the military council in collaboration with the local PDFs.
Battles with the EROs	One battle with the New Mon State Party (NMSP) in 2019 and two with the Kawthoolei Army (KTLA) led by Major General Saw Nerdah Mya in 2023.

80 “All Roads to Nay Pyi Taw” or A Study of Southern Military Regional Command.”

<http://rb.gy/kcpoe>

81 Statement on the 17th Congress of the Karen National Union (KNU). <http://rb.gy/qe866>

82 The KNU declared the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) null and void due to the military coup. <http://rb.gy/wndkb>

Ceasefires and Peace Process

- 6th EAO to sign a ceasefire
- Step 1 - State-level Ceasefire (January 12, 2012)
- Step 2 - Union-level ceasefire (April 7, 2012)
- Step 3 - Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (October 15, 2015)

Official Representatives

rotating

Liaison Offices

1. Hpa-an September 29, 2012
2. Phayatonesu, May 15, 2012
3. Hte We April 12, 2012
4. Kyaukkyi - April 9, 2012
5. Thaton - March 5, 2012

Business Liaison Offices

1. Mawlamyaine November 22, 2013
2. Hpa-An
3. Yangon

Alliances

Other Karen EAOs

Contact

Website: [http:// www.knuhq.org](http://www.knuhq.org)

Email: info@knuhq.org



Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army – Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC) (KPC)

Established	- 11 February 2007
Headquarters	- Kawkaik Township, Karen State
Active territories	- Kawkaik and Hlaingbwe Townships, Karen State
Strength	- Over 500
Chairman	- General Saw Htaw Lay
Vice chairman	- Dr Naw Kapaw Htoo
General secretary	- Colonel Saw Kyaw Nyunt

After being expelled from the Central Executive Committee of the Karen National Union (KNU) for engaging in peace talks with the military regime without permission from the parent organization, Major-General Htein Maung led the formation of the KNU/KNLA – Peace Council (KPC) and signed a ceasefire agreement with the junta in early February 2007. In February 2012, the faction continued to sign state and union-level ceasefires, and the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the U Thein Sein government on 15 October 2015. It then participated in the peace process under the NCA.

The fact that not all Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) had signed the NCA was a major challenge, said General Saw Htaw Lay on the occasion of the 13th anniversary of the Peace Council.

However, in the third week of May 2022, the council held meetings with coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) under the military council. It presented converging views on implementing a multi-party democratic system and building a federal union based on democracy and federalism.⁸³

⁸³ Since it is a federal in which all ethnic groups are represented, each group should focus on and work towards the development of the nation starting from their own ethnic group and state <http://rb.gy/9t82k>

The KPC General Secretary Colonel Saw Kyaw Nyunt, who also serves as the spokesperson for the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST), said that it is currently facing unprecedented challenges. More so than under any previous era or government.⁸⁴

Number of clashes with the Myanmar army	No clashes between the KPC and the Myanmar army from 2019 to the end of March 2023
Number of clashes with EROs	One clash with the New Mon State Party (NMSP) in 2020.

Ceasefires and Peace Process

- 9th EAO to sign a ceasefire agreement
- Step 1 - State-level Ceasefire Agreement (February 7, 2012)
- Step 2 - Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (October 15, 2015)
- Former Ceasefire agreement - February 11, 2017

Official Representative Team

Saw Htay Maung, Dr. Temawthay Lat Lam, Saw Yin Nu,
Dr. Naw Kapaw Htoo, Saw El Kyaw Htoo, Dr. Saw Aung Than,
Naw Karen Na

Liaison Offices

1. Mandalay 2. Phaya Thone Su

Alliances

Karen armed groups

⁸⁴ An interview with PPST's spokesperson, BNI-MPM, 22 March 2023 <http://rb.gy/gqh1u>

Lahu Democratic Union (LDU)

Established	- 1 January 1973, 1987, 1997, April 2008
Headquarters	- Loilin area, Mong Hsat District, Shan State
Strength	- More than 1,000
Chair	- Kyar Har
Vice-chair	- Kyar Khun Sar
General secretary	- Kyar Kaw

Kyar Solomon, the General Secretary of the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), has said that public participation in the peace process and political discussion is the top priority, along with the implementation of development projects and the integration of the dispersed Lahu population. He said that through the peace process and political negotiations, it will progressively work towards the Lahu people's right to self-determination.

Just as the LDU actively participated in the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) formed after the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), it also engaged in meetings and negotiations with the military regime together with the PPST after the military coup.

On 22 April 2022, differences arose within the LDU over the military council's invitation to peace talks. On 27-28 July 2022, the LDU held a central committee meeting and announced General Secretary Kyar Solomon as its new chairman. The new LDU, led by Kyar Solomon, continues to participate in PPST cluster meetings and has taken the lead in negotiations with the military council.

However, chairman Kyar Har issued a statement on 8 July 2022, saying that Kyar Solomon and the party were expelled from the LDU. He also announced on 22 August that Kyar Solomon and the party, which met the military council, did not represent the LDU.

On 10 January 2023, LDU chair Kyar Har said at the 50th Anniversary of Lahu Revolution that "the LDU will fight in alliance with Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) and social organizations, which have the same goal until Myanmar can build a federal union."

Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA)-Kokang Army

Established	-	11 March 1989
Headquarters	-	Mobile headquarters
Active territories	-	Monekoe in Kokang and Laukkai, Kutkai, Lashio, Theinni, Muse and Pang Hseng Townships.
Strength	-	More than 6,000
Chair	-	Phon Tar Shwin
Vice-Chair	-	Yan Win Zhong
Secretary General/Military Chief	-	U Phon Tae Yin



On 16 February 2022, U Phon Kyar Shin, the leader of the MNTJP and the MNDAA-Kokang died. His funeral service was attended by delegates from allied organizations, including a representative from the military council, a representative from the National Unity Government (NUG), and the Chief of Staff of the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA). It joined the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) led by the United Wa State Party/United Wa State Army (UWSP/UWSA) and opened the way for political dialogue. It has formed a strong military alliance with the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) and the ULA/AA. Together with the Three Brotherhood Alliance, it issues the joint statements honouring the People's Defense Forces/Local Defense Forces (PDFs/LDFs), which are waging a war against the military council during the Spring Revolution.

On the anniversary of the establishment of the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and the Bamar People's Liberation Army (BPLA), the MNTJP/MNDAA released congratulatory messages along with the ULA/AA and the PSLF/TNLA. Due to the intervention of the Chinese government, it had a meeting with the delegation of the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) under the military council in Mongla, under

the control of the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) on 1 June 2023. However, the talks ended on 2 June without reaching any agreement.

Clashes with the military council force	One in 2020, 47 in 2021, 14 in 2022 and eight in 2023 (up to August). Take a look at the battles between the military council forces and the MNDAA, it is fighting as a joint force with either the TNLA or the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).
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Ceasefires and Peace Process

Non - ceasefire group

Alliance

UNFC, NCCT, Northern Alliance (Myanmar)

Leadership

U Phone Kyar Sin (Patron)

Secretary and commander in chief- Phen Dern (or) Phen Dexun

Deputy commander in chief - Yan Win Zhone

Chief of staff - Phen De Chuan

Spokesperson - U Htun Myant Lin

Political Demands

Self-administration in Kokang Region

Equal Ethnic rights like other ethnic groups

Full citizen rights for Kokang ethnic people

Contact

Website: <http://www.kokang123.com>

National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla) - Eastern Shan State (NDAA/ESS)



Established	-	1989
Headquarters	-	Mongla, Eastern Shan State
Active territories	-	Mongla, Shan State (Special Region-4)
Strength	-	More than 3,000
Chair	-	Sai Lin
Vice-Chair	-	San Pae
General Secretary	-	U Kyi Myint

The NDAA-ESS was established in 1989 after splitting from the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). It signed a ceasefire agreement with the military government on 30 June the same year. It is an ethnic armed group based in Mongla. In September and December 2011, it signed the state-level and union-level ceasefire agreements with the U Thein Sein administration. However, it did not sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The NDAA-ESS, which is a member of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) led by the United Wa State Party/ the United Wa State Army (UWSP/UWSA), has held talks with the military council following the 2021 military coup. It arranged a meeting between the military council and a group of the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) and the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA), at its headquarters in Mongla from 1-3 June 2023. However, the discussion stopped on the second day of the meeting. The meeting was sponsored by the Chinese government, but ended without any agreement.

At a meeting with the coup leader on 26 September 2022, the NDAA-ESS called for the designation of Special Region-4 as a self-administered zone.

Ceasefires and Peace Process

2nd EAO to sign ceasefire agreement

Step 1 - State - Level Ceasefire Agreement (September 7, 2011)

Step 2 - Union - level ceasefire agreement (December 27, 2011)

Former Ceasefire agreement -

June 30, 1989

Official Representative Team

rotating

Liaison Offices

Yangon

Taunggyi

Kyaing Tong

Tachileik

Mandalay (reopened)

New Mon State Party (NMSP)

Established - 20 July 1958

Headquarters - Ye Chaung Phya in Mon State

Active territories - Thaton, Paung, Chaungsone, Mawlamyine, Kyaikmaraw, Mudon, Thanbyuzayat, and Ye in Mon State; Yebyu, Myeik, and Dawei in Tanintharyi Region; Kyarinseikgyi, Hpa-An, Kawkareik, and Phayathonesu valley in Karen State

Strength - More than 1500 (Auxiliary force 5,000)

Chair - Nai Han Thar

Vice-Chair - Nai Aung Min

General Secretary - Nai Kyaw Ye



Nai Han Thar, the Chair of the NMSP said at a ceremony to mark the 74th Mon Revolution Day that the need to encourage the National Unity Government (NUG) to cooperate with the military council is useless. However, the NMSP held dialogue with the military council more than five times. Its view is that the political problem should be resolved by political means. They signed a seven-point agreement, including building a strong multi-party democratic system and establishing a federal union to deal with Mon affairs.⁸⁵

The NMSP, which has actively participated in the peace process after signing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on 12 February 2018, has taken the leadership position in the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) following the military coup and is engaged in dialogue with the military council. In April 2023, it resigned from the PPST and reduced its participation in the PPST.

⁸⁵ Mon youth criticized that the NMSP's meeting with the military council disrespects the will of the people. <http://rb.gy/5ojhv>

NMSP Chair Nai Han Thar, who adheres to the dialogue process, said that if all the ethnic armed organizations join the Spring Revolution to eradicate the military dictatorship, he would do the same.⁸⁶

According to a statement released by the NMSP on Mon National Day 5 February, 2023, an election without resolving the political crisis would lead to bloody conflict. The NMSP added that it would work with all ethnic groups to create their own destiny. In addition, the statement pointed out that even though it is holding meetings with the military council under the 2008 Constitution. This means the rights of the ethnic peoples are far from being expected.⁸⁷

The NUG's Acting President Duwa Lashi La has invited the NMSP to work together to build a federal democratic union.

Clashes with the military council force	There have been no clashes with the military council.
Clashes with the EROs	There were some skirmishes between the ground forces of the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) and the NMSP in 2019. On 11 October, 2020, there was an exchange of fire between the KNU/KNLA-Peace Council (PC) and the NMSP.

86 The chairman of the New Mon State Party said that if all EAOs participate in the Spring Revolution, it will also participate in it. <http://rb.gy/bp7ad>

87 The political stance of the New Mon State Party which held talks with the military council. <http://rb.gy/zaf8n>

Ceasefires and Peace Process

Peace Negotiations

Step 1 - State - Level ceasefire

(February 1, 2012)

NCA - February 13, 2018

Former Ceasefire Agreement - June 29, 1995

Official Representative Team

Outside Myanmar

1. Naing Han Thar

2. Naing Tala Nyi

Within Myanmar

1. Naing Htaw Mon

2. Naing Ta La Nyi

3. General Zay Ya

4. Naing Aung Min (Secretary 1)

5. Brigadier General La Yee Kaung

Liaison Offices

1. Mudon ၊ 2. THanbyuzayat ၊ 3. Ye

4. Ye Phyu (Ye Phyu Village) ၊ 5. Kyeik Ma Yaw

6. Zinn Kyeik (Pung Township) ၊ 7. Myeik

Business

1. Myawaddy ၊ 2. Phaya Thone Su ၊

3. Mawlmyaing

Alliances

UNFC ၊ NCCT ၊ SD and DPN member



National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K)

Established	- 1 January 1980
Headquarters	- Taga, Naga Self-Administered Zone, Sagaing Region
Active territories	- Lahe, Layshe and Nanyun Townships in Sagaing Region.
Strength	- Less than 500
Chair	- U Yung Aung
Spokesperson	- U Kyaw Wan Sein

Under the National League for Democracy (NLD) administration, the NSCN-K attended the 21st Century Panglong -Union Peace Conference as an observer. Although it held some discussions for peace, around 400 soldiers from six battalions in the North-West command of the military council took control of Taga area, headquarters of the NSCN-K on 29 January 2019.

Major-General Zaw Min Tun stressed at the time that this problem could be solved if the NSCN-K followed three points—follow the path of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), respect and abide by the agreements contained in the bilateral contract and not to accept Assam and Kathe insurgents.

It is difficult for the NSCN-K to sign the NCA as it is focusing on the integration of all Nagas in both India and Myanmar. U Kyaw Wan Sein, the spokesperson of the NSCN-K, said that it had no plan to move its headquarters to another region as it had signed the region-level ceasefire agreement on 9 April 2012.

Following the 2021 military coup, the activities of the NSCN-K have gone unnoticed

Ceasefires and Peace Process

12th EAO to sign a ceasefire agreement

Step 1 - State-level ceasefire agreement (9 April 2012)

Conflicts after ceasefire - None

Official Representative Team - None

Leaders

Chairman - S. S. Khaplang

Secretary - Darli Man Garu O

Chief of military staffs - Kho Li Kun Yet

Liaison Offices

Khamti, Sagaing Region



Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO)

Established	- 11 December 1949 (first time) and 7-9 December, 2009 (second time)
Headquarters	- Kadugyi area in Mawmai Township in southern Shan State
Active territories	- Hsi Hseng, Hopong, Namhsan, Langhko and Mawmai Townships in Shan State.
Strength	- More than 400
Chair	- General Khun Thurein
Vice-Chair (1)	- Khun Tun Tin
General Secretary	- Khun Aung Man

The PNLO called on the public to use their rights of "one vote per person" in the 2020 general election. The PNLO also welcomed and supported the emergence of the National Unity Government (NUG) following the 2021 military coup based on its stated aim of building a democratic federal union.

There were some informal talks between the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) and the PNLO after the military coup. Khun Myint Tun, the Vice-Chair of the PNLO serves as the chair of the Pa-O National Federal Council (PNFC) and cooperates with the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC).

After the third conference held from 29 May to 1 June 2022, Vice-Chair Khun Myint Tun who serves as a representative in the PPST on behalf of the PNLO was not included in its new central committee. Khun Myint Tun himself forms the PNFC and cooperates with the forces of the Spring Revolution by joining the NUCC.

The new PNLO central committee, led by Chair Khun Thurein, plays a leading role in the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) and is holding informal

talks with the military council. PNLO patron Colonel Khun Okkar led the meeting between the military council and five ethnic armed organizations which signed the ceasefire agreement in June 2023. The meeting mainly focused on four points, including the amendment to the 2008 Constitution and holding the peace conference.⁸⁸

On 7 May 2023, a convoy carrying ASEAN diplomats, officials from the Indonesia and Singapore embassies, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), PNLO delegates and officials from the Shan State administration council, were attacked on the way to Hsi Hseng from Taunggyi to deliver supplies to displaced persons in PNLO-controlled territory.

Clashes with the military council force	There have been no clashes between the PNLO and the military council before and after the military coup.
Clashes with the EROs	There were two clashes between the PNLO and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) up to August 2023.

⁸⁸ A delegation of five PPST member organizations and the military's peace discussion team held a peace meeting. <http://rb.gy/akv52>

Ceasefires and Peace Process

13th EAO to sign a ceasefire agreement

Step 1 - State-level ceasefire agreement (August 25, 2012)

Step 2 - Union - level ceasefire agreement (March 23, 2013)

Step 3 - NCA (15 October 2015)

Official Representative Team

State Level - 7 members

1. Khun Myint Htun (Team Leader) ၊ 2. Colonel Khun Therein (Deputy Team Leader)
3. Brigadier General Khun Tee Saung (Member)
4. Major Khun Kyaw Htin (Member) ၊ 5. Khun Oo (Member)
6. Khun Tun Tin (Member) ၊ 7. Major Khun Swe Hto (Member)

Union Level - 12 members

1. Colonel Khun Oakkar (Leader) ၊ 2. Khun Myint Htun (Second Leader)
3. Colonel Khun Thurein (Member) ၊ 4. Colonel Aung Kyaw (Member)
5. Khun Oo (Member) ၊ 6. Khun Tin Shwe Oo (Member)
- PNLO peace building team 7. Major Khun Swe Hto (Member)
8. Kung Htee (Member) ၊ 9. Khun Htun Tin (Member) ၊ 10. Khun Thomas (Member) ၊
11. Nan Nwe Nwe (Member) ၊ 12. Nan Myint (Member)

Liaison Offices

1. Taunggyi (26/01,2013) ၊ 2. Tha Htone (21/03/2013)
3. Maukme (08/12/2013) ၊ 4. Hsi Seng (opening soon)

Alliances

PPST, PPWT/CT, UPDJC, JMC member

Contact

Email: pnlopower@gmail.com

Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA)



Established - 1963, 1976, January 1992, January 2009

Headquarters - Mobile

Active territories - Naungcho, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Kutkai, Namtu, Mantong, Namsang (South), Namhsan (North), Lashio, Tangyan, Namhkam, Muse, and Momeik in northern Shan State; Mogok in Mandalay Region

Strength - Over 6000

Chairman - Lieutenant-General Tar Aik Bong

Vice-chairman - Brig-Gen Tarr Jode Jarr

General secretary - Brig-Gen Tar Bone Kyaw

The Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) has set a political goal of building a federal democratic union that guarantees democracy, human rights, and self-determination. The PSLF/TNLA cooperates politically and militarily with the four members of the Northern Alliance including the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), and the three members of the Brotherhood Alliance, including the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA). The PSLF/TNLA is also a member of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), which is led by the United Wa State Army (UWSA).

The PSLF/TNLA has spoken out against the 2021 military coup and said it will join efforts to build a federal democratic union, which is the aim of the Spring Revolution, although its participation in the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) has not yet been seen. However, the ethnic armed group has had contacts and exchanged information with the Ta'ang Political Consultative Committee (TPCC), one of the constituent groups of the National Unity Consultative Council, and its voices are represented in the TPCC, said the

PSLF/TNLA's general secretary. It also participated in discussion of the third draft constitution of Ta'ang State on 11-12 March 2023, which was led by the TPCC.

Despite some contacts and negotiations with the military council due to pressure from the Chinese government, clashes occurred between Myanmar army troops and the PSLF/TNLA. At the 12 January 2023 ceremony marking the 60th anniversary of Ta'ang National Revolution Day, PSLF/TNLA's Chairman Lieutenant-General Tar Aik Bong urged the revolutionary forces to deter the elections being planned by the military council.⁸⁹

Along with the ULA/AA and the MNDAA, the PSLF/TNLA currently provides military training and support to the Bamar People's Liberation Army (BPLA), the Student Armed Force (SAF), and the People's Defense Forces – Local Defense Forces (PDFs-LDFs).

Clashes with Myanmar army	15 clashes in 2023; 11 clashes in 2021; 8 clashes in 2022 13 clashes in 2023 (as of August)
Clashes with EROs	Two clashes in 2022, and 9 clashes in 2021 with the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA)

89 TNLA urges on revolutionary forces to deter junta election <http://rb.gy/v1wm8>

Ceasefires and Peace Process

Non-ceasefire EAO

Leaders

Brigadier General Tar Eik Phone (Chairman)

Brigadier General Tar Gyaw Gyar (Vice President)

Brig-Gen Tar Bone Kyaw (General Secretary)

Information Office - Mai Eik Kyaw

Foreign Affairs Office - Tar Pan La

Central Committee - 23

Reserve committee - 8

Official Representative Team - None

Liaison Offices - None

Alliances

FPNCC, Northern Alliance – Myanmar

Contact

Website: [http:// www.pslftnla.org/](http://www.pslftnla.org/)

Email: pslftnalnews@gmail.com



Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA)

Established - 1964, 1996

Headquarters - Loi Tai Leng, Northern Shan State

Active territories - Mongping, Kyaingtong, Tachileik, Monghpyak, Mongyawng, Mongton, and Mong Hsat in eastern Shan State; Mongpan, Mongnai, Laihka, Kunhing, Mawksai and Namsang in southern Shan State; Hsipaw, Namtu, Muse, Kyaukse, and Namhkam in northern Shan State

Strength - Over 8000

Chairman - General Yawd Serk

Vice Chairman - Lt-Gen Sai Yee

Commander-in-Chief - General Kherh Ngeun

Secretary (1) - Col. Sai Ngeun

Although there were some clashes with Myanmar army troops following the military coup, an informal meeting took place between the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) and the regime's National Solidarity and Peacemaking Committee (NSPNC). On 28 March 2022, after an informal meeting in Nay Pyi Taw, RCSS Secretary (1) Col. Sai Ngeun said they would continue talks with the military council by adhering to the state and union-level ceasefire agreements.

Towards the end of March 2023, ahead of the talks with the military junta, the RCSS/SSA which led the seven Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) that signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), reduced its participation in the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) and appears to be shifting towards a separate negotiation channel with the military council.

The RCSS/SSA has stated they have a policy in place to resolve current political and military issues through negotiations, and on 10 October 2022, it

reached out to meet and discuss with ethnic armed organizations in the country, including those in Shan State. The RCSS statement mentioning “all organizations” raises the question of whether it includes all the Spring Revolution forces opposing the military regime.⁹⁰

Following the bi-annual meeting of the RCSS in 18-20 August 2023, it stated that it still “adheres to the essence of the NCA.”

During the Spring Revolution, the RCSS/SSA drew criticism from the Spring Revolution forces for providing rations and dealing in business matters with military council troops.

Clashes with the Myanmar army	8 clashes in 2020 and 8 in 2021; No apparent clashes in 2022 and 2023
Clashes with EROs	<p>One clash in 2021 and one in 2022 with the Northern Alliance consisting of Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). Two clashes in 2020; 24 clashes in 2021; 4 clashes in 2022; 3 clashes in 2023 (as of August). Two clashes in 2020 and 11 clashes in 2021 with PSLF/TNLA.</p> <p>One clash with the United Wa State Party/United Wa State Army (UWSP/UWSA) in 2023 (as of August).</p> <p>Two clashes with the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) in 2023 (as of August).</p> <p>The RCSS/SSA has clashed with up to 7 EROs, with the most clashes occurring with the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA).</p>

90 RCSS statement regarding invitation to dialogue <http://rb.gy/vs802>

Ceasefires and Peace Process

4th EAO to sign ceasefire agreement

Step 1 - State - Level Ceasefire Agreement

(2 December 2011)

Step 2 - Union - level ceasefire agreement

(16 January, 2012)

Step 3 - NCA (October 15, 2015)

Official Representative Team

Negotiation Leader - Paung Khey

Liaison Offices

1. Taunggyi (22/02/2012)
2. Kyaing Tone (February 22, 2012)
3. Tachileik (February 29, 2012)
4. Mai Tone (February 29, 2012)
5. Kho Lam (March 21, 2012)
6. Muse (Business Liaison Office)
7. Mai Pan (March 6, 2014)

Alliances

PPST, PPWT/CT, UPDJC, JMC member

Contact

Website: <http://www.taifreedom.com>,

<http://www.rcssanc.org>

Email: rcssinfordepartment@gmail.com

Shan State Progressive Party/ Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA)



Established - 24 April, 1964

Headquarters - Wan Hai, Kyethi Township, Southern Shan State

Active territories - Mong Hsu, Kyethi, Mong Kung, Laihka, Panglong, Loilem, Hopong, and Yatsauk in southern Shan State; Mongyai, Tangyan, Lashio, Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Naungcho, Momeik, Namtu, Namhsan, Mantong, Theinni, Kutkai, Muse, and Namhkam in northern Shan State

Strength - More than 10,000

Chair - General Sao Pan Pha

Vice-Chair - Lt-Gen Sao Khay Tai

General Secretary - Colonel Kyaw Hla

At the plenary meeting of Annual Central Committee for 2020, the SSPP/SSA decided four points for the future process, including working towards the emergence of a genuine federal union that guarantees equality and self-determination with the aim of ensuring ethnic unity in Shan State and continued collaboration with the government, Tatmadaw, the EROs, political parties, and social organizations for domestic peace.

According to the statement on the 51st Anniversary of the establishment of the SSPP released on 16 August 2022, in order to solve political crisis, economic crisis and social problems, there is a special need to end the military dictatorship, stop the unjust repression and killings, redraft the federal democratic charter, release all political prisoners and create an all-inclusive community for solving the political crisis.⁹¹

91 Announcement of the 51st anniversary of the establishment of the Shan State Progressive Party. <http://rb.gy/kz2j3>

As the SSPP/SSA, which is part of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) led by the United Wa State Party/ United Wa State Army (UWSP/UWSA), was unable to refuse the military's invitation for peace talks. It held informal talks with the military council following the military coup. At a meeting with the military council on 26 September 2022, the SSPP/SSA submitted nine points including the implementation of the Panglong Agreement, Principle and Pledge, implement the agreements made in the 1961 All States Conference, form a Bamar state in order to achieve national equality and build a federal democratic union.⁹²

After the meeting between the military council and a group of the UWSA, the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)-Mongla and the SSPP on 20 and 21 July 2023, the group said that they were not yet ready to attend the peace conference that the military group is trying to hold.⁹³

Clashes with the military council force	There were six clashes in 2022 and three in 2023 (till August).
Clashes with the EROs	There were two clashes between the SSPP/SSA and the Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) in 2020, 24 in 2021, four in 2022 and three in 2023 (till August). There were two clashes between the Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) and the RCSS/SSA in 2020 and 11 in 2021.

92 The SSPP announced that 9 points including the implementation of Panglong pledges and the formation of Burma state were presented to the military council. <http://rb.gy/4il9a>

93 An interview with Lt-Col Sai Su, Spokesperson of the SSPP. <http://rb.gy/2xo3h>

Ceasefires and Peace Process

7th EAO to sign ceasefire agreement

Step 1 - State - Level Ceasefire Agreement (January 28, 2012)

Step 2 - Union - level ceasefire agreement (January 28, 2012)

Former Ceasefire Agreement

September 2, 1988

Official Representative Team

rotating

Liaison Offices

1. Lashio
2. Taunggyi
3. Kho Lam
4. Muse (not yet opened)
5. Tachileik (Not Confirmed)

Alliances

UNFC, FUA, NCCT,
DPN member

Contact

Email: sspp.hq@gmail.com



United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA)

Established - 10 April 2009

Headquarters - KIA-controlled area in Kachin State

Active territories - Kachin State, northern Shan State, Paletwa in Chin State and the entire Arakan State

Strength - More than 30,000

Commander-in-Chief - Major General Twan Mrat Naing

Deputy Commander-in-Chief - Dr. Nyo Twan Awng

Secretary-1 - Colonel Kyaw Han

Following the 2020 Election, fighting between the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) and the military council stopped suddenly. With the talks of holding elections for skipped constituencies, a truce was reached through an understanding between the ULA/AA and the military council. Following the 2021 military coup, some clashes between the military council army and the ULA/AA had resumed, and there was competition between the military council and the ULA/AA for territorial control in Arakan State.

The ULA/AA had some discussions with the military group due to the participation in the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) and the intervention of the Chinese government. On the other hand, clashes broke out between military council forces and the joint forces of the Northern Alliance—the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA).

It must be said that the ULA/AA is involved in the Spring Revolution if you consider the congratulatory statements sent to the forces of the Spring Revolution, such as the Student Armed Force (SAF), the Yaw Defence Force (YDF), the Bamar People's Liberation Army (BPLA), the Karenni Nationalities

Defense Force (KNDF), the People's Revolution Alliance (PRA) (Magway), including statements about military training and assistance provided by The Brotherhood Alliance, which includes the ULA/AA.

The Alliance Relations Committee (ARC) of the National Unity Government (NUG) officially held online meetings with the leaders of the ULA/AA. The role of ULA/AA during the Spring Revolution is likely to materialize. At the ceremony to mark the 14th anniversary of the ULA/AA on 10 April 2023, nearly 30 organizations such as the Brotherhood Alliance, Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), the People's Defense Forces (PDFs) and the NUG sent congratulatory messages.

Clashes with the military council force	There were 81 clashes in 2020, five in 2021 and 90 in 2022.
Clashes with the EROs	There were two clashes with the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in 2023.

Ceasefires and Peace Process

Non-ceasefire signatory EAO

Official Representative Team

Colonel Kyaw Han | Spokesperson - Khaing Thu Kha

Liaison Offices

None

Alliances

FPNCC, Northern Alliance - Myanmar

Contact

Website: <http://thearakanarmy.com/>

Email: unitedleagueofarakan@yahoo.com



United Wa State Party/United Wa State Army (UWSP/UWSA)

Established - 17 April 1989

Headquarters - Pangkham (Pangsang)

Active territories - Panghsang, Mongmao, Panwai, Namphan, Mongpauk, Mongton, Mong Hsat, and Tachileik

Strength - Over 30,000

Chairman - Bao Youxiang

Commander-in-Chief - Bao Junping (aka) U Bao Ai Chan

General secretary - U Bao Ai Kham

In April 2022, on the 33rd anniversary of the establishment of peace in the Wa region, the Ministry of Defense of the National Unity Government (NUG) sent a message, praying that Wa leaders and Wa people may continue to work together to strengthen the peaceful coexistence and socio-economic development in Wa State. At the same time, it also encouraged Wa leaders to play a visionary role in laying the foundations of a new federal democratic union in the future.

Following the 2021 military coup, the UWSP/UWSA, which has been engaging in talks with the military council, has demanded that the Wa State be designated as an autonomous ethnic state, and the military junta agreed in principle to this demand.

The FPNCC meeting held on 15-16 March 2023, led by the UWSP/UWSA, issued a seven-point statement welcoming, among other things, Chinese intervention to resolve the conflict in Myanmar and cooperation with the Chinese government for stability along the border areas.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ Statement of FPNCC working meeting <http://rb.gy/rmuvr>

Clashes with the Myanmar army	No clashes with the Myanmar army yet
Clashes with EROs	In April 2022, clashes broke out between the UWSA and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA).

Ceasefire and Peace Process

- 1st EAO to sign ceasefire agreement
- Step 1 - State - level agreement (6 September 2011)
- Step 2 - Union - level agreement (25 December 2011)

Former Ceasefire Agreement

May 18, 1989

Liaison Offices

1. Lashio
2. Tanyun
3. Kyaing Tone
4. Tachileik
5. Taunggyi
6. Mandalay
7. Yangon

CEC members


Chairman - Bao Yu Chan | Vice Chairman - Bao Yuyi | Vice Chairman - Shao Min Lian
 Chief of Military Staff - Bao Yu Chan | Deputy Chief of Military Staff - Kyauk Kyone Tan
 Spokesperson - U Aung Myint @ Le Kyu Lee | Communications Officer - Kyauk Kw Ann
 Deputy Communication Officer - Sam Khun | Chief of Justice - Lee Kyauk Kaw
 Finance and Business Officer - Bao Yu Lian

Political Wing

United Wa State Party (UWSP) | Governmental Reference to Territory - (Northern)
 Shan State Special Region 2 | Armed Group - United Wa State Army (USWA)

Alliances


FPNCC

An aerial photograph of a mountain range covered in snow. The mountains are dark, jagged peaks, and the valleys between them are filled with a thick layer of white snow. The perspective is from a high angle, looking down on the terrain.


**Massacres perpetrated by
the military council throughout
the country in one year**

Massacres perpetrated by the military council throughout the country in one year

From April 2022 to the end of March 2023, BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor recorded as many as 44 massacres involving five or more people perpetrated by the military council against civilians. These figures are based on data from 15 BNI member news outlets as well as other local and international news agencies, excluding the mass killings that occurred in the earlier months of 2022 through March, and after March 2023.⁹⁵



⁹⁵ Three women raped during Tartaing village massacre <https://tinyurl.com/2m5hpf3b>



Sagaing Region

Of the above-mentioned events, 15 massacres occurred in Kanbalu, Salingyi, Tabayin, Khin-U, Pale, Kawlin, Indaw, Katha, Budalin, and Chaung-U Townships in Sagaing Region, resulting in the death of 130 people.

In Sagaing Region which has seen most mass killings, the Light Infantry Division 99 butchered one PDF member and 16 local residents who had been rounded up to be used as human shields in Tartaing village on 1 and 2 March 2023, leaving their limbs severed. The military council forces also raped and killed women. The victims include 13 men and three women between the ages of 17 and 67.

On 3 November 2023, troops from Koetaungboet-based Light Infantry Battalion 363 in Kanbalu Township arrested 18 men in the Sartaungpyin area in the northern part of the township. They later released four of them but tortured the rest to death and burnt their bodies beyond recognition on 5 and 6 November.⁹⁶

A total of 11 children were killed when the regime's air force carried out airstrikes on the school of Let Yet Kone village in Tabayin Township on 16 September 2022. The military council's airstrikes with the use of combat helicopters as well as ground offensives claimed the lives of 11 people - four 5-year-old elementary school students, four residents in their 30s, and three civilians on village security duty. The regime troops also kidnapped about 20 children who had been wounded in the attacks.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Junta troops arrest, murder 14 residents in Kanbalu's Sartaungpyin area <https://tinyurl.com/24xglczv>

⁹⁷ Death toll reaches 11 after junta airstrike in Tabayin's Let Yet Kone village <https://tinyurl.com/2g8ryt7m>



Kachin State

Kachin State has ranked second in terms of the number of mass killings involving five or more people, with four incidents in one year. All the incidents occurred in Hpakant Township, resulting in the deaths of 122 people.

On 23 October 2022, nearly 80 people were killed and 70 other wounded when the regime's air force conducted aerial bombardments on the music concert in Brigade 9 area of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), marking the 62nd anniversary of the founding of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO).⁹⁸

On the night of 9 August 2022, the air force dropped incendiary bombs on Sezin village in Hpakant Township, burning down more than 400 houses. Airstrikes using fighter jets and indiscriminate shooting by the military also caused about 30 civilian casualties.⁹⁹

98 Junta rescue efforts for seriously injured in Hpakant; death toll reaches 80

<https://tinyurl.com/2gj2v57q>

99 junta troops burn more than 400 houses in Sezin, leaves 30 residents killed or injured

<https://tinyurl.com/2ke2ac4g>



Yangon Region

Yangon Region has ranked the third in terms of massacres involving five or more people with four cases, resulting in the death of 30 people. These mass killings occurred in Kyimyindaing, Hlegu, and Twantay Townships. On 5 December 2022 at around 7 am, 13 dead Rohingyas were discovered by residents. Most of them were youths between the ages of 15 and 16, and their bodies were carried off by the village administrator. Prior to the incident, soldiers arrested a driver and an assistant of a 12-wheeler with 66 Rohingyas on board near Zone 1 in Nyaung Hna Pin village in Hlegu Township.¹⁰⁰

On 19 August 2022, at around 5pm, six young men were killed in an explosion at a fermented rice wine in Setsan Ward on the other side of Kyeemyingdaing Township. The bodies were carried off by military council soldiers and their families were threatened, depriving them of performing a traditional Buddhist end of life ritual.¹⁰¹

100 13 bodies found in Hlegu Township <https://tinyurl.com/2ncwdw7j>

101 Bodies of youths not allowed to recover; families threatened, depriving them of funeral ritual <https://tinyurl.com/2jhbyh49>



Magway Region

A total of four mass killings occurred in Gangaw, Myaing, Yesagyo, and Pauk Townships in Magway Region, resulting in the death of 29 people.

On 12 April 2022, nine IDPs from Tansu village in Pauk Township were fatally hit by artillery shells. The victims include Ma Zin Zin Aung, 16; Daw Khin Than Nu, 47; Daw Sann Htwe, 75; Ma Moe Hlaing, 22; Daw Than Soe, 62; U Myint Po, 37; Daw Htay Wa, 37; Ma Hla Myo New, 22; and Ma Hla Myo Kywel, 19.¹⁰² In addition, junta soldiers burned alive five people in Yesagyo, including a school principal who joined the CDM, a nurse, and a pregnant school teacher, on 10 June 2022.¹⁰³


102 Nine IDPs fatally hit by artillery shells in Pauk Township <https://tinyurl.com/yxpn2g75>

103 Junta troops kill, burn five people incl. nurse, pregnant mother
<https://tinyurl.com/2dq7p5ge>



Shan State

Although Shan State only saw a mass killing involving five people, 28 people lost their lives in a single incident. On 11 March 2023, military council forces massacred 28 people sheltering at the village monastery in Namneint village in Pinlaung Township. The bodies were later found by local defense forces.¹⁰⁴



Tanintharyi Region

Four mass killings involving five or more people in Yebyu, Bokepyin, Palaw, and Launglon Townships in Tanintharyi Region, resulting in the death of 25 people.

On 16 January 2023, local residents found eight bodies of men on the roadside between Ywar Hae Lu and Namtom in Bokepyin Township.¹⁰⁵

On 11 February 2023, seven family members of military council-appointed administrator of Nyaungshinkone village, Kyauklonegyi village tract, Palauk town, Palaw Township, were killed by unknown gunmen. The victims include the administrator U Myint Aung's wife Daw Kyin Nwae, 62; his daughter Daw Than Than Maw, 42; Maung Nay Htet Thein, 17; Maung Zeyar Aung, 16; Maung Soe Min Paing, 13; Ma May Zin Phyu, 9; and Maung Thar Thar, 1.¹⁰⁶

104 Junta troops massacre residents sheltering at Namneint monastery; death toll reaches 28 <https://tinyurl.com/2nwdqpya>

105 Eight bodies of men found in Ywar Haelu village, Bokepyin Township <https://tinyurl.com/2gsgjh5h>

106 Security tightened after mass killing of 7 members of administrator's family <https://tinyurl.com/2jrwwz4>



Mandalay Region

Four massacres occurred in Natogyi, Myingyan, and Madaya Townships in Mandalay Region, resulting in the death of 23 people.

Military council soldiers and a pro-military militia group called Thway Thauk killed five residents in Natogyi Township on 3 October 2022. They discarded their bodies outside of the town with a sign reading: "Thway Thauk".¹⁰⁷



Arakan State

Arakan State saw two incidents of mass killing of five or more people due to heavy weapons fire and violent incursion into villages by military council forces, resulting in the death of 20 people.

On 16 November 2022, a total of 11 residents were killed and more than 30 others injured including children, when a ear-piercing ceremony in the Mro village of Jadechaung, Maungdaw Township, was struck by artillery shells fired by Border Guard Forces (BGFs) based in Kyaingchaung.¹⁰⁸

On 10 November 2022, ten bodies with knife and gunshot wounds murdered by military council troops were found local residents in Sininn village in Ponnagayun Township.¹⁰⁹

107 "Kyauppadaung Thway Thauk" name tag found on bodies in Natogyi

<https://tinyurl.com/2lxlclp>

108 Junta shells hit ear-piercing ceremony in Maungdaw's Jadechaung village, 11 killed, 30 injured <https://tinyurl.com/25xr343s>

109 Nine bodies killed by junta army found in Sininn village <https://tinyurl.com/2d7uu9jq>



Karen State

Three incidents of mass killing involving five or more people occurred in Kawkaareik and Hpapun Townships in Karen State, resulting in the death of 17 people, with most of deaths attributed to airstrikes.

On 7 January 2023, four gold-panning family members and two other workers when four heavy shells hit houses in Yarhteehta village, Methu village tract, in Dweloe Township, Hpapun Township.¹¹⁰



Chin State

Chin State saw two incidents of mass killing which resulted in the death of 14 people in Matupi and Thantlang townships.

On 30 March 2023, eight civilians, including two children under the age of eight, were killed and about 20 others injured when the air force bombed Khuafu village in Thantlang Township. The victims include two children between the ages of six and nine, and five women.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Six residents killed in military council airstrikes in KNU-controlled Mutraw(Hpapun) District

¹¹¹ Eight civilians incl. two children under 10 killed in junta bombing in Chin's Thantlang
<https://tinyurl.com/2ou6y5bl>



Mon State

Mon State saw two incidents of mass killing involving five or more people in Ye and Thabon Townships, resulting in the death of ten people.

On 5 June 2022, military council troops set fire to Htonebolay village in Thabon Township, arrested two women, and shot and killed three men.¹¹²

112 More than 5 civilians murdered during arson attack on Htonebolay village, nearly 70000 forced to flee <https://tinyurl.com/25u5leeh>

An aerial photograph of a coastline, showing a dark blue ocean on the left and a white sandy beach on the right. The text "International Responses" is centered in the white area.

International Responses

United Nations' response to Myanmar issue (April 2022 – March 2023)

In 2022-2023, the United Nations continued to issue statements of concern over the Myanmar issue. In addition to strongly condemning the execution by the military council and the shooting death of a World Health Organization (WHO) staff member in Mon State. It expressed deep concern over the Hpakant airstrike, it also approved a draft motion on the legal suspension of the death penalty. The UN General Assembly also voted to keep U Kyaw Moe Tun as Myanmar's representative at the UN. The UN chief also reiterated his call for the immediate release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and for international governments to recognize the National Unity Government (NUG). The intergovernmental body also stated that Myanmar's military council was planning a sham election in 2023 and called on international governments, organizations, and election monitoring groups to not provide technical support for the junta elections. In addition, UN experts, including the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, issued a statement that Myanmar's military dictatorship uses social media as a weapon to suppress pro-democracy activists and engages in online violence..

Date	Subject	Note
27 May 2022	Statement on access to learning opportunities for millions of children in Myanmar; access to education for all children. ¹¹³	To facilitate access to learning, the safety of children, their parents, and educators must be protected. These include teachers, volunteer teachers, learning facilitators and education officials. Safe, unimpeded access for the delivery of all humanitarian aid, including the delivery of learning materials, needs to be guaranteed.
8 June 2022	Statement by Mr. Ramanathan Balakrishnan, UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator on the killing of WHO staff member. ¹¹⁴	The United Nations appeals to all parties and stakeholders to respect the neutrality of the United Nations and Humanitarians and further calls for all parties to protect the rights and safety of civilians and strongly condemns acts of violence against civilians. The United Nations expects an impartial investigation into the incident and the perpetrators to be held accountable.
26 July 2022	UN Special Envoy calls for inclusive engagement and innovative solutions for Rohingya during mission to Malaysia. ¹¹⁵	The UN Special Envoy stressed that ultimately it was Myanmar's responsibility to address underlying issues affecting the Rohingya and establish durable solutions for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of all refugees and forcibly displaced persons.
25 July 2022	Secretary-General strongly condemns executions by Myanmar military against political activists. ¹¹⁶	The Secretary-General strongly condemns the executions carried out by the Myanmar military against four political activists in Myanmar — 88 Generation student leader Ko Jimmy, former National League for Democracy lawmaker Phyo Zeya Thaw, Hla Myo Aung and Aung Thura Zaw;

113 <https://tinyurl.com/2e4rphp2> 114 <https://tinyurl.com/2qk5n6ld>

115 <https://tinyurl.com/2kjcnycr> 116 <https://burmese.dvb.no/archives/545257>

17 August 2022	UN Special Envoy requests a meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. ¹¹⁷	The Special Envoy directly urged the Senior General to impose a moratorium on all future executions. She also reiterated the United Nations Secretary-General's call for the release of all political prisoners. She also conveyed a specific request from the Australian Government that has asked for the release of Australian economist Sean Turnell. Personally, I call for the release of all children who are being detained in prisons or other facilities.
15 September 2022	UN says Myanmar junta bans aid humanitarian programs in six townships in Arakan State. ¹¹⁸	The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) said that the military council instructed humanitarian organizations to suspend aid operations in 6 townships in Arakan State.
23 October 2022	Statement by the United Nations in Myanmar on reported airstrikes in Hpakant. ¹¹⁹	The United Nations (UN) in Myanmar is deeply concerned and saddened by reports of airstrikes that took place in Hpakant, Kachin State around 8:00pm on 23 October 2022. Initial reports suggest that over 100 civilians may have been affected by the bombing. Numerous fatalities have also been reported.
25 October 2022	UNHCR reiterates call on Malaysia to stop forcibly repatriating refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar. ¹²⁰	UNHCR said that there have been more than 100 repatriations of Myanmar nationals from Malaysia over the past two months.
11 November 2022	UN approves draft on moratorium of the death penalty. ¹²¹	The ambassador said that prior to the military coup in his country, there was an effective moratorium on the death penalty, even though it was not abolished in the penal code.

117 <https://burmese.dvb.no/archives/549506>

118 <https://burmese.dvb.no/archives/555364>

119 <https://www.mizzimaburmese.com/article/117819>

120 <https://burmese.dvb.no/archives/560822>

121 <https://tinyurl.com/2473fgaf>

16 November 2022	UN calls for protection of Myanmar minority rights in Myanmar. ¹²²	The resolution stated the findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar "of evidence of serious human rights violations and abuses suffered by Rohingya Muslims and other minorities, perpetrated by the security and armed forces of Myanmar, which amount to the gravest crimes under international law.
2 December 2022	High Commissioner for Human Rights calls on to establish moratoriums on the death penalty. ¹²³	At least seven university students were sentenced to death by a military court on 30 November. UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk said that more than 130 people have now been sentenced to death by the military.
2 December 2022	UNHCR warns dramatic increase in Andaman Sea crossings. ¹²⁴	The Southeast Asia waterway is one of the deadliest in the world and more than 1,900 people have already made the journey since January - six times more than in 2020.
17 December 2022	UN General Assembly unanimously approved continuation of U Kyaw Moe Tun as Myanmar's representative. ¹²⁵	The military council has tried three times to get representation at the United Nations (UN), but it has not been granted representation until now.
3 January 2023	UN chief reiterates call for immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi. ¹²⁶	The UN Secretary-General expresses his deep concern over the final verdicts and sentencing of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and reiterates his calls for her immediate release and that of President Win Myint and of all arbitrarily detained prisoners in Myanmar.

122 <https://www.mizzimaburmese.com/article/119259>

123 <https://burmese.dvb.no/archives/566954>

124 <https://burmese.dvb.no/archives/567232>

125 <https://www.mizzimaburmese.com/article/120784>

126 <https://burmese.dvb.no/archives/571994>

17 January 2023	The United Nations Human Rights Council stated that it will not allow Myanmar's military council-appointed permanent representative ambassador to represent the country, but will leave it vacant as previous year. ¹²⁷	Permanent Representative Ambassador U Kyaw Moe Tun, who stands as one with the people of Myanmar and supports the National Unity Government (NUG), as the representative of Myanmar at the UN headquarters, continues to hold his position.
30 January 2023	Secretary-General concerned by military council's intention to hold elections. ¹²⁸	Without conditions that permit the people of Myanmar to freely exercise their political rights, the proposed polls risk exacerbating instability.
31 January 2023	UN Special Rapporteur urged member states to provide recognition to the NUG as the legitimate representative of the people of Myanmar. ¹²⁹	He warned that the junta was planning to seek legitimacy in 2023 by orchestrating a sham election; urged member states, international organizations and election monitoring groups not to provide technical support to Myanmar's military council in its efforts to appear legitimate.
31 January 2023	The UN Special Rapporteur said that the international community has not been able to effectively resolve the Myanmar issue for two years. ¹³⁰	UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews said the military dictators are in desperate need of three key things to continue to prop themselves: funds, weapons, and legitimacy to prop themselves, and in the eyes of the people of Myanmar, these military dictators have no legitimacy at all.
13 March 2023	UN says that Myanmar's military dictatorship weaponizing social media to oppress pro-democracy activists. ¹³¹	UN experts, including UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews, stated on 13 March that the Myanmar's military junta is orchestrating an online campaign of terror, and weaponizing social media platforms to crush democratic opposition.
15 March 2023	The special representative reported to the United Nations that the people had no faith in the military council. ¹³²	UN experts urged Telegram to curb posting online terror campaign by misogynists and members of ultranationalist Patriotic Association of Myanmar .

127 <https://www.mizzimaburmese.com/article/122828>

128 <https://burmese.dvb.no/archives/576275>

129 <https://tinyurl.com/2yole3lu>

130 <https://burmese.dvb.no/archives/576521>

131 <https://burmese.dvb.no/archives/583386>

132 <https://tinyurl.com/2ecrd94r>

ASEAN's response to Myanmar issue

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been largely ineffective in its response to the crisis in Myanmar. The bloc has been unable to agree on a unified approach to the crisis in Myanmar, and its efforts to mediate have been unsuccessful. On April 24, 2021, the leaders of nine ASEAN member states and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing agreed to the following Five point consensus: an immediate end to violence in the country; dialogue among all parties; the appointment of a special envoy; humanitarian assistance by ASEAN; and the special envoy's visit to Myanmar to meet with all parties.

The situation in Myanmar remains volatile and it is unclear how ASEAN will be able to resolve the crisis.

ASEAN's approach to act effectively on Myanmar has been criticized by many, including the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union. The bloc has been accused of being too soft on the military junta and of not doing enough to help the people of Myanmar.

ASEAN's inaction on Myanmar is a major challenge for the bloc. The crisis in Myanmar has the potential to destabilize the region and to undermine ASEAN's credibility. The bloc needs to find a way to resolve the crisis and to show that it is willing to take tough action against those who violate human rights.

29 June 2022	The second working visit of the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar to Myanmar. ¹³³	The delegation led by the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar paid a second working visit to Myanmar for five days from 29 June to 03 July 2022.
27 July 2022	ASEAN Chairman's statement on the execution of four opposition activists in Myanmar. ¹³⁴	ASEAN denounces and is strongly disappointed by the execution of four opposition activists, including Phyo Zeya Thaw, Kyaw Min Yu (aka Ko Jimmy), Hla Myo Aung and Aung Thura Zaw, despite the appeals by Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia, in his capacity as the ASEAN Chair, as well as other ASEAN Member States, for the sentences to be reconsidered.
3 August 2022	Singapore's statement on 55th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting. ¹³⁵	ASEAN noted that no progress has been made on the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC). The decision by the Myanmar military authorities to execute four opposition activists in the week leading up to the 55th AMM was a grave setback for ASEAN's efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution and national reconciliation in Myanmar. It also disrespected the efforts of the ASEAN Chair Cambodia and the ASEAN Special Envoy on Myanmar. Without any progress on this front, further engagement with the Myanmar military authorities would be of limited value. ASEAN is exploring ways to engage with all stakeholders in Myanmar.
3 August 2022	Statement on 55 th ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting. ¹³⁶	We extensively discussed the recent developments in Myanmar and expressed our concerns over the prolonged political crisis in the country, including the execution of four opposition activists. We were deeply

133 <https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/Posts/2022-06-29-News-A-Second-Working-Visit-to-the-Republic-of-the-Union-of-Myanmar---29-June-2022----14-03-26>

134 <https://asean.org/asean-chairmans-statement-on-the-execution-of-four-opposition-activists-in-myanmar/>

135 <https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2022/08/20220803-55th-ASEAN-Foreign-Ministers-Meeting>

136 https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Joint_Communique-of-the-55th-AMM-FINAL.pdf

		<p>disappointed by the limited progress in and lack of commitment of the Nay Pyi Taw authorities to the timely and complete implementation of the Five-Point Consensus.</p> <p>We reiterated our commitment to peace and stability in the region and expressed ASEAN's readiness to assist Myanmar in a positive, peaceful, and constructive manner, including in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.</p>
2 November 2022	ASEAN Chairman's statement on the recent escalation of violence in Myanmar. ¹³⁷	ASEAN is gravely concerned over the recent escalation of violence in Myanmar, including the bombing at Insein prison, hostilities in Karen State, and the most recent report of an airstrike in Kachin State, which hit a civilian gathering, killing and injuring many people. We are deeply saddened by the growing casualties, and the immense suffering that ordinary people in Myanmar have endured.
11 November 2022	ASEAN leaders' review and decision on the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. ¹³⁸	During the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits, the Leaders assessed the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus as agreed at the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting in April 2021. They took note of the recommendations of the 55th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 3 August 2022 and Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers on 27 October 2022.
23 November 2022	9th ASEAN defence ministers' meeting plus (ADMM-Plus) ¹³⁹	Myanmar's military-appointed defense minister has been disinvited from Southeast Asia's top meeting of defense chiefs by host nation Cambodia / The 9th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) was convened on 23 November 2022 in Siem Reap, Cambodia.

137 <https://asean.org/asean-chairmans-statement-on-the-recent-escalation-of-violence-in-myanmar/>

138 <https://asean.org/asean-leaders-review-and-decision-on-the-implementation-of-the-five-point-consensus/>

139 <https://english.cambodiadaily.com/politics/cambodia-blacklists-myanmar-from-an-asean-meeting-180621/>

EU's Response

The EU strongly condemned the military coup and the subsequent violence against protesters and civilians. It called for the immediate release of detained political leaders, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and the restoration of democracy. The EU also imposed targeted sanctions on individuals and entities involved in the coup, including travel bans and asset freezes. In response to the coup, the EU announced a review of its development assistance to Myanmar.

The EU engaged in diplomatic efforts to coordinate a united international response to the crisis in Myanmar. It worked closely with its international partners, including the United Nations (UN) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to find a peaceful and inclusive solution to the crisis. The EU called for dialogue between all parties involved and encouraged ASEAN to play a constructive role in facilitating a peaceful transition.

The EU increased its humanitarian aid to address the deteriorating situation in Myanmar. It provided funding to support essential services, such as healthcare, food assistance, and protection for vulnerable populations affected by the crisis.

The EU provided support to civil society organizations, independent media outlets, and human rights defenders in Myanmar. It aimed to strengthen their capacity to promote and protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The EU also advocated for the release of journalists and activists detained by the military junta.

Date	Particular	Remark
1.06.2022	Paola Pampaloni, Deputy Managing Director of European External Action Service (EEAS) met with UNG's Dr. Zaw Wai Soe, Minister of Health and Education of NUG Myanmar. ¹⁴⁰	Humanitarian support and access for ASEAN Special Envoy to all stakeholders in Myanmar were among the top priorities discussed during a recent meeting between EEAS Deputy Managing Director Paola Pampaloni and Dr. Zaw Wai Soe, Minister of Health and Education of NUG Myanmar.
25.07.2022	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the execution of pro-democracy and opposition leaders in Myanmar. ¹⁴¹	These politically motivated executions represent yet another step towards the complete dismantling of the rule of law and a further blatant violation of human rights in Myanmar. The four men were the first prisoners to be executed in Myanmar in more than three decades, a move that is contrary to the overall worldwide trend to abolish the death penalty. The European Union is fundamentally opposed to the death penalty as an inhumane, cruel and irreversible punishment that violates the inalienable right to life. The executions are reprehensible acts that show that the military authorities have no respect for the life or dignity of the very people they are supposed to protect.
26.07.2022	A joint statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union, and the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, the	
	United Kingdom and the United States, strongly condemning the military regime's execution of pro-democracy and opposition leaders in Myanmar. ¹⁴²	

140 <https://www.facebook.com/EUinMyanmar/photos/a.197755080374039/2248559725293554/>

141 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/07/25/myanmar-burma-declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-execution-of-pro-democracy-and-opposition-leaders-in-myanmar-burma/?fbclid=IwAR3CmFRIS52ugLHOHEXBXLjgGykgDeB6HwXojnwuhr88Ckfb1dD8et7s-IM>

142 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/myanmar-joint-statement-execution-pro-democracy-and-opposition-leaders_en?fbclid=IwAR36D4F3RdO3UwiDE7oT_CAd5Q7HNT7yjppJTuDxEQdJYFIstXp-qDROQIY

5.09.2022	The statement on the sentencing of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to an additional three years. ¹⁴³	The EU condemns the unjustified sentence of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to an additional three years of detention, with hard labour. She now faces 20 years imprisonment on eleven counts with several charges remaining. The EU calls on the regime in Myanmar to release her and all political prisoners.
30.09.2022	Statement by the Spokesperson on the further sentencing of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. ¹⁴⁴	A military court in Myanmar has sentenced detained State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to an additional three years' imprisonment. Her trials are purely politically motivated.
24.10.2022	Joint statement on attacks on civilians in Kachin State. ¹⁴⁵	This attack underscores the military regime's responsibility for the crisis and instability in Myanmar and the region and its disregard for its obligation to protect civilians and respect the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.
8.11.2022	Statement on the EU's imposition of further restrictive measures on 19 individuals and one entity. ¹⁴⁶	The new listings target 19 persons and one entity, including the Minister of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations U Kan Zaw, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court U Htun Htun Oo, high-ranking members of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) and Air Force, members of the Union Election Commission, as well as business representatives of private companies closely connected and providing support to the Tatmadaw.
15.12.2022	EU-ASEAN Commemorative Summit – Joint Leaders' Statement. ¹⁴⁷	We remain deeply concerned over the crisis situation in Myanmar. We recall Myanmar's commitment to the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus during the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting and urge the timely and complete implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, including the ASEAN Leaders' Review and Decision on the Implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. The EU will continue to support ASEAN's efforts to facilitate a peaceful solution in the interest of the

143 <https://twitter.com/JosepBorrellF/status/1566453905688612865>

144 <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/.../myanmar-statement...>

145 <https://www.facebook.com/EUinMyanmar/photos/a.197755080374039/2371300569686135/>

146 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/.../myanmar-burma-eu.../>

147 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/.../eu-asean.../>

		people of Myanmar, including through the work of the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, in building confidence and trust with full access to all parties concerned, and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar, including those who are the most in need, without discrimination.
30.12.2022	Statement by the Spokesperson on the final sentencing of President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. ¹⁴⁸	These trials were carried forward with no respect for due legal procedure or necessary judicial guarantees and are a clear attempt to exclude democratically elected leaders from political life. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Win Myint face a total of 33 and 12 years' imprisonment respectively, including 3 years of hard labour, representing another blatant violation of human rights in Myanmar. The European Union strongly condemns these trials, verdicts and the overall dismantlement of democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar. The EU reiterates its full support for ASEAN efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Myanmar, including the inclusive dialogue called for by ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus.
1.02.2023	Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the 2nd anniversary of the military take-over. ¹⁴⁹	On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military overthrew by force the country's democratically elected government. The EU has always stood unequivocally with the people of Myanmar in their demands for civilian rule and democracy. The continuing escalation of violence by the military regime and the evolution into a protracted conflict throughout Myanmar is alarming, with implications for stability and peace in the broader region. The EU reiterates its call for increased international preventive action, including an arms embargo in order to cease the sale and transfer of arms and equipment, as they facilitate the military's atrocities.

148 <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/.../myanmar-statement...>

149 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/.../myanmar-statement-by.../>

		<p>The EU is fundamentally opposed to the death penalty as an inhumane, cruel and irreversible punishment that violates the inalienable right to life. The EU will continue to provide humanitarian assistance in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. The European Union welcomes the UN Security Council's adoption of Resolution 2669 on Myanmar. Only an inclusive political process involving the National Unity Government (NUG), the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), political parties, civil society, religious and minority leaders, ethnic groups and all other relevant stakeholders in Myanmar, can lead the way out of the protracted crisis in the country and pave the way for a meaningful democratic process.</p>
20.02.2023	<p>EU imposes sixth round of sanctions against 9 individuals and 7 entities.¹⁵⁰</p>	<p>The sanctioned individuals include the Minister for Energy, prominent businessmen who have supported the regime's repression with arms and dual use goods, and high-ranking officers in the Myanmar armed forces that are closely associated with the regime. Also listed are politicians and administrators from the Yangon Region involved in the process of death sentences and execution of four democracy activists in July 2022, and in Kachin State, where they oversaw air strikes, massacres, raids, arson and the use of human shields committed by the military.</p>
8.03.2023	<p>On International Women's Day, which falls today, the Council of Europe, nine individuals and three entities from Myanmar, Russia, South Sudan and Afghanistan have been added to the list of individuals and entities to be sanctioned by the European Union.¹⁵¹</p>	<p>The European Union has decided to sanction Deputy Home Affairs Minister Major General Toe Yi and the Office of the Chief Military Security Officer, responsible for the management of detention and interrogation centres, due to their role in serious human rights abuses and, in particular, sexual and gender-based violence, the statement said.</p>

150 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/.../myanmar-burma-eu.../>

151 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/.../violence-against.../>

29.03.2023	Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the dissolution of democratic political parties. ¹⁵²	On 28 March, the military-appointed Union Election Commission of Myanmar decided to dissolve forty political parties, including the National League for Democracy. These include those parties who won the votes of the vast majority of Myanmar's citizens in the election on 8 November 2020. Yet many of their political leaders have been arrested following the military coup and remain in prison. This decision is yet another demonstration of the blatant disrespect by the military regime for democracy and the rights and wishes of the Myanmar population, and demonstrates the military regime's determination to eradicate any democratic and peaceful opposition to its rule.
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152 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/.../myanmar-statement-by-.../>

China's response

The Sino-Myanmar border is 218,574 kilometres (1,370 miles) long. Historically, China has a close relationship with Myanmar, and has continued to engage with the military council after the military coup. China has long followed a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It has maintained this stance towards Myanmar.

China has significant economic interests in Myanmar, including investments in infrastructure projects, natural resources and energy sectors. It sought to protect its economic interests and maintain a stable environment for ongoing projects in the country. China has been careful not to damage economic relations with Myanmar.

China has been engaging with different stakeholders in Myanmar, including the military council and various ethnic armed groups. China has supported the involvement of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in addressing the situation in Myanmar. China has faced some criticism from the international community for not taking a stronger stance against the military coup and the subsequent human rights abuses in Myanmar. It's important to note that China's position on Myanmar is shaped by various factors, including its strategic interests, economic considerations, regional dynamics, and its broader foreign policy principles. However, China's stance may evolve over time based on the unfolding situation and international pressures.

Date	Particular	Remark
1.04.2022	At the invitation of Mr Wang Yi, State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, U Wunna Maung Lwin, Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, paid a working visit to Huangshan, Anhui Province of the People's Republic of China, according to the statement by the military council's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ¹⁵³	At the meeting, they cordially exchanged views on matters pertaining to the further consolidation of the existing Pauk Phaw relations, accelerating the implementation of Myanmar-China bilateral projects on the basis of mutual benefit, strengthening cooperation in the fights against the Covid-19 pandemic, opening the Myanmar Consulate-General in Chongqing Municipality, the maintenance of peace and stability along the border between Myanmar and China and promotion of trade and commerce between the two countries.
27.06.2022	Union Minister U Ko Ko Hlaing of the Ministry of International Cooperation received Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Mr. Chen Hai, according to the statement by the military council's Foreign Affairs Ministry. ¹⁵⁴	At the meeting, they discussed the matters regarding promotion of bilateral relations and cooperation and regional situation.
30.06.2022	A ceremony to handover Covid-19 vaccines donated by the Chinese government to Myanmar via ASEAN was held. ¹⁵⁵	China provided 51 million vaccines to Myanmar so far. China helped Myanmar with vaccine bottling. A green channel was opened for the supply of anti-epidemic materials
3.07.2022	On 3 July, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi held bilateral talks with Myanmar's Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin on the sidelines of the seventh Lancang-Mekong	Both sides discussed a plan to continue to implement the projects in Myanmar, maintain peace and stability along the border area and to make continued cooperation to ensure the smooth trade at

153 <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=2001147813418837&set=pcb>

154 <https://www.facebook.com/mofamyanmar/photos/a.514086435458323/2070295893170695>

155 <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=5189793484429996&set=pcb.5189793717763306>

	Cooperation Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Bagan, Myanmar. ¹⁵⁶	border gates, the junta-controlled paper reported. Wang Yi said that China will enhance cooperation with Myanmar under the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation. The LMC should better align with the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI) proposed by President Xi Jinping.
4.07.2022	Foreign Minister Wang Yi expounded on China's three expectations in a meeting with Prak Sokhonn, the Special Envoy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for Myanmar on the situation in Myanmar, according to the statement by the Chinese embassy in Myanmar. ¹⁵⁷	China expects to make joint efforts with ASEAN to push Myanmar in pursuit of continuous political reconciliation within the framework of the constitution and laws, and encourage all political parties in Myanmar to prioritize the interests of the people, understand each other and implement stability and peace. China expects to make joint efforts with ASEAN to encourage Myanmar to restart the democratic transition process and
		explore a path of political development with Myanmar's characteristics and in line with Myanmar's national conditions. China expects ASEAN to uphold the "ASEAN way", stay committed to the basic principles and traditions of non-interference in internal affairs and engage in patient coordination, constructively implement the "five-point consensus" of ASEAN, and safeguard the overall solidarity and leading role of ASEAN.
25.07.2022	Chinese foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's comment on the military council's execution of four democracy activists in Myanmar, at the regular press conference. ¹⁵⁸	China always adheres to the principle of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs, said Chinese foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian.

156 <https://www.facebook.com/mofamyanmar/videos/564033791873587>

157 <https://www.facebook.com/paukphawfriendship>

158 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202207/t20220725_10727739.html

24-12-2022	Deng Xijun, the Chinese special envoy to Myanmar, separately met representatives from seven ethnic armed groups of the Union Political Consultative Committee (FPNCC). ¹⁵⁹	The special envoy repeated that China's policy is that it wants stability at the border and does not want to see fighting, that it is wrong to start fighting, that China does not support reciprocal fighting, that fighting is not the right solution to problems, and that China is concerned that fighting will make it more difficult to achieve internal peace.
29.12.2022	Military Council Chair Senior General Min Aung Hlaing received Mr. Deng Xijun, Special Envoy for Asian Affairs of Foreign Affairs Ministry of China, in Nay Pyi Taw. ¹⁶⁰	They discussed peace talks with ethnic armed groups and China's support for the peace process.
21-02-2023	Mr. Deng Xijun, Special Envoy for Asian Affairs of Foreign Affairs Ministry of China met with the Northern Alliance including the UWSP and the KIA in the third week of February. ¹⁶¹	They discussed the opening of the National Unity Government (NUG) foreign affairs office in Washington DC. The Mekong News Agency quoted participants in the discussion as saying that the Chinese side did not like it very much.
6.03.2023	Union Minister for Foreign Affairs U Than Swe received Mr. Deng Xijun, Special Envoy for Asian Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China at the Ministry in Nay Pyi Taw. ¹⁶²	During the meeting, they cordially discussed the matters pertaining to the further consolidation of the existing Pauk Phaw relations and cooperation, the maintenance of peace and stability along the border between Myanmar and China, latest developments on peace and national reconciliation process of Myanmar, and China's continuous constructive support towards Myanmar development endeavors.

159 <https://www.ispmyanmar.com/burmese/ispccd-timeline2022/>

160 <https://cincds.gov.mm/node/20573?d>

161 <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1184655408861061&set=pcb.1184655485527720>

162 <https://www.facebook.com/mofamyanmar/photos/a.524188071114826/2277823282417954/>

India's response to Myanmar issue

After the military coup, India continued to maintain good relations with the military council and provided either diplomatic or military support to the regime. Although the Indian government has not issued an official statement, both military support and bilateral trade and projects continue. In April and June 2022, the Indian ambassador met with ministers U Ko Ko Hlaing and U Khin Yi; there was also a meeting between the Indian foreign minister and Min Aung Hlaing in November 2022. In addition, the Indian ambassador to Myanmar attended the military council's independence ceremony in January 2023.¹⁶³ In the two years since the military took power, India has reportedly supplied weapons to the Myanmar military regime four times.¹⁶⁴

On the one hand, the Indian government did not approve the planned protest rally against the executions by the military council in New Delhi.¹⁶⁵ In addition, two bombs fired by the regime landed on the Indian side of the border, but the Indian government has not even responded to the military council on this matter. In a statement on India's stance on Myanmar, the Indian Foreign Minister said that India cannot shirk from negotiating with the Myanmar military council because Myanmar is India's closest neighbour and at the same time there are border issues such as organized crime, coronavirus, and Indian rebels in Myanmar. In a reply to the Chief Minister of Mizoram on the demand that the government of Mizoram must intervene to restore peace in Myanmar, the Indian Prime Minister replied that his government would do everything in its power. The Indian minister said that the construction of Sittwe Port will be completed in early 2023 and other states, including Mizoram, will have a chance to benefit from the project.

163 <https://www.bbc.com/burmese/articles/cq5ezx754rqo>

164 https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/

[india-myanmar-junta-relations-02162023052601.html](https://www.india-myanmar-junta-relations-02162023052601.html)

165 <https://tinyurl.com/27kdnvx>

Date	Subject	Note
2 August 2022	Indian government cancels protest rally against executions by Myanmar military council. ¹⁶⁶	The government of India did not permit a planned protest by Myanmar nationals in New Delhi against the unjust executions of pro-democracy activists by the military council.
14 August 2022	Interior Minister of Mizoram says there is no collusion between military council and his government. ¹⁶⁷	Concerns among refugees grew after the leak of an internal letter to the military chief regarding the repatriation of refugees from Mizoram on 5 August, signed by junta-appointed foreign minister U Wunna Maung Lwin.
19 August 2022	Indian foreign minister defends ties with Myanmar junta. ¹⁶⁸	As a direct neighbour, India could not avoid dealing with the military junta regime because of border issues such as organized crime, coronavirus and Indian insurgents in Myanmar.
14 September 2022	The Chief Minister of Mizoram urges the Prime Minister of India to intervene in the Myanmar issue. ¹⁶⁹	Mizoram Chief Minister urged Prime Minister Narendra Modi that India should intervene to bring back peace in neighbouring Myanmar. The Prime Minister pledged that the government would work as much as they can to restore peace to the neighbouring nation.
12 January 2023	The Indian Minister says Sittwe Port is ready for use. ¹⁷⁰	In this project, the transport route from the port of Sittwe to Paletwa is planned by water and from Paletwa to the Indian-Myanmar border by road.

166 <https://tinyurl.com/27kdnxvx>

167 <https://tinyurl.com/2qk8kpoj> | <https://tinyurl.com/2f2vwjkn>

168 <https://tinyurl.com/2f2vwjkn>

169 <https://tinyurl.com/2jgcjruj>

170 <https://tinyurl.com/2nklfvqe>

18 January 2023	CIC release with photo evidence that two bombs landed in Indian territory. ¹⁷¹	Residents reported to the government of Mizoram that there had been two bomb explosions in the state, but the Indian government did not respond to the airspace intrusion and the bombings.
19 January 2023	India helping Myanmar's military council produce weapons. ¹⁷²	Justice for Myanmar, which researches and identifies people who have business ties with the Myanmar military, revealed that India's Tonbo Imaging Company is supporting the production of weapons for the Myanmar's military council through its defense equipment manufacturing factories, known locally as Ka Pa Sa.
19 March 2023	India responds to United Nations Special Rapporteur's report. ¹⁷³	In the report presented by Tom Andrews, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, on March 9, the Indian government is trying to find a way to prevent refugees fleeing violence and human rights violations in neighbouring Myanmar. He said that this is beyond the authority of the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar.

171 <https://tinyurl.com/2njvz9uk> <https://tinyurl.com/2kelecod>

172 <https://tinyurl.com/2kelecod>

173 <https://tinyurl.com/22crdbmr>

Thailand's response to Myanmar issue

Thailand has been relatively cautious in its response to the crisis in Myanmar. The Thai government has expressed concern about the violence and has called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. However, the Thai government has also been reluctant to criticize the military in Myanmar.

There are a few reasons for Thailand's cautious approach. First, Thailand shares a long border with Myanmar. The Thai government is concerned about the potential for the conflict in Myanmar to spill over into Thailand. Second, the Thai military has close ties to the military junta in Myanmar. The Thai government does not want to jeopardize these ties. Third, Thailand is a member of ASEAN. The Thai government is reluctant to take a stand that could isolate Myanmar from ASEAN.

Thailand's cautious approach has been criticized by some. Some have argued that the Thai government is not doing enough to help the people of Myanmar. The Thai government has argued that it is trying to play a constructive role in resolving the crisis in Myanmar. It is unclear how long Thailand will be able to maintain its cautious approach.

22 December 2022	Informal meeting of ASEAN member countries on Myanmar issue. ¹⁷⁴	Thailand has invited interested members of ASEAN to join an informal meeting on the situation in Myanmar. The meeting was attended by foreign ministers of the Myanmar military council, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Notably, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore skipped the meeting.
19 January 2023	8 th high-level committee meeting between armed forces of Myanmar and Thailand. ¹⁷⁵	State Administration Council Chairman Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services Senior General Min Aung Hlaing received Chief of the Defence Forces of the Royal Thai Armed Forces General Chalermphon Srisawasdi at Ngapali Beach Resort in Thandwe, Arakan State. The leaders of the two armies discussed cooperation on border security and stability and agreed to establish a framework for cooperation between the two armies in the future.

174 <https://www.thaipbsworld.com/thailand-to-host-non-asean-meeting-on-myanmar/>

175 <https://www.gnlm.com.mm/8th-high-level-committee-meeting-between-myanmar-and-thai-armed-forces-held/>

US's response

The United States has been actively involved in the restoration of democracy in Myanmar since the 2021 military coup. It has also been involved in sanctioning the military council officials and their related businesses.

The United States, through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), is providing an additional \$50 million in humanitarian assistance for emergency food and nutrition assistance in Burma, where increased displacements, armed conflict, and growing food insecurity are compounding existing needs, the US Embassy in Yangon announced on 15 February.

More significantly, the US House of Representatives voted to approve the Burma Act bill on December 7, 2022 as part of the US government's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which would sanction military coup officials and support resistance forces.

Under the bill, the U.S. government encourages and supports the National Unity Government (NUG), the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and the Union Representative Committee of the Union Hluttaw (CRPH), sanctions the military council officials and heads of state-owned enterprises, to encourage and support the actions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Independent Investigation Mechanism (IIMM) for the Myanmar military's human rights violations. It provides humanitarian aid to the people of Myanmar, in need of emergency aid, without the military council's channel and provides non-lethal assistance to the CSOs, CDM, EROs and the PDFs.

The National Defense Authorization Act was signed into law by US President Biden on December 23, 2022.

Date	Particular	Remark
11-05-2022	"We support ASEAN's decision to invite nonpolitical representatives from Burma to high-level ASEAN events absent progress on the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus that was put forward," Ned Price, Department of State Spokesperson said. ¹⁷⁶	We will follow ASEAN's precedent for the upcoming U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit, and we're going to continue to follow that precedent because the regime has demonstrably failed to make progress on ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus and it continues to escalate its violence, its repression against the people of Burma, according to the US Embassy statement.
13-05-2022	Deputy Secretary Sherman met in Washington with NUG representatives, including Daw Zin Mar Aung. ¹⁷⁷	The Deputy Secretary underscored robust U.S. support for the people of Burma in the face of the regime's brutal crackdown and pledged to continue providing support to all those working peacefully toward the restoration of Burma's path to inclusive democracy.
16-05-2022	ASEAN-U.S. Special Summit 2022, Joint Vision Statement. ¹⁷⁸	We remain deeply concerned over the crisis in Myanmar. We highlight Myanmar's commitment to the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus during the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting on 24 April 2021 and urge the timely and complete implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. We will continue to support ASEAN's efforts to facilitate a peaceful solution in the interest of the people of Myanmar, including through the work of the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, in building confidence and trust with full access to all parties

176 <https://www.facebook.com/usembassy.rangoon/photos/a.127051360710025>

177 go.usa.gov/xuH93

178 <https://go.usa.gov/xuMGE>

		concerned, and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar, including those who are the most in need, without discrimination. We welcome close coordination between the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar and the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar to ensure synergy in this important endeavor.
23-05-2023	The United States-Republic of Korea Leaders' Joint Statement by President Biden and Republic of Korea (ROK) President Yoon Suk Yeol. ¹⁷⁹	The two Presidents resolutely condemn the coup in Myanmar and the military's brutal attacks on civilians, and commit to press for the immediate cessation of violence, the release of those who are detained, unfettered countrywide humanitarian access, and a swift return to democracy. The two Presidents call on all nations to join us in providing safe haven to Burmese nationals and in prohibiting arms sales to Myanmar."
23-05-2022	Japan-U.S. Joint Leaders' Statement: Strengthening the Free and Open International Order. ¹⁸⁰	"Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden condemned the coup in Myanmar and the Myanmar military's brutal attacks on civilians, and committed to continue taking action to press for the immediate cessation of violence, the release of all those who are wrongfully detained, unfettered countrywide humanitarian access, and a swift return to democracy."

179 <https://go.usa.gov/xJ3P4>

180 <https://go.usa.gov/xJ3vY>

24-05-2022	Quad Joint Leaders' Statement. ¹⁸¹	"We remain deeply concerned by the crisis in Myanmar, which has caused grave humanitarian suffering and posed challenges to regional stability. We continue to call for the immediate end to violence in Myanmar, the release of all political detainees, including foreigners, engagement in constructive dialogue, humanitarian access, and the swift restoration of democracy. We reaffirm our support for ASEAN-led efforts to seek a solution in Myanmar and welcome the role of Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair. We further call for the urgent implementation of the ASEAN Five Point Consensus."
6-06-2022	The US State Department's statement on the Myanmar military regime's reported plans to execute pro-democracy and opposition leaders. ¹⁸²	"The United States strongly condemns the Burmese military regime's reported plans to execute pro-democracy and opposition leaders, exemplifying the regime's disregard for human rights and the rule of law. We urge the release of all unjustly detained," Ned Price, Department of State Spokesperson said.
17-06-2022	US Secretary of State applaud the United Kingdom's announcement to impose sanctions on entities supporting Russia's aggression against Ukraine as well as on companies perpetuating the Myanmar military regime. ¹⁸³	"I applaud the United Kingdom's announcement today to impose sanctions on entities supporting Russia's aggression against Ukraine as well as on companies perpetuating the Myanmar military regime's brutal violence against the people of Myanmar," Secretary of State Antony Blinken said.

181 <https://go.usa.gov/xJxa5>

182 <https://www.facebook.com/usembassy.rangoon/photos/a.127051360710025/5132551736826604/>

183 <https://www.facebook.com/usembassy.rangoon/photos/a.127051360710025/5163230857092025/>

22-06-2022	US embassy issued statement on mourning the 2,000 civilians murdered by the military regime since the February 2021 coup. ¹⁸⁴	The military's nationwide, inhumane atrocities committed against the people of Burma underscore the urgency of holding its members accountable. Since the coup, the United States has sanctioned the military regime, its leaders, and their financial interests, disrupting their access to the international financial system. We will continue to work with our partners and the people of Burma to promote accountability, including by supporting the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, while also continuing to press for a restoration of Burma's path to peace and democracy.
26-07-2022	The United States strongly condemns the Burma military regime's executions of pro-democracy activists and elected leaders. ¹⁸⁵	The United States condemns in the strongest terms the Burma military regime's executions of pro-democracy activists and elected leaders Ko Jimmy, U Phyto Zeya Thaw, U Hla Myo Aung, and U Aung Thura Zaw for the exercise of their fundamental freedoms," said Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
26-07-2022	The joint statement on condemning the military regime's execution of pro-democracy and opposition leaders in Myanmar. ¹⁸⁶	The joint statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union, and the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States, condemning the military regime's execution of pro-democracy and opposition leaders in Myanmar.

184 <https://www.facebook.com/usembassy.rangoon/videos/1392319584567994>

185 <https://bit.ly/3zA2s8B>

186 <https://bit.ly/3cuJt63>

29-07-2022	Execution of pro-democracy and opposition leaders in Myanmar: G7 Foreign Ministers Joint Statement. ¹⁸⁷	the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, strongly condemn the four executions by the military junta in Myanmar, the statement said.
2-08-2022	Assistant Secretary of State Daniel J. Kritenbrink met U Moe Zaw Oo of the NUG. ¹⁸⁸	"I met U Moe Zaw Oo of the NUG to personally express condolences over the Burmese military's horrific executions and to discuss how we can step up support for the people of Burma. We continue to impose costs on the regime for its reprehensible violence and repression," Assistant Secretary of State Daniel J. Kritenbrink said.
8-8-2022	Statement from the US Embassy on the 34th anniversary of the 8888 Democracy Movement. ¹⁸⁹	As the 34th anniversary of the 8888 Democracy Movement is being commemorated at home and abroad, the US Embassy in Myanmar has issued a statement asking the military council to respect the democracy and human rights that the people of Myanmar have been longing for.

187 <https://bit.ly/3PZjWk3>

188 <https://www.facebook.com/usembassy.rangoon/photos/a.127051360710025/5289459864469123/>

189 <https://www.facebook.com/usembassy.rangoon/photos/a.127051360710025/5298551383559971/>

20-09-2022	The Department of State announced an additional contribution of \$1 million through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM). ¹⁹⁰	This contribution will further support the IIMM's efforts to ensure victim and witness protection, while also increasing the mechanism's access to important credible information of crimes committed within the scope of the IIMM's mandate to investigate, collect, preserve, and analyze evidence of the most serious international crimes in Burma since 2011.
6-10-2022	The statement on designations of Burmese Targets to Promote Justice and Accountability. ¹⁹¹	The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating three individuals, U Aung Moe Myint, U Hlaing Moe Myint, and U Myo Thitsar, for their roles related to the procurement Russian-produced military arms from Belarus for the Burmese regime, as well as Dynasty International Company Limited, under Executive Order 14014.
24-10-2022	Joint Statement on Attacks on Civilians in Kachin State. ¹⁹²	Indiscriminate attacks which include civilian victims continue to cause extraordinary harm and suffering across the country. This attack underscores the military regime's responsibility for crisis and instability in Myanmar and the region and its disregard for its obligation to protect civilians and respect the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

190 <https://mm.usembassy.gov/my/u-s-contribution-for-the-uns-independent-investigative-mechanism-for-myanmars-witness-protection-efforts-mm/>

191 https://www.facebook.com/usembassy.rangoon/photos/a.127051360710025/5472469566168151/?paipv=0&eav=Afa7iKiiWPqE_tK8FEcGOamszS91Swj61rqxauXBDG_armCmVdYjm02nNjCted8dsKY&_rdr

192 <https://www.facebook.com/usembassy.rangoon/photos/a.127051360710025/5524550780960029/>

7-11-2022	Press statement on the 2 nd Anniversary of the 2020 Elections in Myanmar. ¹⁹³	The United States, alongside our allies and partners, will continue to take measures to impose consequences for the regime's atrocities. We will persist in working with
		our partners to ensure justice and accountability and deny the regime revenue and resources as we press the regime to cease the violence and respect the will of the people and their demands for democracy, rule of law, and human dignity, said ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE.
8-11-2022	Press statement on the designation of the Burmese regime's military aircraft suppliers. ¹⁹⁴	The Department of the Treasury is designating Sky Aviator Company Limited and its owner and director, U Kyaw Min Oo, pursuant to Executive Order 14014, for operating in the defense sector of the Burmese economy.
22-12-2022	The United States welcomes the UN Security Council's adoption of Resolution 2669 on Myanmar, said Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State about UN Security Council's adoption of resolution on Myanmar. ¹⁹⁵	The United States welcomes the UN Security Council's adoption of Resolution 2669 on Myanmar. This is an important step by the Security Council to address the crisis and end the Burma military regime's escalating repression and violence against civilians. the Security Council still has much more work to do to advance a just solution to the crisis in Burma. We remain committed to working with the UN and our international partners, including ASEAN, to end the violence in Burma and seek a peaceful reconciliation to the crisis, the statement said.

193 <https://mm.usembassy.gov/my/the-second-anniversary-of-the-2020-elections-in-burma-mm/>

194 <https://mm.usembassy.gov/my/designation-of-the-burmese-regimes-military-aircraft-suppliers-mm/>

195 <https://www.facebook.com/usembassy.rangoon/photos/a.127051360710025/5701527896595649/>

23-12-2022	In December 2022, President Biden signed the National Defense Authorization Act, which includes the BURMA Act. ¹⁹⁶	According to the Burma Act, which is part of the NDAA, the United States government budgeted \$50 million per year for Myanmar democracy activities and allocated five years. It also includes providing \$220 million in humanitarian aid to Myanmar for the fiscal year 2023, and Myanmar will receive aid from 2023 to 2027.
31-01-2023	U.S. Embassy Rangoon honors the more than 2,900 people who have lost their lives as a result of the February 1, 2021, military coup. ¹⁹⁷	<p>The United States has led efforts to hold the regime accountable for its campaign of violence since the coup, sanctioning both individuals and entities, including arms and aircraft parts suppliers.</p> <p>In December 2022, President Biden signed the National Defense Authorization Act, which includes the BURMA Act. The United States continues to work with its international partners to support the people of Burma in their fight for democracy and human rights. We will continue to pressure the military regime to end its brutal violence against civilians and respect the will of the people.</p>
31-01-2023	Press statement on the 2 nd anniversary of coup in Myanmar by	Since the military's coup on February 1, 2021, the political, economic, and

196 <https://news-eleven.com/article/242168>

197 <https://www.facebook.com/usembassy.rangoon/videos/728263762161844>

	<p>Antony John J. Blinken, Secretary of State.¹⁹⁸</p>	<p>humanitarian crisis in Burma has only grown more dire, with reports indicating nearly 3,000 killed, nearly 17,000 detained, and more than 1.5 million displaced. The regime's ongoing scorched-earth campaign continues to inflict harm and claim the lives of innocent people, fueling a worsening armed conflict within Burma and insecurity beyond its borders. Today, the United States is imposing sanctions on six individuals and three entities linked to the regime's efforts to generate revenue and procure arms, including senior leadership of Burma's Ministry of Energy, Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), and Burma's Air Force, as well as an arms dealer and a family member of a previously designated business associate of the military. We are also sanctioning the Union Electoral Commission. We are taking today's action in conjunction with actions also being taken by the United Kingdom and Canada. The United States will continue to support the pro-democracy movement and its efforts to advance peace and multiparty governance in Burma. The United States will also continue to promote accountability for the military's atrocities, including through support to the UN's Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and other international efforts to protect and support vulnerable populations, including Rohingya.</p>
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198 <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1233>

15-02-2023	United States Announces additional \$50 Million in Humanitarian Assistance for the People of Burma. ¹⁹⁹	The United States, through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), is providing an additional \$50 million in humanitarian assistance for emergency food and nutrition assistance in Burma, where increased displacements, armed conflict, and growing food insecurity are compounding existing needs.
4-03-2023	The U.S. Commerce Department has added entities in Myanmar to the entity List in response to new export restrictions, coup and violence against peaceful protestors. ²⁰⁰	The U.S. Commerce Department has added three entities in Myanmar to the Entity List for providing surveillance technology to Myanmar's military regime and enabling the regime to track, identify, and commit human rights abuses against individuals in Myanmar.
24-3-2023	United States Imposes Additional Sanctions on Jet Fuel Suppliers and Military Cronies to Address Burma Military Regime's Atrocities, said Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State. ²⁰¹	We are designating two individuals and six entities. The U.S. Department of the Treasury is imposing sanctions on U Tun Min Latt and his spouse Daw Win Min Soe, as well as three entities owned or controlled by U Tun Min Latt.
30-03-2023	The statement on the abolition of political parties in Myanmar. ²⁰²	We strongly condemn the Burma military regime-controlled Union Election Commission's decision to abolish 40 political parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD).

199 <http://www.usaid.gov/humanitarian.../burma-bangladesh>

200 <https://tinyurl.com/USDC20230304MM>

201 <https://www.facebook.com/usembassy.rangoon/photos/a.127051360710025/5985775141504255>

202 <https://www.facebook.com/usembassy.rangoon/photos/a.127051360710025/6003020326446403/>

Japan's response to Myanmar issue

The government of Japan continued to provide humanitarian aid in 2022 after the military takeover and also put an end to training military officers in cooperation with the regime, in response to demands from international organizations and activists. Japan condemned the airstrike in Hpakant, expressed concern over the exclusion of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party from the upcoming elections, and called on the military regime to immediately stop terrorist acts against the people, release detained individuals including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, restore the democratic political system, and develop practical political processes.

Dr. Sasakawa, Chairman of the Nippon Foundation, also called for maintaining the period of stability interrupted by the informal ceasefire between the military council and the Arakan Army (AA) and provided humanitarian aid to Arakan State.

Date	Subject	Note
25 July 2022	Japan expresses condolences over execution of Myanmar citizens, including pro-democracy activists. ²⁰³	Japan once again strongly urges the Myanmar military to faithfully work towards the peaceful resolution of the situation through taking concrete actions to (1) immediately stop the violence, (2) release those who are detained, and (3) swiftly restore Myanmar's democratic political system.
10 August 2022	HRW urges that the Japanese government should immediately stop the military training program with Myanmar and investigate whether program participants have been involved in operations violating the laws-of-war. ²⁰⁴	A Myanmar army general who received military training in Japan served as a high-ranking officer in a regional command implicated in serious abuses in ethnic minority areas.

203 <https://yktnews.com/2022/07/25216/>

204 <https://tinyurl.com/2lw77yes>

19 August 2022	The government of Japan says that it will continue to provide humanitarian aid programs, including the ODA assistance previously signed to Myanmar. ²⁰⁵	Protesters, through officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, delivered a request to the Japanese government to stop ODA and provide assistance to the National Unity Government.
20 September 2022	Japan to suspend Myanmar military training program. ²⁰⁶	We have decided that it is not appropriate to continue military cooperation and exchanges in their current form because the military regime disregarded warnings of violence against the people of Myanmar in February 2021 and executed four democracy activists last July, a ministry spokesman said.
25 October 2022	Japan's Foreign Minister condemns Hpakant airstrike; calls for immediate cessation of violence. ²⁰⁷	The government of Japan again strongly urges the Myanmar military to make sincere efforts for the peaceful resolution of the situation by taking concrete actions to immediately stop the violence, release those who are detained including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and swiftly restore Myanmar's democratic political system.
23 January 2023	HRW reports that a Japanese construction company is helping Myanmar's military dictators. ²⁰⁸	HRW said that between July and November 2022, Yokogawa Corporation transferred more than 1.3 million US dollars to the Myanmar Economic Corporation for the Bago River Bridge Construction Project in Yangon.
4 February 2023	Dr. Sasakawa, Chairman of the Japan Nippon Foundation, urges the two armies to observe the informal ceasefire to ensure humanitarian assistance and stability in Arakan State. ²⁰⁹	Dr. Sasakawa said this during a meeting with U Oo Hla Saw, the political representative of the AA during his third visit to Arakan State on February 4.
23 March 2023	Japan expresses concerns about further exclusion of NLD from political processes. ²¹⁰	The Government of Japan urges the Government of Myanmar to release NLD leaders, including State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, as soon as possible and to chart a path to a peaceful resolution involving all relevant parties.

205 <https://tinyurl.com/2q968wpx> 206 <https://tinyurl.com/2lsufw88>

207 <https://tinyurl.com/2bqsjmp3> 208 <https://tinyurl.com/2z5q9gqz>

209 <https://tinyurl.com/2b9btewc> 210 <https://tinyurl.com/2e6z9rfp>

An aerial photograph of a mountain slope covered in snow. The snow is bright white, and there are patches of dark blue and grey, likely representing rocks or shadows. The sky is a clear, pale blue. The overall scene is serene and high-altitude.

Weekly News Review



**I've even killed 26 people. How did
you kill them?
(We) shot and killed some of them.
But I cut their throats...
I killed many by cutting their throats.**



Confessions of the murderous criminals (Issue No 59)

Introduction

In the wake of the coup, the military has grabbed control of the country. There have been atrocities every day due to unjust orders and directives.

The documentary video titled "26 people were killed" released by the Radio Free Asia (RFA) on 18 June evidently shows the inhumane violence committed by the military, such as the arrests, torture, killings and arson. The Myanmar Peace Monitor's Weekly News Review for this week conducts a review based on that documentary video.

Incident

A local from Ayardaw Township in Sagaing Region got an Oppo brand mobile phone which fell from the pocket of a soldier of the military council. The local sent the video files and photos taken by the mobile phone owner, to the RFA. On 18 June, the RFA covered the news titled "26 civilians were killed."

In the video file, three soldiers of the military council are recounting their experiences in the killings of civilians with appreciation.

"I killed 26 people." "How did you kill the people?" "You have killed 26 people." "How did you kill the people?" "The people were shot dead" "I even cut off their heads." "I cut off many heads."

This is a conversation between the corporal with two bars and the soldier who was taking the video. The RFA released a 9.5 minute-long-video file in which the soldiers made a conversation about the killings of civilians and their inhumane acts. The RFA said it had got 144 photos from the mobile phone.

That video file was recorded at the Basic Education High School (BEHS) (branch) in Ponnakar (East) Pinsi village located about three miles in the west of Monetaingpin village in Ye-U Township in Shwebo District of Sagaing Region, on May 12th, 2022, Captain Zero (aka) Captain Khant Ko who has joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) posted on his social media at 7.46 pm on 18 June. On 12 May, the soldiers arrested 40 locals from Ponnakar village. Then, they killed Ko Aung Myo Htet, 26, and dismembered his body into three parts. Then, they covered the body parts with sand in the south of the school, captain Khant Ko said. The RFA's documentary video released some of 144 photos from the mobile phone. In the photos, around 30 civilians are sitting with their hands tied behind their backs in the compound of a monastery. The photo shows the soldier recording five persons lying in a pool of blood with exit wounds in the back of their heads, their eyes tied with longyi and their hands tied behind back. In a photo, the soldier is interrogating



a civilian by putting a knife to his chest. According to the dates found in the photos from the mobile phone, the phone owner took those photos from 13 April to 8 June 2022.

Related news records

In early May 2022, two military columns conducted an offensive. On 10 May, locals fled to safer places as the military council fired shots in Monetaingpin village in YeU Township. The military council arrested more than 50 civilians who were unable to flee. On 12 May, the military released more than 20 women and children. The military continues to detain more than 30 villagers. Soldiers left after burning down homes in Monetaingpin village.

The villagers returned to put out the fires. They found 29 burnt houses and 31 charred bodies.

"Twenty-nine houses in Monetaingpin village were burned down. We found 17 dead bodies on the first day. Two persons were hit by heavy shells. On 13 June, additional 13 bodies were found. We found 31 dead bodies. We cannot confirm who they are," a local from Ye-U Township told the Democratic

Voice of Burma (DVB).

During ten days from 4-13th May 2022, the soldiers of the military council burned down up to 115 civilian houses in Ye-U Township—12 houses in Inpin village, seven in Sisone village, 75 houses in Paygyi village, nine in Hnawkone village, 21 in Chanthar village, two in Thanthal village and 29 in Monetaingpin village.

In April 2022, more than 60 bodies of those killed were found near the villages, beside the rivers and creeks, roads and railroads in Ye-U Township and cremated, an official of the Ponenyakuthala Social Organization told the Kachin News Group (KNG).

Review

Up to May 2022, 279 days of fighting were reported in Sagaing Region which is the strongest resistance area compared to other regions and states, according to the BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor. As being a region with the strongest resistance, the military is committing murder, massacres, arson, airstrikes, arrests, and use of civilians as human shields. According to Data For Myanmar, up to 31 May 2022, 13,837 civilian houses in 27 townships in Sagaing Region were burned down by the military.

The above-mentioned confessions of the soldiers have accentuated the atrocities committed by military council forces. By looking at the words of the corporal of the military council, "I killed the one whom I arrested. The sergeant told me to cut the detainee into three parts and buried those parts." Soldiers are unsympathetically carrying out arrests, tortures and killings on their own. The confessions will be used as evidence. However, the military places blame on subordinates. For example, the Indin massacre in Arakan State.

It is worth monitoring whether their confessions can help the groups and persons who are familiar with the junta during the Spring Revolution including China, Russia and ASEAN countries which cannot distinguish between Dhamma and Adhamma, to distinguish between right and wrong.

The confession is another case reported about Myanmar people who are facing daily atrocities. It is difficult to calculate how many violent cases the soldiers are committing across the country. We need to document the unlawful acts committed by the military council forces.



**Ma Mya Thawe Thawe Khaing,
a young woman,
was the first person killed
following the military coup**



Military coup and women (Issue 79)

Introduction

Repeated calls for negotiations with those who are committing war crimes have a huge impact not only on Myanmar's security but also on women, peace and security, according to a statement issued by women involved in Myanmar's peacemaking process on 31 October 2022.

The joint statement was issued on the 22nd year anniversary of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. The statement pointed out that the international community is turning a blind eye to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide against ethnic groups including the Rohingya.

This Weekly News Review by Burma News International (BNI) - Myanmar Peace Monitor (MPM) focuses on the insecurities faced by women in Myanmar society throughout the coup period.

UNSCR 1325

The landmark UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security, was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council on 31 October 2000. The UN Security Council formally acknowledged through the creation of Resolution 1325 the changing nature of warfare, in which civilians are increasingly targeted, and women continue to be excluded from participation in peace processes. The 18-point resolution specifically addresses how women and girls are disproportionately impacted by violent conflict and war, and recognizes the critical role that women can and already do play in peacebuilding efforts. Resolution 1325 calls for the inclusion of gender perspectives in peace and security processes. It also calls upon all parties to conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from violence in armed conflict, particularly sexual and gender-based violence.

Resolution 1325 calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to fully respect international laws pertaining to the protection of women and girls rights, particularly the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocols, the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Optional Protocol, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and 1999 Optional Protocol, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and 2000 Optional Protocol, and the articles listed in the 2002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

During the period from the coup on 1 February 2021 to 31 October 2022, the number of women killed by various forms of violence in Myanmar has reached 344.



Point No.11 of Resolution 1325 emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls. It stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible, from amnesty provisions.

Military takeover and defenseless women

During the period from 1 February 2021 to 31 October 2022, the number of women killed by various forms of violence in Myanmar has reached 344. The total number of women detained has reached 2,636, according to the joint statement released by the Burmese Women's Union (BWU) and the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP).

According to the statement, 227 women have been convicted and subsequently imprisoned. Of them, nine women received a death sentence, 11 women were sentenced to life imprisonment, and 37 women to more than nine years' imprisonment.

Ma Mya Thwe Thwe Khaing, who was killed at a peaceful protest on 19 February 2021, became the first young woman who sacrificed her life after the military coup. Similar to Ma Mya Thwe Thwe Khaing, 19-year-old Ma Kyal Sin (aka Kyar Shie), was killed during a protest in Mandalay.

The above-mentioned figures presented by the BWU and AAPP cover only three issues - arrest, killing, and sentencing. Women in the whole of Myanmar are still facing other forms of insecurity which may be challenging to document in terms of figures.

The majority of women and children may be among the millions of IDPs and refugees displaced by a wider civil war following the 2021 military coup. Moreover, the news about inhumane violence such as targeted attacks even on IDP camps, and the indiscriminate artillery shelling and airstrikes committed, are still being circulated on social media every day.

Review

Similar to men, Myanmar women have been playing a leading role in anti-coup peaceful protests since 1 February 2021. Women are participating in every part of the Myanmar Spring Revolution, and have transformed from self-defence to armed resistance.

The anti-coup protest columns led by women are still marching. During the Spring Revolution, the country witnessed movements led by female-only revolutionary battalions and forces. Since the coup, women in Myanmar have faced increasing insecurity, and challenges. At least 12 female civilians have been reportedly raped to death, or raped after being killed by soldiers, according to the AAPP's statement on 9 November 2022.

Resolution 1325 calls on all parties to conflict to adopt special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in situations of armed conflict. Despite that, the

forces of the Spring Revolution, which are marching and resisting with the goal of rooting out the military dictatorship and building up a federal democratic union, have not received practical assistance apart from the UN's mere expressions of serious concerns. Resolution 1325 has not yet protected Myanmar women from the insecurity they are facing. It is recommended that the UN should remember Resolution 1325 adopted by its Security Council, and earnestly seek ways to enable Myanmar women to be protected from atrocities.



The military council pressured the Union Election Commission with unconstitutional demands such as requesting to inspect soldiers' ballots and re-examine voter lists, as per the phrase "there is nothing I dare not do".



Spring Revolution and the Role of Political Party (Issue 56)

Introduction

The role of political parties which usually ask for the public's votes by offering various incentives to the public during the Spring Revolution, are said to be disappearing. It is surprising that the political parties which ask for votes from the public whenever the election draws to close, remain silent although they have experienced the military coup and the military's atrocities such as brutal crackdown, arrests, killings and arsons every day.

The BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor's weekly news review for this week focuses on the role of the political parties during the Spring Revolution.

Background


Let's start with the 2020 General Elections held in Myanmar. It is related to the 1 February 2021 military coup. According to the final records released by the Union Election Commission (UEC) on 15 November 2020, there were 476 elected candidates in the Union parliament (a combination of the upper house and lower house). A total of 315 lower house candidates planned to attend the first-day session of the parliament on 1 February.

The National League for Democracy (NLD) won the 2020 General Election by securing up to 396 seats while the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) secured 33 seats, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) secured 15 seats, the Arakan National Party (ANP) secured eight seats, and the Mon Unity Party (MUP), the Ta'ang National Party (TNP), the KySDP (Kayah State Democratic Party), secured five seats each. The Pa-O National Organization (PNO) secured four seats, and the Arakan Front Party (AFP), the Kachin State People's Party (KSPP), the Wa National Party (WNP), the Zomi Congress for Democracy (ZCD) and the New Democratic Party (NDP)-Kachin, secured one seat each.

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing said after casting his vote at Zeyar Thiri Township in Nay Pyi Taw that he would accept the election results. More than 90 political parties participated in the 2020 General Elections.

"We will accept the election results which emerge in conformity with the public's desires. We cannot deny it. We must accept it. It is required to think about ways to calm the distress of our citizens," the military leader said before the release of election results. However, after the declaration of election results, the military pressured the UEC through the demands which go beyond the existing laws such as the demand for checking the ballots of servicemen and rechecking vote lists, in line with his previous statement: "There is nothing I won't dare to do."

The seats at the Union Parliament from the results of the 2020 General Elections.



Parties	Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (2020 Election Results)
NLD	396
USDP	33
PNO	4
SNLD	15
AFP	1
ANP	8
KySDP	5
MUP	5
KSPP	1
WNP	1
ZCD	1
TNP	5
NDP(Kachin)	1



The military council led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing seized power and detained the President, the State Counsellor and top government leaders at dawn on 1 February 2021 before the session of the lower house parliament began.

The direction of the political parties which have friendly relations with the military group

The military councilled by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, formed the State Administration Council (SAC), invited representatives from political parties with friendly relations to the military to become members of the SAC. One member from the Arakan National Party (ANP), one of the winning parties in the 2020 General Elections, was appointed as a member of the SAC. Even the USDP members were not included in the SAC.

Among the 34 parties, which met with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing before the 2020 General Elections, U Khin Maung Swe from the National Democratic Force (NDF) and U Thein Nyunt from the New National Democracy Party (NNDP) became the SAC members despite losing the elections. The significant point is that 34 parties including the KySDP, the WNP and the USDP secured some union, state and regional-level seats only. The remaining 29 parties secured no seats in the election.

The military council attempted to change the electoral system and the peace process following the 2021 military coup. We notice the fact that the military is cooperating with the political parties which it has friendly relations with. As the military reformed the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) through the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) path without the cabinet and parliaments, U Ko Ko Gyi from the People's Party and Dr. Aye Maung from the Arakan Front Party (AFP) resigned from it.

The military-appointed UEC led by U Thein Soe is attempting to shift from the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) voting system to a Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system. The UEC still neglects to mention that 25 percent of parliamentary seats are reserved for the military.

Although the military staged a coup and rejected the results of the 2020 General Elections, it is attempting to inspect the flows of money to political parties which competed in the election. The military is trying every possible

means to cancel the results of the 2020 General Elections by scrutinising the winning parties, including the NLD - whose leaders were detained - and the SNLD.

Some political parties have a close relationship to the military, while others are defying the military coup. There are still political parties that remain under the shadow of the 2008 Constitution.

The political parties which go along with the Spring Revolution

The NLD and the Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS) have publicly announced their participation in the Spring Revolution with a goal to root out the military dictatorship and build up a federal democratic union. However, the NLD is not included in the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) which is at the forefront of the Spring Revolution. The NLD is included in the NUCC as the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH).

The DPNS is the only political party included in the NUCC. The DPNS is participating in the Spring Revolution by setting its political goal to totally abolish the military dictatorship and build up a federal democratic union which can guarantee national equality and self-determination.

The Kayah State Democratic Party (KySDP) and the Ta'ang National Party (TNP), which secured some seats in the 2020 General Elections, are participating in the Spring Revolution. Sai Nyunt Lwin, the newly-elected chair of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) has said that the SNLD would stand for Dhamma.

During the Spring Revolution, the political parties are involved in every strata of the groups and forces which defy the military by representing relevant races and the states instead of the role of political party. Their activities have changed to represent ethnic nationalities rather than their own political agenda.

Finding and review

In summary, the stance and activities of political parties during the Spring Revolution has changed. There are political parties which have friendly relations to the military, those which cannot decide which side they should stand on, those which continue to adhere to the 2008 Constitution, and those working to root out the military dictatorship. We also notice that there are some political parties which are paying attention to the path of political dialogue with the military.

This is the period of urgent demand for weak coordination among political forces to cooperate on the common goal of abolishing the military dictatorship, democratic affairs, peace, and the establishment of a federal democratic union.

This is said to be the period of urgent demand for weak coordination among political forces to firmly cooperate on the common goal such as abolishing the military dictatorship, democratic affairs, peace and the establishment of the federal democratic union.

The 2008 Constitution has been abolished with the collective leadership of the forces involved in the Spring Revolution. The National Unity Government (NUG) was formed with the enactment of the Federal Democracy Charter. The People's Defense Forces (PDFs) were formed across the country and are in armed resistance against the military. The international community is ready to bet on a horse to win. The Spring Revolution aimed at rooting out the military dictatorship has gained momentum.

The time has come for all political parties, which ask for the public's votes when there is election, to decisively stand for the public by choosing Dhamma and Adhamma.



The journalist protection association has recorded that at least 15 domestic journalists have been arrested by the military dictatorship. Although some have been released, around 55 journalists remain detained in various prisons.



Security of journalists and the decline of Press freedom following the coup (Issue 63)

Introduction

The military will not understand the fact that journalists perform their duties for the public's right to information. They are neither terrorists nor criminals. Due to the military's lack of understanding, it is carrying out arrests and imprisonment of journalists covering the news by investigating violence, under the various sections of laws including the Counter-Terrorism Law.

As a result, Myanmar is ranked 176 out of 180 countries on the 2022 global Press Freedom Index, dropping 36 spots from the previous index in 2021. There are only four countries, including North Korea, after Myanmar. The BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor's weekly news review for this week focuses on the difficulties and challenges being faced by journalists in Myanmar.

News-related incidents

On 14 July 2022, freelance reporter Ma May Bel (aka) Ma Nyein Nyein Aye from Mizzima was sentenced to three years in prison with hard labour by the Insein prison court. She was arrested while covering news in Yangon on 15 January 2022. Deputy Police Major San Win Aung, head of the Tamwe Township Police Station, filed a case against her under Section 505 (a) of the Penal Code.

On 7 July DVB reporter U Aung San Lin was sentenced to six years in prison with hard labour by Wetlet Township Court in Sagaing Region. U Aung San Lin, 47, was arrested at his house in Pinzin village, located in Wetlet Township in December 2021. He was charged and imprisoned under Section 505 (a) of the Penal Code and Section 52 of the Counter-Terrorism Law.

On 26 September 2021, around 30 soldiers arrested Lway Em Phaung, 21, who worked as a video reporter from the Shwe Phee Myay News Agency in Lashio. She was sentenced to two years in prison under Section 505 (a) of the Penal Code on the morning of 7 April 2022.



On March 22th, Ko Than Htike Aung, the news editor at Mizzima was sentenced to two years in prison by Zubuthiri Township Court in Nay Pyi Taw. He was arrested in front of Dekkhina Thiri District Court in Nay Pyi Taw while covering news about the court appearance of U Win Htein, a veteran member of the National League for Democracy (NLD) on 19 March 2021. He was charged and imprisoned under Section 505 (a) of the Penal Code.

Targeted efforts were made to arrest journalists at any time and any place. In addition to arrests and torture, properties belonging to journalists have been seized.

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), at least 150 local journalists were arrested following the 2021 military coup. Although some detained journalists were released, around 55 journalists remain behind bars. Freelance journalist Ko Soe Yar Zar Tun was released from detention. However, seven months later he was re-arrested and charged under Section 52(a) of the Counter-Terrorism Law.

Findings

According to Athan, a local organization working to improve freedom of expression in Myanmar, on World Press Freedom Day 3 May 2022, the total number of journalists detained following the 2021 military coup had reached 156. Of them, 28 detained journalists are female. Four of 26 journalists imprisoned are females. The military council has issued arrest warrants for 39 journalists. Of them, four journalists are female. Although more than 90 detained journalists were released, 61 journalists are being detained in jails, prisons and interrogation camps. Of them, 10 detained journalists are female. Three journalists were reportedly killed, according to Athan.

The junta revoked the license of 11 news agencies which were working for the public's rights to information. These news agencies are still operating. For example, DVB, Mizzima, Khit Thit Media, Myitkyina News, and Tachileik

News Agency. Myanmar's Press Freedom deteriorated rapidly. According to Reporters without Borders (RSF), Myanmar is ranked 176 out of 180 countries in the 2022 World Press Freedom Index. This is the worst press freedom ranking in over 30 years. There are only four countries after Myanmar, including North Korea.

According to Article 19's 2022 Global Expression Report, "Myanmar is now in the global bottom 5 scores for seven indicators, including freedom of discussion, government censorship, and arrests for political content, the US Embassy Yangon posted on its facebook on July 8th. The country also saw the world's steepest declines in 2021 in its scores for political killing, harassment of journalists, and freedom of assembly, government censorship, and repression of NGOs."

Review

The biggest challenge for journalists investigating and covering news and the Myanmar people who are defying the military dictatorship are psychological and physical security, reporters told the Myanmar Peace Monitor. Journalists are facing the risk of arrest, torture and criminal charges.

"Security, money and trust are the biggest challenges for the journalists," said a youth journalist from Yangon.

Due to financial difficulties, a journalist who has to worry about security cannot carry out daily tasks. Declining trust between the news sources and journalists becomes a challenge to collect information from the ground, he claimed.

Due to the military's tightened inspections, journalists in Arakan State face a lot of difficulties in carrying necessary equipment for covering the news on the ground, according to a journalist based in Sittwe of Arakan State.



“At present, security is the most difficult one. The main point is tightened inspection and security is the biggest challenge for the reporters who are working on the ground,” he added.

On the other side, the junta funds its subordinate journalists who can be used to spread propaganda. These so-called journalists attend its monthly press conferences, while threats are made to journalists performing their duties independently, who are following the journalistic code of ethics and conduct for the public’s right to information. Journalists facing security and survival challenges have to cover the news from outside of areas under military council forces.

A journalist from Yangon said: “I will do my work only after I manage to escape from the hands of the military council. I feel unsafe when I cover the news. It has an impact on my mental health. I feel unsafe.”

Journalists are regarded as the enemy because they attempt to cover the violence used against the public. They also face arrest and torture.



The freedom of expression, the free flow of information and the rights to information is the lifeblood in a democratic society. Freedom of expression exists as a basic human right essential for a democratic country.

The security and survival of the journalists who are working for the public's rights to information should be taken into consideration

as part of the Spring Revolution's goal to root out the military dictatorship and build up the federal democratic union.



Two automatic rifles were seized from the junta side during the raid which was carried out by three resistance soldiers, including female comrade Pu Tu.



Mission to get automatic rifles in Magway Region (Issue 71)

Introduction

It has been over one year since the armed resistance against the military council began. The armed resistance which started with slingshots, sticks, knives and Tumi continues to resist airstrikes and the firing of heavy and light weapons.

However, the demands for ammunition and funds on the battleground are growing as time passes.

The BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor's weekly review for this week focuses on the mission to procure automatic rifles based on the incidents in which the resistance fighters sacrifice their lives with the belief that "The enemy's arms are ours".

Incident

On 4 September, the mission for automatic rifles began.

Pakokku Urban Guerrilla Force-2 launched a mission to get automatic rifles by attacking a camp of the military council in the south of Pakokku-Ayeyarwady Bridge in Magway Region. It seized two automatic rifles during its mission led by three members, including female comrade Pu Tu.

Although the urban guerrilla force lost one pistol, two motorbikes, two grenades and 20 bullets, the force could successfully conduct its mission without any casualties. Comrade Yan Naung, in-charge of the Pakokku Urban Guerrilla Force-2, told the media that it made necessary preparations for the mission.

On the afternoon of 8 September, the Royal Defense Force attacked soldiers who stood guard over a garment factory in Pakokku in Magway Region. Two members of the local defense force, who rushed to the incident to get a gun from an injured soldier, were killed. The local defense force lost a gun, and a PDF member was wounded.


These are two incidents in a mission called "The enemy's arms are ours." It is evident that these incidents are helping resistance forces to root out the military dictatorship and to build a federal democratic union.

Related findings

According to lists compiled by the BNI-MPM, there are 22 People's Defense Force (PDFs) and Local Defense Force (LDFs) in Magway Region. This is the highest number of PDFs after Sagaing and Mandalay regions. (Remark the latest information about the PDF/LDF lists are added to the PDF dashboard of the BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor daily).

Up to 31 August 2022, 143 days of clashes between the military council and the PDFs/LDFs were recorded in Magway Region. This is the third largest

amount after Sagaing Region and Chin State. According to the list from the BNI-MPM, 377 days of clashes were recorded in Sagaing Region, 145 days in Chin State and 115 days in Karenni (Kayah) State. (Remark The number of




clashes may be higher than that as clashes are reported more than two times per day.)

Not only the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) but also the PDFs/LDFs are facing the military council’s army, air force and navy. According to Data For Myanmar, Magway Region sees the second highest number of arson after Sagaing Region.


The armed resistance has gained momentum. A total of 974,400 civilians have been displaced by conflict and insecurity since the 2021 military coup, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) report released on 2 September 2022. Magway Region sees the second highest number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) after Sagaing Region, with nearly 100,000 IDPs.

Sagaing and Magway Regions have experienced the military council's airstrikes, arson, and the arrest and use of civilians as human shields. The military council is conducting targeted attacks on IDPs.



The lack of ammunition and funds serves as a deterrent to the armed resistance as the military council has more military power.

Number of IDPs by State and Region After coup



Source: [UN-OCHA](#) • Created by Hninno

Review

In his speech delivered on 7 September, on the one-year anniversary of the declaration of nationwide revolt, the acting president of the National Unity Government (NUG) called on the international community to cut off revenue sources which supports the military council to purchase more weapons. He also called for more weapons, technology and cash to go to the Spring Revolution forces.

According to the records collected by the BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor, the PDFs/LDFs are conducting increased resistance movements based on circumstances, regions and times. So, our PDF dashboard presents the clashes between the PDFs/LDFs and the military council forces.

More than 300 PDF battalions have been formed under the NUG's Defense Ministry and 250 township-level PDFs have not received sufficient funds and technical assistance. However, they receive assistance from the NUG. The PDFs/LDFs are affiliated with the fund-raising groups for the Spring Revolution and receive a certain amount of assistance.

The PDFs/LDFs have the goal to root out the military dictatorship. All those who take a leading role in the Spring Revolution need to be aware of the

fact that they will immediately achieve their desired goal only when all resistance forces have the same goal. This is to build a federal democratic union through mutual understanding.

Every person who leads the Spring Revolution forces, including the NUG, are duty-bound to ensure the fair allocation of funds available for the Spring Revolution based on their needs.

On 10 September, Magway Technological University Students Union launched a fundraising program to purchase an automatic rifle for female comrade Putu with the Pakokku Urban Guerrilla Force-2 in Magway Region.

"The enemy's arms are ours" program starts with a minimum donation of Ks-3,000 per person to provide more support for the Spring Revolution. hyshall the armed.



Deciding to make it the decisive year of the final battle, it is time for all revolutionary forces to unite as one voice and stand together...



Why Shall the armed resistance war succeed? (Issue 75)

Introduction

The National Unity Government (NUG) announced on 7 October that it has defined the coming year as a decisive year for the revolution, and has committed to staging a final battle through strategic integration among revolutionary forces.

So as not to give breathing space to the military council trying to find its exit strategy with stalling, divisive and erratic ways, the NUG and all the allied forces are in preparation to open an offensive war on six fronts.


It is time to firmly define the most important coming year as the “decisive year of the final battle” and we urge all revolutionary forces to persevere

together with unrelenting persistence and strive with one united voice, the NUG says.

BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor's (MPM) weekly news review for this week focuses on the approaches to the role of the resistance war, which is a component of the Spring Revolution. BNI-MPM presents statistics of this resistance war and highlights the advantages and disadvantages faced by revolutionary forces.

Approach-1

The People's Defense Forces (PDFs) and the Local Defense Forces (LDFs) which have emerged under different names have grown in strength across the country. According to the PDF Dashboard presented daily by BNI-MPM,



the total number of PDFs and LDFs has reached nearly 230 nationwide (Remark: MPM continues to collect the data). Sagaing Region sees the highest number of PDFs and LDFs.

Total Number of PDF Members


Likewise, Magway Region, Mandalay Region, Yangon Region and Chin State see a rising number of PDFs and LDFs.

In his one-year anniversary address on the declaration of the nationwide resistance war, NUG Acting President Duwa Lashi La informed the public that the NUG has formed over 250 township-based PDFs in Myanmar in 330 townships nationwide. There are more than 300 PDF battalions under the NUG Ministry of Defense.

The Acting President said, "I earnestly inform the public that at a time when our resistance war turns one year, the fascist terrorist military council is not in a position to control even half of the country's territory".

The PDFs and LDFs have taken up arms in self-defence following the brutal crackdown on anti-coup protests. But they have yet to obtain sufficient money, ammunition and technology. However, they remain active participants in the Spring Revolution, with the support of the public. According to BNI-MPM's record, 1,178 days of clashes were recorded between the military council and the PDFs/LDFs up to 30 September 2022. Sagaing and Magway regions see the strongest armed resistance. Taking a look at the clashes in townships across the country, 152 were reported in townships between the PDFs/LDFs and military council forces. Pekon Township, located on the border

There were 1178 days of clashes between the military council and the PDFs/LDFs in more than 150 townships till September 30, 2022.



of southern Shan and Karenni (Kayah) states, and Kalay Township in Sagaing Region topped the list of clashes with 51 days each.

The intent is to crush the PDFs and LDFs. However, Spring Revolution forces, including the PDFs and LDFs, should continue to recognize the importance of unity. There were 1,178 days of clashes between military council forces and the PDFs/LDFs in more than 150 townships up to 30 September 2022.


Approach-2

According to BNI-MPM's records, the resistance war is being led by a combined force of the PDFs and LDFs in areas such as Kachin, Karen (Kayin), Karenni (Kayah) and Chin States, and the existing Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) became stronger. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is carrying out joint military operations with the PDFs in Kachin State, along with the PDFs and LDFs in townships located in the upper Sagaing Region.

In Karenni (Kayah) State, the battalions and units under the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) are carrying out armed resistance under the supervision of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and Karenni Army (KA). In Chin State, the Chinland Defense Forces (CDFs) have established connections and are conducting joint military operations with the Chin National Front (CNF).

In Sagaing Region, the PDFs and LDFs are cooperating with the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF), which emerged from the 1988 Uprising, to carry out armed resistance against the military council. Likewise, the Cobra Column is conducting armed resistance against the military council in Karen (Kayin) State under the command of the Karen National Union (KNU)/Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA).

The following graph shows clashes between the military council and the EROs from the coup till September 30, 2022.



According to BNI-MPM's Armed Conflict Dashboard, there were more than 550 days of clashes between the military council forces and the EROs up to 30 September 2022. The highest number of clashes were recorded between the KIA and the military council forces. The second highest number of clashes was between the military council forces and the KNU/KNLA.

The following graph shows clashes between the military council and the EROs from the 2021 military coup up to 30 September 2022. 6

The Spring Revolution began with anti-coup peaceful protests. Following the violent crackdown, peaceful protestors then started to use weapons such as slingshots and Tumi guns. The collaboration of the EROs –which have been fighting for equality, self-determination and federal democracy –, the PDFs/LDFs, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and the NUG, are crucial components for the success of the resistance. Enhancing cooperation among these groups, without putting personal interest, group interest, and ego on the front burner, is imperative. They need to understand that military council

forces may use every possible means to create disunity among the forces of the Spring Revolution.

Approach-3


According to the report released by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) on September 5, the NUG and resistance organizations have effective control over 52 percent (172 townships) of the territory of Myanmar. The junta is being actively contested in a further 23 percent and can only claim to have stable control over 17 percent (93 townships) of Myanmar territory. The junta has controlled 21 out of 93 townships with the help of the military-backed people's militia forces.

According to the NUG's report on 10 October 2022 about the future process, the NUG and its ethnic allies control more than 50 percent of the total area of the country. The NUG's Home Affairs and Immigration Ministry has formed the Union Police Force, built more than 20 makeshift jails in that territorial area and started hearing 116 cases. Under the leadership of the State Consultative Councils, Police Forces composed of Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) police members from the state, have been formed. These police forces have begun carrying out rule of law responsibilities.

It is found that the military council forces are bluntly committing violence such as arson and conducting mass killings in areas which see strong armed resistance, and in areas where they lack effective control. They even resorted to bombarding schools and religious buildings.

According to Data For Myanmar, the military council forces burnt down 28,434 houses across the country up to 27 August 2022. Sagaing Region topped the list of destroyed houses with 20,153, followed by Magway Region with 5,418 and Chin State with 1,474.

The number of houses burned down by the military council by month



Administrative mechanisms have been shaken by the CDM since the 2021 military coup. There is no doubt that the efforts to control territorial areas face a lot of challenges as the resistance forces have been carrying out targeted attacks. At the same time, the Spring Revolution forces are required to prepare necessary security measures in advance as violent acts may occur anytime and anywhere.

Review

BNI-MPM presented the aforementioned approaches by taking into account the growing strength of the PDFs/LDFs, cooperation between the EROs and Spring Revolution forces, and the administrative mechanisms of the military council. Disadvantages and noticeable points have been highlighted. We can also focus on other approaches such as the international arena and the public’s support and trust. The military council’s only advantage is arms. It has encountered failures on all other fronts and opposition from the public remains active. BNI-MPM notices that public hatred against it continues to

grow due to its violent acts, for instance the attack on a school in Let Yet Kone village, Sagaing Region.

The Spring Revolution forces are working to root out the military dictatorship and build up a federal democratic union. Although they have strong advantages such as public support, there still are weaknesses and challenges. In particular, they still lack sufficient ammunition, technology and money. The NUG's Acting President is therefore calling on the international community to provide ammunition, technological and financial aid to help the Spring Revolution succeed.

The practical implementation of the pledges made between the Spring Revolution forces and groups, including the EROs, for building the future federal democracy and especially, drafting a constitution based on federal democracy, lies at the core of the success of the Spring Revolution.

Likewise, there is an urgent need for having improved strategic cooperation and links among the revolutionary forces including the PDFs/LDFs which is crucial in the resistance war. The above-mentioned approaches and factors answer the question of why the resistance shall succeed.



Just 24 hours after announcing the release, at least 10 people were killed in northern Arakan State when the army shelled with artillery.



Today's Myanmar is similar to a prison (Issue 81)

Introduction

On 17 November 2022, the military council announced that it had released 5,774 prisoners in honour of National Victory Day. According to the list compiled by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) on 21 November, the military council freed 402 political prisoners from 19 prisons.

The AAPP said that it only recorded the names of 161 political prisoners. At the military council's press conference, it said that amnesty has been granted seven times to nearly 60,000 prisoners since the 2021 military coup. According to the AAPP, the organization faces a delay in compiling the list of released political prisoners as the military council has not been transparent and issues only a limited number of name lists of freed political prisoners.

This issue of Burma News International (BNI) - Myanmar Peace Monitor's (MPM) Weekly News Review on how the military council exploits prisoners and the prison sector for political objectives.

Personal recounts of those freed

Australian economist Mr. Sean Turnell was detained in the military council's prison for 650 days. He recalls the weekly trips for his remand hearings from Insein prison to a nearby courthouse as the worst physical mistreatment.

He says he was chained together with as many as 50 other political prisoners.

"They pushed us into the back of a van I reckon was meant to hold about 20. We were squeezed against each other, it was so hot, the sweat is just pouring down your face, people are vomiting, sweating, fainting ... the only thing stopping them falling onto the floor was we were so tightly packed," he recalls.

In an interview with the news organization The Australian on 21 November, Turnell explained about the conditions inside Insein prison and at Nay Pyi Taw detention centre.

"Incredibly, the Nay Pyi Taw detention centre turned out to be worse than Insein prison, a run-down facility managed by a drunken prison superintendent, infested with cockroaches and mosquitoes where the roof would leak whenever it rained."

"You would sit there every day with sweat pouring down and nothing to do because there you were locked away in the cells for 20 hours a day," recounted Turnell.

In an interview with The Newsmakers aired on 23 November, Toru Kubota, a Japanese filmmaker who was included in the military council's seventh amnesty said, "The place is very dirty and hot. And it is so packed.



More than 20 people were squeezed into the cell which is like two metres times five metres square space. It was extremely unhygienic and there was no sunshine. There is only one bucket of water for everyone to use for washing and flushing the toilet and the smell was awful.”

In an interview with Radio Free Asia (RFA) on November 18, U Mya Aye, 88 Generation student leader said, “My feeling on the day I got out of jail is totally different from the past. I feel like I have to leave my friends and brothers Ko Jimmy and Ko Zeya Thaw behind in prison. I am unhappy at all.”

“I am, of course, acutely aware that as I experience the joy of my reunion with my family, the 53 million people in Myanmar continue to suffer under a regime that is about as unrepresentative of them as is possible to imagine,” Sean Turnell posted on his Facebook page.

Among those who were granted amnesty on November 17 are: U Mya Aye, writer Maung Tha Cho, Shwe Nya War Sayadaw U Pyin Nyar Thiha, and Dr. Myo Nyunt, the spokesperson of the National League for Democracy (NLD).

"I feel like I have to leave my friends and brothers Ko Jimmy and Ko Zeyar Thaw behind in prison. I am unhappy at all"

The entire country is a prison

According to the list compiled by the AAPP on 23 November, the military council has convicted 1,608 of nearly 13,000 detainees across the country. A total of 128 people who are linked to Myanmar's Spring Revolution have been sentenced to death. These figures are only those that are known to the AAPP. The actual numbers may be higher, the AAPP stated.

Although prisons and jails are broadly regarded as the places which hold criminals, the military council arrests many people in Myanmar regardless of class, gender, and age. It then takes them to nearby police stations and jails without probing whether or not they have actually committed crimes. From there, they bring charges against them arbitrarily.

"I think the military did not set a separate plan to arrest me. Soldiers arrested every person they met near the incident on that day," recalled Toru Kubota.

The military council arrested 88 Generation student leader U Mya Aye on the day of the coup on 1 February 2021 over an email sent in 2014. He was sentenced to two years by the Insein prison court. By looking at the fact that the military council released him in an amnesty despite the fact he was about to complete his prison term. This reflects the military council's control over the prison, jail, and judiciary sectors.

In addition, there often are news about the frequent demonstrations taking place in prisons as the military council is inhumanely committing sexual violence and torture on inmates. Prison authorities under the military council usually restrict families and relatives from visiting prisoners.

They allowed 88 Generation student leader Ko Jimmy (aka Ko Kyaw Min Yu), ex-Lower House Member of Parliament (MP) Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw, Ko Hla Myo Aung, and Ko Aung Thura Zaw to meet their families only one time before execution.

The military council is carrying out airstrikes, committing arson, and launching targeted attacks on civilians across the country. They additionally arrest civilians and use them as human shields. The parents, brothers, sisters, and relatives of revolutionaries have also been arrested. The people in Myanmar have to pass their days in insecure environments, which also affects their mental health, even if they are not actually inside jails and prisons. As a result, Myanmar is akin to a prison. Reggae singer Ko Saw Phoe Khwar bears witness to the fact that those released from the military-controlled prisons face the risk of being re-arrested anytime and anywhere.

"I of course welcome this release, but I caution that this is part of the junta's efforts to create a veneer of progress in Myanmar to sway international opinion," said Thomas Andrews, the United Nations (UN) special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, during a news conference in Seoul, South Korea on 21 November. "The international community must not applaud the junta for this release or take it as evidence that the junta is softening," said Andrews. He stated that he had received reports that some were immediately re-arrested within 24 hours of release from prison. He added that the military rained down heavy artillery on a village in Myanmar's western Arakan State, killing at least 10 people.

Review

The release of those who were arbitrarily arrested, charged, and then sentenced, is welcomed. However, nobody expresses thanks for the military council's general amnesty. Despite its amnesty, the people will not forget the crimes committed by the military council such as brutally cracking down on



peaceful anti-coup protests, by shooting and killing people with live rounds. It has launched hundreds of airstrikes on resistance forces. It has burned civilians alive. It has carried out mass killings, and arson. The people are continuing their revolution to seek justice for the crimes committed by the military council. As long as it remains, it will face nationwide armed resistance from the Spring Revolution forces, especially by the People's Defense Forces (PDFs), Local Defense Forces (LDFs), and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs). In addition, the military council is isolated and facing mounting pressure in the international arena.

The military council is trying to legitimize its 2021 coup and its control over the country by holding an upcoming general election, which will then discredit the results of the 2020 election. Moreover, the military council is attempting to seek international recognition through elections and approaching political groups which are not involved in the Spring Revolution.

The military council is trying to implement a proportional representation (PR) electoral system. This is an attempt to hold onto power along with the current model which guarantees it at least 25 percent of parliamentary seats. Observers and analysts view that the release of some political prisoners who

are already about to complete their prison terms is to a certain extent aimed at reducing domestic and international pressures on the military council. Even though some prisoners are being released, the everyday situation in Myanmar is similar to that of living inside prisons and jails. Violence, arbitrary arrests, and burning of villages have not stopped.

Fighting between the military council troops and the revolutionary forces, especially the PDFs, LDFs, and the EROs has expanded. Although the fighting has displaced millions of people, the internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received humanitarian assistance from the UN, the international community, nor from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Like the phrase “from the people to the people”, resistance forces and the IDPs have to instead rely on each other.

Therefore, the forces of the Spring Revolution which have the same goal of rooting out the military dictatorship and building up a federal democratic union are required to have more unity and to adopt cautious approaches. The international community, on its part, should take a clear view of the situation in Myanmar and understand that every step taken by the military council will have an impact on the people of Myanmar.



**For this little taste of democracy
we enjoyed, he was truly proud
for the people still fighting
for democracy.**



Myanmar Spring Revolution and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's message (Issue 83)

Introduction

"Please tell everyone the truth about Myanmar. We've been silenced but you can talk," Australian economist Mr. Sean Turnell remembered State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi asking him.

The last time he saw her was when they were sentenced, about eight weeks ago. They had a farewell conversation of sorts.

"She also expressed how proud she was, especially of the young Burmese people. She was really proud of how the people were prepared to defend and fight for democracy, even though their exposure to democracy was very brief," recalled Turnell.

Burma News International – Myanmar Peace Monitor’s (MPM) Weekly News Review for this week focuses on an interesting interview with Mr. Sean Turnell which offers a glimpse of State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

News 10 ABC’s interview with Mr. Sean Turnell

On 6 December 2022, the News 10 ABC based in the US had an interview with Mr. Sean Turnell about his time in prison and his thoughts on Myanmar’s future.

He was arrested five days after the coup and spent 650 days in jails and prisons in Myanmar. He was released on 17 November 2022. He shared his experiences and his views about Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s future, and his own future.

Mr. Sean Turnell, 58, had been working as an economic adviser to State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The military council arrested him, accusing him of being a secret agent. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment for violating the country’s official secrets act.

According to Mr. Sean Turnell, he greeted Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at the court in Nay Pyi Taw prison on 12 October 2022. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi pleaded not guilty to every charge brought forth by the regime. She was sentenced to 26 years in prison by the military-controlled courts on 14 counts.

Mr. Sean Turnell told News 10 ABC, “I want to write the book, write my personal story, correct the record a little bit about what the government was trying to do, and use the book as a sort of cathartic thing”.

“More than any other time, this is the time for the young Burmese people to shine, and I want to stay well in the background,” he said.

“She also expressed how proud she was, especially of the young Burmese people. She was really proud of how the people were prepared to defend and



fight for democracy, even though their exposure to democracy was very brief”
How does Daw Aung San Suu Kyi pass the days during the coup?

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi alone shall give an answer to the above question. The regime wants to utilize Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s image only when it faces a crisis. The military, which took control of the nation’s telecommunication networks since the 2021 coup, released fake news like the freeing of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The National League for Democracy (NLD) leader and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi usually conveys her messages via her legal team if necessary.

On 21 May 2021, the military-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC) threatened to dissolve the NLD. During a meeting with her legal team on 24 May 2021, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi conveyed a message to the public about the UEC’s threat. Lawyer Daw Min Min Soe, who is one of the legal representatives

for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, told the media, "She prays for the good health of all our people. She conveys a message that the party continues to exist as long as the public is present because the establishment of the party is aimed for the public."

During a court hearing in Nay Pyi Taw on 7 June 2021, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said she and the others who are detained together need cash for food and medicine. "The relevant department (military council) will make arrangements every two weeks. However, mother (Daw Aung San Suu Kyi) doesn't want it," the legal representative Daw Min Min Soe told the reporters.



"Daw Aung San Suu Kyi did not want support from those detaining her and asked the lawyers to help if possible," said the head of the legal team U Khin Maung Zaw.

Testifying as a civilian witness, detained Yangon Region Chief Minister U Phyo Min Thein told the special court on 1 October 2021 that he paid her \$600,000 USD and seven viss of gold. During a meeting with the legal team on 4 October 2021, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi rejected the testimony from the Chief Minister, dismissing his claims as "all absurd", said the legal team leader U Khin Maung Zaw.

On 14 October 2021, U Khin Maung Zaw, head of the legal team representing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, was issued gag orders under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. U Khin Maung Zaw told the media about the military's pressures and threats on the day of the military coup.

On 30 September 2021, all the lawyers representing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi were not allowed to attend the court hearing for the case charged under the State Secrets Act, citing the location. Only two lawyers were allowed to

enter the courtroom. During a meeting with the legal team at the special court in Nay Pyi Taw Council on 5 November 2021, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi conveyed a message to the public, "She expressed concern for the public. She wants the public to have unity."

"She is concerned about the health, economy, and circumstances of the country. She wants all the people to have unity and help each other with like minds," said a person close to the court. Later, the regime imposed gag orders on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's legal team.

Mr. Sean Turnell, who had the chance to have a conversation with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at the court hearing on 12 October 2022, could send her message to the Myanmar people and the world.

Mr. Sean Turnell was surprised by and respects Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's determination. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who has no access to the radio, computer, or the internet, is still interested in the world and Myanmar affairs although she only has access to the regime's propaganda newspapers, said Mr. Sean Turnell .

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is aware of the execution of four political prisoners including Ko Jimmy and Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw through the military propaganda newspapers. She may also know about the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), the National Unity Government (NUG), the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) which do not accept the invitation to peace talks, the People's Defense Forces (PDFs) and Local Defense Forces (LDFs) across the country, via its newspapers which do not cover information about the Myanmar Spring Revolution.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi can be proud of Myanmar people and youths who are staging anti-coup protests to root out the military dictatorship by holding placards reading "the regime shall have no chance to govern the nation".

Review

The junta usually tries to avert the crisis by making use of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's image and words whenever it faces a troubling situation. The junta wants Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to give a comment on the nationwide resistance by the PDFs, LDFs, and EROs. Then, the junta may attempt to drive a wedge between the forces of the Spring Revolution by utilizing her remarks.

At the military council's meeting held on 13 December 2021, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing said Daw Aung San Suu Kyi can give her comments about the CRPH and the NUG via her legal team. The junta seems to circumvent a part of the Myanmar Spring Revolution in which the people are staging a revolution by taking up arms with the use of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's stance on non-violence.

Since the 2021 military coup, international pressure and collective revolutionary movements of local groups have shown no signs of weakening. The resistance war which targets the junta and its cohorts has gained momentum. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi may potentially be a means for the junta to see an exit through the crisis.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's message was carried by Mr. Sean Turnell, "She was really proud of how the people were prepared to defend and fight for democracy, even though their exposure to democracy was very brief."

Although her words cannot be regarded as a message that she is together with the Myanmar Spring Revolution, it can be said that her message is exceptional and meaningful.

NLD leader and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 78, is a person who could send the motto "Together with the Public" to the Myanmar people. It is observed that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi shall not turn a blind eye to the public as long as the Myanmar Spring Revolution – which has seen participation by the public through the banging of pots and pans at night, the 22222 protest, and the silent strike – is synonymous with the people.



Among the colorful petals of the Spring Revolution, the participation of civil servants in the CDM can be seen as a dazzling and brilliant movement.



CDM policy and threat, the paradox of organizing (Issue 89)

Introduction

The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) on 20 January 2023 released a paper on the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) policy for civil servants for public review. The paper prepared by the Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) on CDM covers three parts, five chapters and 14 pages. It is found that reviews, critiques and different views on the paper have emerged. The NUCC on 20 January declared that it adopts a four-point CDM policy for civil servants based on the paper prepared by the JCC on CDM.

Our BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor's weekly news review for this week highlights the advantages and disadvantages of the NUCC CDM policy.

CDM and Paper on CDM policy

Since the military coup on 1 February 2021, many thousands of civil servants from the ministries of health and education, Myanmar Railways and other governmental organisations joined the CDM and stood by the people by defying the coup. The public provided assistance to CDM civil servants who lost their jobs and had no income. The NUG said it is systematically providing aid to CDM staff. But in practice, there are a lot of CDM civil servants who have not received any assistance yet. So, some CDM civil servants had to return to their work due to various circumstances.

According to the statement issued by health staff, assistant doctors from the 300-bed Mandalay children's hospital joined the CDM on 2 February 2022, states the paper prepared by the JCC on CDM. The fact that the act and spirit of CDM civil servants is a major driving force for the Spring Revolution is put on record by the paper.

Part one of the paper covers two chapters, namely the impact of policy and the definitions of CDM and objective. Part two describes the registration of CDM staff, honouring CDM staff, seeking truth and justice, remedy for losses and action taken against non-CDM staff. Part three covers the miscellaneous section with 12 points.

Of the Spring Revolution movements, the CDM plays a crucial role. It can put an enormous pressure on the military council's administrative mechanisms. However, it depends on the desires and stance of each civil servant. It is reviewed that emphasis should be placed on sufficient and broad organizing, providing assistance and safeguarding.

Findings

Most of the facts included in the JCC on CDM's policy paper pay attention to the role of the CDM civil servants. However, the approach to non-CDM staff



pays more attention to penalizing and action rather than the form of organizing. Part four covers 14 points and 13 sub-paragraphs and the facts such as the dismissals, threatening and oppression of CDM staff, charging the public under various sections, failing to abide by the NUG announcements, cooperation in the military council's state revolt and effective action against non-CDM staff who support the military and cooperate with it, in accordance of the codes of criminal procedures. It is observed that the actual implementation of the above-mentioned facts will contribute a lot to CDM staff and the public.

In addition, the plan to take action against non-CDM staff with different ranks in accordance with the Civil Service Personnel Law and Regulations is interesting. It is assumed that the fact will help support the collapse of the military council's administrative mechanisms. Investigation will be made, and action will be taken against non-CDM civil servants who are involved in bribery and corruption cases, states the paper.

Chapter four paragraph eight states: "The government shall regard CDM civil servants who choose to return to work as non-CDM ones and take appropriate action against them." It is viewed as a threat to the civil servants

who joined the CDM. A plan to take action against civil staff who joined the CDM with an aim to drive a wedge and collect information is acceptable. The point is said to be deprived of sympathy towards the CDM staff who are struggling for their survival amid a lack of income, insecurity and threats.

The NUG declared that civil servants appointed by the military council following the 2021 coup, illegal. The dismissal of those staff is not controversial. The fact that the examinations organized by the military council are illegal is impractical. It is reviewed that more clear-cut explanations are required.

It needs to take account of the fact to what extent basic education students and higher education youths shall have access to the education programs run by the NUG and the education plans led by the forces of the Spring Revolution. Children and youths of different ages shall have access to learning over time. It needs to pay special attention to the fact that the efforts made by students from different stratum who have no easy access to the internet and digital literacy should not be ignored.





Review

In the second week of October 2021, Our Myanmar Peace Monitor published a review on the CDM for civil servants. In 1848, an essay titled "Resistance to Civil Government" was published by David Henry Thoreau who started to introduce Civil Disobedience, from the state of Massachusetts in the US. Thoreau was motivated in part by his disgust with slavery and the Mexican–American War. He started the CDM by refusing to pay tax to the civilian government.

Mahatma Gandhi from India adhered to non-violent methods for social change and independence. Gandhi alone walked towards his goal by organising the public. Gandhi broke the power pillar of the British government through non-violent disobedience movements which covered truth, non-violence and boycott which shook the foundations of the British Empire.

As Martin Luther King Jr. believed Mahatma Gandhi's tactics, he led the Civil Disobedience Movement. Martin Luther King Jr.'s Montgomery Bus Boycott took place from 5 December 1955 to 1956.

Even State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was detained and imprisoned by the junta. She called on the public to disobey the laws set forth by the military on 19 July 1989. She introduced David Henry Thoreau's philosophy of nonviolent resistance to the Myanmar people.

The Spring Revolution is over two-years-old. The success of the Spring Revolution is peaceful protests, resistance to military dictatorship, political pressures and the international community's encouragement and consolation, along with the participation of civil servants in the CDM. All of this can be regarded as a delicate and noble movement. It depends on the spirit, perception and belief of each person who can differentiate between right and wrong and Dhamma (truth) and Adhamma (misconduct). Only an organizing-like approach will be more effective rather than pressuring, intimidation and coercion. At the same time, people need to be aware of the nominal CDM staff and informants from the military council. CDM staff still face threats and oppression. The CDM policy paper describes the NUG's attempt to encourage and honour CDM civil servants who are still defying the junta, through assistance and safeguarding,.



...in fighting back against the military, mine warfare remains an iconic aspect of the Spring Revolution.



Mine operation (or) the junta's most fearful thing (Issue 97)

Introduction

The BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor which has constantly monitored conflicts and the shifts in peace processes in Myanmar since 2013. It has reviewed the matters such as the resistance, its prospects and directions, the military council's bombardments, the impacts on civilians and the newly displaced by the armed resistance following the 2021 military coup. The BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor will continue to review the new matters and findings through constant monitoring.

The BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor's weekly news review for this week focuses on the resistance forces' mine attacks on the junta and its cohorts during the coup and the figures related to mine attacks.

Significant mine attacks

On 7 and 9 March 2023, a military convoy of more than 30 vehicles including two tanks left Kalay of Sagaing Region for Falam of Chin State. From 8:30 am until 4 pm on 11 March, a combined force of Chinland Defense Force (CDF)-Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) Siyin and the Mountain Eagle Defense Force (MEDF) carried out 10 mine attacks. The mine attacks killed six military council soldiers and wounded 21, according to the statement by the CDF-CDM Siyin. According to our record, this is the highest number of mine attacks in a single day.

On 28 February 2022, a combined force of Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA), the Chin National Defense Force (CNDF) and Chinland Defense Forces (CDFs) ambushed the military council's ration convoy of more than 20 vehicles and two tanks leaving Falam for Hakha. Over 60 military council soldiers were killed in the ambush, according to the CNDF's statement. It is found that the military council suffered heavy losses in the mine attacks according to our record.


A total of 35 military council soldiers were killed in an ambush attack on a military vehicle on Ayardaw-Htisaung road Myinmu Township of Sagaing Region on 29 April 2022. On 11 March, the Chindwin Yoma Alliance Force and Bo Thurein Battalion ambushed a military convoy which burned 12 civilians to death from Letpantaw village in Yinmarbin Township with the use of 12 mines, on 8 March, 2022 while the junta soldiers were heading to Myauknone village. The mine attack killed 32 military council soldiers, according to the Alliance Force's statement. On 28 April 2022, Myaung Township (TGR) PDF ambushed the military council's mine clearance team leaving Monywa between Chaung-U and Myinmu Townships. Around 30 military council soldiers were killed in the attack.




According to the BNI–Myanmar Peace Monitor’s record, there were nearly 40 mine attacks which killed more than 10 soldiers up to 20 March 2023. It is found that thousands of military council soldiers were killed and hundreds wounded by the mine attacks.

Figures related to mine attacks

According to the BNI – Myanmar Peace Monitor’s report, the resistance forces conducted mine attacks on the military council soldiers for 272 days, up to 20 March 2023. The number of mine attacks may be higher than 272 days as at least one to at most 10 mine attacks per day are recorded.




Taking a look at the above-mentioned mine attacks by year and month, December 2021 stood first on the list of mine attacks with 44 days; followed by May 2022 with 34 days, January 2022 with 30 days, November 2021 with 29 days and June 2022 with 27 days. There were 57 days of mine attacks in 2021, 163 days in 2022 and 34 days up to 20 March 2023.



Taking a look at mine attacks on the military council troops in regions and states, Sagaing Region topped the list with 132 days, followed by Magway Region with 45 days, Mandalay Region with 23 days, Mon State with 14 days and Tanintharyi Region and Kachin State with 14 days each.

The mine attacks killed 635 military council soldiers in Sagaing Region, 122 in Magway Region, 69 in Chin State, 33 in Mandalay Region, 32 in Kachin State. As a significant event, 24 soldiers were killed by the PDFs' mine attacks even in the Nay Pyi Taw Council Area.

The PDFs/LDFs, which emerged following the 2021 military coup, are the major forces which carry out mine attacks on the military council troops. There were 248 days of mine attacks by the PDFs/LDFs, accounting for 91 per cent of all mine attacks. We put all resistance forces and organizations which emerged following the military coup into the list of urban PDFs/ LDFs.



The graph shows the mine attacks by the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs)—the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) and the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA).


Review

According to the BNI – Myanmar Peace Monitor’s record, there were 2,525 days of clashes between the military council and the revolutionary forces from 1 February 2021 up to 14 March 2023. Of them, the mine attacks by the PDFs/LDFs accounted for 272 days. The military council’s ground forces suffer heavy casualties due to mine attacks. The military council is losing ground so it has to rely only on aerial bombardments. It has increased the tempo of its offensive operations with nearly 300 days of bombardments. Mines are the most dangerous weapon for members of both armed groups and also civilians in conflict-affected areas.

According to our records, there were 94 mine accidents, explosion of war remnants and landmine explosions since the 2021 military coup, killing 22 civilians and wounding 47 others. The mine accidents killed 11 members of the PDFs/LDFs and wounded three. Since the coup, there were 27 landmine explosions in Arakan State which saw intense fighting between the ULA/AA and the military council, which made a temporary ceasefire. We need to notice the fact that Arakan State saw the highest number of civilian casualties.

More than 73 percent of mine attacks on the military council troops throughout the Spring Revolution are reported in Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay regions. So, mine attack strategy (or) mine operation is said to be a major military strategy in the resistance war which has spread to the whole upper Myanmar.

Mine attacks which are under the control of resistance forces or mine operations are said to be the things which can instil fear into the military council. It is viewed that the mine operation remains a symbol of the Spring Revolution in the nationwide revolt. Mine attacks have been proven to weaken ground forces.

An aerial photograph of a snowy mountain slope. The snow is bright white, and the sky is a clear, pale blue. The terrain is rugged, with various ridges and gullies visible. The text 'Analysis Papers' is centered in the middle of the image.

Analysis Papers



BURMA NEWS INTERNATIONAL
**Burma News International,
Myanmar Peace Monitor**

The Defensive War and the Role of Women Warriors



June, 2022

The Defensive War and the Role of Women Warriors

Introduction

The Spring Revolution to remove dictatorship in Myanmar could hardly have been called a "people's revolution" without the participation of a large number of women, who make up as much as 52 percent of the country. The slogan "Without women, this struggle will not succeed" written in red paint on the white canvas, exemplifies the mass of women proudly standing at the forefront against the coup of February 1st, 2021.

From the very beginning, women who have been fighting for equal rights for men and women, to end discrimination against women, to end oppression of women, to end domestic violence against women, including religious discrimination against women, have continued to hold peaceful protests and armed resistance movements against the coup regime despite its brutalities, such as violent crackdowns, torture, killings and rapes of women.

This research paper is about the removal of military dictatorship, the role of women in the Spring Revolution to establish a federal democratic union and the stories of female soldiers fighting the junta forces with all the weapons they can get.

Research methodology

This paper, titled "The Defensive War and the Role of Women Warriors", contains information and news from local and foreign media, including members of Burma News International (BNI). Through exclusive interviews, the BNI

reporters have also collected and presented opinions, assessments and visions from women participating in the People's Defence Forces, women leading strikes, and women active in civilian and military organisations in regions across Myanmar such as Kachin, Kayin, Kayah (Karenni), Rakhine, Yangon and Mandalay.

Background

People have become accustomed to misconceptions over the years. The oppression and discrimination against women, not only in Burmese society but in society at large, is taken for granted. However, women have continued to struggle against the oppression, violence and discrimination from generation to generation. Society is still reluctant to allow women a role in decision-making, whether socio-economic or political.

From revolutionary movements for liberation from colonial rule and the rule of fascist Japan through generations of military coups and anti-authoritarian movements, the 1988 uprising, the 2007 Saffron Revolution, post-2010 governments, judicial and legislative inconsistencies, and protests against injustice. Women's rights activists have been vocal against unjust orders and laws not only under military rule but also under elected governments.

The participation of a large number of women in Burmese society became even more evident during the Spring Revolution against the military coup on February 1st, 2021. The role of women has been enormous, from the pot and pan banging movement and demonstrations in the streets to armed resistance against the coup regime with all the weapons they could get on the front lines, as well as logistics soldiers and paramedics. No fewer than 156 women have died in violent crackdowns and killings by the coup regime and its henchmen, including Mya Thwe Thwe Khaing, who was shot in the head during a demonstration in Nay Pyi Taw, Kyal Sin, also known by her Chinese name, Jiaxi, who was shot dead during a demonstration in Mandalay, and Ma Pan Thee, who jumped from a building on the 44th Street in Yangon.

The fact that tens of thousands of women, young and old, have been in prisons and internally displaced persons camps for over a year since the military coup shows the sheer courage of women who are physically less strong than men during the Spring Revolution.

In the Spring Revolution in Myanmar, women are playing a role in two different groups - one involved in peaceful protest against the military dictatorship, the other in armed resistance movements. Women are also involved in efforts to overthrow the military regime and build a federal democratic union in the future. The role of women in the Spring Revolution has become so important that sarongs are raised as flags as a tribute to their participation.

In addition to resisting the military dictatorship, women in Burmese society have simultaneously fought against oppression, discrimination, and certain misconceptions such as male supremacy.

The role of women in the Spring Revolution

The role of women in the Spring Revolution to overthrow the coup and uproot the military dictatorship continues to gain momentum. Women in Myanmar have not only fought against the military dictatorship but also for the reform of fundamental ideas such as gender equality, the elimination of discrimination and gender-based oppression.

Mi Hsu Pwint likened women's participation in the Spring Revolution to "Smouldering like a rice husk fire, not a rice straw fire". Mi Hsu Pwint was one of the leaders in the 1988 uprising and a female leading member of the Central Leading Committee of the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF).

Amara, a spokesperson for the M2M - Myaung Women Warriors in Sagaing Region, which was formed during the Spring Revolution, said they are not only fighting for the success of the Spring Revolution, but also for gender equality as they fight on the front lines and take on tasks of logistics soldiers, paramedics and mine production in the rear.

"We are walking the path of this Spring Revolution with confidence. Like the men, we have always had the attitude that we must be able to participate vigorously in this armed struggle," she said.

For this paper, BNI - Myanmar Peace Monitor interviewed women members of the People's Defence Forces, women leaders of urban and rural strikes, ethnic armed groups, and civil society organisations. They believe that the continued strength of the Spring Revolution to this day is due to the strong participation of women as a whole.

Women's participation in all the groups and movements of the Spring Revolution, such as the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) represented by the slogan "Do not go to the government office, free yourself", the still active women's strikes in the cities, the People's Defence Forces in the cities, and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), remains very strong.

As of April 11th, 2022, 156 of the 1,673 people killed during the Spring Revolution were women, according to the Ministry of Youth and Children Affairs of the National Unity Government (NUG). Most of the victims were between 14 and 70 years old, and most of the women were between 18 and 50 years old. Mya Thwe Thwe Kahing, the 19-year-old girl, is the first person to give her life during the Spring Revolution.

"They rebelled against the dictator by raising women's sarongs as flags, which are the symbol of most prominent Burmese women. I think their campaign and persuasion did a lot for the revolution. Even in this difficult situation, we can see the participation of women in the protests. So, I really believe that women's participation in the Spring Revolution has led to change," said Ma Hsuzi Nway, who is participating in the urban protests in Yangon.

"I think women are fighting the ideological revolution and the overthrow of the military dictatorship from all sides at the same time," said Ma Chaw Su San, a member of the Monywa University Students Union, who is leading the urban strikes.



In Burmese society, it can be said that the greater participation of the mass of women in the Spring Revolution is practical proof of the decades of oppression, violence, discrimination and marginalisation they are still fighting against.

Challenges for women in action

In a society dominated by male supremacy, the challenges for women are greater than for men because of their anatomically different femininity. Despite the obvious acts of courage, bravery and risk-taking during the Spring Revolution,

women still face inequalities because their capabilities are underestimated simply because they are women. They are also still disrespected and marginalised in the political decision-making arenas.

Ma Aye Myint Aung Aung of the Women's Alliance, which is leading the strikes in Mandalay, described her confrontation with the henchmen of the coup regime as follows:



"I still remember that. The women were told not to go to the front because we were being shot at with live ammunition by the soldiers of the coup regime and we could only fight them off with slingshots. The men only wanted us to stand at the back while they went to the front. But we women would not listen. We wanted to hold the shields. We also dared to risk our lives, so we wanted to go to the front. The men thought we women were physically weak. They thought we could not run. Since then, such things have become a problem."



Bauk Hsai, an ethnic Kachin girl actively involved in the anti-coup movements in Kachin State, said women's participation in the Spring Revolution was severely challenged by conservative ideologies.

"The leaders were only men. Women were not allowed to lead," she said.

Mi Hsu Pwint, a member of the Central Leading Committee of the ABSDF, a signatory to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and a participant in the peace process, said women had been left behind in political leadership positions. "Women's participation in decision-making areas is still very weak," she said.

Saw San Nyein Thu, president of the Rakhine Women's Initiative Organisation (RWIO), argued that women's capabilities are limited by superficial notions and misunderstandings in the traditional sense of Burmese society and this poses a great challenge to women.

Hillary, a member of the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF B-09), who has been fighting on the front line against the regime forces during the Spring Revolution, said from her current experience, that women are actively participating in various aspects of the struggle to overthrow the military dictatorship.

For example, some of them have taken on the task of educating internally displaced persons (IDPs), providing them with medical and logistical support.

"Even in the most difficult form of armed struggle, girls risked their lives on the front lines on an equal footing with boys. We women have been active in all walks of life and our generation has been fighting against the dictatorship as much as they could. We are the generation that will lay the foundation," Hillary believes.

Nang Htet, a female soldier of the People Defence Force in the Karen National Union (KNU)-controlled area, said they faced great challenges, including the danger to their lives, but also the heinous atrocities committed against their families by the coup regime and its henchmen.



Every woman who participated in the Spring Revolution, whether in the armed resistance movement or in the urban-rural strikes to overthrow the military dictatorship, has her own challenge. There are many cases of women who were arrested by the coup regime and subjected to undue torture and ill-treatment, sexual violence and rape, and even death.

A 27-year-old woman who had just come out of the childbirth, was raped by three soldiers of the military regime in Aklui village in Tedim Township, Chin State, on the evening of November 11th, 2021. According to Thin Yu Mon, Director of Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO), the coup regime soldiers forced the husband to lie down in the bathroom at gunpoint and raped his wife right in front of him.

On April 4th, 2022, junta soldiers arrested a father and his daughter in Hte Hlaw village in Gangaw Township, Magwe Region, raped and killed the 14-year-old daughter, and also murdered the father. In another case, two women from Kyaw village in Minkin Township, Sagaing Region, killed themselves by hanging after being repeatedly raped by the regime soldiers on March 27th, 2022, according to a member of the People's Defence Force - Minkin Township. At

least five civilians died in Kyaw village, including the two women who committed suicide.

The All Burma Federation of Students Union (ABFSU) announced on February 19th, 2022, that a member of the Burma Communist Party (BCP) and a woman who had been detained for political reasons, were raped and imprisoned in an interrogation camp run by the coup regime in Obo Prison in Mandalay.

These are just some of the heinous atrocities committed by the coup regime. Across the country, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which women

were affected by such incidents, where the coup regime soldiers set fire villages on fire, committed mass arson, and, of course, forced civilians to flee the war. Therefore, the challenges for women actively and vigorously participating in the anti-dictatorship movement during the military coup or the Spring Revolution are as great as for women in Burmese society.



**For the leadership,
it's just men, they
don't give women
much position.**



Benefits of women's participation

Women's participation in the Spring Revolution also focuses on the elimination of male supremacy as a priority in Burmese society, along with the abolition of dictatorship in all forms. So, it can be said that it is more difficult than the groups fighting against the military dictatorship alone. Worse, it will be many times more difficult for them than for groups fighting only to regain political power. However, the active participation of women in the Spring Revolution has only added to its momentum.

"The sacrifices of the first deaths of Mya Thwe Thwe Khaing and Jiaxi, and Ma Pan Thee, who jumped dead from the building without kneeling before the dictators, have hurt the hearts of the public and given them a clear

perspective on the revolution," said Ma Hsuzi Nway, who is currently participating in the urban flash mob protests in Yangon. These examples are testament to the risk-taking, courage and sacrifice of women, and this is one of the benefits of women's participation in the Spring Revolution.

Baukk Hsai, a leader of the anti-military movement in Kachin State, said that during the Spring Revolution, those who used to view women as weak and discriminated against them have realized women's true capabilities, but that women in detention are still subjected to sexual harassment and violence, in addition to torture, just like men.

During the Spring Revolution, women took on the same responsibilities as men. While the men fight at the front against the regime forces, the women take on their tasks in logistics and carrying out strikes in the rear. Women also play a crucial role in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and the Boycott Military Products' campaign, said Ma Chaw Su San, a member of the Monywa University Students Union, who is participating in the urban strikes. Ma Chaw Su San cited an example of the benefits of women's participation during the Spring Revolution:

"During the "Our Htabi, Our Flag, Our Victory" strike, the coup regime seemed afraid of women's participation. Some groups of women participated in the anti-coup strikes by hoisting sarongs while others fought shoulder to shoulder with the men. The idea of mutual respect emerged among the people."

Amara of the Myaung Women Warriors said the women's participation in the Spring Revolution helps the men to plan all activities better. In monitoring the activities of the coup regime's troops in Myaung Township, women's participation is very strong. Women's participation is also crucial in making weapons, especially mines, she said. Explaining the mines they make, she said:

"As far as the effect of the mines is concerned, the mines can cut off the way of the terrorist regime troops. They help us to defeat the terrorists of the State Administration Council (SAC) quickly and save the resistance soldiers from unnecessary harm. So, I think mine operations are a very effective way to repel enemy attacks."

Women are generally soft-hearted, but women's participation in the armed resistance

movement could create a more conducive environment for dialogue, said Saw San Nyein Thu, head of the RWIO. "Women tend to be detail-oriented. Only women can discuss causes more thoroughly," she said.

Mi Hsu Pwint, one of the leaders of the ABSDF, said that women's participation in the Spring Revolution has strengthened and activated the revolutionary movement and that it is also receiving more support and empathy



from the public and the international community. Mi Hsu Pwint believes in the motto "The highest level of organisation will be the strongest".

It is hoped that women's participation in the Spring Revolution will provide insight into the details of their respective roles as well as collective thinking in the field of political ideology. It also provides a balance between the pillars of the revolution.

Difference between urban-rural strikes and armed struggle

The violent acts of the coup regime and its henchmen against the people, including the women who were peacefully protesting against the military coup, as well as the torture and killings in public, have only led to the formation of the armed resistance throughout the country. The military regime's violent crackdown on protesters with speeding cars on the streets of cities like Yangon and Mandalay has shocked not only the Burmese community but also the world community.

In exclusive interviews with BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor correspondents, women members of the People's Defence Forces, women leaders who have participated in anti-coup strikes and military organisations, said they chose armed resistance because it was simply inevitable.

"We understood that this revolution, which started with the people's strikes, could not be fought in this way. The enemy would not surrender. We had to choose the path of armed revolution. But there is a phrase about why we chose it," said Ma Aye Myint Aung Aung, an activist with the Women's Alliance Bureau (WAB) in Mandalay. The question of whether we take up arms is not important, but the purpose of doing so is important, she said.

It is important to follow the military's code of conduct and the Geneva Conventions because armed resistance is not as internationally recognised as peaceful protests. As in Sagaing Region, the combination of mass protests and armed resistance has strengthened the Spring Revolution, said Ma Aye Myint Aung Aung.

This is similar to the ideology of Bauk Hsai, a girl who is participating in the movement against military dictatorship in Kachin State. Bauk Hsai sees the need for a combination of armed resistance and mass strike in Kachin State. Instead of shouting "Our Cause," people should participate in the Spring Revolution by boycotting the main loyal supporters and groups of the junta until victory is achieved, she said. Referring to the geographical situation, Bauk Hsai also said the following:

"I think we can rely more on armed resistance in places where there are ethnic armed groups. In places far from ethnic armed groups, like Yangon, we should do more urban resistance so as not to let the people's revolution go down."

Currently, the People Defence Forces are providing security for strikes against the military regime in townships such as Monywa, Myaung, Yin Mar Bin in Sagaing Region. On the morning of April 17th, 2022, five members of the local People's Defence Forces, who were providing security for a protest in Monywa, were arrested and killed by a Pyu Saw Htee group under the State Administration Council (SAC).

Both the urban-rural strikes and armed resistance are features of the Spring Revolution that involve great risk and the sacrifice of many lives. The sacrifices are enormous. Both approaches have the same goal - removal of the military dictatorship and establishment of a federal democratic union. Ruling a region cannot be achieved through strikes or armed struggle alone, said Ma Chaw Su San, who is participating in strikes in Monywa, Sagaing Region.

"We had to take up arms for democracy, but we also support armed resistance with strikes on the ground. The paths are different, but they are interwoven. This is how we get the message of the need for armed revolution and participation. Only by combining the two can we create a free zone," she said.

Hillary, a member of the Karenni National Defence Force (KNDF), believes that armed revolution could lead to the rapid removal of military dictatorship. "Either way, our common enemy is this dictator. The common path is the emergence of a federal democracy. Therefore, we all have to work together with different responsibilities for the common goal. So, we must continue the urban-rural strikes along with the armed resistance to shake the dictator's throne," Hillary said.



Ma Zu Zu, Joint Secretary (1) of the Burmese Women's Union (BWU), believes that neither the urban-rural strikes nor the armed resistance will decide the victory of the Spring Revolution, but they are only a step on the way of the Spring Revolution. Therefore, it is necessary for the urban-rural protests to continue while armed resistance remains necessary to protect the villages and towns, Ma Zu Zu said.

"To show that the SAC is unable to rule us and that we can resist their orders, we must continue the strikes. Strikes can mean going to the streets to protest, staying at home and resisting their orders, not going to school, not paying taxes, etc. It's a movement that has to be made anyway."

Regardless of which way is better, there is no doubt that the two features of the Spring Revolution, both mass strike and armed resistance, are the lifeline of the Spring Revolution in Myanmar.

The defensive war and the role of women

"Women who are working for gender equality in the course of the Spring Revolution, like me, are also empowering themselves by participating in the defensive war against the coup regime," said Amara from the Myaung Women Warriors.

"We must work for gender equality while striving for the success of the Spring Revolution," she said.



Whether to take up arms or not is not the crucial point, but rather the purpose and intention behind bearing arms.



Mi Hsu Pwint, a central leading committee member of the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) suggested that women who aspire to armed resistance should strive to become good commanders. She sees the potential of young women participating in the Spring Revolution as brilliant and full of energy. I think we could see many good female leaders if they clearly understand the purpose and goal of the struggle," said Mi Hsu Pwint.

According to the Defence Minister of the National Unity Government (NUG), there are now more than 400 People's Defence Forces waging defensive war against the coup regime throughout Myanmar. In addition, the NUG Ministry of Defence has established as many as 259 battalions and People's Defence Forces in more than 250 townships. Although it is not possible to estimate the number of female soldiers in these forces, it can be assumed that a greater or lesser number of women are participating in the defensive war.

The Myaung Women Warriors in Sagaing Region has more than 500 soldiers. The Sagaing Region-based Myanmar Defence Force (MDF-Special Force) has a female commando group. There are also about 700 women in the People's Defence Force (Demoso) in Karenni (Kayah) State.

Ma Thandar Lin, a 25-year-old paramedic from the 7th Battalion of the

People's Defence Force (Kale) in Sagaing Region, worked as a teacher in Kale Township. She is one of the young people who gave up their personal goals for the future and joined the struggle because she could no longer bear the oppression of the military dictators after the coup.

"Many people have sacrificed their lives, sweat and blood in this revolution. I do not know when I will have to sacrifice my life. I cannot expect to return home alive. Maybe I will be able to return home with broken limbs. I might also fall in battle. But we will not turn back until we win. We will not go home until we have won," said Thandar Lin.

Daw Thiri Yadanar, a representative of Amyotha Hluttaw (National Assembly) from Mon State Constituency (11), was surrounded by coup regime soldiers and police on February 1st, 2021, along with over 400 other MPs at the City Development Council Guesthouse in Zabu Thiri Township, Nay Pyi Taw. Upon her return to his constituency in Bilin Township, she was charged under Section 505 of the Penal Code for leading protests against the military dictatorship and being hounded by the coup regime. Daw Thiri Yadanar, who is now in the area of the ethnic armed groups, said she will continue to participate in the revolution because she wants to continue the unfinished responsibility for the people, even though her life is in danger.

Ma Darli, who completed 45 days of military training in a liberated area, is a graduate of the University of Economics and worked in digital marketing. Ma Darli, who was even mocked as a child soldier during military training because of her small body, said she is now ready to fight against the coup regime.

"I live with the thought that I will die. Instead of dying without having done anything, it would be worth dying if I could carry out a suicide bombing to kill at least five of them (soldiers of the military regime). Even if I have to die, I think of how many of them I could kill then. I do not want to die for nothing. I do not feel sorry for myself. So, I will take their lives with mine," Ma Darli said.

Now, as the Spring Revolution drags on and the defensive war gains momentum, massive offensives by the coup regime are being seen across the country. Under the impact of the People's Defence Forces' defensive war, the coup regime has started to carry out ruthless airstrikes and also commit vicious acts, such as setting villages on fire and torturing civilians. Ten members of the People Defence Forces, including seven female paramedics, were arrested in a raid by the junta forces on a local defence unit in Myinmu Township, Sagaing Region, on the morning of February 20th, 2022. On November 16th, 2021, nine paramedics were arrested when the military regime forces raided the Camp (3) of the People's Defence Force's battalion in Kale Township, Sagaing Region. Further information about those arrested is not yet available.





Like ordinary women, well-known female soldiers also participated in the defensive war of the Spring Revolution, such as Daw Yati Ohn, who worked as a university lecturer at Kale University, Daw Wara Nyarni, who joined the resistance movement as a Buddhist nun, and Ma Nang Wint War, a Shan-Karen ethnic woman. Also appearing were Htar Htet Htet, the former beauty queen of Myanmar, and actress Mya Hnin Yee Lwin in the uniform of the People's Defence Forces during the Spring Revolution.

The training scenes in which women participate shoulder-to-shoulder with men in the military training of the People's Defence Forces will forever remain a revered symbol of the Spring Revolution. Like the men, female soldiers have endured various forms of hardship and excessive use of force by the coup regime, in all weathers.

"Women's armed resistance is our history. It is a movement that needs to be documented and recognised," said Ma Zu Zu, Joint Secretary (1) of the Burmese Women's Union (BWU).

Personal experiences of women warriors

"For generations they have never given us what we peacefully asked for. They have killed women in front of us. They killed our friends on our journey. The regime forces even killed Mya Thwe Thwe Khaing, on the grounds that protesters had thrown stones at them. So, we had no choice but to take up armed struggle against them. We could not give love to someone who could not be loved," said Nang Htet Htet, a member of the People's Defence Force in the KNU-controlled area, about the reasons for the armed resistance.

"We did not choose to take up arms because we are militants," said Nang Htet Htet.

After the military coup, the regime troops went from village to village, committing all kinds of crimes on a daily basis, such as killing innocent civilians, setting houses on fire, and stealing and looting civilian property. This led to the formation of the Myaung Women Warriors.

"We found ourselves in a situation where we had to decide to take up arms and defend ourselves against those who were committing all kinds of crimes. The situation required us to take up the arms we could get and join the armed resistance to fight against them since October 26th," said Amara, who founded the Myaung Women Warriors on October 26th, 2021.

The Spring Revolution is not a road already paved. It is bumpy and requires great sacrifices. The rulers will no longer be able to stand up to the rebellious people. That is why the people of Myanmar should remain strong, Hillary urged .

"Either way, our common enemy is this military dictator. Our common path is the emergence of a federal democracy. We will show that we will never

accept this dictatorship," Hillary said.

Amara said that every time she fought on the front line, it was a big challenge for her on how to defend herself and defeat the enemy (the junta forces). No soldier who has joined the armed struggle wants anything to go wrong halfway before victory is achieved, Amara said.

"To be able to fight for the victory of the revolution, you have to protect yourself. Trying to defeat the enemy can lead to sacrifice and loss."

The country's economic downturn, rising commodity prices, and the decline of the currency during the military coup pose a major challenge to those fighting against the junta and those preparing to fight. As the revolution drags on, donor support is also dwindling. The resistance forces fighting on the front lines, including female soldiers, therefore need additional support from the people, Hillary said. Calling on the people to provide more support, she said the following:

"No one wants to be ruled by this dictator. Therefore, I would like to appeal to the people not to forget that people's power is necessary to overthrow this military regime. We will fight for this on the front line. I ask the people to support us as much as you can. Together, let us end this revolution as soon as possible. I would like to ask you to donate in good faith again."

Even if I were to die, I tend to think how many of them (junta soldiers) could I have killed?

Analysis

Women's participation has been widespread, from the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and urban-rural protests to armed resistance. Women have participated at all levels of the anti-dictatorship movement, as educators, health workers, artists, workers, students and young people who call themselves Generation Z.

The women-led protests continue to this day. They chant slogans against the military dictatorship in Yangon, Mandalay, the villages of Amyint Lan in Monywa, the villages on the west bank of the Chindwin River, Kale, Depayin, Taze, Dawei, Gangaw, Thayetchaung, Wetlet, and Ayadaw townships in Myanmar.

During the Spring Revolution, women commando groups such as the Myaung Women Warriors were also formed. Women participated in armed resistance in urban and rural areas as frontline members of the People's Defence Forces, and as logistics soldiers and paramedics in the rear.

During the Spring Revolution, which emerged from a military coup in 2021, everyone is fighting for the removal of the dictatorship, including the military dictatorship, and for the establishment of a federal democratic union. At the same time, it is important to eliminate gender discrimination, sexual violence, and all other forms of oppression against women that have persisted for generations.

The role of women in building a future federal democratic union must be highlighted. Just as the military dictatorship must be overthrown, so must the





ideology and behaviours associated with male domination in Burmese society. The exclusion of women in areas of political decision-making must be addressed.

As women's participation in the Spring Revolution was celebrated with the hoisting of women's sarongs, there is a need to address all forms of oppression against women and to fully ensure equality for women.

Excerpts from interviews for the research paper

Amara, M2M Information Officer -
Myaung Women Warriors

"There are areas where women's participation in the Spring Revolution is more effective. Even if this revolution is successful, the issue of gender equality will remain. I am proud of myself for having had the chance to strengthen the role of women, and grateful for all others who participated in the resistance. I would urge everyone to focus more on empowering themselves and to work hard to do so."



Hillary - female soldier of the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF B-09)

"Help us in view of the difficult situation. After this, we want to go home. Let us build an independent and fair federal democratic union as soon as possible and live together peacefully. Only with strong public support and funding will we be able to accomplish our tasks faster. From there, we can procure more weapons to quickly overthrow the dictatorship. Our biggest challenge in this is donations, and we need heavy weapons. At the moment, we also need anti-aircraft guns. As you know, heavy weapons are much more expensive than normal guns. So, donate more as soon as possible. Donate half of your expenses. I would like to urge everyone to donate half of the money you spend on your pleasure."






Ma Chaw Su San -

young woman participating in the urban boycott movement of the Monywa University Students Union

"It occurred to me, why should we be able to participate when even physically less strong women are bravely and actively fighting on the front lines. This struggle is not a women's struggle, nor a men's struggle, nor an LGBT's struggle. We must keep in mind that this is a fight for the federal democracy we all want. This will make history in the end. Throughout history, women have participated in revolutions, but the extent of their participation has not been great. No matter how many women have participated, the ideas about women have not changed over time. But now you can see that those ideas changed in the first year of the Spring Revolution. That is history."

Ma Hsu Zan Nway - young woman participating in the urban strikes in Yangon

"When it comes to defensive war or other military matters, everyone thinks that only men are capable of it. No one can say if the defence minister could be a woman in the time of reconstruction of federal democracy. Not only in the military field, women could be experts in other fields as well. When the National Unity Government (NUG), which is considered by the public as the vanguard of this revolution, declared defensive war on the military regime, women became pillars of this development. We can see that they are trying in various ways to financially support the young people who are learning military skills to fight against the dictator. The fact that women lawyers are bravely providing legal aid to those arrested in urban flash mob strikes and making efforts to contact the families of those arrested under difficult circumstances shows that women are playing an important role in this revolution."



Bauk Hsai - young woman campaigning against military dictatorship in Kachin State

"In this revolution, 60 per cent of the leaders are women. I think women are just as capable as men, if not better. They are actively participating in this revolution. I would like to pay tribute to all the women who are participating in this revolution."



Ma Aye Myint Aung Aung - young woman participating in the urban strikes in Mandalay

"If we do not make sacrifices, this revolution will not succeed. This is something we have to accept. This revolution will have its price. That is why we want to say that we remain united in this situation. Not everyone in the jungle can take up arms. If everyone had to take up arms, there would not be enough arms. So, there are people who can afford to take up arms. We support the resistance by supplying what is needed. From here, I want to say that we are united for them."



**Ma Zu Zu - Joint Secretary (1)
of the Burmese Women's Union (BWU)**

"Women are brave, and they do not let the dictator rule them, and they show their courage by taking part in the armed resistance. This is a clear example for everyone to see. Now women can fight on the front lines while others serve as logistic soldiers and paramedics in the rear. No matter what role they play, women's participation in this revolution cannot be ignored."





Saw San Nyein Thu - President of the Rakhine Women's Initiative Organisation (RWIO)

"Women have been advocating for women's participation in political dialogues. This is because women want peace more. When a country thirsts for peace, women are thirstier for it."



Mi Hsu Pwint - member of the Central Leading Committee of the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF)

"We need to support women until they become good commanders and give them suitable ranks in the military. We need to involve women in politics so that they are not left behind. We need to create opportunities for them. Women should work hard until they become influential political leaders. They should focus more on engaging in political arenas rather than expressing political views. Young women are smart and strong."

An aerial photograph of a coastline, showing a dark blue ocean on the left and a white sandy beach on the right. The beach is irregularly shaped and has some small structures or trees scattered along its edge. The water is a deep, dark blue, and the sky is a pale, clear blue.

Acronyms

Acronyms

AAPP	- Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
ABSDF	- The All Burma Students' Democratic Front
UNRA	- Union of National Resistance Army
ALP	- Arakan Liberation Party
ANC/AA	- Arakan National Council/Arakan Army
ASEAN	- Association of South East Asian Nations
BGF	- Border Guard Force
BLO	- Border Liaison Offices
BNI	- Burma News International
BRI	- The Belt and Road Initiative
CMEC	- China-Myanmar Economic Corridor
CNF	- Chin National Front
CSOs	- Civil Society Organizations
CSSU	- The Committee for Shan State Unity
CT	- Coordination Team
DKBA	- The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
DKBA	- Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (Former Brigade-5)
DPN	- Delegation for Political Negotiation
EAOs	- Ethnic Armed Organizations
EBO	- Euro-Burma Office
ENAC	- Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center
ENC	- Ethnic Nationalities Council

EU	- European Union
EUMC	- European Union Military Committee
FDI	- Foreign Direct Investment
FPD	- Framework for Political Dialogue
FPNCC	- Federal Political Negotiation Consultative Committee
IC	- Investigation Commission
IDP	- Internally Displaced Persons
IPSG	- International Peace Support Group
JICM	- the Joint Implementing Coordination Meeting
JMC-L	- Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee-Local
JMC-S	- Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee-State
JMC-U	- Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee-Union
JPF	- Joint Peace Fund
KAF	- Kawthoolei Armed Force
KIO/KIA	- Kachin Independence Organization/ Kachin Independence Army
KNDP/A	- Karenni National Democratic Party/ Karenni Army
KNLP	- Kayan New Land Party
KNO	- (Burma)-Kuki National Organization (Burma)
KNO	- Kachin National Organization
KNPDP	- Karenni National Peace and Development Party
KNPLF	- Karenni National People's Liberation Front
KNPP	- Karenni National Progressive Party
KNSO	- Karenni National Solidarity Organization
KNU	- Karen National Union

- KPC - Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council
- KPF - Karen Peace Force
- KWAT - Kachin Women's Association Thailand
- LDU - Lahu Democratic Union
- LNDO - Lahu National Development Organization
- MA - Myanmar Army
- MNDAA - Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
- MPC - Myanmar Peace Center
- MPM - Myanmar Peace Monitor
- MPSI - Myanmar Peace Support Initiative
- NA-B - Northern Alliance-Burma
- NBF - Nationalities Brotherhood Federation
- NCA - Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
- NCA-NS EAOs - Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement- Non-Signatory
Ethnic Armed Organizations
- NCA-S EAOs - Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-Signatory Ethnic Armed
Organizations
- NCCT - Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team
- NDA-K - New Democratic Army-Kachin
- NDAA-ESS - National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State
- NDSC - National Defense and Security Council
- NLD - National League for Democracy
- NMSP - New Mon State Party
- NRPC - National Reconciliation and Peace Center
- NSAG - Non State Armed Groups

NSCN-K	- National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
OIC	- Organization of Islamic Cooperation
PC	- Peace Commission
PCG	- Peace Talk Creation Group
PDSG	- Peace Donor Support Group
PI	- Pyidaungsu Institute
PMF	- People's Militia Force
PNLO	- Pa-O National Liberation Organisation
PNO	- Pa-O National Organisation
PPST	- Peace Process Steering Team
PPWT	- Peace Process Working Team
PRC	- The People's Republic of China
PSLF/TNLA	- Palung State Liberation Front/ Ta'ang National Liberation Army
PYO	- Pa-O Youth Organization
RCSS/SSA	- Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army
SAZ	- Special Administrative Zone
SEZ/SIZ	- Special Economic Zone/Special Industrial Zone
SLORC	- State Law and Order Restoration Council (The former government from 1988 to 1997)
SNA	- Shanni Nationalities Army
SNDP	- Shan Nationalities Democratic Party
SNLD	- Shan Nationalities League for Democracy
SPDC	- State Peace and Development Council
SSPP/SSA	- Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army

ULA/AA	- United League for Arakan/Arakan Army
UNFC	- United Nationalities Federal Council
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UPCC	- Union Peace Central Committee
UPDJC-U	- Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee-Union
UPWC	- Union Peace Working Committee
USDP	- Union Solidarity and Development Party
USIP	- United States Institute of Peace
UWSA/P	- United Wa State Army/United Wa State Army
WGEC	- Working Group for Ethnic Coordination
WLB	- Women League of Burma
WNO/A	- Wa National Organization/Wa National Army
ZRO	- Zomi Re-unification Organization
AFCC-Mdy	- Anti-coup' Forces Coordination Committee-Mandalay
DPNS	- Democratic Party for a New Society
GSC	- General Strike Committee
GSCBHE	- General Strike Committee of Basic and Higher Education
GSCB	- General Strike Coordination Body
GSCC	- General Strike Cooperation Committee
GSCN	- General Strike Committee
ICNCC	- Interim-Chin National Consultative Council
KSCC	- Karenni State Consultative Council
MSICC	- Mon State Interim Consultative Council
MTF	- Myanmar Teachers Federation

NUG	- National Unity Government
PNFC	- Pa-O National Federal Council
SSHO	- Synergy Social Harmony Organization
TPCC	- Ta' aung Political Consultative Committee
TTF	- Technological Teachers' Federation
WAC-M	- Woman Advocacy Coalition Myanmar
WLB	- Women's League of Burma
CRPH	- Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
SURC	- Students Union Representatives Committee
KPICT	- Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team
BPLA	- Burma People's Liberation Army
SAF	- Student Armed Force

