Deciphering
Myanmar’s Peace Process
A Reference Guide
2016
## Contents

Notes to the reader: ................................................................. v
Executive Summary ............................................................... vi
Acronyms ........................................................................ vii
Grand Map of the Peace Process: Introduction ...................... 1
Tracking peace and conflict: An overview ............................... 2

I. Conflict Analysis 2015-2016 .................................................... 4
   Number of conflicts per EAG 2015 and 2016 ......................... 4
   EAO expansions between 2011 - 2016 .................................. 5
   The Northern Alliance and continuing armed struggle .......... 6
   Major military incidents per group. ........................................ 8
   Minor Tensions: ................................................................. 9
   Inter-EAG conflicts ........................................................... 10
   Number of clashes or tensions investigated or resolved diplomatically . 10
   Armed Groups outside the Peace Process ............................ 12
   New Myanmar Army crackdown in Rakhine state ................ 13
   Roots of Rakhine-Rohingya conflict .................................... 15
   Spillover of crisis ............................................................... 16
   Repercussions of war ......................................................... 18
   IDPs .................................................................................. 18
   Drug production ............................................................... 20
   Communal Conflict ......................................................... 23

II. The Peace Process Roadmap .................................................. 25
   Current roadmap ............................................................. 25
   Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement ....................................... 29
   Step 1: NCA signing ........................................................ 31
   New structure and mechanisms of the NCA peace process ...... 34
   JICM - Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting ............................... 35
   JMC - Joint Monitoring Committee .................................... 36
   Ceasefire Code of Conduct ............................................... 40
   UPDJC - Union Political Dialogue Joint Committee ................ 42
   Ratification of the NCA ..................................................... 46
   Step 2: Framework for Political Dialogue ............................ 47
   Step 3: Current Proposed NRPC Political dialogue Process ...... 50
National-level Political Dialogue ........................................... 51
Step 4: Proposed Union Peace Conference .............................. 54
Union Peace Conference ...................................................... 55
Union Peace Conference - 21st Century Panglong ...................... 56
Step 5: Proposed Union accord .............................................. 59
Changes with the new NLD-administration ............................. 59
NRPC (National Reconciliation and Peace Centre) ..................... 60
PPST - Peace Process Steering Team ...................................... 61
Ethnic Summits ................................................................. 64
Military (Tatmadaw) ........................................................... 66
Technical support ............................................................. 68
Funding ........................................................................... 70
Challenges to Peace Roadmap and issues to consider ................. 71

III. NCA Non-signatories: Complementary peace processes .......... 74
    EAO current positions within the Peace Process .................... 75
    UNFC ................................................................. 78
    Kokang Allies ......................................................... 82
    UWSA & NDAA ...................................................... 83
    NSCN-K ............................................................... 84
    Visions for the new Federal Democratic Union ....................... 85
    Developments in the peace process since 2010 ..................... 87

IV. Ongoing efforts for reintegration and long term peace ............ 90
    Reconciliation efforts for Rakhine state crisis ....................... 95

V. International stakeholders ................................................. 98
    International impact of Myanmar’s conflict ....................... 99

VI. Profiles ................................................................. 110
Peace Monitoring Dashboard - December

**News headlines**

- International Based Groups Denied Vote at KNU 16th Congress Elections
- Territory, Natural Resources Dispute Fills Fighting
- Between Karen and Mon Armies in Burma’s Southern Township of Yemyu
- HRW Blame Government Military for Burning Villages in Rakhine State – “Witnesses and Satellite Imagery Reveal Pattern of Burning”
- Two-tier administration and two-pronged approach lead to failed peace process
- NMSP and KNU exchange fire again
- Government and ethnic groups form Joint Coordinating Body for Peace Process Funding
- Shan State fighting causes as many as 15,000 to flee to China

- Click Here to More PEACE RELATED NEWS

**ARMS CLASHES**

- 60

**PEACE MEETINGS**

- among peace process stakeholders
  - UPDC - EAOs (Dec 12)
  - PPST - CT (Dec 10-11)

**SCHEDULED**

- Projected to meet in the month:
  - State Counselor - EAO
  - (13-15) Political Dialogue Framework

**CONFICT ALERT**

- Waingmaw Township
- Muse Township
- Kutkai Township

**Peace Dialogue**

- ENAC Sectorial Policy Recommendations Draft
- The government’s roadmap for national reconciliation and union peace
- UNFC 9 Points Proposal
Notes to the reader:

This book covers events from January 2015 to December 2016 and aims to map out the many aspects of the peace process. Although all efforts have been made to ensure accuracy of the date, due to the ambitious objective to cover the immense scope of the peace process, it is inevitable that there will be gaps and information that need to be verified by the reader. Actual figures are difficult to verify and most of the data published in this book are based on estimates from insider sources, organisation reports, official statements and media reports. Furthermore, the fast changing nature of developments in the peace process and persistent changes in stakeholder policies has also posed major challenges in data collection. The book however hopes to provide a general overview and create framework to understanding the complex peace and conflict situation in Myanmar.

To avoid confusion, the term “Tatmadaw” is used to refer to the government military, while the term “Myanmar Army” is used to specifically refer to its branch that performs land-based military operations. The report adopts the official term “EAOs” (Ethnic Armed Groups) used in the NCA agreement to refer to non-state armed groups - although this is not entirely accurate as one of the signatories (All Burma Students Democratic Front) is not ethnic based. These groups are also described as “insurgents” here to recognise their political motivation, the term “rebel” is also occasionally used to emphasise insurgent groups resisting the government, while “combatant” refers only to insurgent groups engaged in ongoing military offensives. Although the term “Rohingya” is not officially recognised in Myanmar and highly sensitive because it implies its indigenous ethnic status, it is used in this report for specificity and because it is how the community uses it to identify themselves; not as a political statement against the Buddhist Rakhine term “Bengali” that implies the community are foreign migrants. The government’s official term “muslims in Rakhine state” is also imprecise as there are other muslim groups such as the Kaman that have a separate identity from the Rohingya.
Executive Summary

The signing of a Nationwide Ceasefire in October 2015 officially marks the beginning of the end of nearly seventy years of Myanmar’s civil war. However as in previous years, seeming breakthroughs in the peace process have not solved ongoing conflict in parts of the country, and more worryingly, have given rise to increases in military preparedness on both the government and ethnic sides. The apparent end of military dictatorship following the NLD’s sweeping victory in the 2015 elections, and overall optimism in the country’s political reform have not healed deep distrust between the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and government.

The eight out of twenty-one recognised EAOs that signed the NCA have nevertheless decided to press ahead with the government and other stakeholders from political parties and civil society groups to find a political settlement for ethnic self-determination. Accepting that the ceasefire will not be perfect, the final peace structure on the other hand is meant to write into law the rights that each group demands to end armed struggle. While the door remains open for non-signatory groups to join later, the ratification of the NCA into law has formally institutionalised the multi-stakeholder structure for conflict control and political settlement laid out in the document.

Myanmar now faces a critical juncture as it tries to work out a federal structure to appease the large number of diverse groups in Myanmar. The NCA framework contains potential conflict control mechanisms, but a solution to the key topics of demilitarisation, territorial demarcation and power sharing remains elusive. At the end of 2016, a major counter offensive on the Chinese border by the Northern Alliance made up of four combatant groups, three of which are denied participation in the NCA process, is one example of growing frustrations and grievances. Moreover attacks by alleged Rohingya militants in October 2016 have prompted a new large-scale security crackdown by the Myanmar Army in northern Rakhine in October 2016, sending tens of thousands of new refugees into Bangladesh.

This book is a contribution to efforts attempting to make sense of the complicated peace mechanisms, myriad committees, stakeholders, issues and events for those seeking a solution to Myanmar’s conflicts and its repercussions on international security. A highly complex problem requires a highly sophisticated solution, and this requires immense effort and understanding.
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Arakan Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAPP</td>
<td>Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSDF</td>
<td>All Burma Students’ Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSDF-UNRA</td>
<td>All Burma Students’ Democratic Front - Union National Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRS</td>
<td>Advisory Commission on Rakhine State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Arakan Liberation Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Arakan National Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC/AA</td>
<td>Arakhine National Council/Arakhine Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGF</td>
<td>Border Guard Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLO</td>
<td>Border Liaison Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNF</td>
<td>Chin National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSU</td>
<td>Committee for Shan State Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>Delegation for EAO Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKBA</td>
<td>Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (Formerly DKBA-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKBA</td>
<td>Democratic Karen Buddhist Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPN</td>
<td>Delegation for Political Negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAOs</td>
<td>Ethnic Armed Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBO</td>
<td>Euro-Burma Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENAC</td>
<td>Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENC</td>
<td>Ethnic Nationalities Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMA</td>
<td>Faith Movement of Arakhine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPD</td>
<td>Framework for Political Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Investigation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPSG</td>
<td>International Peace Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICM</td>
<td>Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMC-S</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring Committee - State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMC-U</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring Committee - Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPF</td>
<td>Joint Peace Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAF</td>
<td>Kawthoolei Armed Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIO/KIA</td>
<td>Kachin Independence Organization/ Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNNDP/A</td>
<td>Karenni National Democratic Party/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNLP</td>
<td>Kayan New Land Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNO</td>
<td>Kachin National Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNO (Burma)</td>
<td>Kuki National Organization (Burma)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNPDP</td>
<td>Karenni National Peace and Development Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNPLF</td>
<td>Karenni National People’s Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNPP</td>
<td>Karenni National Progressive Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNSO</td>
<td>Karenni National Solidarity Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNU</td>
<td>Karen National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPC</td>
<td>Karen National Union/ Karen National Liberation Army - Peace Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPF</td>
<td>Karen Peace Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWAT</td>
<td>Kachin Women Association Thailand</td>
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<td>LDU</td>
<td>Lahu Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNDO</td>
<td>Lahu National Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNNDAA</td>
<td>Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Myanmar Peace Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPM</td>
<td>Myanmar Peace Monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPSI</td>
<td>Myanmar Peace Support Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA-B</td>
<td>Northern Alliance - Burma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBF</td>
<td>Nationalities Brotherhood Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCT</td>
<td>Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDA-K</td>
<td>New Democratic Army - Kachin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDAA-ESS</td>
<td>National Democratic Alliance Army - Eastern Shan State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDSC</td>
<td>National Defence and Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>National League for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMSP</td>
<td>New Mon State Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRPC</td>
<td>National Reconciliation Peace Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAG</td>
<td>Non-State Armed Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCN-K</td>
<td>National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Peace Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCG</td>
<td>Peace Creation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDSG</td>
<td>Peace Donor Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>Pyidaungsu Institute for Peace and Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMF</td>
<td>People’s Militia Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNLO</td>
<td>Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNO</td>
<td>Pa-Oh National Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPST</td>
<td>Peace Process Steering Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPWT</td>
<td>Peace Process Working Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSLF/TNLA</td>
<td>Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta-ang National League Army</td>
</tr>
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<td>PYO</td>
<td>Pa-Oh Youth Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCSS/SSA</td>
<td>Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAZ</td>
<td>Special Administration Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEZ/SIZ</td>
<td>Special Economic Zone/Special Industrial Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLORC</td>
<td>State Law and Order Restoration Council</td>
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<td>SNA</td>
<td>Shanni Nationalities Army</td>
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<td>SNDP</td>
<td>Shan Nationalities Democratic Party</td>
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<td>SNLD</td>
<td>Shan National League for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPDC</td>
<td>State Peace and Development Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSPP/SSA</td>
<td>Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMD</td>
<td>Tatmadaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNLA</td>
<td>Ta’ang National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFC</td>
<td>United Nationalities Federal Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPCC</td>
<td>Union Peace Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDJC</td>
<td>Union Political Dialogue Joint Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPWC</td>
<td>Union Peace-making Work Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDP</td>
<td>Union Solidarity and Development Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWSA/P</td>
<td>United Wa State Army/ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGEC</td>
<td>Working Group for Ethnic Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>WLB</td>
<td>Women’s League of Burma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WNO/A</td>
<td>Wa National Organization/ Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZRO</td>
<td>Zomi Reunification Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Grand Map of the Peace Process: Introduction

Fig.1 2016 Peace Process overview map
Tracking peace and conflict: An overview

A Persistent Contradiction of Peace and Conflict in Myanmar

Analysis of 2015-2016

Fig.2 2015-2016 Timeline

[annotated timeline - trends as well as major important events, turning point, milestones, communal clashes – See folded paper]

2015-2016 was an eventful two years in Myanmar’s ongoing democratic transition and national reconciliation. After over two years of hard negotiations, the government and EAO representatives finalised a single text nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) in March 2015. It is based on a 2013 framework proposed by the Working Group of Ethnic Coordination (WGEC), made up of EAO representatives. The NLD’s sweeping victory in the 2015 elections and new leadership in government appear to mark the end of military dictatorship and optimism that real political change can be achieved. However, as in previous years, the contradictory increases in military preparedness and offensives by the government, reveal an unresolved security dilemma remains unaddressed.

Fig.3 Ethnic Conflict Status
2015

**Peace Talks**

- January: 12/23 Peace Process
- February: 13/55 Peace Process
- March: 14/87 Peace Process
- April: 15/29 Peace Process
- May: 16/61 Peace Process
- June: 17/93 Peace Process
- July: 18/25 Peace Process
- August: 19/57 Peace Process
- September: 20/89 Peace Process
- October: 21/21 Peace Process
- November: 22/53 Peace Process
- December: 23/85 Peace Process

**EAO Clashes**

- January: Draft NCA is preliminarily agreed
- February: NCA signed, JMC and LDF/DUC formed
- March: Military CIC discussed?
- April: NCA ratified by parliament
- May: Draft Framework for Political Dialogue agreed
- June: EAO meetings held to decide whether to sign NCA
- July: EAO 1st Panghsang summit
- August: EAO 2nd Panghsang summit
- September: EAO 3rd Panghsang summit
- October: EAO 4th Panghsang summit
- November: EAO 5th Panghsang summit
- December: EAO 6th Panghsang summit

**Fig 2: 2015-2016 Timeline**

2016

**Peace Agreement**

- January: 30/22 New government sworn in
- February: 12/16/1 Peace Conference
- March: 14/28/1 Peace Conference
- April: 16/59 Peace Conference
- May: 18/91 Peace Conference
- June: 20/23 Peace Conference
- July: 22/55 Peace Conference
- August: 24/87 Peace Conference
- September: 26/109 Peace Conference
- October: 28/42 Peace Conference
- November: 30/74 Peace Conference
- December: 32/06 Peace Conference

**Communal Clashes**

- January: 2/6/1 Peace Conference
- February: 14/18 Peace Conference
- March: 26/40 Peace Conference
- April: 38/72 Peace Conference
- May: 50/104 Peace Conference
- June: 72/136 Peace Conference
- July: 94/168 Peace Conference
- August: 116/190 Peace Conference
- September: 138/222 Peace Conference
- October: 160/254 Peace Conference
- November: 182/286 Peace Conference
- December: 204/318 Peace Conference

**Fig 3: 2015-2016 Timeline**
Chapter 1 is an analysis of the conflict which finds that clashes in NCA areas have generally decreased, while conflict in combatant areas have increased steadily. Special attention is given to the Northern Alliance of four combatant groups to explain why they continue to fight. It also highlights the expanding control areas and increasing military strength of certain EAOs. Contrasting attitudes on the battlefield and at the negotiation table have naturally resulted in contrasting trends in conflict and developments in the peace process.

Chapter 2 explains the NCA agreement and the complex mechanisms that aim to both control the conflict situation and organise the political dialogue that will lead to a final union accord for long-term peace. As it attempts to encompass all stakeholders in both a democratic decision-making process with fair representation, it is made up of numerous committees at different decision-making levels that are linked in convoluted ways.

While the mainstream NCA process has been ratified into law and has strong backing of the international community, only eight out of twenty-one recognised EAOs have signed and are officially participating in the peace process. Chapter 3 outlines the ongoing parallel efforts to include non-signatory groups in the political dialogue to ensure their interests are reflected in the final federal constitution. Currently these can be categorised into six main groups: the self-autonomous camp such as the UWSA; the NSCN-K that is preoccupied with creating an independent Nagaland with its Indian counterpart; those that want more political guarantees and all inclusive participation before signing; combatant groups that are not recognised as dialogue partners by the government; small groups that are also not recognised; the combatant KIO that demands a political settlement before signing. As of the end of 2016, these groups continue to oppose participation in the current NCA process.

Efforts for reintegration and to address ethnic grievances outside the peace process are crucial to ensure overall national reconciliation. These efforts are briefly summarised in Chapter 4. International actors also play a crucial role in determining the success of the peace process. Chapter 5 highlights important international stakeholders, the impact of the conflict on domestic security (especially Myanmar’s two powerful neighbours China and India) and their contributions to the peace process.

While 2016 ends with two fresh outbreaks of conflict and formidable challenges lay ahead, stakeholders inside and outside the country remain dedicated to achieving long-term peace in Myanmar. Much more work needs to be done to understand the complex roots of conflict to prevent the deterioration of security in the country and a sophisticated political solution to Myanmar’s complex ethnic issues.
I. Conflict Analysis 2015-2016

Fig. 4a.b Map of conflicts in 2015 & 2016

Number of conflicts per EAG 2015 and 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th></th>
<th>2016</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+MA</td>
<td>+BGF/PMF</td>
<td>+EAO</td>
<td>+MA</td>
<td>+BGF/PMF</td>
<td>+EAO</td>
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>82</td>
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<td>MNDA</td>
<td>51</td>
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### EAO expansions between 2011 - 2016

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<tr>
<th>Org</th>
<th>Est. Strength</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
<th>Active area</th>
<th>2016 (additions)</th>
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>&gt;3,000 3 Brig.</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>KIA area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Myinbya, Patetwa Rakhine state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>10,000 8 Brig.</td>
<td>0 10,000</td>
<td>Bhamo, Myitkyina, Winemaw, Moenyn, Moegaung, Shwegu, Moemaik, Mansi, Putao, Hpakant, Chipwi, Injanyang, Machan-baw, Tanai, Sumprabum, Tsawlaw Mongkoe, Kutkai and Muse in Shan state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. TNLA annual report, 18 Nov 2016
2. Clashes between TNLA and Myanmar Army from November 21 to December 2016
3. Clashes between TNLA and RCSAA from November 21 to December 2016
4. “Current conditions have required us to cooperate militarily in aggressive offensives to resist the Burma Army”: Tar Pam la, PSLF/TNLA”, Burma Link, 30 Nov 2016
The Northern Alliance and continuing armed struggle

In spite of the optimistic changes with the NLD-led government and the NCA’s establishment of new structures for political dialogue and conflict resolution, four major combatant groups under the banner of the Northern Alliance remain persistent in their armed struggle.

The four groups launched a major military counter-offensive on 20 November 2016 against Myanmar Army outposts in Northern Shan state along the Chinese border (Muse’s 105 Mile free trade zone, Mong Koe, Pang-Sai, Namhkan and Kutkai) as the “Northern Alliance- Burma”. In the statement on the November 2016 Muse attacks, the groups claim they wish to solve political problems by political means, but were compelled to launch attacks to counter heavy military offensives and ongoing abuses by the Myanmar army. They believe that the attacks will pressure the military to cease-fire, make them rethink the use of arms to solve conflicts and to solve the root cause of the problem through political means.  

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The groups are reported members of the UNFC’s armed wing Federal Union Army (FUA) - Northern Division formed following the KIA’s 1994 ceasefire breakdown in 2011. It is unclear whether the groups are still members of the FUA Northern Division, but their joint military offensives are not linked to the UNFC and members in the south say they were not consulted about the campaign. At the same time, the UNFC does not condemn the attacks and understands it is a necessary action to stop heavy offensives by the Myanmar army.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Founded or revived</th>
<th>AA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>TNLA</th>
<th>MNDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Reasons for offensives | Fighting for equal rights for their people and defending them from abuse by the central government. | Defending themselves from heavy military offensives from the Myanmar army and their requests for conflict resolution negotiations have been ignored. | Believe they have been bullied by the central government despite being granted a special administration zone, their area remains underdeveloped and plagued by drug abuse. | 90% of their people are requesting them to take the region back from Myanmar army control. |

| Role in peace process | NCCT member not recognised as a dialogue partner, are requested to merge with ALP to participate in the peace process. | Leading role in NCCT, NCCT-SD and DPN. Invited to sign NCA and participate in political dialogue. | NCCT member invited to sign the NCA on condition they will end armed struggle in the future. | NCCT member MNDA perceived as national traitor, not recognised as dialogue partner. |

| Position on the NCA | Ready to sign NCA if all-inclusive | Want political talks before signing NCA | Ready to sign NCA if all-inclusive | Ready to sign NCA if all-inclusive |

---

6 Kyaw Kha, “UNFC’s Nai Hong Sar: Major Difficulty Lies in Negotiating with Burma Army”, Irrawaddy, 6 Dec 2016.
7 Nyein Nyein Pyae, “China is not behind the curtain: Interview to MNDA’s general secretary Peng Ah Ti” (Burmese), 7 Day Daily, 14 Jan 2015.
## Major military incidents per group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Feb-June 2015: Participated in the Kokang offensive alongside the MNDAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29 March 2015: First reported clash with government in Rakhine state, gained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>control of a Myanmar army camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26 August 2015: Skirmish after Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) soldiers took</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 horses belonging to the AA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 April 2016: New Year water festival ambush by Myanmar military to remove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AA insurgents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKBA</td>
<td>Conflict with Myanmar army and BGF for control along the Asia Highway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIO</td>
<td>2015: Illegal trading - timber (northern southern Kachin state) and jade (Hpa-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>kant) (^8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul-Nov 2015: N’Kram bum near Laiza (expanding control area/strategic posi-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug-ongoing: Gidon post (expanding control area/strategic position)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNDAA</td>
<td>9 Feb - 11 June 2015: Kokang conflict (unilateral ceasefire).(^9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operation to recapture the group’s headquarter (led by Peng Jiasheng) Ta-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tmadaw responded with a large military offensive, supported by airstrikes,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in an all-out effort to drive out the MNDAA from the Kokang region. 80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>displaced, 100 deaths on government side, 104 from MNDAA side, 5 chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>citizens killed.(^10) Claimed support from KIA(^11) and increased its</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>numbers to 5000 from local supporters, although there were allegations that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>these were former Chinese PLA soldiers paid to serve.(^12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSPP/</td>
<td>Ongoing: Fighting along the Mandalay-Muse road 2015: strategic positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>along the Salween river near UWSA area and defending their headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNLA</td>
<td>Ongoing offensives by the Myanmar Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^8\) Nyein Nyein, Govt Targets Kachin Rebels in Timber Takedown, Irrawaddy, 6 Jan 2015.

\(^9\) Transnational Institute “Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue: Consequences of the Kokang Crisis for Peace and Democracy in Myanmar”, Myanmar Policy Briefing Nr 15, July 2015; 2

\(^10\) Heavy fighting continues in Myanmar’s Kokang, gov’t forces capture five more strategic hilltops, Global Times, 19 Mar 2016


\(^12\) MNDAA claims swelling of its ranks, DVB, 6 Mar 2015
## Minor Tensions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>KNPP</strong></th>
<th>Patrol problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>KNU</strong></td>
<td>27 April 2016: TMD entered the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) headquarters territory of Oo Kray Kee Village in Waw Lay Sub-Township, Myawaddy District.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NMSP/ MNLA</strong></td>
<td>16 Jun 2016: MNLA’s yearly revenue-acquisition “donation” drive - The Myanmar Army raided a MNLA base in Kyaikmayaw Township, Mon State. Ordered the MNLA to withdraw from bases in Mudon, Thanbyuzayat and Kyaikmayaw, claiming they were beyond the lines agreed to in the ceasefire.¹³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RCSS/ SSA</strong></td>
<td>October 2016: Attack on a drug rehabilitation centre, TMD claimed the RCSS was conducting forced recruitment. (CF violation) 28 Feb 2015: Attacked RCSS/SSA’s Advanced Youth Empowerment Programme Training School in Mawkmai Township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UWSA</strong></td>
<td>(tension) 6 January 2015: Burmese authorities ordered the shutdown of the Popa-kyen trading hub in Mong Hsat Township, trade station in October after a large drug haul was seized nearby, but the heavily-armed rebels now appear to be defying the order and have deployed troops in the area since late December to assert control, according to residents. October 2016: UWSA + TMD: deadline of an ultimatum delivered by the Myanmar Army to the UWSA—to withdraw its troops who had occupied several bases belonging to the NDAA—passed on 21 October without action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Inter-EAG conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflicting EAGs</th>
<th>Points of conflict</th>
<th>Overlapping/disputed areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TNLA vs. RCSS</td>
<td>Territorial disputes starting from 27 November 2015 ongoing in 2016. TNLA: Claims the RCSS reinforced troops in their area (from 80 to 1700) in Northern Shan state with support of the Myanmar government after signing the NCA. Will keep attacking until RCSS soldiers return to their headquarters in southern Shan State. RCSS: Defending the Shan population from the TNLA, believes it is their area.</td>
<td>Kyaukme and Nahmkan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWSA vs. NDAA</td>
<td>UWSA: Conducting military exercises Others: Seizure of posts in early October 2016 to shore up the UWSA’s strategic position against a potential Myanmar Army offensive. Sign of growing distrust and dissatisfaction with NDAA’s support of the NCA.</td>
<td>Mongla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA vs ALP</td>
<td>21 June 2016: AA captured an ALP soldier accused of stealing military armor, weapons and other supplies in Chin State. 26 October 2016: ALP soldiers set up a landmine at an AA warehouse, killing 1 AA soldier.</td>
<td>Paletwa Township, Chin State. Kyauktaw Township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNU vs NMSP</td>
<td>8th September: Territorial dispute near Thaegyaung village in Tanintharyi Region.</td>
<td>Kalainaung sub-township of Yephyu Township</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Number of clashes or tensions investigated or resolved diplomatically

Following the signing of the NCA at the end of 2015, the Joint Monitoring Committees provide official structures to coordinate ceasefire-monitoring efforts to diplomatically resolve clashes. These are more formal than previous joint monitoring committees created.


15 Lawi Weng, Irrawaddy (2016), Deaths of Three Ethnic Palaung Reveal Persisting Conflict in Shan State, 8 Jun 2016

under state and union level ceasefires signed between EAOs and government. Improved relations between EAOs and state level governments have also enabled direct meetings to resolve the conflicts.

The JCRC (Joint Conflict Resolution Committee) formed by the KIO and government in 28 May 2014 has stopped working since 2015. The deteriorating relationship has prevented any bilateral meetings to end the intense fighting and ongoing Myanmar army offensives. Meanwhile efforts to resolve clashes between the TNLA and RCSS by the UNFC and other third party groups have also to bring the two sides to the negotiating table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party A + Party B</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NMSP + Mon State government</td>
<td>30 Sept 2016:</td>
<td>discussed 28 complaint letters from Mon State’s Security and Border Affairs Ministry to the NMSP related to cases of extortion, narcotic arrests, military recruitment training and justice related projects. NMSP explained they were moved to enforce the law where the government had not and would stop only if the government found political solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNU + Myanmar Army (JMC-S)</td>
<td>2 July 2016:</td>
<td>Dispute over the Htee Khee checkpoint used by the KNLA for tax collection formally resolved through bilateral negotiations headed by chairman of the Tanintharyi Division JMC chairman Brig-Gen Maung Maung Soe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNU + NMSP</td>
<td>15 Oct 2016:</td>
<td>leaders from both parties met and agreed to put an end to the armed disputes from happening in the future. Both delegations reached an agreement that there would not be Reappointed a joint administrative committee and a demarcation committee, formed in 2006 and 2007 in 24 villages in the Taung Pauk areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCSS + Myanmar Army (JMC-U)</td>
<td>31 Oct 2016:</td>
<td>JMC-U peace verification team began field visits to investigate fighting in early October in Shan State’s Mong Kung.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 “Mon Armed Group Warned to ‘Stop Violating Ceasefire’, Irrawaddy, 7 October 2016. “NMSP received 28 complaint letters from Mon State Gov’t”, Mon News Agency, 4 October 2016.
18 Border Checkpoint Dispute Settled Between Burma Army, KNLA, Irrawaddy, 6 Jul 2016.
TNLA + RCSS 14 Feb 2016: RCSS declares it is ready to talk with TNLA about conflict, SSPP to mediate.  
23 Feb 2016: UPWC member Khin Zaw Oo told RCSS to remove its bases in Northern Shan state and that the tatmadaw has plans to take charge of security in the area.  
21 Feb 2016: 5-member mediation committee for mediating between RCSS and PSLF/TNLA (21 Feb 2016)  
   1. Nai Han Tha (NMSP/UNFC Vice-Chairman/Committee leader)  
   4. Brig. Gen. Sao Sai Htoo (SSPP)  
   5. Twan Zaw (ANC).  
1 June 2016: RCSS met the UNFC for help in mediating conflict with TNLA.  
12 Sept 2016: RCSS met TNP mediator in Chiang Mai.  

KIO + Government Early 2015 about attack on cadet school.  
27/4/15 JCRC meeting held at KIO technical advisory team office in Setapru, Myitkyina to reduce the confrontation and armed conflicts in Kachin state. They agreed that a joint team will investigate ground situation where battles broke out.  
21/5/15 KIO and Kachin state border affairs held a JCRC meeting in Myitkyina to find a way to reduce the armed conflicts in Nam Lin Par, Mansi township.  

Armed Groups outside the Peace Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAO</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Date Formed</th>
<th>Base/Active areas</th>
<th>Est. strength</th>
<th>Clashes 2015-2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSDF - UNRA (Union National resistance Army)</td>
<td>Comrade Khin Kyaw</td>
<td>6 Sept 2014</td>
<td>KNU area</td>
<td>&lt;70</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

20 Lun Min Mang, SSPP to moderate talks, aims to end northern Shan fighting, Myanmar Times, 16 Feb 2016.  
21 Wai Mar Tun, Myanmar Cease-fire Committee Member Tells Rebel Group to Lay Down Its Arms, RFA, 23 Feb 2016.  
22 Phanida, RCSS meets UNFC to discuss fighting in northern Shan State, Mizzima, 2 Jun 2016.  
23 Meeting to Resolve Conflict Between RCSS/SSA and TNLA, BNI and NMG, 15 Sept 2016.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Leader(s)</th>
<th>Start Year</th>
<th>Location (other than Rakhine)</th>
<th>Combatants</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SNA - Shanni Nationalities Army</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1989 &amp; 2014</td>
<td>Homelin/ + Khamti, Sagain</td>
<td>&gt;500</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Bangladesh border area / Buthidaung, Maungdaw Rakhine</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZRO - Zomi Reunification Organisation/ Army</td>
<td>Thanglian-pau Guite</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>India Border</td>
<td>&lt;200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuki National Organisation</td>
<td>Pu.Letlam</td>
<td>29 July 2013</td>
<td>Indian Border</td>
<td>200+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**New Myanmar Army crackdown in Rakhine state**

On 9 October 2016 an attack was carried out against 3 police posts in Maungdaw killing 9 policemen. Soldiers and police launched a large scale security operation in Maungdaw township, where they said they were confronted by residents armed with guns, swords, and knives.24

**Late October Clashes**

Killed: 5 soldiers and 33 alleged insurgents (official reports).

As of 25 October, police report they have arrested 50 people and retrieved 18 guns and more than 3,000 rounds of ammunition seized during the 9 October attacks.

State media said more than 100 people have been killed, and around 600 others have been arrested.

Other reports: At least 130 people killed25

Curfew (article 144): 9 October, 9 December (1st extension) in Buthidaung and Maungdaw Township, Rakhine state.

Displaced: more than 2,000 Rakhine residents displaced by the fighting in Maungdaw.

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Over 600 are now staying in the state capital Sittwe, with another 500 camped outside Maungdaw and over a thousand in Buthidaung Township.\textsuperscript{26} OCHA reports say at least 30,000 displaced at the end of November 2016. More than 10,000 Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar crossed the border into Bangladesh (United Nations official, 30 Nov 2016).\textsuperscript{27} OCHA reports in mid-December 2016 say at least 30,000 displaced by security operations.\textsuperscript{28}

Human Rights Watch condemned Myanmar’s torching of three Rohingya villages (based on satellite images) and urged the UN to investigate the destruction of 430 buildings in the northern Maungdaw district between 22 October and 10 November - Myanmar denies allegations, saying that the Rohingya were setting fire to their own homes to attract international attention.\textsuperscript{29}

**Auxiliary police recruits:**

7 November 2016

100 recruits (ethnic Rakhine and other non-Muslim ethnic minorities living in Maungdaw) aged between 18 and 35, will undergo an accelerated 16-week training program, the state capital, Sittwe. They will be paid and come under the control of the border police.\textsuperscript{30} → in response to demands by ethnic Rakhine Buddhists to protect need to be armed to protect themselves against future attacks by Rohingya Muslim militants. → Rights group warn arming and training local non-Muslims could make the situation worse.

**Investigation Commission**

28 November 2016

Aung San Suu Kyi appointed a commission to investigate the original attacks and the allegations of human rights abuses by the military. Chief of the team, Vice-President Myint Swe, is former head of the SPDC regime’s military intelligence close to Than Shwe.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{26} Win Naung Toe and Min Thein Aung, Thirty Insurgents Killed in Rakhine Clashes, Myanmar Police Chief Says, RFA, 27 Oct 2016.
\textsuperscript{27} Myanmar wants ethnic cleansing of Rohingya - UN official, BBC-Asia, 24 Nov 2016.
\textsuperscript{28} Humanitarian situation in the northern part of Rakhine State-Myanmar, OCHA Update, 13 December 2016.
\textsuperscript{29} Bangladesh presses Myanmar as Rohingya flee across border, BBC-Asia, 23 Nov 2016.
\textsuperscript{30} Non-Muslims in conflict-torn Rakhine State to get arms, The Japan Times, 3 Nov 2016.
\textsuperscript{31} Former UN chief Kofi Annan visits Myanmar's Rakhine state amid Rohingya crisis, The Straits times, 2 Dec 2016.
**Roots of Rakhine-Rohingya conflict**

The Rohingya citizenship issue has been a focus of international attention since massive communal violence broke out between Rakhine and Rohingya communities that displaced more than 125,000 people in 2012. The security situation in Rakhine state stabilised under heavy presence of the Nasaka (border police) and the Myanmar army, but no solution had been found for the humanitarian crisis. An estimated 25,000 Rohingya refugees fled by boats to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand from January to March in 2015.

**Government Policy**

During the Ne Win-era the government army attacked Rohingya mujahideen armed group, forcing large numbers to flee to Bangladesh in 1978. After the operation ended and the mujahadeen surrendered, the government accepted many rohingyas to return to Myanmar.

In 1982 Myanmar authorities implemented Citizenship Law that required documentation to prove they or their ancestors had resided in the country prior to independence from the British on 4 January 1948. Many Rohingyas were unable to provide documentation and hence denied citizenship.

The government has never recognised the Rohingya as an ethnic group. The term was used up until the end of the Ne Win era, but since then has refused to recognise the term, instead adopts the term Bengali to refer to them as “resident foreigners”.

The new NLD administration uses the term “Muslims in Rakhine state” to avoid taking sides.32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rohingya perspectives and international supporters</th>
<th>Rakhine perspective and Myanmar supporters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claim “Rohingyas” have lived in Rakhine state for generations and are an ethnic group.</td>
<td>Believe that “Bengali” are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Antagonism towards “Bengali” not religious as Rakhines accept Kaman Muslims living in Rakhine state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Ethnic Cleansing
Rohingya advocates claim that the government is committing ethnic cleansing. Myanmar’s government and local authorities have been complicit in the violence against the Rohingya and other minority groups. UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, Tomas Ojea Quintana believes anti-Muslim riots were organised, based on testimonies.

Grievances
1. Rapid “Bengali” population growth since independence threatens Rakhine cultural and ethnic identity, and loss of land/resources.
2. Many new illegal immigrants from Bangladesh during the military regime that has boosted the population.
3. Do not see the “Bengali” issue as a race and religious issue, but only an economic issue.

Spillover of crisis
Masses of Rohingya refugees have extended the humanitarian crisis to Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia - threatening national security and increasing financial burden of host countries. These countries have also faced heavy international pressure for turning back desperate refugees. On 1 May 2015, human trafficking camps and mass graves were discovered on Thailand’s border with Malaysia, which led to authorities clamping down on people smuggling in the country.

Fig.6 International spillover of Rakhine state crisis

### International protests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29/6/15</td>
<td>Aceh, Indonesia</td>
<td>The Coalition for Caring for Rohingya held a press conference to urge Indonesia to act decisively against the Myanmar government’s role in the Rohingya humanitarian crisis. Calls for: 1. Calls on President Widodo to reconsider Indonesia’s relations with Myanmar. 2. Demands Indonesian businessmen and state companies suspend investments in the country. 3. Demand Myanmar’s ASEAN membership be revoked. 4. Myanmar officials should be blacklisted from visiting Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/11/16</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>3 November 2016: Malaysian foreign ministry statement accused Myanmar of engaging in “ethnic cleansing” of its Rohingya Muslim minority and claimed “spillover effect of which will affect the safety, security and standing of Malaysia.” Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak participated in a Solidarity March of around 500 in Kuala Lumpur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/11/16</td>
<td>Jakarta, Indonesia</td>
<td>Around 200 rallied against the persecution of Rohingya Muslims, outside the Embassy of Myanmar in Jakarta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/12/16</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Top U.S. diplomat for East Asia, Daniel Russel said a security crackdown that has displaced tens of thousands of Rohingya Muslims risks radicalizing a downtrodden people and stoking religious tensions in Southeast Asia. Called on neighboring countries to resist protests that could further stir religious passions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/11/16</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Bangladesh’s foreign ministry asked Myanmar to “ensure the integrity of its border” and to stop the influx of people from Rakhine State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/11/16</td>
<td>Dhaka, Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>10,000 Bangladeshi Muslims demonstrated to end violence against Rohingyas. Hundreds of Rohingyas gathered at the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok to urge an immediate end to the reported mass killings in Rakhine state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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35 Press release: Rebrutal to the "Myanmar Times" on the statement made by U Zaw Htay, DDG of the President’s Office, MOFA of Malaysia, 3 Dec 2016
Repercussions of war

IDPs

Shan - 29204
Rakhine - 120000
Karen - 13255
Thailand - Refugee - 266,510
Malaysia - 135,475
Bangladesh - 232,894
### Myanmar IDPs and Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Kachin | OCHA report 2016  
TBC – 2015  
Loi Kaw Wan - 2723  
Loi Sam Sip - 416  
Loi Lam - 301  
Loi Tai Lang - 2412  
China and Muse township | 87,000\(^{37}\) | 11000\(^{38}\)  
5852\(^{39}\)  
3,000 and 3,500\(^{40}\) (OCHA - Nov 28, 16) |
| Shan | Rathedaung, Buthidaung, Kyauktaw and Ponnagyun townships | | 120000\(^{41}\) (over 1100 people have been displaced to eight temporary camps by the renewed fighting in Rakhine State as of April 28 2016 (OCHA)). |
| Karen | Maethawar Region  
Ee Tu Hta  
Halockhani | | 5900\(^{42}\)  
4309\(^{43}\)  
3046\(^{44}\) |

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37 “Myanmar Humanitarian Bulletin, July and September”, Myanmar, OCHA Issues 3-2016, Page 1  
38 Ibid  
41 Ibid  
42 Ibid  
43 Ibid  
44 Ibid  

19 | Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thailand - Refugee</td>
<td>MaeHongson</td>
<td>103,366&lt;sup&gt;45&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ban Mai Nai Soi – 10,069</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ban Mae Surin – 2,433</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mae La Oon – 9,941</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mae Ra Ma Luang – 11,148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TAK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mae La – 37,448</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Umiem Mai – 12,038</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nu Po – 11,152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kanchanburi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ban Don Yang – 2,804</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rachaburi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tham Hin – 6,333</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Rohingya – 54856</td>
<td>135,475&lt;sup&gt;47&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chin – 41420</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Myanmar Muslim – 10928</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rakhine/Arakanese - 5221</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Ethnicities– 25,050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Between mid-1991 and early 1992, more than a quarter million Rohingya crossed the Naf River into Teknaf and Cox’s Bazaar</td>
<td>232,894 (UNHCR registered 32,894, about 200,000 non-registered)&lt;sup&gt;47&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Drug production**

Myanmar remains the largest producer of illicit drugs in Southeast Asia and the world's second largest opium producer after Afghanistan.<sup>48</sup> Illegal drug production is a significant financial resource for armed conflicts in the country and a crucial source of income for populations in areas in and outside government control.<sup>49</sup> Many armed groups are believed to depend directly or indirectly on the trade. The Myanmar government’s policy to transform EAOs into PMFs is cited as a major source of the problem. In allowing PMFs to run their own areas and find their own sources of income, many have come to rely on opium culti-

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<sup>45</sup> “Refugee and IDP Camp Populations: September 2016” TBC (2016).
<sup>46</sup> UNHibiCR (October 2016), “Figure at glance”
<sup>47</sup> UNHCR Factsheet, Bangladesh (March 2016)
<sup>48</sup> According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
vation, taxation and drug manufacturing. According to Lahu National Development Organization (LNDO), Myanmar army heavily relies on the drug trade to support PMFs in eastern Shan state and has been building up its militia strength from about 2,300 troops in 68 militia groups ten years ago, to 3,400 troops in 87 groups today in Shan state that accounts for the steady rise in drug production until 2014.

Several EAOs that have resisted transformation into BGF/PMF are active in eradicating drug production and trading in their areas. The TNLA, RCSS and NMSG for example have had clashes with BGFs and PMFs, or tried to enforce anti-drug laws themselves, creating tension and misunderstandings with government law enforcers. There have been several cases where the EAOs have claimed to force or arrest civilians on drug charges, which the government side believed was part of unlawful activities such as forced taxation or recruitment. In addition, the government raided a building to save young men they believed were being forcibly recruited, when the RCSS claimed it was a drug rehabilitation centre.

In 2015, the UNODC recorded that opium poppy cultivation remained stable for the third consecutive year with a slight year on year decrease. The total area under opium-poppy cultivation decreased by 0.4% (estimated 57,600 to 55,500 hectares) and total opium production slightly decreased by 0.3 (estimated 670 to 647 tons) in 2015. However, UNODC’s 2015 report cited that decreases may have been caused by heavy rains in Kachin state and drought in Shan state.

Fig.8 Opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar, 1996-2015

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50 UNODC Fact Sheet, Myanmar Opium Survey 2015
Fig. 9 Poppy growing areas in 2015
Communal Conflict

The anti-Muslim riots in Rakhine state from June to October of 2012 gave rise to the 969 Buddhist protection movement in 2013 that fanned anti-Muslim sentiments and sparked religious riots across the country. Following the new NLD-administration the activities of the nationalist Buddhist organisation Ma Ba Tha have decreased significantly.

The new government has taken measures to take action against those that violate religious discrimination laws, which it had not done so in the past. Interfaith groups are also reviving efforts to pass a “Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act” to prevent incitement of religious violence through social media, newspapers, and radio and television.52 Religious Affairs and Culture Minister Thura U Aung Ko held discussions with interfaith groups in early May about the legislation, but the status of the act is unknown as of the end of 2016.

In response to two mosques being destroyed by Buddhist mobs within less than two weeks of each other at the end of June 2016, the government launched a task force to prevent further racial or religious conflict from flaring up in the country. It is tasked with investigating and holding accountable anyone inciting violence. It has threatened to take legal action.

52 Ei Ei Toe Lwin, NLD considers religious harmony law, Myanmar Times, 20 May 2016.
against anyone who spreads hate speech and incites violence.

Central Emergency Management Committee
Formed to handle sudden crises, 12-point mandate, with responsibilities including effective communication with government security forces and prevention of sectarian conflict.
Formed 12 July 2016

Members:
- Vice president 2 Henry Van Thio (Chair)
- Union Minister (Vice-Chair)
- Police Director-General Zaw Win (secretary)
- Union Minister Defence
- Union Minister Border affairs
- Union Attorney General
- All state and region ministers
- Chief of Staff (Army)
- Permanent secretaries (Information/Labour, Immigration and Population/Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement)
II. The Peace Process Roadmap

Current roadmap

The current peace process and political framework is moving full speed ahead after the NCA was signed on 15 October 2015. The document details the conditions in which the two sides should stop fighting and a structure in which to conduct political talks. It is based on a design by the WGEC with the advice from foreign experts, and adjusted with suggestions from key stakeholders. The WGEC’s framework was officially adopted as the government’s main peace program in April 2013 and by the ethnic side at the first Laiza Ethnic summit 30 October - 2 November 2013. From March 2014 to March 2015, the negotiation teams from the EAO and government sides officially met seven times and went through five rounds of drafts before agreeing on a final text. The difficulties in reaching the final version may explain why only eight out of fifteen invited EAOs have signed and there has been no end to the conflict.

The peace process continues to experience its ups and downs as it has in the past. The ratification of the NCA in parliament, however, gives the current peace process legal status and backing. When peace negotiations appeared to have broken down at the end of 2014, the EBO and members of the government side facilitated informal talks and the signing of a Deed of Commitment for Peace and National Reconciliation to push the NCA forward.53

Deed of Commitment for Peace and National Reconciliation

12 February 2015

The NCA peace talks hit a political deadlock following the 5th official meeting (4th NCA draft) in September 2014 where army representatives rejected all previously agreed points. The nationwide ceasefire agreement further stalled after the army’s deadly attack on a KIA academy on 19 November 2014.54 An interim solution was sought with the UNFC proposing an “Agreement Relating to the Establishment of a Federal Union” and the EBO’s “Peace Pledge Agreement” (PPA) proposal to be signed on Union Day in 2015.55

Another possible contribution to breaking the deadlock between the two sides was the invitation of the Mizo National Front leader Mr Zoramthanga to served as an interlocutor to

53  EBO Annual report 2015
initiate trust between the sides in early 2015. Although was not directly involved in talks he may have been instrumental in boosting confidence in the peace process.\textsuperscript{56}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 January 2015</td>
<td>President's Invitation to EAOs to sign NCA on February 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 January - 10 February 2015</td>
<td>EBO &amp; KNU Consult with ethnic leaders on a potential Deed of Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 January 2015</td>
<td>UNFC called for the signing of an “Agreement Relating to the Establishment of a Federal Union” on Union Day.\textsuperscript{57}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 February 2015</td>
<td>Signing of the Deed of Commitment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deed of Commitment for Peace and National Reconciliation
February 12, 2015
We, the signatories to this Deed of Commitment for Peace and National Reconciliation, pledge, in order to achieve lasting peace in Myanmar, to work together towards realizing the goals envisioned in this Commitment in the spirit of responsible action, transparency and accountability.

1. Aiming to safeguard sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity on the basis of the peace process; and building a Union based on democratic and federal principles in the spirit of Panglong and in accordance with the outcomes of Political Dialogue to ensure freedom, equality, justice and self-determination for all citizens;
2. Striving together at the outset to conclude the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement without delay while recognizing that a nationwide ceasefire is vital for the political dialogue process;
3. Establishing a new political culture of ending long-existing armed conflicts and solving grievances through dialogue instead of resorting to force of arms; and striving together to promptly hold an all inclusive political dialogue process;
4. Working together to promptly draft the Framework for Political Dialogue after concluding the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and commencing political dialogue prior to the 2015 General Elections in accordance with the Framework on Political Dialogue;
5. Undertaking jointly to prevent armed clashes and confrontations between various armed groups and to refrain from taking actions or measures that will harm the peace process;

All signatories to this Deed of Commitment for Peace and National Reconciliation promise to endeavor together for the success of the peace process in order to achieve peace and national reconciliation desired by all citizens.

\textsuperscript{56} Ex-Mizo CM meets with Myanmar govt, rebel groups, The Times of India, 3 Feb 2015.
\textsuperscript{57} Nyein Nyein, Ethnic Bloc Calls for Agreement on Federalism to Mark Union Day, Irrawaddy, 3 Feb 2015. UNFC offers Gov’t agreement for the establishment of federal union on Union Day, Mon News Agency, 2 Feb 2015.
Signatories: 58

President Office
1. President
2. Vice President (1)
3. Vice President (2)
4. Chairman of Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House)
5. Chairman of Amyothar Hluttaw (Upper House)
6. Minister
7. Minister
8. Minister
9. Minister
10. Minister

Ethnic Armed Groups
1. KNU- 2 candidates signed (Karen National Union)
2. DKBA- 2 candidates signed (Democratic Kayin Benevolent Army)
3. KNU, KNLA-PC – 2 candidates signed
4. RCSS- 2 candidates signed ( Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South)

Delegates from Tatmadaw (Army)
1. Lt. Gen. Myint Soe
2. Lt. Gen. Ye Aung

Delegates from Hluttaw (Parliament)
1. 2 delegates from Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower house)
2. 1 delegate from Amyothar Hluttaw (Upper House)

29 Ethnic Affairs ministers
14 Union Ministers

Political Parties 34 out of 66 representatives

1. National League for Democracy Party (NLD)

58 President U Thein Sein meets armed ethnic groups, political parties, Global New Light of Myanmar, 12 Feb 2015.
2. Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)
3. Arakan National Party (ANP)
4. Mon National Party (MNP)
5. National Unity Party (NUP)
6. Democratic Party (DP)
7. Kayin People's Party (KPP)
8. People's Democracy Party (PDP)
10. Kaman National Progressive Party (KNPP)
11. Ethnic National Development Party (ENDP)
12. Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party (PSDP)
13. National Democratic Party for Development (NDPD)
14. Burma People's Party (BPP)
15. Asho Chin National Party (ACNP)
16. Democracy and Human Rights Party (DHRP)
17. Kayah Unity Democracy Party (KUDP)
18. Chin League for Democracy (CLD)
19. Inn National Development Party (INDP)
20. Chin Progressive Party (CPP)
21. Modern People's Party (MPP)
22. Wun Thar Nu Democratic Party (WDP)
23. Chin National Democratic Party (CNDP)
24. The Union of Myanmar Federation of National Politics
25. The 88 Generation Students Youths (Union of Myanmar)
26. Union Democratic Party (UDP)
27. Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP)
29. All Mon Region Democracy Party (AMRDP)
30. Ta’ang National Party (TNP)
31. Rakhine State National United Party (RSNUP)
32. Democratic Party (Myanmar) (DP-M)
33. Pa-O National Organization (PNO)
34. Khami National Unity Party (KNUP)
**Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement**

“Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between Republic of Union of Myanmar and Ethnic Armed Organisations”: final draft agreed on 31 March 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preamble</th>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Basic Principles 11 points</td>
<td>Democracy, federalism, national equality, self-determination; non-disintegration of the union, national solidarity and sovereignty). End conflict, political dialogue to resolve conflict. Secular state and respect for all religions. Multinational state. Work for the good and protection of the people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Aims and Objectives (4 points)</td>
<td>Inclusive political dialogue based on agreed framework, signing and implementation of NCA, . Uphold previous bilateral ceasefire agreements between government and EAOs. include all relevant EAOs.</td>
<td>Joint ceasefire monitoring committee (implementation of NCA and code of conduct)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Ceasefire issues</td>
<td>Provisions to prevent conflict and human rights violations, humanitarian assistance.</td>
<td>Military code of conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Ceasefire mechanism</td>
<td>To form JMC How to resolve conflicts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: Guarantees of political dialogue (5 points)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Roadmap for political dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6: Future Tasks and responsibilities</td>
<td>Confidence building measures, ongoing efforts for peace and development in the interim, protection of projects.</td>
<td>Interim arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>administrative obligations and guidelines for dispute settlement</td>
<td>Signatory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Compromises made by the 8 groups and the Burma Army to reach the current NCA:**

1. The EAOs have assented to the Three Main National Causes of non-disintegration of the union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of national sovereignty.
2. The government has accepted the demands of the Ethnic Armed Organisations to establish a union based on the principles of democracy and federalism.59

3. Agreed to defer sensitive discussions (especially DDR/SSR) to political dialogue held at a later stage.

4. Open book agreement: to avoid further delays by EAOs demanding better terms in the NCA, the government team agreed to sign with EAOs ready to sign and push ahead with the peace process while leaving the invitation to sign when they felt ready.

Reasons given to sign:

1. Legal protection and reinstatement of all previous bilateral agreements.
3. Clashes will no longer be blamed on the EAOs but the government and the monitoring mechanisms.
4. An official position in the political dialogue.

Reasons given not to sign:

1. Ongoing Myanmar Army expansion and offensives in ethnic areas
2. The current NCA violates the principle of inclusivity and has led to fighting between signatories and non-signatories
3. The current NCA is not sustainable as there has been continued fighting even between the signatories and the Burma army
4. Therefore the UNFC has called for 8 modifications which includes the principle of inclusivity, the inclusion of neutral international experts in cease-fire monitoring, clarification of the “federal” goal, and the clarification of process of tripartite political dialogue

Ongoing negotiations:
EOA-Senior delegation replaced the NCCT to continue negotiations with the UPWC about revising the NCA draft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Official meeting</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8th official meeting</td>
<td>20-22 Jul 2015</td>
<td>Negotiation on a set of amendments to the draft NCA by the ethnic side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>9th official meeting</td>
<td>4-5 Aug 2015</td>
<td>Finalised draft but remained at odds over including all groups, including combatant and small groups, in the proposed NCA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Step 1: NCA signing

Date: 15 October 2015
Location: Myanmar International Convention Centre-2, Naypyitaw

4 October 2015: preliminary meeting on the signing of the NCA between government and eight armed groups at the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) in Yangon. Joint Observance Committee for signing the NCA was formed with 10 leaders from each side.

→ Most EAOs involved in the drafting process decided not to sign, adhering to their call for all-inclusiveness and that the NCA was not complete.
### Signatories:

#### Government:
1. Vice President Dr Sai Mauk Kham
2. Vice President U Nyan Tun
3. Speaker of Pyithu Hluttaw Thura U Shwe Mann
4. Speaker of Amyotha Hluttaw U Khin Aung Myint
5. Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services Senior General Min Aung Hlaing

#### EAO
1. KNU Chairman Saw Mutu Sae Poe
2. DKBA Chief of Staff Saw Lah Bwe
3. KPC Chairman Saw Htay Maung
4. CNF Chairman U Pu Nang Lian Thang
5. PNLO Patron U Khun Okker
6. ABSDF Chairman Yebaw Than Khe
7. ALP Vice Chairman U Khaing Soe Naing Aung
8. RCSS Chairman U Yawd Serk.

U Aung Min and General Secretary of KNU Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win exchanged the NCA. President Thein Sein presided over the ceremony.

International observers and witnesses: Six international witnesses – China, India, Japan, Thailand, UN and the European Union, Diplomats from 45 countries and World Bank

### Timeline of official peace process roadmap:

Both the Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi led governments have been pushing for strict deadlines to ensure swift completion of the peace process. A prolonged negotiation over the NCA draft has delayed the peace process by over 2 years from its original schedule. The 2013 WGEC framework, of which the NCA peace process is based, had planned the signing of the NCA for May 2013 and the Union Accord at least 6 months before the 2015 general election. The latest timeline under the new NLD administration has postponed the signing of the union accord to sometime before the next election in 2020.

Many on the other hand criticise the rapid pace of the NCA and signing just five weeks before the 8 November elections, the EBO 2015 report explained: “A democratic government may want to give a better deal to the EAOs, but it is the Tatmadaw that will in the final analysis decide. Therefore, it was imperative to get the Commander-in-Chief to sign the NCA before the Tatmadaw under a democratic government decided to change its mind. It
was also imperative that the Thein Sein government sign the NCA, so that the democratic
government would not have to argue with the Tatmadaw over the necessity of an NCA.\textsuperscript{60}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roadmap</th>
<th>Date (Planned) Actual</th>
<th>16 October 2016 Roadmap</th>
<th>Date (Planned) Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft of single text NCA</td>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 1: Signing of Nationwide ceasefire</td>
<td>15 October 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting up of JMC and UPDJC</td>
<td>15 October 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMD and EAOs meet to define exact timeframes governing ceasefire</td>
<td>(Within 14 days)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military code of conduct and ceasefire-related rules and regulations (Within 1 month)</td>
<td>18 November 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratification by Parliament</td>
<td>8 December 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2: Draft Framework (60 days after)</td>
<td>5 December 2015</td>
<td>Step 1: Review the political dialogue framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3: Political Dialogue (90 days after)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Step 2: Amend the political dialogue framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{60} EBO 2015 Annual Report: 10.
**New structure and mechanisms of the NCA peace process**

The current NCA peace process is a complex structure with numerous components. It aims to encompass all-important stakeholders at different levels of the peace process, according to the WGEC 2013 framework these include:

1. All branches of the Government of the Union of Myanmar including the Tatmadaw,
2. All ethnic nationalities organizations and their armies,
3. All political parties – democratic and ethnic-based,
4. Civil Society including women, youth, interest groups such as environmentalists, farmers, workers, businessmen, scholars and experts.
5. 30% of women participation in every process is recommended.
JICM - Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting

The highest level body mandated to oversee and guide the current NCA implementation. The first meeting was held immediately after the NCA signing ceremony from October 15-17.

Regularly held - composed by signatories
Hear the reports of the Joint Monitoring Committee (on military affairs) and the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (on political dialogue) related to the NCA.

Members:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oct 2015 - 31 March 2016</th>
<th>April 2016 -</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP Sai Mawk Kham</td>
<td>U Thein Swe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Senior General Soe Win</td>
<td>U Tun Tun Oo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Aung Min</td>
<td>Dr. Tin Myo Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Thein Zaw</td>
<td>U Kyaw Tint Swe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Soe Thein</td>
<td>Lt. General Ye Aung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khin Maung Soe</td>
<td>Lt. General Yar Pyae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Ohn Myint</td>
<td>U Thein Zaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt General Ye Aung</td>
<td>U Khin Zaw Oo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EAOs</strong></td>
<td><strong>EAOs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phado Saw Kwe Htoo Win - KNU</td>
<td>Comrade Than Khe (ABSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Saw Yin Nu - KPC</td>
<td>Khaing Soe Naing Aung (ALP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pu Zin Chung - CNF</td>
<td>Dr. Lian H. Sakhong (CNF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Saw Moshey - DKBA</td>
<td>Maj. General Saw Moshay (DKBA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Khun Oakker - PNLO</td>
<td>Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win (KNU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comrade Than Khe - ABSDF</td>
<td>Naw Kapaw Htoo (KPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaing Soe Naing Aung - ALP</td>
<td>Khun Myint Tun (PNLO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Sai La - RCSS</td>
<td>Maj. General Bawng Khur (RCSS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

JICM Meetings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>15-17 Oct 2015</th>
<th>17-18 Nov 2015</th>
<th>Participants discussed duties and responsibilities and future tasks of JICM and formation of JMC and UPDJC.</th>
<th>JCM and UPDJC Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JICM Meetings:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JICM Meetings:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 16 Dec 2015</td>
<td>JICM approved the Framework for Political Dialogue submitted by the UPDJC.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UPDJC members Lt. Gen. Tin Maung Win, Maj. Gen. Soe Naing Oo and Brig. Gen. Sein Tun Hla to be replaced by union ministers U Win Tun, U Zayyar Aung and deputy Union Minister U Aung Thein. NLD central executive committee members U Nyan Win and U Tun Tun Hein to be appointed as new UPDJC members.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 25 Aug 2016</td>
<td>Arrangements will be made to hold JICM meetings every 3 months.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretaries of UPDJC reported on the committee’s implementations and future plans.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The list of members of UPDJC was also presented and approved.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remarks by the Vice Chairman of Arakan Liberation Party, the Chairman of Peace Commission and Union Minister U Kyaw Tint Swe.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**JMC - Joint Monitoring Committee**

JMC-U (Union level JMC): Established 18 October 2015  
JMC-TOR (Terms of Reference): Approved in November 2015  
https://www.facebook.com/Joint-CEasefire-Monitoring-Committee-239649679741477/  

- Responsible for preventing the recurrence of armed clashes - drafting the Code of Conduct, enforcing the military code of conduct and resolving conflicts.  
- Works on three levels - Union level, State level and Local level  
- Reports to the JIMC.

**JMC-U Members:**  
- Ten of government (including military),  
  - Five high-ranking army officers  
  - Four are commanders of the Bureaus of Special Operations.  
  - military judge advocate general  
- deputy home affairs minister  
- ten representatives of NCA-signatory armed groups  
- four independent civilians (Civilian representatives, according to the JMC-TOR, must be persons “trusted and respected by the many” and accepted by both parties).
### Oct 2015 - April 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Government</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairman: Lt-Gen Yar Pyae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Ohn Myint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khin Maung Soe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Tun Tun Naung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Aung Kyaw Zaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Min Naung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Myint Soe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Kyaw Soe Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary 2- Col Wunna Aung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Min Zaw Oo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>EAOs</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chair 1: Maj Gen. Saw Isaac Po - KNU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj Gen Saw Nay Soe Mya - KPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary: Dr Sui Khar - CNF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Saw Kyaw Than Htay - DKBA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt Colonel Khun Aung Man - PNLO</td>
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<td>Comrade Salai Yaw Aung - ABSDF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt Colonel Khaing Myo Chit - ALP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel Saung Han - RCSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phado Saw Tadoh Moo - KNU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 representative from RCSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Civilians</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chair 2 - U Pyae Sone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev Saw Matthew Aye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Ko Ko Kyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sai Myo Than</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maung Maung Than</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thura U Tin Hla</td>
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### April 2016 - present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Government</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairman - Lt General Ya Pyae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khin Maung Soe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt General Ye Aung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Tun Tun Naung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Aung Kyaw Zaw</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major General Min Naung</td>
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<tr>
<td>U Myint Soe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Aung Soe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary 2 - Col Wunna Aung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Min Zaw Oo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>EAOs</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chair 1 - Maj Gen Saw Isaac Po - KNU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj Genl Saw Nay Soe Mya - KPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary 1 - Dr Sui Khar - CNF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Saw Kyaw Than Htay - DKBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Colonel Khun Aung Man - PNLO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sai Leng - RCSS</td>
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<td>Sai Myo Than</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maung Maung Than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thura U Tin Hla</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### JMC-U Meetings: Held at MPC/NPRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>18 Oct 2015</td>
<td>Formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>29-31 Oct 2015</td>
<td>Drafting Code of Conduct - Setting exact territorial boundaries and monitoring mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Formation of state-level and regional committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8 Jan 2016</td>
<td>Agreement to form a state-level monitoring mechanism in Shan State, following renewed clashes in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Budgetary matters, flare-ups in Shan State and measures to prevent the recurrence of conflict in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-24 Feb</td>
<td>Seek ways to prevent further clashes between RCSS and TNLA TOR for technical secretariat Center of JMC-U as well as secretariats at state and local levels. Peace support fund and technology assistance from international organizations and donors (offered 23 million USD to form the regional and state level JMCs in 7 Regions and States)61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-28 Apr</td>
<td>With State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi to discuss guidelines and procedures relating to the Union-level ceasefire agreement. Formation of Mon State and Kayin State-level JMCs (29-30 June) Elected U Pyayt Son as alternate vice chairman of the committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 to 28 Jun</td>
<td>Works to be done on JCMC-Technical Secretariat Center (TSC), a budget for the implementation of the JCMC process for three years and the formation of working committees to develop work programs and a JCMC database Presentation of civil participation in the ceasefire monitoring process (U Ko Ko Gyi, JCMCs vice chairman 2) Forming JMC-S in Mon and Kayin (expected date) and JMC-R in Bago regions. Htee Htee checkpoint; opened in 2013 in Dawei Township.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-15 Sept</td>
<td>JMC’s database, land demarcation, demining, Terms of Reference for CSO and liaisons. Form JMC-S (Kayin-2) in Bago Region to begin November Form JMC-S in Chin State to begin December a report on the interim Technical Secretariat Centre of JMC discussions on work guidelines for two secretaries of JMC-U duties and responsibilities of an executive director and a deputy executive director presence of international experts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10 Nov</td>
<td>Discussed the financial proposal and the UNFC’s 9 point proposal. Agreed 4 Points in general. Attended by UNFC non-signatory groups.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Dec 2016</td>
<td>Review the committee’s work and performance over the last year.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**JMC-Technical Secretariat Center (TSC)**

Director: Min Zaw Oo
A technical body to advise and support the JMC to oversee, coordinate and integrate the

---

61 4th JMC Meeting : Seeking Ways To Prevent Clashes, Myanmar International TV Channel, 25 Feb 2016
implementation of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 15th October 2015, Military Code of Conduct of 18th November 2015 and Terms of Reference of the Joint Monitoring Committee of 18th November 2015, referred to as ‘THE JMC RELATED AGREEMENTS’.

JMC-S Responsibilities:
- To see that the terms of NCA and Military Code of Conduct (CoC) are strictly observed by both parties
- To verify and jointly resolve disputes (without using force)
- To monitor redeployment of troops as agreed by both sides
- To coordinate between NGOs-INGOs and government-EAOs over humanitarian assistance programs for IDPs and conflict victims as well as demining programs
- To give guidance to local level Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committees (JMC-L)\(^62\)

Created JMC-S: Shan 9/1/16, Mon Mawlamyaing 30/6/16, Karen, Hpa-an 29/6/16 Thanitharyi Meik 25/2/16, Bago, Chin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member/Role</th>
<th>Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Chair (Government) Designated Regional Commander</td>
<td>Maj-Gen Win Min Tun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Vice Chair #1 (EAO) Designated Brigade or Sector Commander</td>
<td>Col Aung Mya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Vice Chair #2 (civilian)</td>
<td>Nang Shwe Nwe Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Member, (Government) State/Region Security and Border Affairs Minister</td>
<td>Col Soe Moe Aung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Member, (Government) Secretary State/Region General Administrative Department (GAD)</td>
<td>U Myint Aung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Member, (Government) Director, State/Region Police Force</td>
<td>U Aung Aung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Member, (EAO) – as designated</td>
<td>Maj Sai Oo (RCSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Member, (EAO) – as designated</td>
<td>Maj Deving (RCSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Member, (EAO) – as designated</td>
<td>Maj Nang Phyu Pya (PNLO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Member, (Civilian) as agreed</td>
<td>Nang Zing Chae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Member, (Civilian) as agreed</td>
<td>Khun Soe Tun Aung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Member, (Civilian) as agreed</td>
<td>U Win Tint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Secretary #1 (EAO) – as designated</td>
<td>Lt-Col Zoy Hto (PNLO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Secretary # 2 (Government) Staff Office Grade 1</td>
<td>Col Thaung Htike Oo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^62\) Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee: A tool to prevent the recurrence of hostilities, SHAN, 13 Jan 2016.
JMC-Ls are to be formed in the following way:
1. Chair (Government) Military representative
2. Vice Chair #1 (EAO)
3. Vice Chair #2 (Civilian)
4. Member(Government) Representative, Township General Administrative Department (GAD)
5. Member (EAO)
6. Member (Civilian) –
7. Secretary #1 (EAO)
8. Secretary #2 (Government)

Complaints can be lodged to JMCs through EAOs' liaison offices, wards/village tracts and district/township GAD offices.

Violations are categorized into three:
- Minor Violation - Violators are taken action by party concerned
- Serious Violation - JMC shall inform party concerned that it has been committed. Party concerned takes action in accordance with its laws.
- Critical Violation - JMC-U will form verification team. Findings will be informed to party concerned to take action in accordance with its law

Ceasefire Code of Conduct
Signed: 18 November 2015

Objective: to build a Union based on democracy and federalism by creating trust and stable conditions through removal of burden from the people and reduction of hostilities between both parties.

Four Chapters:
1. Basic Principles
2. Code of Conduct Regarding Civilians
3. Military Code of Conduct during a ceasefire
4. General matters
CoC Signatories:

| 1. | Lt. Gen. Yar Pyae Commander, No. 2 Special Operation |
| 2. | U Khin Maung Soe Union Minister |
| 4. | Maj. Gen. Tun Tun Naung Commander, No. 1 Special Operation |
| 5. | Maj. Gen. Aung Kyaw Zaw Commander, No. 3 Special Operation |
| 6. | Maj. Gen. Min Naung Commander, No. 4 Special Operation |
| 10. | Dr. Min Zaw Oo, Director, MPC |

| 1. | Maj. Gen. Saw Isaac Poe, Quartermaster General, KNL; Permanent Central Committee, KNU |
| 3. | Dr. Sui Khar, Joint Secretary, CNF |
| 4. | Col. Saw Kyaw Than Htay; Chief Liaison Officer, DKBA |
| 5. | Lt. Col. Khun Aung Mang, PNLO |
| 6. | Salai Yaw Aung, ABSDF |
| 7. | Lt. Col Khine Myo Chit, ALP |
| 8. | Col. Hsaung Han RCSS |
| 9. | Padoh Saw Ta Doh Moo, KNU |
| 10. | Sai Leng, RCSS |

JMC-U investigation cases:

1. 15 Sep 2016: seven soldiers from the Northeast Regional Command in Lashio were sentenced to five years in prison with hard labour for murdering seven civilians in a botched interrogation.63
2. 29 Oct - 5 Nov 2016: JMC-U verification team investigated the battles between RCSS and Myanmar Army. The findings issued on 21 November 2016 concluded it was a misunderstanding between low level personnel on both sides and more is needed to educate their troops.64

Ceasefire violations:

1. 24 Feb 2016: Fighting broke out between the Myanmar Army and KNU in Papun Township, northern Karen State, over claims that the government soldiers had violated a ceasefire agreement. Padoh Mahn Mahn said: "The NCA stated that both government troops and ethnic armed groups must not take in new recruits or increase its areas of control... We see government troops increase their deployment in our areas and they are constructing routes that could be used for offensive operations."65

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64 “Fighting between Tatmadaw and RCSS/SSA found to be ignited by low level personnel of both sides”, The Republic of Union of Myanmar - President office, 21 Nov 2016.
2. 8 December 2016: ALP violated the NCA when it tried to reinforce their troops by sending arms from Karen state to Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships in Rakhine state in response to increasing Rohingya militancy.66

UPDJC - Union Political Dialogue Joint Committee

Established: 15-17 October 2015 at first JICM
The political wing of the NCA is responsible for overseeing the overall political dialogue.

Responsibilities (from FPD and EBO 2015 annual report):
1. Draft and approve the Framework for Political Dialogue, and launch the political dialogue.67
2. Organise the UPC.
3. Draft and submit rules and regulations to be followed by UPC participants, structure of the meetings, and procedures for carrying out tasks to the UPC for approval.
4. Collect and analyse the proposals from the working committees that will be submitted to the UPC.
5. Form necessary committees and subcommittees and specify their duties and responsibilities.
7. Submit the Union accord to Pyidaungsu Hluttaw for ratification.

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67 “UPDJC: The political wing of the NCA”, SHAN, 14 Jan 2016.
Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oct 2015 - April 2016</th>
<th>28 June 2016 - reformed, 16-member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48 members – 16 representatives each from the government, ethnic armed groups and political parties.</td>
<td>Government, Parliament and Military</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Government, Parliament and Military

| 1. Chair: Vice-President Sai Mauk Kham | 1. Chair: State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi |
| 2. U Aung Min | 2. Vice-Chair 1: U Kyaw Tint Swe |
| 3. U Thein Zaw | 3. Vice-Chair 2: Dr Tin Myo Win |
| 4. U Soe Thein | 4. U Thant Zin Maung |
| 5. U Hla Tun | 5. U Thein Shwe |
| 6. Lt General Tin Maung Win | 6. Dr Win Myat Aye |
| 8. Maj General Myint Nwe | 8. U Tun Tun Oo |
| 9. Bgd General Sein Tun Hla | 9. Lt General Tin Maung Win |
| 10. U Khin Zaw Oo | 10. U Khun Muang Thaung |
| 11. U Tun Tun Oo | 11. Daw Sheila Nang Twaung |
| 12. U Khin Ye | 12. Maj General Myint Nwe |
| 15. U Tin Maung Than | 16. U Khin Zaw Oo |
| 16. U Hla Maung Shwe | |

### Ethnic Armed Groups

| 1. Vice-Chair: Padoh Saw Kwel Htoo Win - KNU | 1. Vice-Chair: Padoh Saw Kwel Htoo Win - KNU |
| Col Saw Kyaw Nyunt - KPC | 2. Saw Kyaw Nyunt - KPC |
| Dr Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong - CNF | 3. Saw Smith Don - DKBA |
| Col Saw Htoo Htoo Lay - DKBA | 4. Khun Myat Tun - PNLO |
| Khun Myat Tun - PNLO | 5. Saw Myat Razar Linn - ALP |
| Comrade Myo Win - ABSDF | 6. U Bawng Hkur - RCSS |
| Saw Myat Zayar Linn - ALP | 7. Phado Man Ngein Maung - KNU |
| Bdg Gen Bawng Hkre - RCSS | 8. Salai Thla Hei - CNF |
| Phado Mahn Nyein Maung | 9. Saw Sein Win - DKBA |
| Lt Saw Tha Mula - KPC | 10. Khun Tun Tin - PNLO |
| Salai Thla Hei - CNF | 11. Mi Su Pwint - ABSDF |
| Major Sein Win - DKBA | 12. U Khaing Linn Khairng - ALP |
| Khun Tun Tin - PNLO | 13. U Myo Win - ABSDF |
| Comrade Mi Su Pwint - ABSDF | 14. U Sai La - RCSS |
| Khaing Aung Soe Than - ALP | 15. Dr Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong - CNF |
| Colonel Sai La - RCSS | |
Political Parties

1. U Thu Wai - DP Myanmar
2. U Nyan Win - NLD
3. U Tun Tun Hein - NLD
4. U Myint Soe - USDP
5. Dr Maung Maung Htay - USDP
6. Sai Kyaw Nyunt - SNLD
7. Dr Aye Maung - ANP
8. Dr Min New Soe - MNDP
9. Saw Tun Aung Myint - KPP
10. U Thein Tun - NUP
11. Dr Manam Tu Ja - KSDP
12. Tar Hla Pe - TNP
13. U Khun Tun Shwe - PNLP
14. U Zam Za Mung - ZCD
15. U Shwe Min - LNDP
16. U Kyaw Zeya Oo - MNP
17. Sai Kyaw Nyunt - SNLD

UPDJC meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 Oct 2015</td>
<td>Opening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Nov 2015</td>
<td>Agreement to start drawing up the Political framework and appointment of a drafting committee. Tentative agreement to invite NCA non-signatories as special invitees to framework-drafting process and political dialogue meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dec 2015</td>
<td>Framework for Political Dialogue Draft completed and Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jan 2016</td>
<td>Matters for holding 1st Union Peace Conference review implementation processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appointed members, approved rules and regulations, set duties of secretaries team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 main sectors in the framework and 5 of them concerned with political, economic, social, lands and resources affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May 2016</td>
<td>Signatories met with Aung San Suu Kyi about reforming the UPDJC - return control of political decision back from the JMC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aung San Suu Kyi announced the 21st Century Panglong Conference, reformation of the MPC and to prepare for Union Peace Conference reformation of organizational structure of UPDJC. The role of CSOs in the peace process plans to establish CSO forums and future programs. Peace, stability and development of Rakhine State and citizens verification process. Union Ministers for Home Affairs, Border Affairs, Information, Religious and Culture as well as Labour, Immigration and Population, the Union Attorney General, Rakhine State Chief Minister and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs attended the meeting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 May</td>
<td>Approving list of the participants in the Union Peace Conference - 21st Century Panglong - all inclusive. Discussed and approved agendas for the Union Peace Conference - 21st Century Panglong, formation of a joint committee for holding the conference and matters related to the number of participants to the conference and agenda of opening ceremony and dinner. A review of the political dialogue framework and substitution of UPDJC representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-20 Oct</td>
<td>Analyzed the framework of whether the non-NCA signatories could hold the national level political talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-29 Oct</td>
<td>Put forth nine decisions needed for the national-level political dialogue. Draft structure for political dialogue, work guidelines – or Terms of Reference (TOR) – for national level political dialogues, regional level political dialogues, content-based or issue-based national level political dialogues, supervisory committee of the UPDJC, the UPDJC, the UPDJC Secretariat, work committees and the UPDJC Office organizational structure and topics to be discussed at the first national-level political dialogues were drawn up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Discussed how to hold National Level Political Dialogue and topics to discuss; Karen state, Tanintharyi region and Naypyitaw region ready to start.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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68 Sai Wansai, NATIONAL-LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE: The eighth UPDJC meeting a step forward?, SHAN, 1 Nov 2016.

69 “Peace Commission Meet NCA Sign Organizations” (Burmese), RFA, 12 Dec 2016.
UPDJC Secretariat

The Secretariat's duties and responsibilities are prescribed by the UPDJC. It is formed with representatives of the government, parliament, Tatmadaw, ethnic armed organizations, and at most (15) representatives of registered political parties.

Working committees: a.k.a Thematic working groups (Joint) (TWG)
Works under the UPDJC

Description

From EBO’s 2015 Report

- Conduct research and comparative studies regarding their related thematic topics, create options and prepare proposals to submit to the UPDJC.
- Combine all suggestions and proposals submitted by the State and Regions dialogue to prepare proposals for UPC through UPDJC for discussion and decision making.
- Coordinate with state and region dialogue committees.

From FPD point 10:

1. Submits recommendations and proposals related to the issues assigned to them to the Union Peace Conference for discussion and decision-making.
2. Drafts and submits to the Secretariat policy recommendations based on the recommendations and proposals submitted by the national political dialogue for discussion and decision-making by the Union Peace Conference.
3. Issues that are unresolved within a Working Committee or between Working Committees are submitted to the UPDJC for decision-making.

Participants:

Formed with equal numbers of representatives of the groups that are participating in the Union Peace Conference (aims to include 30% women)

Ratification of the NCA

Date: 8 December 2015

In accordance with Article 26 of the NCA: “We shall submit this agreement to the Pyid-aungsu Hluttaw [The Assembly of the Union] for ratification in accordance with established procedures.”

→ by making the NCA legally binding, in the event the NCA faces tough opposition the peace teams can “ask the parliament to place the NCA on parliamentary record, which is easier and also legally binding.” (Aung Min)70

70 Sai KhuenSai, NCA Approved by Parliament, BNI and SHAN, 16 Dec 2015.
Step 2: Framework for Political Dialogue

The Framework for Political Dialogue provides a dialogue process plan, agendas for discussion, and structure of the political dialogue (Chapter 21B) to resolve grievances that fuel conflict.

Draft completed

Approved: 15 December 2015, by a 24-member drafting committee (Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee) at the 3rd UPDJC meeting, and after negotiations with the NLD.71

Drafting: 1-5 December 2015: nine-member team began the task of drawing up the details of a political dialogue framework at the Myanmar Peace Centre in Yangon.

Members:

1. Dr Kyaw Yin Hlaing (MPC)
2. Deputy Minister for Defence Rear Admiral Myint Nwe - Govt
3. U Hla Maung Shwe (MPC senior adviser) - Govt
4. U Naing Ngan Lin (NLD lower house MP)
5. U Thu Wai (Democratic Party (Myanmar)) - Political Party
6. Sai Kyaw Nyunt (SNLD) - Political Party
7. Dr Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong (CNF) - Ethnic Armed group
8. U Myo Win (ABSDF) - Armed group
9. Saw Kyaw Nyunt (KPC) - Ethnic Armed group

Outline of the draft framework:

Preamble
Chapter 1: Aims and Objectives
Chapter 2: Basic Principles
Chapter 3: Agenda for Political Dialogue
Chapter 4: Holding of National Political Dialogue and Union Peace Conference
   4.1 National Political Dialogue
   4.2 Union Peace Conference
Chapter 5: Topics to be discussed in Political dialogue
Chapter 6: Decision Making in Political dialogue
Chapter 7: Organization of Political Dialogue
   Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC)
   Secretariat
   Office
   Topics Based Working Committees
   Technical Teams
   Observers

---

71 Myanmar government approves political dialogue framework, Eleven Myanmar, 16 Dec 2015.
Topics to be discussed

The dialogue topics, according to the approved FPD, include:

I. Political
   Constitutional principles based on democratic and federal principles
   Collective rights of the ethnic peoples
   Check and balance among the country’s three sovereign powers (i.e. executive, legislative, and judiciary)
   General administrative reform
   Matters pertaining to elections
   Matters pertaining to rule of law

II. Social
   Matters pertaining to the ethnic peoples, such as history, literature, language, traditions, education and health
   Faith and religious matters
   Resettlement, reconstruction and social development
   Human rights, gender equality and humanitarian matters

Narcotic drugs: prevention and education

III. Economics
   National economic policies
   Foreign investment
   Taxation and revenue sharing
   Local development
   Finance and fiscal policies

IV. Security
   National defense
   Security Sector Reintegration

V. Land and Natural resources
   Management and distribution
   Protection against natural disasters

VI. General

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72 UPDJC: The political wing of the NCA, SHAN, 14 Jan 2016.
### Framework Review in the New Administration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9-12 June 2016</td>
<td>Union Peace Conference Preparatory Subcommittee-1 met in Yangon to collect ideas for reforming the political dialogue framework.⁷³</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 11-13 Aug 2016 | Political Dialogue Framework Review Meeting⁷⁴  
Attendees: representatives from the government, Tatmadaw, parliament and political parties  
Venue: NRPC, Yangon  
Review of the political dialogue framework will be approved at a UPDJC meeting scheduled to be held on 15 August. Representatives of the government, 16 armed ethnic organisations and UPDJC-member political parties.⁷⁵  
Briefed non-signatory EAOs of the DPN and NDAA.  
The principles of the former government and the current government for national-level political dialogue are different. Under the former government, there was a peace summit and a committee composed of peace summit representatives. The new administration is considering how to hold national-level political dialogue, who will be involved in it and what resolutions will be made during the political dialogue.⁷⁶ |
| 16-17 Sept 2016 | A working team for drawing procedures for national-level political dialogue was formed during the fifth meeting on the political dialogue framework held in Yangon. The team has been tasked with drawing procedures and discussion titles based on outcomes of the UPC for national-level political dialogue as well as a list of participants:⁷⁵  
1. Hla Maung Shwe,  
2. Dr Min Zaw Oo  
3. Maj-Gen Sein Tun Hla from the government side;  
4. Dr Salai Lian Hmung,  
5. Comrade Myo Win  
6. Khun Myint Tun representing ethnic armed organisations;  
7. Sai Kyaw Nyunt  
8. Kyaw Zayyar Oo  
9. Tar Hla Pe representing political parties. |

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⁷³ NCA groups, govt and military meet over framework reform, Myanmar Times, 10 Jun 2016.  
⁷⁵ Framework for Political Dialogue meeting focusses on all-inclusiveness, Mizzima, 11 15 Aug 2016.  
⁷⁶ Team formed to draft political dialogue framework, Eleven Myanmar, 19 Sep 2016.  
⁷⁷ Team formed to draft political dialogue framework, Eleven Myanmar, 19 Sep 2016.
Step 3: Current Proposed NRPC Political dialogue Process

There are three stages of the political dialogue to finalise the Union Accord that will lay out visions of the new Federal Union and answers to achieving internal peace, national reconciliation. Representation at the national-level talks aims to bring more stakeholders into the process than the Panglong conference.

(FPD points 4.2 and 13)

1. UPDJC organises the UPC where participants voice their opinions
2. The relevant Working Committees submit recommendations and proposals from National level dialogues for discussion and decision-making to the UPC.
3. The UPC shall decide on the recommendations and proposals submitted by the relevant Working Committees. If needed, the submissions may be returned from the Union Peace Conference to the relevant Working Committee for further discussion.
4. If a decision cannot be reached at the Union Peace Conference, the UPDJC and the relevant Working Committee shall discuss separately to either resolve (or) make recommendations to resolve the matter.
5. The agreements reached at each session of the Union Peace Conference shall be binding provisions of the Pyidaungsu Accord.
6. After all topics have been discussed, the agreements reached at each stage shall be incorporated as the Pyidaungsu Accord, which must be signed by the leaders of the respective groups and witnesses.
7. The Pyidaungsu Accord so incorporated shall be signed by the leaders of the groups participating in the Union Peace Conference, and by witnesses.
**Decision making:** (FPD point 6)

1. All matters are discussed at the Working Committee level and submitted to the UPC for approval.
2. Important matters including those related to the establishment of a Union based on
   a. federal principles
   b. national security
   c. security reintegration
must be approved by at least 75% of the attendees from each group, and by at least 75% of all the attendees.
3. All other matters must be approved by at least 50% of the attendees from each group, and by at least 65 percent of all the attendees.

**Funding For Political Dialogue** (FPD point 17)

1. The Union government is responsible for funding the UPC, and the national political dialogue, Working Committees and other committees.
2. Funding and technical assistance that are unconditional may be sought from local and foreign sources.

**National-level Political Dialogue**

- Topics = based on the political paradigms received from the 21st Century Panglong Conference.
- Outcomes = “proposals and suggestions” (defined in the political dialogue framework) → submitted to the Union Peace Conference.

**Participants:** divided among government, the Tatmadaw, ethnic armed groups, registered political parties, ethnic representatives, civil society organisations and “other appropriate individuals”. Divided into three dialogue categories
   1. Ethnic based dialogue (led by EAO)
   2. Region Based (State level Multi-stakeholder conference)
   3. Nationwide issue based dialogue (led by a CSO forum)

**Terms of reference (ethnic-region-topic ToR trichotomy)**

17-19 September 2016: nine-member working group formed to draft three different ToRs for each national-level dialogue (Ethnic, Region and Topic), consisting of three representatives each from government, NCA signatories and political parties. It reports to the UPDJC.

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Lun Min Mäng, Drafting of national-level dialogues’ terms of reference under way, Myanmar Times, 21 Sep 2016.
ToR seeks to add greater structure to a process that is vaguely outlined in the 2015 Framework for Political Dialogue covers:

1. dialogues’ objectives
2. definitions
3. rights and responsibilities
4. leadership and eligible stakeholders
5. how talks should be held
6. topics to be discussed

Under the six major sectors to be discussed

1. politics;
2. security;
3. economics;
4. social issues;
5. land and natural resource management;
6. “general”
### National level political dialogue and Union Peace Conference - 21st Panglong timetable:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Land issues Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016 Nov-2017 Jan</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>CSO-F</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017 Feb</td>
<td>Union Peace Conference - 21st Panglong</td>
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<td>2017 Mar-Jul</td>
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<td>Region</td>
<td>CSO-F</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017 Aug</td>
<td>Union Peace Conference - 21st Panglong</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Sept-2018 Jan</td>
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<td>Region</td>
<td>CSO-F</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Region</td>
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<td>2018 Jan</td>
<td>Union Peace Conference - 21st Panglong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018 Mar-Jul</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>CSO-F</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018 Aug</td>
<td>Union Peace Conference - 21st Panglong</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019 Feb</td>
<td>Union Peace Conference - 21st Panglong</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019 Aug</td>
<td>Union Peace Conference - 21st Panglong</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Step 4: Proposed Union Peace Conference

The central body of the peace and dialogue process in charge of adopting the final agreement (“Union Accord”). Decisions made at the UPC will become the basis for amending constitution and laws. It is also an instrument that sets the agenda for the next political dialogues to come.

UPC Chairing Committee: 9 representatives from each participant group, and 3 representatives from each participant group shall be assigned duties to in turn jointly chair the Union Peace Conference.

Participation: (700) total participants in the Union Peace Conference comprising: (75) representatives of the government, (75) representatives of parliament, (150) representatives of the Tatmadaw, (150) representatives of the ethnic armed organizations, (150) representatives of registered political parties, (50) ethnic representatives, and (50) relevant stakeholders.

ToR: UPDJC draft and submit rules and regulations to be followed by UPC participants, structure of the meetings, and procedures for carrying out tasks to the UPC for approval.

Decision making: Voting
Timetable: Previously 4 months, now every 6 months

Procedures:
1. Relevant Working Committees of each national dialogue group shall submit recommendations and proposals from these meetings to the Union Peace Conference for discussion and decision-making.
2. If needed, the submissions may be returned from the Union Peace Conference to the relevant Working Committee for further discussion.
3. If a decision cannot be reached at the Union Peace Conference, the UPDJC and the relevant Working Committee shall discuss separately to either resolve (or) make recommendations to resolve the matter.
Union Peace Conference

Date: 12-16 January 2016

Participants: > 700 people = 150 representatives each from Tatmadaw, EAO signatories and 92 political parties + 50 ethnic representatives and another 50 representatives of the civil society + representatives from NSCN-K (non-signatory EAO)

Boycott: over 100 civil society organizations and EAOs invited boycotted the event on the grounds it was not inclusive and in protest of ongoing conflict.

Preparation: 3-5 Jan 2016, 15 representatives from five stakeholder groups (government, parliament, Tatmadaw, ethnic armed organisations and political parties) considered topics for discussion at the UPC.

**Agenda:**

1. Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament Thura U Shwe Mann: called for commitment to the peace process.
2. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing: military’s six-point peace policy, open to non-signatories, invited all EAOs to join the Myanmar army, called for a timetable for disarmament and demobilisation
3. NLD Chairperson Daw Aung San Suu Kyi: need for national reconciliation to achieve peace and the peace process must be all inclusive
4. UPDJC Secretary Dr. Lian H. Sakhong: summary of the NCA
5. UPDJC Vice Chairman U Aung Min: function of the UPDJC
6. UPDJC Member Sai Kyaw Nyunt: summary of the Framework for Political Dialogue
7. JMC Member Lieutenant General Ye Aung: function of the JMC
8. UPDJC invited each group to present their views on five main topics the Federal
system, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Tax and Revenue sharing, National
Security, Land and Environment and Natural Resources sharing.

4 Agreed points from the First UPC
   1. political dialogue to conclude within three to five years
   2. a second Union Peace Conference to convene “as soon as possible,”
   3. the process to enable 30 percent women’s participation
   4. NCA signatories to be “put on record” and honored.

Other points:79

1. disagreement on how to approach the suitable federal form of government. The
   USDP wants a strong central government with weak state and regional govern-
   ments, the ethnic nationalities, armed and unarmed, are for a balanced power-shar-
   ing between the central and the state-regional governments.

2. Ethnic nationalities, particularly the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy
   (SNLD), are for 8 States configuration, while the USDP, military and the NLD opt-
   ed for the present 14 States and Regions in fairness to other ethnic groups which
   reside within the designated area for state-level status of a dominant ethnic group.

3. The Wa, Palaung, Pa-O and Tai-Leng (Shan-ni) aired their aspirations to upgrade
   their status to national state-level within the union.

Union Peace Conference - 21st Century Panglong

Date: 31 August – 4 September 2016

79 Sai wansai: Union Peace Conference opens up a Pandora box of federal union formation and national state-level aspira-
   tions, SHAN, 18 Jan 2016 .
Participants: attended by around 1800 invitees,
- EAO signatories
- Government
- Political parties
- EAO Non-signatories
- CSOs
- International

Special invitee: UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon

Preparations: May 2016 - Soon after Suu Kyi proposed the “21st Century Panglong Conference”
- Evoking the “Panglong Spirit” (a reference to the Panglong Agreement of 1947 reached between Suu Kyi’s father Aung San and ethnic minority leaders to form a federal union guaranteeing ethnic communities equal rights)
- Emphasis on “national reconciliation”

Central convening committee
Chair by the State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi (NRPC chair).
Vice Chair: Kyaw Tint Swe, Minister of the State Counselor’s Office,
Secretary: Khin Maung Tin, Deputy Minister of the State Counselor’s Office,
Joint secretary: former Lt-Gen Khin Zaw Oo
also includes Union ministers and deputy ministers.

Panglong-21 preparatory committee a.k.a Joint Organizing Committee for the Union Peace Conference—21st Century Panglong
Formed: 31 May 2016 (President’s Office Notification 26/2016) 80

The Preparatory Committee
Prepares for the successful holding of the UPC (21st Century Panglong Conference) and involvement of all stakeholders.

Chief Negotiator Dr Tin Myo Win as chairman
Union Minister for the Office of State Counsellor U Kyaw Tint Swe as vice chairman
MPC special adviser U Hla Maung Shwe as secretary
13 members.

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80 UNFC representatives to meet with UPDJC leaders, Mizzima, 9 Jun 2016.
Subcommittee 1
Holds talks with NCA signatories to be led by Lt-Gen Yar Pyae as chairman, Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win as Vice-chairman, Dr Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong as secretary 1, Dr Min Zaw Oo as secretary 2

Subcommittee 2
Holds talks with NCA non-signatories Dr Tin Myo Win as chairman, U Hla Maung Shwe as secretary and seven members.

15 Jun 2016: met DPN (UNFC) in Chiang mai
20 Aug 2016: met UNFC at NRPC-YGN, discussed UNFC’s eight-point proposal to sign the NCA and join the UPC.

Agenda:
- Min Aung Hlaing: uphold Myanmar Army’s 6 points peace policy, warns against “racism, localism and dogmatism”
- KIO vice-chairman and UNFC chairman Maj Gen N’Ban La
- State Councillor Aung San Suu Kyi
- UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
- 73 papers presented by representatives from the government, the Tatmadaw, political parties and ethnic armed groups - each given a 10-minute time slot on the air.
- Closing remarks: Aung San Suu Kyi urged all participants to avoid dwelling on past grievances or slights.

Results: All papers presented at the conference combined and published in a book by the Information Ministry.

Brief summary of the views:
- Representatives of the Myanmar Army and USDP reaffirmed the need to adhere to the 2008 military-drafted constitution and basic principles of the NCA.
- EAO leaders and ethnic political parties called for greater separation of power between the state and central governments: for example, by allowing states to control their territory with their own constitutions, provided those do not contradict the Union charter.
- Common points: peace and building the country based on the principles of democracy and a federal union.
- UNFC presented a 10-point agenda to bring the armed forces under civilian administration, and to appoint ethnic minorities to lead the revised Union military, reorganise the country into 14 states, with the seven current states preserved, and the seven regions turned into “states of nationalities”.
- UWSA and Tai-Leng (Shanni) Nationalities Development Party (TNDP) requested their own autonomous states and to bring the Burma Army under civilian control.
- NDAA urged the government to ensure the future inclusion of the “Northern Alliance” (AA, TNLA and MNDAA)
**Step 5: Proposed Union accord**

The result of all dialogues and Union Peace Conferences will be consolidated in a Myanmar national peace accord, known as the “Union Accord”. It is a supreme agreement which will be the basis for amending the constitution and all laws.81

Approved by: UPC

Ratified by: Parliament (step 6) followed by implementation of Union Accord provisions and “security reintegration” (step 7).

**Top level Decision Making bodies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EAO summit</td>
<td>NDSC (National Defense Security Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFC</td>
<td>UPCC + MPC =&gt; NRPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCT =&gt; SD =&gt; DPN</td>
<td>CT (with gov)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEU (with non-NCA signatory groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UPWC (Aung Min) =&gt; PC (Dr. Tin Myo Win)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Changes with the new NLD-administration**

Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD party have made several changes to the government’s structures related to the peace process. The controversial MPC was the first to be reformed and all its members, except Hla Maung Shwe and Dr Min Zaw Oo, were replaced.

16 May 2016 meeting:

1. Transformation of the MPC into the NRPC, reformation led by U Kyaw Tint Swe
2. Reformation of the UPDJC
3. Convening of the 21st-Century Panglong Conference
4. Formation of:
   a. A preparatory committee for convening the 21st-Century Panglong Conference
   b. sub-committee to coordinate the continuation of discussions with NCA signatories.
   c. sub-committee to discuss and coordinate non-signatories. sub-committees are to hold meetings simultaneously but separately.
   d. CSO Forum is to be held parallel to the political dialogues (NRPC is to provide necessary assistance)

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81 The significance of NCA: What everyone ought to know about the peace process, CDES Analysis Paper
While the new democratically elected government has ushered in a new sense of optimism about political reform, namely amending the constitution, accepting a democratic federal union, working towards all-inclusiveness and reviving the Panglong spirit, the EAO leaders have also encountered difficulties with the new negotiating team:

1. The previous USDP government was more compromising because the peace process gave them the legitimacy they lacked, whereas the newly elected NLD government has less incentive to yield to EAO demands.
2. New peace team less experienced
3. NLD government insists on only formal meetings that are more bureaucratic and does not allow either side to speak freely
4. The communication was also much quicker and more direct in the previous administration where the military and civilian government were all linked, whereas now the government and military channels are split.

**Fig.12 New communication structure between EAOs and government**

a. EAO → PC/DPN → Aung San Suu Kyi → Military
b. EAO → MPC → Aung Min → President → Commander in Chief

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**NRPC (National Reconciliation and Peace Centre)**

Launched: 11 July 2016
Headed by: Aung San Suu Kyi, State Councilor
Chief Peace Negotiator (implementation): U Tin Myo Win and Peace Commission
Advisory team: led by retired Union minister Aung Kyi
Office: Nay Pyi Taw (Head), Yangon Branch (old MPC building)

Formally the NRPC has replaced the UPCC (Union Peace Central Committee), but like the MPC is responsible for peace negotiations and provides a venue for meetings and office space for the UPDJC-U and JMC-U. The name is said to have been taken from the “Deed of Commitment (DoC) for Peace and Reconciliation”. In response to criticisms about the MPC’s mismanagement of funds, Aung San Suu Kyi ordered that the Union government allocate the peace budget and transformed the center into a government institution under the State Counsellor’s Office, staffed by civil servants and governed by civil service laws and financial rules. (See more details in NRPC profile page)

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82 A new peace facilitating center set up, SHAN, 18 Feb 2016.
### UPWC
**UPWC**
(3 May 2012 - 31 March 2016)

| 1. | U Aung Min (Vice Chairman) - Leader |
| 2. | U Thein Zaw (Vice Chairman/MP head of the Lower house National Races Affairs and Internal Peacemaking Committee) |
| 3. | Lt. Gen. Thet Naing Win (Member/Union Minister) |
| 4. | U Khin Yi (Member/Union Minister) |
| 5. | U Thein Htay (Member/Union Minister) |
| 6. | Lt. Gen. Myint Soe (Member/Military) |
| 7. | Lt. Gen. Khin Zaw Oo Member (Member/Military) |
| 8. | Lt. Gen. Ye Aung (Member/Military-Judge Advocate General) |
| 9. | U Tun Tun Oo (Member/Deputy Attorney General) |
| 10. | U Saw Htun Mya Aung (Member/MP, Upper House) |
| 11. | Daw Mi Yin Chan (Secretary/MP, Lower House) |

### Peace Commission
(formed 11 July 2016) - negotiations with NCA-non signatories

| 1. | Dr Tin Myo Win (Chairman) |
| 2. | Thein Zaw (former UPWC VC/Vice-Chairman) |
| 3. | Lt-Gen Khin Zaw Oo (secretary) |
| 4. | Professor Aung Tun Thet (economic advisor to the Thein Sein government) |
| 5. | Naing Ngan Linn (Yangon Region social affairs minister) |
| 6. | Aung Soe (Lower House lawmaker) |

“Think Tank” advisory team of the commission and aiding in the design of NRPC policy:

1. retired Union minister Aung Kyi (leader)
2. Min Zaw Oo (former MPC director of ceasefire negotiation and implementation)
3. Hla Maung Shwe (MPC veteran, secretary of the “21st Century Panglong” peace conference Prep committee).

### MPC Technical team members

1. U Tin Maung Thann
2. U Hla Maung Shwe
3. U Kyaw Soe Hlaing
4. Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing
5. Dr. Min Zaw Oo (Director Ceasefire Negotiation and Implementation Program)
6. U Aung Nai Oo
7. U Nyo Ohn Myint
8. U Thiha Myo Nyunt
9. Dr. Salai Ngun Cung Lian
10. U Kyaw Tin
11. Dr. Rebecca Tin

### PPST - Peace Process Steering Team

A Policy making body of 8 signatory EAOs

**Formed:** 26 March 2016

**Leader:** KNU Chairman Gen. Mutu Say Poe

**Deputy Leader:**
Deputy leader: RCSS chairman Lt-Gen Yawd Serk
Coordinator-1: Hkun Okker
Coordinator-2: Pu Zing Cung
Members: Khaing Soe Naing Aung, Yebaw Than Khe, Dr Naw Kabaw Htoo, (DKBA rep)

Purpose:84
1. to provide leadership (guidance and supervision) when meeting with non-signatory groups and the new government.
2. provide direction when making urgent decisions.
3. direct projects for the JMC (Joint Monitoring Committee) and the UPDJC

Guidelines:
1. Convening of NCA signatory EAOs, together with observers and technical advisors, totaling 79 persons;
2. Reassess NCA implementation;
3. Welcome the new government for its peace commitment and the EAOs readiness to cooperate:
4. The necessity for all EAOs to participate and be represented in the forthcoming 2nd Union Peace Conference;
5. Believe in the need for all EAOs’ enthusiastic participation until agreement to form federal union is achieved through political negotiations;
6. The formation of EAO Peace Process Steering Team (EAO PPST); and
7. Pledge to adhere to the NCA and cooperate with the new regime and the Tatmadaw (Military) to implement the agreement.

Implementation bodies:
- CT - EAO Coordination Team / Peace Process Work Team (PPWT)
- DEU - Delegation for EAO Unity (U Khaing Soe Naing Aung) 85

Team Meetings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-26 Mar 2016</td>
<td>Formed PPST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 May 2016</td>
<td>About 21st Century Panglong Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-25 June 2016</td>
<td>Agreed to attend the Mai Jayang conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-6 August 2016</td>
<td>Prepare for UPC, drafting the political dialogue framework</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

85 Sai Kheunsai, Learning to share: The EAO8 Summit # 2, SHAN, 28 Mar 2016.
Signatory workshop

1-2 November 2015: leaders of eight NCA-signatory EAOs discussed development of a federal system, the sharing of natural resources, the resolution of land problems, and the roles of military and armed ethnic groups during a two-day workshop in Chiang Mai.

PPST External Meetings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 Jun 2016</td>
<td>Naypyitaw</td>
<td>Min Aung Hlaing</td>
<td>Plans to include NCA non-signatories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Aug 2016</td>
<td>Naypyitaw</td>
<td>Aung San Suu Kyi (NRPC)</td>
<td>to negotiate its terms for the peace process and about joint implementation of the NCA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CT - EAO Coordination Team

Formed: 17 October 2015
Office: Diamond Condominium, Hlaing Township, Yangon
formed with one representative each from the signatory EAOs
Led by Padoh Kwe Htoo Win (KNU); members include Sai La (RCSS); Saw Mra Raza Lin (ALP); Pu Thla Hei (CNF); Yebaw Sonny (ABSDF); Saw Kyaw Nyunt (KPC); Hkun Thomas (PNLO); (to be nominated for DKBA).

Meeting in Yangon from 21-22nd October 2015: Discussed and laid the strategy to continue the Political Dialogue, strategizing setting up a strong Ceasefire Monitoring system, and setting up mechanisms to coordinate with Ethnic Armed Organisations that have not signed the NCA.86

DEU - Delegation for EAO Unity (Ad Hoc Team)

Formed: March 28 2016 (at 2nd EAO-8 summit)
led by U Khaing Soe Naing Aung; members include Padoh Kwe, Yebaw Than Khe, Saw Kyaw Nyunt, Dr Lian, Dr Sui Khar and Mi Su Pwint.
To focus on further discussions with non-signatories EAOs, meets with DPN about how both ethnic armed groups can work together under a NLD government.

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86 EAO Coordination Team Meeting in Rangoon 21-22nd October 2015, KNU HQ Facebook. 22 Oct 2015
## Ethnic Summits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Hosted by</th>
<th>Attendees</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1-6 May 2015: | UWSA      | 12 groups | 12 points - calling on the government to demonstrate its commitment to the peace process by ceasing hostilities against AA, MNDA, and TNLA, and include them in the final NCA.  
- requested mediation from the United Nations and China on the NCA process  
- called for an end to human rights violations committed by government troops in ethnic areas  
- pressed for reform of Myanmar’s 2008 junta-backed constitution  
- demanded the creation of a Wa state as part of a federal union. |
| Panghsang     |           | (AA, KIO, KNPP, KNU, MNDA, NDAA, NMSP, PNLO, PSLF, RCSS, SSPP, UWSA) |  |
| 2-9 Jun 2015: | KNU       | 17 EAOs   | 1 Critically review and discuss in depth the NCA (approved draft), which was signed by the UPWC and NCCT on March 31, 2015, and reconfirm it with amendments - will not sign the NCA.  
2 Resolution for all inclusive signing of the NCA - to only sign the NCA if all 16 NCCT members are included, to have international witnesses co-sign the final NCA, including the UN, ASEAN, China, India, Japan, Thailand, Norway, the USA and UK. Demand all the top government and Tatmadaw leaders sign the NCA to ensure it is binding on all parties;  
3 Studied the political framework and basic guidelines (proposed draft) formulated by the NCCT for political dialogue and the conference  
4 Formed the “EAOs’ Nationwide Ceasefire High-Level Delegation” (SD - Senior delegation) with 15 leaders to replace the NCCT to negotiate with the government side headed by Naw Zipporah Sein. |
| Law Khee Lar  |           | (AA, ALP, ANC, CNF, DKBA, KIO, KNPP, KNU, KPC, LDU, MNDA, NDAA, NMSP, PNLO, TNLA, SSPP, WNO) |  |
| 1-3 Nov 2015: | UWSA      | 11 groups | Statement: called for an end to military offensives in the country; wished to move forward through political dialogue with the new government after elections. |
| Panghsang     |           | non-signatories (UWSA, KIO, SSPP, MNDA, PNLO, NDAA, MNDA, TNLA, AA, KNDP, and KNLP) |  |
| 26-28 Mar 2016: | UWSA  | AA, KIA, NDAA, MNDA, SSPP, TNLA, UWSA | NCA non-signatories pledged to cooperate with the new government. EAOs released a statement on ending armed conflicts between the RCSS and TNLA in northern Shan State. |
Results: coordinate positions on key issues, reviewing the NCA; seek common ground on working toward federalism.

1. basic principles for security and defence; two policy papers, one each by the eight NCA signatories and the UNFC alliance of nine non-signatory groups.
   a. 10 points require further discussion, working group formed to overcome differences between the two policy papers (details not publicised).
   b. others – addressing the constitution, putting the military under civilian control and protecting civilians – were universally agreed.

2. approving the Panglong Handbook prepared by the Kachin, Shan and Chin EAOs as the original signatories of the Panglong Agreement in 1947;

3. basic principles for the constitution of a future federal democratic union; 8 points for writing the federal constitution
   1. Sovereign Power;
   2. Equality;
   3. Self-determination;
   4. Federal Principles;
   5. Minority Rights;
   6. Democratic Rights, Basic Human Rights and Gender Equality;
   7. Secular State; and
   8. Multi-party Democratic System.
   9. the amendment, fine-tuning of FPD.

   a. Signatories in the 21st-century Panglong Conference sub-committee-1 submitted points from the political dialogue framework review.
   b. reduce the composition to only three groups – the government, ethnic armed groups and political parties – to streamline the political dialogue.
   c. Agreed that five issues – politics, security, economics, social impacts and the environment – should all be discussed, not only political and security matters as suggested by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.
   d. future talks with the government and the Tatmadaw is guided by “three principles”: “A genuine federal Union can be established through democracy, equality among nationalities and self-determination.
Other ethnic alliances:

"Consultation on Panglong" in Chiang Mai on June 7-8, held mainly to discuss issues relating to the Panglong Agreement in 1947 and the proposed follow-up meeting that is set to take place next month, said Colonel Sai Hla, a spokesperson with the RCSS/SSA. The meeting was attended by Lieutenant General Yawd Serk Chairman of the RCSS, General N'Ban La Vice Chairman of the KIO as well as Sao Sai Htoo of the SSPP. The original Panglong agreement in 1947, on which Suu Kyi has styled her peace initiative, was signed between her father Aung San—representing the soon-to-be independent government of Burma, dominated by ethnic Burmans—and leaders from Shan, Kachin and Chin minority groups. It envisaged "full autonomy in internal administration" for Burma’s ethnic minority “frontier” regions.

Other ethnic meetings

Several ethnic based conferences held annually or periodically to coordinate the efforts between EAOs, Political parties, CBOs and religious leaders for the peace process and ethnic cause. Below are some examples:

1. Committee for Shan State Unity (CSSU)
2. Mon National Conference
3. Karen Unity and Peace Committee (KUPC)

Military (Tatmadaw)

Strength: 406,000
Commander in Chief: Senior General Min Aung Hlaing
Defense budget: US$2.4billion
http://www.mod.gov.mm/

Government ministries: Defense, Interior and Border Affairs

The Myanmar Military plays a decisive role in the peace process and retains partial control of national politics while the threat of internal conflict remains. Its attitude towards EAOs and insurgents as enemies of the state has deep roots in the country’s long history of civil war. With democratic reforms beginning in 2010 and Thein Sein’s renewed peace process

88 KIO, RCSS and SSPP leaders meet to discuss upcoming Panglong meeting, Mizzima, 13 Jun 2016.
89 Shan, Kachin leaders meet, SHAN, 23 Jan 2015.
the following year, the military has since made more effort to understand the ethnic struggle for self-determination. Over the course of the NCA negotiations, it has come to be more accepting of several demands from the ethnic side, namely the notion of federalism and no longer associate it with disintegration of the union. It has also agreed to cooperate with Aung San Suu Kyi to host the 21st century Panglong conference and supports the mainstream peace process in finding a political settlement to appease all interest groups in Myanmar.

The Myanmar military has also been engaging much more with foreign counterparts [see international section for meetings and trainings] and have participated in federalism workshops alongside civil society groups. Some activities related to the peace process include:

1. EBO’s FPD (Framework for Political Dialogue) 5th, 6th and 7th out of 8 workshops in 2015.
2. 1 September 2015: Special workshop organised by the EBO and KNU for tatmadaw what a Framework is, what are the views of different groups on it, and how they could participate in the process.
3. 5-9 Nov 2016: Senior General Min Aung Hlaing visited brussels to attend European Union Military Committee Meeting where he met EU heads of state and defence chiefs.
4. 23 Nov 2016: C-in-C Senior General Min Aung Hlaing received Mr Stavros Lambrinidis, European Union’s Special Representative for Human Rights at Bayintnaung Hall in Nay Pyi Taw yesterday. At the meeting, they discussed matters related to EU’s assistance in peace making processes, humanitarian assistance and the rule of law in Rakhine State.

Notably in the last year, the military has been trying to improve its tarnished reputation and engages more with the public and media. They have formed a public relations team called “Tatmadaw True News Information Team” following the Kokang Conflict in 2015 and hold occasional press conferences.

E.g. 16 May 2016 C-in-C Min Aung Hlaing held a press conference and 20 July 2016 Lt-Gen Mya Tun Oo gave a press briefing in Yangon covering a shooting incident in Myitkyina, dead bodies found near Mong Yaw village in Lashio Township, the ethnic Mai Ja Yang summit and the Tatmadaw’s relief and rehabilitation works in Rakhine State.

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Technical support

**EBO and PI – Euro Burma Office and the Pyidaungsu Institute**


The EBO a player in the peace process as a broker, funder and facilitator. It is closely interrelated with the study and research center PI as its donor, shared board of directors and partner on projects.

**EBO Executive Director:** Harn Yawnghwe  
**Facilitator, contents resource person, and technical advisor:** Hannes Siebert (Common Space Initiative Lebanon)

Other EBO activities includes capacity building for different stakeholders, community outreach and public consultations, organising study trips, federalism workshops and funding for 25 liaison offices.

**ENAC – Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center**


UNFC’s think tank  
Established in July 2013, the Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center (ENAC) is an independent resource, training, and education center supporting the peace process and development of democratic institutions in Burma. The activities are Research, Education and Training, Cooperating and Collaborating and Outreach local and international communities.

It is responsible for drafting the policy of the UNFC, most notably the Nine-Point policy for political dialogue that has been adopted by the UNFC. It often holds workshops and trainings inside and outside Myanmar.
ENAC’s Ethnic policy for political negotiations

Adopted 1-3 June 2016 by the UNFC as official policies as guiding principles for the peace and political dialogue process (development from December 2014) derived from workshops with EAOs, EPP, CSOs, CBOs and grassroots stakeholders.

9 policies in “The Sectoral Policy Recommendations as a basis for building future federal democracy union” (June 2016).

Others include:
- Center for Development and Ethnic Study - Think tank, Executive Director Dr. Lian H. Sakhong
- Peace and Development Foundation - U Aung Min, involved in peace-related development projects and cooperation on projects for women and children.
● Peace Building Dialogue Centre - engagement in the peace process, providing technical aid to ethnic armed groups involved in peace talks, youth training, coordination of aid for mine-clearing, implementing civil-military cooperation, and peace-related research and education.92

● Bayda - NLD think tank

● Shalom (Nyein) Foundation - technical support to NCCT and Civilian local ceasefire monitoring.

● Inter Mediate - founded and led by Jonathan Powell, former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s chief of staff from 1997-2007. He advises State Councillor Aung San Suu Kyi and other activities related to peace, for example inviting Zorumthanga to be an interlocutor between EAOs and the government.

● Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue - Mediation and organising EAO foreign study trips including to Northern Ireland, Colombia and South Africa.

**Funding**

Funding for the peace process comes from the national budget, although the figures are not public, and mostly relies on international funding that is now channelled through the government.

- 12 January 2016: International donors were asked to contribute toward the US$21 million the government says it needs to set up the Joint Monitoring Committee-State Level.
- 16 March 2016: international donors met with government peace team to discuss hand over of donations for the peace process.

**Joint Coordination Body for Peace Funding**

To coordinate international funds for the peace process at the programme level, project level managed directly by donors.

Formed: 20 December 2016

Led by State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi

Members: 8 government reps and 8 EAOs (4 signatories and 4 non-signatories)

4 sectors to which peace funds from international donors will be allocated:

1. Ceasefire
2. Negotiation and Dialogue
3. Peace Supporting Development
4. Peace making process of the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre-NPRC

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Major donors:

1. China: 3 million for JMC
2. Japan: granted more than US $12 million to MPC in 2013, US$31.7 million donation to UN operations in 2016. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pledged ($7.73 billion) to Myanmar over five years to support its peace-building and development efforts, after meeting Aung San Suu Kyi on 2 Nov 2016.93
3. Joint Peace Fund (Australia, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States): pledged just over US$100 million with signed contributions currently totalling over US$85 million over five years.94

Challenges to Peace Roadmap and issues to consider

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Myanmar Army’s ongoing military offensives</th>
<th>Distrust:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. insincerity of the military and government towards the peace process, no change in their strategy to wipe out EAOs.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. NCA signatory EAOs also continue to build up military strength and territory as a precaution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. The Myanmar military still treat EAOs as “outlaws” or “insurgents” rather than nationality resistance groups that are fighting for a political cause.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aung San Suu Kyi’s silence on military offensives and communal conflict</th>
<th>Although EAOs previously saw ASSK and NLD as allies in their fight against military rule, they do not believe she has done enough for their cause and are growing sceptical about her genuine interest in peace and ethnic rights.97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aung San Suu Kyi’s silence on military offensives and communal conflict</td>
<td>Ethnic political parties also voiced disappointment in the new government’s lack of attention on ethnic rights and pressures EAOs to sign the NCA while remaining silent on military operations on ethnic groups.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcoming past grievances</td>
<td>Myanmar has a long history of conflict and failed efforts as well as broken promises that remain fresh in the minds of top negotiators and decision makers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

93 Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Japan to provide $7.73 billion in aid to Myanmar, PM Abe says”, Reuters, 2 Nov 2016
95 About, Peace Support Fund, 2016, web.
### Ongoing dispute about ceasefire before political talks

EAOs resisting the ceasefire insist on political talks first before ceasefire, and the necessity of troop demarcation, a military code of conduct, a real basis for national political dialogue, joint-ceasefire monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Meanwhile NCA signatories believe political talks will take too long and accept a ceasefire will take time to perfect.

### Conflict fuels conflict – Ongoing conflict with combatant groups destabilising relations with ceasefire groups

Ongoing conflict disrupts the positive relationship needed for negotiations and peacebuilding.
E.g. Myanmar military clashes with AA see increase in human rights abuses and create tension between government and ALP.
AA also causing tension in Chin state and territorial dispute with CNF.

### Disagreement over speed of the peace process

Aung San Suu Kyi and EAO signatories criticise non-signatory groups of dragging the peace process for better benefits instead of prioritising an end to conflict and safeguarding the interest of the country and war victims. Threat of unexpected events may further delay and derail the process.
Non-signatory groups believe they are being rushed to sign. Important issues of military offensives and equitable participation not yet addressed to ensure lasting peace.

### Whether to include Kokang allies in the peace process

Government and Myanmar military’s unwillingness to include AA, TNLA and MNDAA is holding the UNFC back.

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99 EBO Background Paper NO. 2 / 2015 3 JULY 2015
100 Sain Wansai, NATIONAL-LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE: The eighth UPDJC meeting a step forward?, SHAN, 1 Nov 2016.
101 “Decreased fighting, increased tension: RCSS/SSA” SHAN, 16 Jan 2015,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postponement of demilitarisation plans</td>
<td>Fear Myanmar Army taking advantage of ceasefire to familiarise themselves in EAO territory. Increasing number of Myanmar government forces in EAO areas. Persistent mutual distrust as both sides refuse to disarm in EAO territory. Dispute over Security Sector reform or “security reintegration”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial disputes between EAOs</td>
<td>Threat of balkanisation already evident, solutions needed to solve competition between EAOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreement over type of Federalism</td>
<td>Many groups asking for their own autonomous states How to protect minorities within minorities (religious and ethnic), Finding an all inclusive solution to avoid emergence of new armed groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid resource extraction</td>
<td>Government continuing to sell off natural resources in ethnic areas before federal devolution of power; EAOs see this as lack of sincerity to peace process, urge moratorium on resource extraction until federalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upholding the 2008 constitution and the Military’s 25% seats in parliament</td>
<td>EAO unwilling to commit fully to the peace process unless there is commitment to changing the 2008 constitution is amended. EAOs do not believe it is possible to amend the current constitution with 25% military in parliament when over 75% is needed. Government and military unwilling to change the constitution until national reconciliation is achieved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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102 Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) 2015 report  
103 Constitutional reform on backburner for now, Myanmar Times, 13 Jun 2016.
III. NCA Non-signatories: Complementary peace processes

The NCA’s ambitious plan to invite the large number of diverse EAOs to a single peace agreement has till now struggled to gain full support. The Myanmar government and military have long adopted different policies to handle different armed groups. The 2009 peace plan to transform all EAOs into a BGF or PMF has worked for a few groups willing to trade political dialogue for extra-legal privileges in their area and economic pragmatism.

The pro current NCA camp led primarily by the KNU and RCSS, have been pushing the current mainstream peace process forward and signing the NCA to start political dialogue. In the case of the RCSS, they have agreed to sign and advocate reforms of the Thein Sein government despite ongoing attacks and persistent qualms about the Myanmar military’s intentions. Within the KNU there has been internal disagreement between Mutu Say Poe, favouring speedier resolution, and Zipporah Sein allies that want to take a more cautious approach.

The ruling NLD government had taken a more open attitude to non-signatories and was trying to include them in the political dialogue and not just observe as in the previous administration.

The non-signatory groups nevertheless maintain different positions on the NCA and are also recognised differently by the government:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Self autonomous camp</th>
<th>UWSA+ NDAA</th>
<th>Invited to sign</th>
<th>Do not want to sign NCA, maintain previous ceasefire agreements. Do not want to participate in political talks. Maintain autonomous status and expand their territory.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>State and Union level ceasefire signatories - NCCT</td>
<td>KNPP+ NMSP+ SSPP</td>
<td>Invited to sign</td>
<td>Negotiating 9 points before signing the NCA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

104 Kyaw Suu Mon, AmCham, UMFCCI to Host Conference on US Investment, Irrawaddy, 1 Jun 2016.
105 Ei Ei Toe Lwin, Shan State Army-South: The Tatmadaw still holds a grudge, Myanmar Times, 16 Jan 2015.
106 The KNU released a statement on 16 February 2015 group say that the two signatories of the Deed of commitment from the KNU, Chairman Mutu Say Poe and Secretary Saw Kwe Htoo Win, were not acting in accordance with the group’s standing committee.
3 State level ceasefire signatory
NSCN-K
Invited to sign
Unsure about signing the NCA. Do not want to participate in political dialogue, working to unite with Indian Nagas to set up an independent Nagaland.

4 Combatant old EAO
KIA
Invited to sign
Political dialogue before ceasefire. Will not sign until the Myanmar military stops offensives.

5 Non-combatant - NCCT
ANC+ LDU+ WNO
Not invited to sign
Want to sign and want to participate in political talks.

6 Combatant new EAOs
AA+ MNDA+ TNLA
Not invited to sign
Want to participate in political dialogue. Will not sign until the military stops offensives.

EAO current positions within the Peace Process
Participation in events 2015-2016:

SL= State level ceasefire; UL = Union level ceasefire ; NCA = Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement; DoC = Deed of Commitment; NCCT = Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team; DPN = Delegation for Political Negotiation; CT = Coordination team; PD = Political Dialogue; PS1= Panghsan Summit 1-6/5/2015; LKL = Law Khee Lar Summit 2-9/6/2015; PS2 = Panghsan Summit 1-3/11/2015; PS3 = Panghsan Summit 26-28/3/2016; MJY = 26-30/07/2016; UPC 1 = Union Peace Conference; 2 = Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAO</th>
<th>Agreements</th>
<th>Negotiation</th>
<th>Ethnic summits</th>
<th>UPC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S L</td>
<td>U L</td>
<td>NC A</td>
<td>Do C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>KIO</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>KNPP</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>LDU</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>NMSP</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SSPP</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>WNO</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 2015 Ceasefire negotiation teams:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NCCT committee (UNFC members) (16)</th>
<th>Invited to Sign (15)</th>
<th>NCA signatories (8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KNU</td>
<td>UNFC/NCCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CNF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALP</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NMSP</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PNLO</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KNPP</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WNO</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SSPP</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DKBA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KPC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LDU</td>
<td>Non UNFC/NCCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KIO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MNDA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TNLA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **UNFC members**
  - KNU
  - PNLO
  - ALP
  - CNF
  - NMSP
  - DKBA
  - KPC

- **Non-UNFC members**
  - ABSDF
  - RCSS
  - NSCN-K
  - NDAA
  - UWSA

### Notes

- **Non-UNFC/NCCT**
  - Not invited to sign
  - Non signatories (13)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.</th>
<th>RCSS</th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>AA</th>
<th>UNFC members</th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>NMSP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>UWSA</td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>MNDDA</td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>KIO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>TNLA</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>KNPP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>NSCN-K</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>WNO</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>ABSDF</td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>LDU</td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>WNO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>6.</td>
<td>SSPP</td>
<td>7.</td>
<td>LDU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Not invited**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.</th>
<th>AA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>MNDDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>TNLA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Non-UNFC members:**

1. UWSA
2. NDAA
3. NSCN-K

---

**NCCT committee (16)**
Laiza summit - Nov 2013

- Nai Hong Sar (Vice Chair-NMSP) - Leader
- Padoh Kwe Htoo Win (Gen Secretary-KNU) - Deputy Team Leader (1)
- Maj. Gen Gun Maw (Vice Chief of Staff-KIO) - Deputy Team Leader (2)
- Dr. Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong (Supreme Council Member-CNF)
- Saw Mra Razar Linn (CEC Member-ALP)
- Col Hkun Okker (Patron-PNLO)
- Khu Thaw Reh (Deputy Minister, Ministry of Justice-KNPP)
- Twan Zaw (Gen Secretary-ANC)
- Tar Aik Nyunt (Ge Secretary-WNO)
- Lt. Col. Kyaw Han (Member of Central War Committee-AA)
- Maj. Saw Lont Long (Gen Secretary-DKBA)
- Nay Soe Mya (KPC Peace Council)
- Col Solomon (Vice Chairman-LDU)
- Maj. Tar Veall Karow (Joint General Secretary 2-PSLF/TNLA)
- U Tun Lwin (General Secretary-MNDAA)

**EAO’s senior delegation aka EAOs’ Nationwide Ceasefire High-Level Delegation (15)**
June 2015 - Law Khee Lah summit

- Padoh Naw Zeporrah Sein (KNU) - Leader
- Dr. La Ja (KIO) - Dep. leader
- Pu Zin Cung - Dep. leader
- Khine Soe Naing Aung
- Nai Hong Sar
- Myo Win
- Khun Myint Tun
- Shwe Myo Thant
- Sao Khun Hseng
- Brig. Gen. Tar Aik Bone
- Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win
- Maj. Gen. Gun Maw
- Dr. Salai Lian H. Sakhong
- Col. Khun Okker
- Saw Mra Raza Lin

**Delegation for Political Negotiation (DPN) - UNFC**
21 Feb 2016

- Khu Oo Reh (KNPP/Leader)
- Brig. Gen. Sao Sai Htoo (SSPP/Vice-Chairman (1))
- Maj. Gen. Gum Maw (KIO/Vice-Chairman (2))
- Maj. Tar Pan La (PSLF)
- Lt. Col. Phone Win Naing (MNDAA)
- Sao Say Om (SSPP)
- Nai Shwe Thein (MNSPA)
- Duwa Bawm Layaw (KIO)
- Col. Min Tun (ANC)
- Col. Solomon (LDU)
- Maj. Ta Ngy Lu (WNO)
UNFC

Founded: 16 February 2011
Headquarters: Chiang Mai, Thailand
The UNFC is the latest coalition of ethnic armed organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Members (7)</th>
<th>Expelled (2)</th>
<th>Withdrawn (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>NMSP</td>
<td>KNU (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDU</td>
<td>WNO</td>
<td>MNDA (2016 - pending)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIO (Chair)</td>
<td>SSPP</td>
<td>TNLA (2016 - pending)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNPP</td>
<td>PNLO (Oct 2015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CNF (Oct 2015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meetings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 February 2016</td>
<td>Prepare for peace negotiations with incoming NLD government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How to intervene in the clash between TNLA and RCSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 June 2016</td>
<td>CEC meeting: Adopt ENAC’s nine fundamental draft policies, and to present them to the public and at political meetings, and to use them in drawing up a federal constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Withdrawal of TNLA and MNDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 July 2016</td>
<td>UNFC emergency meeting: the drafting of a constitution for a federal union; protection policies for security and defence; the agenda for an upcoming meeting with State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; Ethnic Armed Summit in Maijayang; and the 2nd UNFC conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-30 Nov 2016</td>
<td>UNFC meeting discussed progress in peace negotiations made under the current leadership’s two-year term and the escalating conflict in northern Shan State; how to join national-level political dialogue and the next Union Peace Conference, agreed to elect a new chairman at a meeting in December.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The UNFC took a leading position in the NCCT that represented the ethnic side in drafting the NCA but refused to sign the final draft in 2015, citing the need for all EAOs to be included.

UNFC’s 3 core demands:
1. bilateral ceasefire
2. all-inclusive participation
3. equitable composition of participation.\(^{107}\)

\(^{107}\) Sai Wansai, Finalizing incomprehensible framework for political dialogue: Is UNFC to be blamed?, BNI and SHAN, 24 Oct 2016.
UNFC’s disputed issues:

1. Resolve military conflict first, the government enforces a “nationwide ceasefire” whereby the Myanmar military is expected to stop all military offensives within 24 hours and EAOs follow within 48 hours.
2. wants to ensure a “strong agreement” that includes all groups. Commitment to federalism - want more political guarantees for the establishment of a genuine, democratic federal union enshrining self-determination and nationwide equality.
3. want more details on political dialogue decision-making mechanism.
4. the form that representation at the talks would take - Advocated a tripartite dialogue involving EAOs, the government, and political parties. The current framework involves seven groups of stakeholders—government, parliament, EAOs, the military, political parties, ethnic representatives, and special guests, which gives the Myanmar Army a bigger presence and unfair advantage.
5. Allowing the six groups that the government has refused to include such as TNLA, AA, MNDDAA, LDU, WNO and ANC to sign. (for trust building and ethnic unity)
6. DPN requested a “international monitoring team” with foreign governments’ representatives that will work in tandem with JMCs.
7. Feeling rushed to sign the NCA, demand a slow down and removal of rigid timeframes.
8. NCA amounts to “surrendered peace,” and not the “compromised political settlement.”

9 September 2015: EAO top leaders asked the President to give guarantees for the
1. Military: no military offensive against any group that does not sign at the first phase of the signing of NCA,
2. Political: ensuring that all relevant forces including EAOs participate in future political dialogue,
3. Humanitarian assistance: assuring that all ethnic states, including conflict-affected areas, have equal access to humanitarian aid and other humanitarian assistance services
4. Lifting of unlawful association act for groups who do not sign the NCA.

21 August 2016: The UNFC eight point proposal that should be added to the NCA are (4

---

109 Mark Inkey, Burmese ethnic groups rule out Union Day ceasefire agreement, Asia Correspondent, 30 Jan 2015.
110 Lun Min Mang, UNFC commits to Panglong Conference, Myanmar Times, 26 Aug 2016.
112 BCES, What should the government do to maximize number of signatories to the NCA? BCES-AP Analysis (2012)
agreed on 18-20 October 2016)
- Bilateral ceasefire agreement between the government-military and the UNFC
  - To build a federal union with result achieved from 21CPC;
  - Agreement of tripartite/political dialogue composition;
  - Drafting and promulgation of constitutional law based on the outcome of 21 CPC;
- Advance agreement on Military Codes of Conduct (CoC) and monitoring on Terms of Reference (ToR);
- Formation of military Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) with representatives from government, EAOs and international figures acceptable to both parties;
- Formation of a neutral, enforcement tribunal for NCA involving domestic and international law experts and judges that are acceptable to both parties; and
  - Developmental projects to be tackled according to Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), in cooperation with the public and the EAOs. (Source: UNFC Documentation)

10 November 2016 meeting between PC and DPN:
1. point 2: both sides agreed that a federal union, based on democracy and federalism, would be built on the results of political dialogues.
2. point 3: both sides agreed to hold a political dialogue framework meeting as soon as possible discuss the matter in more depth at the upcoming political framework meeting.
3. point 5, 6, 7: both sides agreed to discuss these points at the coming JMC meeting on 24-25 Nov 2016.
4. 2016 PC/DPN 2/6 decision of re-modification. Related to proposal no.8, according to NCA article 10 (a) and article 25 (b), both government and EAOs agreed to work together for implementation.

Latest stance on the NCA: 11 November 2016 - both sides have agreed that the current process should follow the NCA as a roadmap.

1. Trade and Investment

**DPN List of meetings with Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 May</th>
<th>DPN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Jun</td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representatives of the Union Peace Conference – 21 Century Panglong Preparatory Sub-committee (2) and top leaders of the UNFC agreed at a dinner event to meet this month in order to hold discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jun</td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 2016</td>
<td>Yangon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jul 2016</td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jul 2016</td>
<td>Yangon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jul 2016</td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Aug 2016</td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Aug 2016</td>
<td>Yangon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Aug 2016</td>
<td>NRPC, Yangon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 1</td>
<td>23 Sep 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 2</td>
<td>15 Oct 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Nov 2016</td>
<td>Yangon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 3</td>
<td>9-11 Nov 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Dec 2016</td>
<td>Naypy-Itaw</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kokang Allies

A major point of contention for the NCA is whether to include the three combatant groups known as the Kokang allies: AA, TNLA and MNDAA.

They were members of the NCCT that negotiated the draft of the NCA and were not invited to sign, in spite of requests to the government.

The government claims it has difficulty recognising these three groups on the same level as others as they emerged after the Thein Sein government came to power.\textsuperscript{113} Government advisor Min Zaw Oo proposed three ways they could join the peace process:
\begin{enumerate}
\item AA and the ALP, an NCA signatory, could merge and work together for the rights of Rakhine people
\item MNDAA could disarm to join the political dialogue
\item TNLA could finalise negotiations with the government that began in 2013 and sign a bilateral ceasefire.\textsuperscript{114}
\end{enumerate}

Since the MNDAA’s military offensive against government troops in Laukkai 2015, the government believes they are working against the peace process and the country’s democracy. Ongoing attacks on the Myanmar military are seen as acts of provocation.

The military insists they disarm before being allowed to join the political dialogue.

May 2016: TNLA and MNDAA requested to leave the UNFC citing “weak assistance”.\textsuperscript{115} They were rumoured to ally with the powerful UWSA in order to focus on “military defense”.\textsuperscript{116}

Three combatant groups issued a statement on 5 August 2016 inviting the government to start ceasefire talks with them. The government’s PC met the three groups but were unable to reach an agreement over the issue the disarmament.

After the Muse offensive under the banner of the Northern Alliance that began 20 November 2016, the Shan state level parliament branded the groups as terrorist which makes negotiations harder and gives the military more legitimacy to launch offensives against them.

PC meetings with TNLA, AA, MNDAA

\textsuperscript{113} Wa Lone and Ei Ei Toe Lwin, Fresh blow to ceasefire prospects, Myanmar Times, 9 Jun 2015.
\textsuperscript{114} Elliot Brennan and Min Zaw Oo, Peace, alliance, and inclusivity: Ending conflict in Myanmar, Brookings, 1 Apr 2016.
\textsuperscript{115} UNFC to Meet Government’s New Peace Negotiator in Chiang Mai, ENAC, 2 Jun 2016.
\textsuperscript{116} A Fragmented Ethnic Bloc Impedes Suu Kyi’s ‘Panglong’ Vision, ENAC, 20 May 2016.
UWSA & NDAA

The UWSA and NDAA have traditionally distanced themselves from the political struggle by other EAOs for federal democracy and currently enjoy de facto autonomous regions.

The NDAA was initially persuaded by the government peace team to sign the NCA in exchange for an SAZ and its leader Sai Luen attended the 21st century Panglong conference. The move however was said to have angered the UWSA and the NDAA quickly reversed their support and participation in the NCA. Analysts believe the UWSA’s seizure of three NDAA bases in October 2016 were to further pressure the NDAA not to sign the NCA.¹¹⁷

The UWSA, as Myanmar’s largest and most powerful EAO, is seeking to expand its control area to include more townships and upgrade its status from Special administrative division to state with 1 country 2 systems. It does not believe the political dialogue on federal democracy is relevant to their cause and has consistently upheld its 1989 ceasefire with the government.¹¹⁸ Moreover, by signing the NCA it would be forced to disarm and link up with the Tatmadaw in some form.¹¹⁹ Others also believe that if the NDAA area is controlled by the government, it will allow the Myanmar military easy access into the UWSA area. While the UWSA agreed to participate in the 21st century Panglong conference, they sent low level delegates (liaison office staff) that left following a misunderstanding over accreditation.¹²⁰

PC meetings with UWSA and NDAA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8-10 Aug 2016</td>
<td>Mongla</td>
<td>PC led by U Thein Zaw</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹¹⁷ Have been offered an SAZ in return for participating, even though they do not fulfill the requirements of having 2 adjoining townships, and population over 50%.
¹²⁰ Ei Ei Toe Lwin and Pyae Thet Phyo, UWSA pulls out of Panglong, Myanmar Times, 1 Sept 2016.
2 29 July 2016 Nay Pyi Taw

Leaders UWSP and NDAA met Aung San Suu Kyi and Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing separately. Explained the planned 21st Century Panglong Conference and ongoing peace talks and then the leaders of Wa and Mongla groups explained their cooperation in the peace process and also said that they welcomed and supported the 21st Century Panglong Conference.

Followed by: Q&A Suu Kyi with 100 youths from Wa and Mongla groups.

3 30 July 2016 Naypyitaw

UWSA + Peace Commission to discuss participating in the Panglong conference that reviews the framework for political dialogue.

4 2 Aug 2016 Yangon

NDAA + PC Invitation and preparation for the Panglong Conference-21

**NSCN-K**

The NSCN-K declined to sign the NCA in October 2015 due to unresolved political issues within their group and complications in their relationship with the Indian government. The Myanmar-based organisation is active across both sides of the Indo-Myanmar border and is part of an alliance with three Northeast Indian rebel groups known as the United Liberation Front of Western Southeast Asia (ULFWSA). While the NSCN-K has developed good relations with the Myanmar government, signing a state-level ceasefire and attaining a self-autonomous region, it unilaterally abrogated a 2001 ceasefire with the Indian government on 27 March 2015 citing ongoing grievances, protection of Naga interests and the unresolved sovereignty issue.\(^{121}\) The resurgence of violence, including several attacks against government forces in India’s Nagaland and Manipur, has led the Indian government to declare the NSCN-K an “Unlawful Association” on 16 September 2015 and later a “terrorist organisation” on 6 November 2015, complicating Myanmar’s engagement with the group.

While the Myanmar government has a 2010 bilateral agreement allowing Indian forces to pursue insurgents across the border and 2014 memorandum of understanding for coordinated patrolling and intelligence sharing, it also needs to maintain friendly relations with the NSCN-K for the success of its national peace plan.\(^{122}\)

The NSCN-K has stated its intention to sign but not participate in political talks. It attended

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\(^{121}\) NSCN-K Unravels Gov Policies towards Nagas, Morung Express, 4 May 2016.

\(^{122}\) India gets the message all wrong after Myanmar foray, EAST ASIA Forum, 2 Jul 2015.
the first UPC conference under the Thein Sein administration in January 2016, but did not participate in the second UPC conference - 21st Century Panglong Conference. The NSCN-K also participated as an observer in more than five meetings between the government’s UPWC and the NCCT during the drafting of the NCA.123

=> see more about the recent clashes between NSCN-K and Indian army in the international section

| 2 July 2016 | NRPC Yangon | Preparation Sub-committee for 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference led by Dr. Tin Myo Win saying it will only attend the conference as observer and not be involved with political talks. |

**Visions for the new Federal Democratic Union**

As the NCA and Deed of Commitment promise to “establish a union based on the principles of democracy and federalism in accordance with the outcomes of political dialogue”, deciding the type of federalism and how the country will divide its power and resources remains a daunting task. Given Myanmar’s controversial “135” recognised ethnic groups, multiple religious groups and conflicting interest groups, finding the right structure to appease the entire population is crucial in achieving meaningful national reconciliation and preventing future conflict.

Varying perspectives on Federal systems:

| “Federal in form but unitary in practice” | Unitary presidential centralised system Limited devolution of power to the ethnic states despite having state level | 2008 constitution |
| Geographically based | To avoid dispute between Myanmar’s 135 ethnic groups, many of whom overlap or live within each other’s communities. Should focus on national identity rather than racial identity to prevent social friction. | Suggested by a Bama Political party |

Challenges:
1. Designating specific control areas for each EAO and repositioning troops to solve territorial disputes.
2. Accommodating smaller ethnic nationalities living within other larger ethnic groups, to protect their rights, and those that demand an autonomous state such as Wa, Ta-ang and Shanni.
3. Convincing the military/conservative elements to divulge more power to the state level.

Efforts:
1. Numerous workshops on federalism have been held by the former MPC, EBO, ENAC and other civil society groups e.g. 6-8 July 2015 ‘Concepts, Case Studies, and Implication for a Federal Reform Process in Myanmar; UNFC members, signatory EAOs and international experts presented examples of federalist countries around the world.124
2. Overseas study trips for major stakeholders (EAO, Government and Tatmadaw representatives) e.g. to South Africa and Switzerland.
3. Reviving the Panglong legacy - Panglong Handbook written by KIO and RCSS (along with CNF and SSPP) about the promises of Aung San and the importance of the Panglong agreement in today’s peace process. Idea conceived at the Mai Jayang meeting and was scheduled to be published in December 2016.

124 Ethnic Leaders Discuss Federalism, BNI and NMG, 8 Jul 2016.
Feb 2015: Aung Min said that he remained “positive” on the progress of peace talks, saying that 122 points of disagreement in the ceasefire text had been reduced to just eight disagreements left for resolution. He noted that official invitations had been extended to each of the 16 ethnic armed groups for the government’s official Union Day commemoration.\(^\text{125}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>UNFC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2012</strong></td>
<td>1. political talks (reform constitution to ensure ethnic self-determination)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. union accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. approval by parliament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enter the legal fold:  
1. disarm (give up arms or transform into BGF/PMF)  
2. set up a political party to contest into election  
3. set up businesses

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\(^{125}\) Nyein Nyein, Peace Talks to Continue After Union Day, Bypassing Ceasefire Goal, Irrawady, 5 Feb 2015.
### 3 phase peace plan

1. **State level: ceasefire**
   - To cease fire from both sides
   - To deploy troops only in agreed territories
   - Prohibit carrying arms outside the designated territories
   - Open liaison offices in areas agreed by both sides (no arms allowed)
   - In order for the negotiation process to proceed to Union Level negotiation, each group will have to form an official delegation team and negotiate the place and time for Union Level negotiation.

2. **Union level: 8 points**
   1. To remain forever in the Union
   2. To accept the Three National Causes: non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national sovereignty and perpetuation of national sovereignty
   3. To cooperate in economic and development tasks
   4. To cooperate in the elimination of narcotic drugs
   5. To set up political parties and enter elections
   6. To accept the 2008 Constitution and to make necessary amendments via Parliament by majority consent
   7. To fully enter the legal fold for permanent peace and live, move, work in accord with the Constitution
   8. To coordinate existence of only a single armed forces in accord with the Constitution

3. **Create political parties to contest in elections and enter parliament**

### UNFC 6 point plan

1. To host a meeting with civil society and all ethnic armed groups
2. A meeting between all ethnic armed groups and government representatives monitored by the international community
3. Referendums in each ethnic state to ratify agreements reached
4. A meeting with all ethnic people to talk about peace
5. Tripartite dialogue between the government, democracy activists and ethnic people
6. Implementation of agreements reached within a set timeframe

### 2013

**UWSA + NDAA + NSCN-K**

State and Union level peace agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2013</th>
<th>UWSA + NDAA + NSCN-K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State and Union level peace agreements</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**WGEC (April) + KNU + RCSS + Government (NDSC ratified)**

1. Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (between armed groups and the government)
2. Framework for political dialogue negotiations (includes political parties and CSOs)
3. Political Dialogue (government, armed organizations, political parties and CSOs)

**NCCT (UNFC + ABSDF)**

November

1. Framework
2. Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
3. Political Dialogue
4. National Accord

**Dec: PI completed the first “Single text document”**

(combines 4 documents: WGEC April + MPC Oct + NCCT Nov + Army Nov)
2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event/Agreement</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2014 | Joint Nationwide Ceasefire Draft Work Committee | (Agreed in a 5-Point agreement between NCCT and UPWC)
| | Single text draft of the NCA revised 4 times (April, May, August and September) | 1. NCA signing  
2. Drafting political framework  
3. Political dialogue (UPWC demanded SSR/DDR)  
4. Union convention  
5. Sign Union Accord  
6. Interim arrangement  
7. Implementation of the Union Accord (NCCT demanded SSR) |

2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2015 | UWSA NDAA | Do not want to participate in political dialogue or sign the NCA  
NSCN-K: will sign but not participate in the political dialogue |
| 2016 | | 12 Feb: Deed of commitment for peace and national reconciliation (signed DK-BA+KNU+KPC+RCSS)  
5th single text draft of the NCA finalised by NCCT and UPWC (31 March) and signed by (August).  
7 step road map:  
1. EAO and government leaders sign NCA  
2. Draft political framework within 60 days  
3. National-level political dialogue within 90 days  
4. Union Peace Convention  
5. Sign Union Accord  
6. Parliament to approve Union Accord  
7. Implementation of the Union Accord (SSR) |

2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event/Agreement</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>UWSA+NDAA+NSCN-K</td>
<td>Do not willing to participate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | New NLD administration | Step 1: Review the political dialogue framework  
Step 2: Amend the political dialogue framework  
Step 3: Union Peace Conference—the 21st century Panglong  
Step 4: Sign union agreement  
Step 5: Amend the constitution  
Step 6: Multi-party democracy general elections  
Step 7: Build a democratic federal union |
| | June 2015: EAO’s senior delegation aka EAOs’ Nationwide Ceasefire High-Level Delegation | • Request for new 13 points amendment  
• 4 contentious issues - recognising AA, TNLA and MNDA, inclusivity. |
| | Aug 2016: DPN 9 amendments | |
IV. Ongoing efforts for reintegration and long term peace

Alongside the political dialogue, there are various efforts to promote peace and address ethnic grievances related to the issue of equal rights and development.

EAOs are committed to development and security in their areas and NCA signatories have pledged responsibility (point 25(a) of the NCA) for:

1. Projects concerning the health, education and socio-economic development of civilians.
2. Environmental conservation.
3. Efforts to preserve and promote ethnic culture, language, and literature.
4. Matters regarding peace and stability, and the maintenance of rule of law in the said areas.
5. Receiving aid from donor agencies both inside and outside the country for regional development and capacity-building projects.
6. Eradication of illicit drugs.

KNU working with the Myanmar government to build a new model village called Lay Kay Kaw for IDPs in Kawkareik Township.

Liaison offices

Liaison offices crucial to improve communication between the EAOs and government army side by reporting misunderstandings, monitoring the ceasefire and consulting with local civil society and INGOs.126

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Liaison office location</th>
<th>Opening date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSDF</td>
<td>1. Myawaddy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Loikaw</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Muse</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Myeik</td>
<td>Planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>1. Kyauk Taw, Arakan State</td>
<td>03/09/2012</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Paletwa, Chin State*</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNF</td>
<td>1. Tedim</td>
<td>25/09/2012</td>
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<td>2. Thantlang</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3. Matupi</td>
<td>23/06/2012</td>
</tr>
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</table>

126 KNU Liaison Offices, KNU HQ, 2016,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
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<th>Date</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Falam (Business)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindat (Business)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakhkhandar (Business)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paletwa (Business)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yangon</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| DKBA | 1. Myawaddy 09/06/2014  
2. Hpa-an, Karen state | Unknown  
Unknown |
| Kyar-In-Seik-Gyi, Kyaikdon, Three Pagoda Pass, Myain Gyi Ngu | Unknown |
| KIA | 1. Myitkyina (Technical Advisory Office) 23/07/2013 |
| KNPP | 1. Loikaw 25/07/2012  
2. Shadaw 01/08/2012  
3. Hpa-saung 27/07/2012 |
| KNU | 1. Pa-an 29/09/2012  
2. Three Pagoda Pass 15/05/2012  
3. Tavoy 10/04/2012  
4. Myawaddy 18/08/2012  
5. Kyauk Gyi 09/04/2012  
6. Thaton 05/03/2013  
7. Mawlamyine (Business) 22/11/2013  
8. Yangon (Business) | Unknown  
Unknown |
| KPC | Hpa-an, Reopened |
| NDAA | Yangon, Taunggyi, Kengtung, Tachilek, and Mandalay Reopened |
| NMSP** | 1. Mawlamyaing 26/02/2012  
2. Mudon 26/02/2012  
3. Thanbyuzayat 26/02/2012  
4. Ye 26/02/2012  
5. Yaybyu (Yaphyu village) 26/02/2012  
6. Three Pagoda Pass 26/02/2012  
7. Kyaik Mayaw 26/02/2012  
8. Zin Kyelik (Paung township) 26/02/2012  
9. Myeik (Mreuik) 26/02/2012  
10. Myawaddy | Unknown |
| NSCN-K | 1. Khamti | Unknown |
| PNLO | 1. Taung Gyi 22/01/2013  
2. Maukmai | Opened in 2013  
Opened in 2013 |
| 3. Hsihseng | 4. Thaton | Unknown |
| RCSS / SSA-S | 1. Taung Gyi 22/02/2012 |  
2. Keng Tung 22/02/2012 |
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<tr>
<td>3. Tachilek</td>
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<td>4. Mong Tong</td>
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<td>5. Kho Lam</td>
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<td>6. Muse</td>
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<td>7. Mong Pan</td>
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### SSPP / SSA-N

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<tr>
<td>Taung Gyi.2</td>
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<td>Kho Lam .3</td>
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<td>Muse .4</td>
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### UWSA

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<td>Kengtung</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tangyang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lashio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig.16 Liaison office map
Demilitarisation and political reform

Demilitarization of government: the Ministry of Home Affairs issued an official letter to state and region chief ministers, that said local governments could take control of the management of the five departments: the police, the Bureau of Special Investigations, the Fire Service Department, the Prison Department and the General Administration Department (GAD).127

Ethnic Affairs Ministry - a new ministry formed to support the peace process and national reconciliation was part of the NLD-administration’s government reforms to reduce of 36 to 21 ministries.128
Formed: early April 2016
Minister: Nai Thet Lwin
Mandated by: National Race Protection Law (Feb 2016)
Responsibilities:, advocating for a federal Union, regional resource sharing, Union government power and state government power.129

Departments: Ethnic literature and culture, and the protection of ethnic rights

Ethnic affairs ministers under the 2008 Constitution:
Ethnic affairs ministers are elected to a given state or division if that division is comprised of an ethnic minority population of 0.1 percent or greater of the total populace, and cannot include minorities with . If one of the country’s ethnic minorities counts a state as its namesake, however, it is not granted an ethnic affairs minister it counts a state as its namesake (e.g. there is no Mon ethnic affairs minister in Mon State). There are currently 29 ethnic affairs ministers in Burma.

Parliamentary committees and bills
1. Ethnic rights protection bill: January 2015 - proposed by 30 ethnic affairs ministers.
2. Constitution amendment draft implementing committee (early 2014)
a. January 2015: Under a six-party proposal endorsed by Parliament, Aung San Suu Kyi, Thein Sein, Lower House parliamentary Speaker Shwe Mann and his Upper House counterpart Khin Aung Myint, Myanmar Army commander in chief Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing and one representative of the country’s ethnic minorities would meet to discuss constitutional reform.

127 Lun Min Mang, Home Affairs Ministry invites civilian control over departments, Myanmar Times, 30 Aug 2016
129 Ethnic affairs in the first 100 days, ENAC, 8 Jun 2016.
3. Committee for Ethnic Affairs, Conflict Resolution and Peace Process (1 August 2014)
   Ti Khun Myat

**MP parliamentary proposals to ceasefire**

1. 27 May 2016: Ta'ang National Party (TNP) MP Nan Moe’s parliamentary proposal to stop fighting in Shan State to allow IDP camp children attend school was denied.
2. 25 May 2016 Arakan National Party (ANP) MP Khin Saw Wai’s proposal to seek parliamentary assistance for IDPs in Arakan State turned down on the grounds that a similar measure was already under discussion in the upper house. The house speaker also said it was unclear whether she was focusing on aiding IDPs or bringing the AA to the peace negotiation table.
3. 3-4 May 2016 ANP MP U Wai Sein Aung introduced an urgent motion in the upper house calling for an end to fighting in Rakhine state between the military and the AA, and for the armed group to be included in the peace process, approved by a majority vote for discussion but rejected by the defence minister and military legislators - house speaker diffused the situation by putting the motion and discussion on record rather than vote.

**CSOs and CBOs**

Civil society and community based organisations have been active in all aspects of the peace process from promoting peace through rallies, to voicing grievances of local people, to participation in formal political dialogue and monitoring ceasefire agreements. The current NCA and political framework has created a formal position for CSO participation in the peace process through the CSO forum.

Likewise the UNFC has been implementing its process to prepare for political dialogue by including CSO’s and CBO’s in its policy recommendation process started in 2015.

**Drug eradication**

EAOs and CBOs have created their own programs to eradicate drugs in their area, although this has occasionally caused armed clashes and tension with BGF/PMGs and government law enforcement agencies. Examples include destruction of poppy farms (TNLA and KIA), arrest of drug users (NMSP), setting up drug rehabilitation centers (RCSS). CSOs have also assisted in informing the police about drug traffickers and assisting in the destruction of poppy plants.
Resettlement

During Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to Thailand in June 2016, she promised to make it a priority to bring home the hundreds of thousands of Myanmar refugees on the Thai-Myanmar border. The UNHCR has also received a growing number of requests from refugees living in nine camps for assistance to return back to areas in southeast Myanmar where post-2010 ceasefires have improved the security situation in the region. The final week of October 2016 saw the first pilot voluntary returns of Myanmar refugees from Thailand.\textsuperscript{130} Reported 29 families, 60 people returned from Thailand to Kayin and Mon state.\textsuperscript{131} However, Karen CBOs were very critical of the process, particularly the UNHCR’s public promotion of these returns, when no guarantees exist for the returnees’ safety and when the crucial factor pushing refugees to return is the drastic funding cuts to the refugee camps by the international community.

The KNU in particular has been particularly active in resettling refugees. It has been preparing land in its control areas in Kayin state and Tanintharyi division to resettle many returning refugees and IDPs. NGOs like TBC, the UNHCR and the World Food Program have also offered to provide necessary assistance from transportation to integration grants and three months food assistance in cash. The KNU and government have jointly set up a new town project called Laykaykaw Town in an area of 750 acres to create job opportunities and resettlement in Myanmar for returning refugees. The plan contains governmental offices, schools, hospital, playground, market, swimming pool, and electricity. KNU brigade 7 has also built two new settlements for returning refugees and IDPs Maw Po Kay project (50) houses have been completed construction but Mae Ta Ray project (50).\textsuperscript{132}

Reconciliation efforts for Rakhine state crisis

The citizenship verification program was considered particularly controversial by rights groups that were concerned it “could force thousands of minority Rohingya Muslims into detention camps indefinitely if they do not qualify for citizenship.”\textsuperscript{133} On 2 February 2015 the Myanmar parliament decided to allow temporary white card holders to vote in the national referendum on constitutional amendment, but President Thein Sein later revoked the decision following protests.\textsuperscript{134} It later started a scheme to issue “green card” identification documents in exchange for previous temporary “white cards” to 400,000 Muslim Rakhine

\textsuperscript{130} TBC report
\textsuperscript{131} First Myanmar refugee returns from Thailand under way, UNHCR, 25 Oct 2016.
\textsuperscript{132} Brigade (7) Pilot projects are not yet possible to resettle, UNCHR, 2014.
\textsuperscript{133} Jared Ferrie, “Rights groups condemn Myanmar's Rohingya plan”, Reuters, 3 Oct 2014.
residents as a step towards applying for citizenship in June 2015. The citizenship verification process and National Verification Cards (NVCs) or green cards were handed out to those who would be scrutinized for citizenship eligibility under the 1982 Citizenship Law at a later date. It is being continued under the new NLD-administration.

The new government has also stepped up efforts to expedite a solution to the Rakhine state crisis.

Central Committee on Implementation of Peace, Stability and Development of Rakhine State
Formed on 31 May 2016
Chaired by Suu Kyi.
27 members, all of whom are government officials
early focus of the committee has been on revamping a process to determine the citizenship status of the state’s Muslim population, most of whom have no citizenship documents and face pervasive discrimination, both by the government and by the state’s Buddhist Rakhine majority.

Advisory Commission on Rakhine State
Formed: August 2016
http://www.rakhinecommission.org/
(9 members - 6 Myanmar and 3 foreign commissioners,)
1. Chairman Kofi Annan - Kofi Annan Foundation and noble laureate
2. U Win Mra, Chair of the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission
3. Dr. Thar Hla Shwe, President of Myanmar Red Cross Society
4. Mr. Ghassan Salame’, Lebanese Minister of Culture (2000- 2003), UN Special Advisor to Secretary-General (2003-2006)
6. U Aye Lwin, Core Member and Founder of Religious for Peace, Myanmar
7. Dr. Mya Thida, President of Obstetrical and Gynecological Society of MMA, Member of the Myanmar Academy of Medical Science
8. U Khin Maung Lay, Member of the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission
9. Daw Saw Khin Tint, Chairperson (Rakhine Literature and Culture association, Yangon) and Vice-Chairperson (Rakhine Women Association)
Fact finding mission: 2 December 2016

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“It considers humanitarian and developmental issues, access to basic services, legal questions including citizenship and the assurance of basic rights, and security to all people in all communities. It will submit its final report and recommendations to the Government of Myanmar in the second half of 2017.”

**Rakhine State Investigation Commission**

Formed: 1 December 2016 (under notification 89/2016 of the President’s Office)
Chairman: Vice President U Myint Swe
13-member commission

Established to probe allegations of rights abuses surrounding the ongoing Rakhine State military campaign.137
It made inspections of places of conflicts and investigations of persons concerned in the region during 11-13 December 2016. The commission will submit its suggestions by the beginning of February to the President’s Office.

**Rakhine State Action Plan**

The citizenship verification program is an extension of the Rakhine State Action Plan, unveiled under the former government in 2014 in response to the violence between Buddhists and Muslims in 2012 and 2013. The citizenship verification process and National Verification Cards (NVCs), which were handed out to those who would be scrutinized for citizenship eligibility under the 1982 Citizenship Law at a later date. Rohingya population are only permitted to apply for citizenship on the condition that they self-identified as “Bengali,” a term which implies that they have migrated from neighboring Bangladesh.

Thein Swe, minister of labor, immigration and population, said that the ministry has issued about 2,000 NVCs. He added that scrutinization would occur and security issues would be addressed in the coming months before national registration cards would be handed out.

**OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation)**

12 May 2015: The Special Envoy of the OIC Secretary General for Myanmar, Tan Sri Syed Hamid Albar, travelled to the United States on an extensive program of meetings with officials to mobilize support for the initiatives by the OIC to resolve the Rohingya issue.138
September 2014, adopted the plan of action which:

1. calls on the Myanmar government to take action against people promoting hate speech and instigating violence.

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2. hold inter-community and interfaith dialogue
3. allow IDPs to return to their homes
4. invest in the socio-economic development of the Rakhine region
5. open up for international humanitarian assistance to reach the community that was affected by the ethnic violence that broke out in 2012.
6. call on the Myanmar government to restore the citizenship of the Rohingya Muslims which was revoked in the Citizenship Act of 1982
7. Calls on the Myanmar government to have an inclusive transparent policy towards ethnic and religious communities, including the Rohingya Muslims.

V. International stakeholders

The role of the international community in Myanmar’s peace process remains crucial, from diplomatic to technical and financial support for the peace process. With rapid developments in Myanmar’s peace process, there is an overwhelming consensus amongst the international community to support the NCA-led roadmap. For the non-signatory groups of the UNFC, this is seen as an unfair bias in favour of the government over ethnic interests.139

While the peace process remains heavily dependent on international funding to finance its vast structure as well as humanitarian aid, negotiations overall have managed to move ahead with minimal foreign intervention. With the exception of Myanmar’s two power neighbours China and India, peace negotiations between the government and EAOs have been managed with minimal foreign assistance. Ambassadors from 45 countries as well as representatives of the UN and World Bank were in attendance. Six international witnesses – China, India, Japan, Thailand, UN and the European Union (EU) signed the agreement.

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139 Ariana Zarleen, “We are not hardliners – we are the ones who want peace the most”: Khu Oo Reh, General Secretary of UNFC”, Mizzima, 3 Aug 2015.
International impact of Myanmar’s conflict

[Insert map - show: 1. NSCN-K problem in India 2. Kokang conflict and muse border attacks on Chinese border 3. UWSA and Rhai border 4. Bangladesh and AA - annotate, show casualty figures refugee crisis - Bangladesh, China, Thailand (boat Rohingya boat refugees. Human trafficking and graves] May 2016: Thai military officials asked Myanmar Army counterparts to help convince the UWSA to withdraw its bases on the Thai-Burma border, claiming some were on Thai territory. Latest Muse attacks on China border. In China 4 March 2015: China sent fighter jets to its border with neighboring Burma on Saturday and lodged a diplomatic protest after it said a Burmese warplane dropped a bomb on Chinese territory, killing four people.

Fig.17 International impact of Myanmar’s conflict

Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar

Vijay Nambiar appointed 2010
Mandate of the special envoy: “The mandate of the Special Adviser had been to look at a military Government and seeing how far they had stepped away from the expectations of the international community. In other words, to draw attention to continuously remind
the military Government of Myanmar that it needed to look at issues of human rights, at democratization, and to look at issues where the government was seen wanting.”140 UN special envoy has been an important witness to the peace process since 2012 but will be closing office in December 2016 as they have not received any requests to remain involved in the peace process.

**UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar**

Yanghee Lee appointed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2014

Her mandate from the UN Human Rights Council is to monitor the situation of human rights and assess progress in implementation of her previous recommendations. She often conducts frequent fact-finding missions to countries to investigate allegations of human rights violations. She is expected to identify benchmarks for progress and priority areas for technical assistance and capacity building.141

**China**


Witness: NCA, Mai Jayang ethnic summit

Influence on EAG: China’s influence on ethnic armed groups on the border is believed to be strong enough to stop the war if it wanted to and did so for the 1990s ceasefires. EAOs and regions on the border are dependent on Chinese trade and investment for their livelihood and survival.

**High level visits:**

10-14 June 2015: Aung San Suu Kyi visited Beijing
4 September 2015: Thein Sein visited Beijing
23 September 2015: Vice-Senior Soe Win and Minister of Defence and State Councilor of China General Chang Wanquan discussed military ties, bilateral cooperation and border trade.
22 April 2015: President Thein Sein met Chinese President Xi Jinping in Jakarta.
5 December 2015: Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin
19 August 2016 Aung San Suu Kyi visited Beijing

Interests:

- Security and avoiding a humanitarian crisis on its border

140 “Interview with Vijay Nambiar, Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Myanmar”, UN News Centre, 3 Jan 2013.
● Economic interests and investments in the country
● "One Belt, One Road" initiative, which includes the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor
● Shwe gas pipeline and national energy security
● Chinese nationals in Myanmar
● Maintaining its sphere of influence in Myanmar and in the region
  ○ Belief that Western and Japanese funded CSOs responsible for fueling anti-Chinese sentiments and conflicts in Northern Myanmar.142

Contributions to the Peace process:
● One of two international witnesses at peace summits and meetings.
● July summit of armed group leaders hosted by the KIO, the Chinese special envoy publicly called on all groups to attend Panglong-21.
● China has pledged to donate US$3 million, through the United Nations, to the Joint Monitoring Committee.
● Close ties and influence over the UWSA is said to have instigated three ethnic summits hosted in Panghsang (March and November 2015; March 2016) and the UWSA’s increasing role in mediating conflict with combatant groups in Northeast Myanmar.
● Brokering talks between Northern Alliance and Myanmar government

Military meetings:
People’s Liberation Army troops said to be on battle-alert along the Yunnan border
1. During the China-Myanmar Diplomacy and Defense “2+2” Consultation held in Naypyidaw on 25 November, the Chinese Government also urged the Burmese Government to end its military activities and ease tensions in order to restore peace and stability to the border areas.
2. 25 May 2016 -China and Myanmar have vowed to push forward military relations and cooperation in areas such as training and the defence industry Xinhua reported on 25 May.
3. 7 Jan 2015: Burmese officials of the Shan State border township of Tachilek said they attended a regional meeting with officials from China, Laos and Thailand on Wednesday in order to discuss ways to foster economic development and fight the rampant cross-border crime that plagues the Mekong region.
4. 2 April 2015. General Fang Fenghui, chief of general staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) met with Lt-Gen. Aung Than Htut, chief of the Second Bureau

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142 Lun Min Mang, “The high stakes and lofty goals of the Panglong Conference” Myanmar Times, 30 Aug 2016.
of Special Operation (BSO2) of Myanmar Army, in Beijing. apologize to the Chinese military over a Myanmar warplane bombing that killed five Chinese in China’s Yunnan Province on March 13

**Peace related meetings:**

1. 8 March 2015: Senior diplomats from China and Myanmar held consultation at border city Muse on Sunday, vowing to maintain peace at borders and advance the all-round strategic and cooperative partnership between the two countries.
2. 29 November 2016: PC chair Tin Myo Win visited Beijing to meet Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin and Special Envoy on Asian Affairs of the Foreign Ministry Sun Guoxiang.

**Protecting Chinese citizens in Myanmar:**

2. Rising Anti-Chinese sentiment during the Kokang 2015 clashes: amid rumours and reports that former soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army were fighting alongside and providing logistical support to the MNDA, the Myanmar government newspapers reported the Kokang clashes as a war against foreign invaders.\(^{143}\)

**India**

Special envoy to Myanmar: Zoramthanga, Mizo National Front’s president and the former Chief Minister of Mizoram and former rebel insurgent. He is credited for signing a successful peace deal with the Independent government after two decades of armed struggle for an independent country for ethnic Zos. In October 2014 was approached by Dessislava Roussanova of Inter Mediate to broker peace in Myanmar, and officially appointed as India’s peace envoy to Myanmar in 2015.

1. 2011: Kachin leaders invited Zoramthanga to act as an envoy between Myanmar’s ethnic armies and central government, but was unable to accept during the rival congress party led government.
2. 14 Oct 2014: Dessislava Roussanova of Inter-mediate approached Zoramthanga in Delhi to broker peace in Myanmar.
3. 12-22 January; travelled to Yangon to meet UPWC officials and NCCT, then to Bang-

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\(^{143}\) See Transnational Institute, “Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue: Consequences of the Kokang Crisis for Peace and Democracy in Myanmar”, Myanmar Policy Briefing Nr 15, July 2015.
kok to meet EAO leaders and returned to Delhi to brief the Indian Home Affairs minister.

4. 17 Feb 2015: Zoramthanga met three UNFC leaders in Bangkok

5. 26 Feb 2015: Aung Min wrote to NSA Ajit Doval asking the Indian government to take an active role in helping Myanmar reach a peace deal with the ethnic armies. 144

6. 2 March 2015: Zoramthanga met Aung Min in Yangon and the two sides agreed on hosting PM Modi in Myanmar in May 2015 as part of this peace process, and for India to facilitate the visits of ethnic army leaders to India to study the processes that led to the Mizo Accord. 145

7. 4-9 July 2016: Zoramthanga attended a Workshop on Federalism in Chiang Mai attended by EAOs.

NSCN-K and Indian army’s Northeast conflict

“India knows that if there is finally peace in Myanmar, there will be an end to all the different insurgencies in the North-East because most of the rebel’s safe havens would be dismantled. So India needs this peace process to succeed almost as much as Myanmar does,” Zoramthanga. 146

While Myanmar’s media coverage and government attention on the NSCN-K remains overshadowed by conflict reports on the country’s northeastern region bordering China, the Naga armed group is a core issue in India’s own restive Northeast. The lack of coordination between peace efforts in Myanmar and India in dealing with the NSCN-K has resulted in a renewed security dilemma on the Indo-Myanmar border.

A resurgence of conflict has occurred since the Myanmar-based NSCN-K abrogated a 2001 ceasefire with the Indian government and revived an armed struggle for an independent Nagaland. A deadly ambush on 4 June 2015 that killed 18 Indian soldiers and injured 11, considered the Indian army’s worst casualty in a decade, provoked a major Indian army offensive that involved attacking bases on Myanmar territory.

While the NSCN-K’s leader Khaplang is from Myanmar, he is also said to head an alliance with 8 other Indian rebel groups including the United Liberation Front of Asom [Assam] (ULFA) and two smaller groups in Assam, called United Liberation Front of Western Southeast Asia (ULFWSA). 147 Moreover, the NSCN (K) is supported by CorCom, short for Coordination Committee, an umbrella organisation of six insurgent groups in Manipur.

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144 Adam Halliday, “India begins to play official role in Myanmar peace process: Zoramthanga” Indian Express, 9 Mar 2015.
145 Adam Halliday, “India begins to play official role in Myanmar peace process: Zoramthanga” Indian Express, 9 Mar 2015.
146 Ibid.
147 Prabin Kalita, “UNLFW: The new name for terror in NE” The Times of India, 5 Jun 2015.
CorCom groups also regularly camp and train in NSCN (K)-controlled territory in the Naga-inhabited areas of Myanmar contiguous to Nagaland. Indian sources often report that the Chinese intelligence had a role in bringing together several militant groups and having a hand in the ceasefire breakdown. There are said to be about sixty camps of various sizes inside Myanmar where Indian rebels are based and launch military offensives against the Indian army.

The cross border nature of the NSCN-K has now complicated Indian and Myanmar cooperation on how to deal with the renewed conflict as they maintain contradicting policies towards the group. While Myanmar see the NSCN-K as a cooperative partner in the peace process and has granted it several concessions such as autonomy to self-govern three townships and shared interests in gold mining in the area in a 2012 state level ceasefire agreement, the renewed offensives against Indian army in 2015 has led India to list it as a terrorist organisation.

There are contradictory reports on the cooperation between Myanmar and India in India’s attacks on the NSCN-K, and also whether or not India has entered farther than 10km from the border into Myanmar territory. Major publicity about a cross-border operation in June 2015 with the support of Myanmar security and intelligence forces caused discomfort and denial from the Myanmar government. A report of Indian army raids on Myanmar soil in August 2016 was the first to become published since June 2015, but the Indian army has maintained pressure on the NSCN-K which likely include attacks in Myanmar territory.


- Requested the arrest four top leaders of the NSCN-K including Khaplang, for their role in the ambush in Manipur’s Chandel district
- regular meetings of the bilateral Regional Border Committee which promotes such cooperation and understanding for better border management.

**High level visit level meetings:**

1. 15 July 2015: Myanmar Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin visited India
2. 29 July 2015: Senior General Min Aung Hlaing visited India
3. 22 August 2016: Indian

150 Rajiv Bhattacharyya, Rendezvous With Rebels: Journey to Meet India’s Most Wanted Man, HarperCollins India, 2014.
151 Rajiv Bhattacharyya, “What End Of Ceasefire Means For India And Naga Rebel Group NSCN(K)?”, Huffington Post, 4 Apr 2015.
External affairs minister Sushma Swaraj visited Myanmar, was assured by President Htin Kyaw and Aung San Suu Kyi that they would not allow the country's territory to be used by anti-India militants.

3. 29 August 2016: Modi visited Myanmar
4. 16-20 October 2016: Aung San Suu Kyi visited India

**Bangladesh**

Increased fighting on the Bangladesh-Myanmar border has also seen spill over of conflict onto Bangladeshi territory. Several armed groups from Bangladesh, India and Myanmar are active on the eastern border of Bangladesh.

1. Bangladesh has expressed difficulties in hosting 500,000 Rohingya refugees for nearly 30 years with its limited resources. The refugee problem also poses many social, economic and political challenges.152
2. May 2016: Bangladesh protested to Myanmar about 6 mortar-shells from the Myanmar side that hit a Bangladeshi border guard outpost. It is unsure who was responsible for the mortar ALP or Myanmar border Police.

**Bilateral Security Cooperation:**

- developing day-to-day level interaction through the BLO (Border Liaison Office).
- Agreed on a framework for structured dialogue between security forces and agencies.
- Preparing MoU on Security Dialogue and Cooperation to facilitate structured dialogue between Bangladesh and Myanmar Army, Navy and the Air Force level, at the border guard level and at security agency level.

**High level meeting**


30 June 2016: Foreign Secretary Mr. Md. Shahidul Haque met Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw about greater cooperation between the two border guard forces.

**Thailand**

Thailand has seen little spill over of conflict from Myanmar in recent years but maintains close military and security ties with Myanmar. It remains home to many ethnic armed lead-

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152 "Bangladesh wants to work with Myanmar on refugee issues, says PM Hasina", BDnews24, 21 Sep 2016.
ers and 103,300 Myanmar refugees.\textsuperscript{153} Planning to start the return of refugees to Myanmar.

**Anti-drugs cooperation**
The Thai government has also given US$596,698 to Myanmar in aid as part of a joint anti-drug programme.

**Human trafficking:**
- Thailand under pressure from the United States and the European Union to crack down on human trafficking both on land and in its fishing fleets.
- April 2015, police unearthed two dozen bodies from shallow graves in the mountains of southern Thailand, a grim discovery that has since exposed a network of jungle camps run by traffickers who allegedly held migrants captive while they extorted ransoms from their families. A total of 33 bodies, believed to be migrants from Myanmar and Bangladesh, have now been exhumed from various jungle camps.
- May 2015: police chief Gen. Somyot Poompanmoung delivered the strongest public admission yet of police involvement in trafficking syndicates that use Thailand as a regional transit hub. He announced the arrest of a powerful provincial mayor on Friday and said 50 police officers are being investigated in a widening human trafficking scandal spanning four Asian countries.
- 8 May 2015: “Special meeting on Irregular Migration in the Indian Ocean” in Bangkok to address the boat people problem in the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal. Representatives from 17 countries across ASEAN and elsewhere in Asia, along with the United States, Switzerland and international organisations like UNHCR, the UN refugee agency. Agreed to provide humanitarian aid, but root causes not addressed. Hoping Myanmar will recognise citizens.

**High-level meetings**
- 30 June 2015: 83rd Thai-Myanmar Township Border Committee (TBC) conference was held at Tha Khee Lek, Burma.
- 27-29 August 2015: Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces paid an official visit to Thailand as guest of the Royal Thai Armed Forces to attend the 3rd Thailand-Myanmar Joint High-level Committee Meeting.
- 4 February 2016: Chief of the Defence Services of the Royal Thai Army General Sommai Kaotirai met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Nay Pyi Taw
- 25 May 2016: Senior General Min Aung Hlaing met Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and military top brass. Discussed expand cooperation in matters relating to internal

\textsuperscript{153} “First Myanmar refugee returns from Thailand under way”, UNHCR, 25 Oct 2016.
peace, illegal trade, arms smuggling, narcotic drugs, investment, culture and travel.

- 21 June 2016: Senior General Min Aung Hlaing received Lt-Gen Somsak Nilbanjerdkul and his party in Naypyitaw, the Thai military delegation attended the 30th Myanmar-Thailand Regional Border Committee meeting in Kengtung, Shan State (East) on 21-22 June.

**Japan**

Special Envoy of the Government of Japan for National Reconciliation in Myanmar: Yohei Sasakawa

The Nippon Foundation has been working with the Government of Myanmar, armed ethnic groups in Myanmar, and the Government of Japan since 2012 to achieve peace in Myanmar, by promoting confidence building and dialog between the Government of Myanmar and armed ethnic groups, and by distributing approximately ¥2 billion of food and other humanitarian assistance to the country’s roughly 500,000 conflict-affected people.

2 Nov 2016: During Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to Japan, Prime minister Shinzo Abe pledged 40 billion yen ($390 million) in aid to back Myanmar’s peace process with ethnic minorities.

- 14 April 2015: U Aung Min visited Japan and met Japanese special envoy Sasakawa and Prime Minister Abe to discuss the draft NCA.
- 6 July 2016: President Thein Sein visited Japan
- 7 July 2015: Senior General Min Aung Hlaing met Japanese special envoy for National Reconciliation in Myanmar Yohei Sasakawa in Naypyitaw.
- 19-20 November 2015: Special envoy Yohei Sasakawa visited Myanmar and met President Thein Sein, NLD patron Mr. Tin Oo, UEC chairman Mr. Tin Aye, Aung Min,
- 1-5 November 2016: Aung San Suu Kyi visited Japan
- 19 November 2016: Senior General Min Aung Hlaing received a delegation led by Chairman of the Japan-Myanmar Friendship Association Former Minister of Posts and Telecommunications of Japan Mr. Hideo WATANABE

**Military:**

20-30 August 2016: Myanmar Military Officials Exchange Programme (as part of the Nippon Foundation’s Japan)

aims to facilitate Myanmar’s transition to a civilian government by providing opportunities for senior military officers to interact with their Self-Defense Force counterparts and learn
about the role of the military under a civilian government. The first group of officers visited Japan under this program in December 2014, and this was the second group to participate.

During the 2014 visit to Tokyo, Min Aung Hlaing negotiated a five-year exchange agreement between the military and the Nippon Foundation.154

- Increased Myanmar military delegations to Japan: includes visits to Japanese military facilities, participation in workshops on civil-military relations and disaster relief operations, attending Japanese military training institutes, observing Fuji Firepower, Japan's largest annual military land exercises.
- Japanese language and martial arts instructors sent to Myanmar's Defense Services Academy.
- Tatmadaw sends two officer cadets each year to the National Defense Academy of Japan.

The Nippon Foundation has also provided 10 scholarships for Tatmadaw officers to pursue graduate degrees in international relations in Japan.

Joint Peace Fund members
Australia, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States

According to its supporter’s, “the new Joint Peace Fund supports nationally-led efforts to achieve a lasting settlement of the ethnic armed conflict in a flexible, responsive and coherent manner. It will work together with the government, ethnic constituencies, civil society and academia and encourage the participation of women. Peacebuilding activities will serve to increase inclusion, trust and participation in the peace process and contribute to ensuring the safety and security of vulnerable communities. The Joint Peace Fund started operations in April 2016 with over USD 100 million pledged by the EU and nine other donors.”

EU

1 June 2016: new policy on Myanmar called “Elements for an EU strategy vis-à-vis Myanmar/Burma: a special partnership for democracy, peace and prosperity” includes 6 Key Areas – (1) Democracy, Rule of Law, and Good Governance (2) Peace Process (3) Protection and promotion of Human Rights (4) Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development (5) Economic Engagement and Trade and (6) Myanmar in the Region. Part of its policy for the peace fund is:

1. Providing strong political and financial support for an inclusive peace architecture, in-
including implementing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement while encouraging efforts to include those groups to join who have not yet signed up;

2. Engaging in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities by supporting, for example, confidence-building measures, community empowerment, intercultural dialogue, the participation of women, inclusive development and improved livelihoods in ethnic areas, where necessary by linking relief, rehabilitation and development;

3. Developing the capacities of all stakeholders to address the challenges of the process, including security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration;

4. Supporting mine awareness, mine clearance and related activities;

5. Contributing to the debate in Myanmar/Burma over the devolution of executive powers and decentralisation, on the basis of the experience from the various models practised in EU Member States;

6. Providing comparative examples of both EU and third country experiences in post-conflict national dialogues.

Military engagement: 10 November 2016 - Min Aung Hlaing first visit to EU to take part in European Union Military Committee (EUMC) meeting.
Min Aung Hlaing visited defense companies in Italy on the same trip.

USA
Following Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to Washington, President Obama announced he will terminate the national emergency with Myanmar that included lifting of economic sanctions. 14 September 2016 launched U.S.-Myanmar Partnership, top of the list was “Supporting Burma’s efforts to achieve peace and national reconciliation”155

Military engagement: 3-5 October 2016: Lt-Gen Anthony Crutchfield, Deputy Commander of US Pacific Command, met senior Myanmar government officials, ethnic leaders, and local Myanmar youth. He explained that military to military relations would focus on promotion of rule of law and civilian rule at a meeting with. 9 EAO representatives, 4 representing non-signatories and 9 representing signatories on 3 October.156

Others:
9-18 August 2016: A United Nations Peacekeeping Training Course conducted by Australia for the Myanmar Tatmadaw (Defense Services)
12 January 2016: British General Nicholas Houghton, chief of defence staff, visited Myanmar.

VI. Profiles

1. Arakan Army – AA
2. All Burma Students’ Democratic Front - ABSDF
3. Arakan Liberation Party - ALP
4. Arakan Army – AA
5. Chin National Front - CNF
6. Democratic Karen Benevolent Army - DKBA
7. Kachin Independence Organization (KIO/KIA)
8. Karenni National Progressive Party - KNPP
9. Karen National Union - KNU
10. KNU/KNLA Peace Council
11. Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party
12. National Democratic Alliance Army
13. New Mon State Party
14. National Reconciliation and Peace Center
15. National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
16. Pa-O National Liberation Organization - PNLO
17. Restoration Council of Shan State – RCSS
18. Shan State Progress Party
19. Palaung State Liberation Front – PSLF
20. United Nationalities Federal Council - UNFC
21. United Wa State Party - UWSP
### Arakan Army – AA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political wing: United League of Arakan - ULA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUMMARY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founded: 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters: HQ (temporary) in KIA controlled areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Area: KIO/KIA controlled area, Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Myinbya, Paletwa Rakhine state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Strength: 3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader: Brig. Gen. Twan Mrat Naing (commander-in-chief)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Dr. Nyo Twan Awng (2nd-in-command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CEC member:</strong> <em>Lt. Col. Kyaw Han was AA representative in NCCT.</em>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Arakan Army (AA) was founded to protect the Rakhine people, and to establish peace, justice, freedom and development. The AA has fought alongside the KIA since the conflict with the government army resumed on June 9, 2011. More than half their troops have been trained by the KIA.

1. self-determination for the multi-ethnic Rakhine population.
2. safeguard national identity and cultural heritage.
3. promote national dignity and Rakhine interests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of clashes –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015: # 5+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016: # 10+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official delegation team:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col. Kyaw Han</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Spokesperson: Khaing Thu Kha |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liaison offices: N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Alliances: FUA, The Northern Alliance - Burma |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contact:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Website: <a href="http://thearakanarmy.com/">http://thearakanarmy.com/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facebook: <a href="https://www.facebook.com/thearakanarmy1">https://www.facebook.com/thearakanarmy1</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email: <a href="mailto:unitedleagueofarakan@yahoo.com">unitedleagueofarakan@yahoo.com</a> <a href="mailto:arakanarmy2012@gmail.com">arakanarmy2012@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone: +86 18088164061/ +91 977495 3234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**All Burma Students’ Democratic Front - ABSDF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Founded: 1 Nov. 1988  
Headquarters: KNU controlled area  
Operational Area: KIA and KNU controlled areas  
Estimated strength: 400+ (about 200 in Kachin state)  
**CEC members:**  
U Than Khe (Chairperson)  
U Myo Win (Vice-Chairperson)  
U Sonny Mahindra (General Secretary)  
The ABSDF is a student army that was formed after the 1988 uprisings. Their objectives are to fight for restoring democracy, human rights, establishing a genuine federal union and dismantling the dictatorship in Myanmar alongside other democratic and ethnic nationality forces. They have 7 camps along the Myanmar-Thailand border, 3 camps along the Myanmar-India border and 3 camps on the Myanmar-China border. The ABSDF also has foreign branche in the US and Australia.  
**Aims and Objectives:**  
1. To liberate the peoples of Burma from the oppression of military dictatorship  
2. To achieve democracy and human rights  
3. To attain internal peace  
4. To bring about the emergence of a federal union in Burma |

| Ceasefire & Peace Process  
NCA signed: 15 October 2015  
# Post-NCA Signed Clashes:  
2015-16: unknown  
**Official delegation team:**  
U Myo Win (UPDJC)  
Salai Yaw Aung (JMC)  
**Liaison offices:**  
1. Myawaddy  
2. Muse  
3. Proposed: Loikaw, Kalay, Payathonsu, and Myeik  
**Alliances:** ABSDF northern Burma Branch bases in KIA control area.  
**Contact:**  
Website:  
Facebook:  
Email: absdfinfo@gmail.com  
Phone:+66 808 7725 |
The ABSDF elects its leadership democratically. Leaders of the organisation serve for a certain period of time (Three years) in accordance with the ABSDF constitution. The following is the list of the organisation’s current leaders who were elected in ABSDF’s Eight Conference convened in December 2006, to serve for a three-year executive term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CEC members:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Comrade Than Khe</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Comrade Myo Win</td>
<td>Vice-chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Comrade Sonny</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Comrade Myint Oo</td>
<td>Secretary 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Comrade Ye Htut (a) Hla Htay</td>
<td>Secretary 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Comrade Lwan Ni</td>
<td>CEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Comrade Mi Sue Pwint (a) Ma Lay Lon</td>
<td>CEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Comrade Maung Oo</td>
<td>CEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Comrade Salai Yaw Aung</td>
<td>CEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Comrade Chit Win</td>
<td>CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Comrade Kyaw Lin</td>
<td>CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Comrade Thura</td>
<td>CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Comrade Soe Htut</td>
<td>CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Comrade Min Htay</td>
<td>CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Comrade Thant Chain Myint</td>
<td>CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Comrade Yan Naing Soe</td>
<td>CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Comrade Win Tint Han</td>
<td>CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Comrade Thein Lwin</td>
<td>CC reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Comrade Yee Htun</td>
<td>CC reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Comrade Moe Kyaw Oo</td>
<td>CC reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Comrade Nay Myo Htike</td>
<td>CC reserve</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Arakan Liberation Party - ALP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Founded:** 9 April 1967, 1973, 1981  
**Headquarters:** HQ in Indian border  
**Operational Area:** Northern Rakhine and Karen states  
**Estimated strength:** 60-100 (2,000 party members)  
**Leader:** U Khine Ray Khine (Chairman)  
U Khine Tun Win (deputy chairman 1)  
U Khine Soe Naing Aung (deputy chairman 2)  
U Khine Soe Naing (General Secretary)  
U Khine Aung Soe Than (Joint GS) |
| **Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) is advocating freedom and ethnic rights for Rakhine people in Myanmar. Its headquarters based on the Indian border near Rakhine State. The ALP’s armed wing, the Arakan Liberation Army (ALA), have fought against the Myanmar army near the Indo-Myanmar and Thai-Myanmar border.** |

ALP/ALA has 4 military camps: battalion no. 9 (Bangladesh border), Danyawaddy battalion and Arakan Ranger (India border), Yamarwaddy battalion (Karen state).

ALP Branch: Maesot (Thailand), Dhaka (Bangladesh), New Delhi and Guwahati (India), Malaysia branch and USA branch.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ceasefire &amp; Peace Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ceasefire:</strong> 5 April 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Peace talk:** State level  
**Clash:** Unknown  
**Official delegation team:**  
Daw Saw Mra Razalin (UP-DJC)  
**Armed wing:** Arakan Liberation Army (ALA)  
**Government name:** Rakhine State Liberation Party (RSLP)  
**Liaison offices**  
1. Kyauk Taw (Arakan State)  
3/9/12  
2. Paletwa (Chin State) – Pending  

**Alliances:**

**Contact:**

**Website:** [http://www.arakanalp.com/](http://www.arakanalp.com/)  
**Email:** alpinfoandorg@gmail.com  
**Phone:** 09260438424, 09425018154
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CEC members: 4th Conference elected (19-24 Nov 2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U Khine Ray Khine (Chairman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khine Tun Win (deputy chairman 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khine Soe Naing Aung (deputy chairman 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khine Soe Naing (General Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khine Aung Soe Than (Joint GS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khine Aung Zan Phyu (CEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khine Moe Chan (CEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khine Yan Min Soe (CEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khine Soe Mya (CEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khine Myo Chit (CC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khine Ye Lin (CC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Khine High Nilar Aung (CC reserve)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Khine Min Soe (CC reserve)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Affairs:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-in-C: Khine Ray Khine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Khine Soe Naing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Khine Myo Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Khine Bone Myint Zaw (Yamarwaddy battalion commander)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Khine Nay Min (deputy commander of Yamarwaddy battalion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Daw Saw Mra Raza Lin was a NCCT member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Arakan Army – AA နေဒါနှင့်အတူခေါ်သူ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
<th>Peace Process:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Founded: 2010</td>
<td># of clashes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters: HQ in DKBA-controlled area</td>
<td>2011 – Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Area: Karen state</td>
<td>2012 - Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated strength: 100+</td>
<td>2013 - Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader: Maj. Moe Hein aka Khine Zan Wai</td>
<td>2014 - Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Arakan Army (AA) was founded to protect the Rakhine people, establish peace, justice, freedom and promote development. In the past, the AA worked alongside the DKBA. As an observer, AA representatives attended the second conference of EAOs held in Law Khee Ler in Karen state on 20-25 Jan 2014. *U Tawn Zaw is serving UNFC secretary 1. *AA is a member of Arakan National Council (ANC).

**Aims:**

1. To gain self-determination for multi-ethnic Rakhine
2. To safeguard national identity and cultural heritage
3. To promote national dignity and related interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims:</th>
<th>Peace Process:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire &amp; Peace Process:</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official delegation team: None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison offices: None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliances: ANC member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/arakanarmy.ghq.kawthoolei/
Email: aa.arakanarmy@gmail.com
Phone:+66 (0) 911 371 736
**Chin National Front - CNF**

**SUMMARY**

Founded: 20 March 1988  
Headquarters: Thantlang, Chin State (Camp Victoria)  
Operational Area: Thanlang Township, Tlangpi village tract, Dawn village tract and Zang Tlang village tract  
Estimated strength: 200+

The Chin National Front (CNF) was formed on 20 March, 1988, dedicated to securing the self-determination of the Chin people, to restore democracy, and to establish a federal Union of Burma. They are based along the Indo-Myanmar border and other locations inside Chin state. At least 70 CNA soldiers were killed during fighting with the Myanmar military between 1988 and 2012. After 2003, fighting with government troops stopped. CNF has opposed the 2008 Constitution.

**CEC members:**
- Pu Zing Cung (chairman)  
- Pu Thang Nang Lian Thang (VCM 1)  
- Dr Lian H. Sakhong (VCM 2)  
- Pu Thang Ning Kee (VCM 3)  
- Salai Thla Hei (General Secretary)  
- Dr. Sui Khar (AGS 1)  
- Pu Khua Uk Lian (AGS 2)  
- Pu Thet Ni (AGS 3)

**Ceasefire & Peace Process:**

11th resistance group to sign ceasefire with government  
Stage 1: State level ceasefire  
6 Jan 2012  
Stage 2: Union level ceasefire  
7 May 2012  
Stage 3: Nationwide Ceasefire  
15 October 2015

**# Post-Ceasefire Clashes:**
- 2012: None  
- 2013: None  
- 2014: None  
- 2015: None  
- 2016: None

**Official delegation team:**
Twenty committee members were selected from the Central Executive Committee, Central Committee, Supreme Council members and CNA leaders.  
* Member of Chin Peace and Tranquility Committee 24-31 August 2012
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Liaison offices:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pu HC. Ral Hnin (CEC)</td>
<td>1. Tedim (25/09/2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pu Paul Sitha (CEC)</td>
<td>2. Thantlang (29/06/2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Pu Rokhawma (CEC)</td>
<td>Economic liaison office:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Pu Ngai JaThang</td>
<td>2. Yangon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Col. Biak Ling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Lt. Col. Sanglian Thang</td>
<td>Contact:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Pu Thang Ling Kee</td>
<td>Website: <a href="http://www.chinland.org">www.chinland.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Lt. Col. HreTling</td>
<td>Email: <a href="mailto:chinlandweb@gmail.com">chinlandweb@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Salai Peter Lian</td>
<td>Phone: +91 89741215887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Pu Bil Cung</td>
<td>Military affairs:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Salai Biak Pum (CEC)</td>
<td>Deputy C-in-C 1: Col. Than Tun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy C-in-C 2: Col. Biak Hleng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign Affairs: Pu Paul Sehta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Liaison offices:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pu Bawi Cung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pu Tluang Peng</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pu Ngun Cung Lian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Salai Pa Hmun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Pu Tawk Ceu</td>
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Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Liaison offices:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pi Leng Kee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lia Cing Zam Vung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pi Lalhmangaihzuali</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Democratic Karen Benevolent Army - DKBA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Founded:** 8 Nov. 2010  
**Headquarters:** Sonesee Myaing, Myawaddy township, Karen State  
**Operational Area:** Three Pagodas Pass, Myine Gyi Ngu, HlaingBwe and Kyar-In-Seik-Gyi, Kawkareik townships  
**Estimated strength:** 1,500+  
**Battalion:** 9  
**Led by Gen Saw Moo Shay,** the DKBA Brigade 5 is a breakaway faction of the original Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (now a BGF) and renamed itself the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army. During the 2010 elections, DKBA (Brigade 5) attacked government troops and security forces in Myawaddy, Karen state. DKBA changed the name of Buddhist army to Benevolent army on 4 April 2012.  
**Armed wing:** Klo Htoo Baw Battalion  
**Political wing:** Klo Htoo Baw  
**Other names:** Karen Klo-Htoo-Baw Organisation (KKO)  
**Gov name:** Kalo Htoo Baw armed group (Former Democratic Karen Buddhist Army - Brigade 5) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ceasefire &amp; Peace Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 3rd resistance group to sign ceasefire with government  
**Stage 1:** State level ceasefire  
3 Nov 2011  
**Stage 2:** Union level ceasefire  
11 Dec 2011  
**Post-ceasefire Clashes:**  
2012: 1  
2013: 4  
2014: 13  
2015: 40+  
2016: unknown  
**Official delegation team:** N/A  
**HQ guard Battalions:** 904, 906, 908  
**Military column 1:** Brig. Gen Saw Sein Myint, Strategic commander Col. Saw Kyar Ni, battalions: 907, 909, 910.  
**Military column 2:** Brig. Gen Saw Tatuu, Strategic commander Col. Saw Ba Nyein, battalions: 901, 902, 903. |
| Commander in Chief: Gen Saw Moo Shay | Alliances: |
| Deputy C-in-C: Lt. Gen Saw Steel | DKBA was a member of NCCT. |
| Adjacent General: Phu Mu Khoe | Liaison offices |
| Chief of Staff: Col. Saw Hedoh | Hpa-an city (Nov 2011) |
| Lt. Saw Tun Tun (military operation) | Myawaddy (Nov 2011) |
| Lt. Saw Sein Win (adjacent) | Kyar-In-Seik-Gyi, Kyaikdon, |
| Col. Saw Mu Ko Paw (support) | Three Pagoda Pass, Myain |
| Col. Saw Shwe Wa (strategic command commander) | Gynngu (pending) |
### Kachin Independence Organization (KIO/KIA)

**UNFC and DPN member**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Founded: 5 February 1961  
Headquarters: Laiza, Kachin state  
Operational Area: 8 brigades across Kachin State and Northern Shan state  
Estimated strength: 10,000 to 12,000 (excluding the KIO’s MHH and MKM civilian militia forces) |

The KIO’s armed wing the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is the second largest ethnic armed group in Myanmar. The KIO claims to have 10,000 troops with another 10,000 reservists in the civilian population ready to fight. The KIO generates large revenues from its rich natural resources, which has enabled them to create a powerful army and develop trade centers in several cities along the Sino-Myanmar border. e.g. Laiza, Mai Ja Yang

A 17-year ceasefire, which for many years was the only written agreement that the government had with any armed group, ended less than 3 months after the nominally civilian government took power in 2011. The contributing factor was the KIO’s refusal to join the government’s BGF scheme. Construction of the Myitsone dam - that would flood large tracts of land in KIO-controlled territories was also a major source of tension.

| Ceasefire & Peace Process: Preliminary Peace Talks and combatant  
Previous ceasefire: 24 Feb. 1994  
Official delegation team: Rotational |

**Conflict Resolution Team – CRT**

1. Brig. Gen Zau Tawng (leader)  
2. Lt. Col. Naw Li  
3. Maj. Taint Boam  
4. U Dau Hka  
5. U La Yeik  
6. Minzai Hkawng Lum

Liaison offices: Technical Advisory Team office in Myitkyina.

| Alliances: UNFC, NCCT, SD, DPN and Northern Alliance member |

**Contact:**

Website: http://kachinnet.net/  
Email: kachinnet.net@outlook.com  
Wechat ID: gamung2016
Although the Myanmar state media started referring to the KIO as an illegal organization from 2009-2010, the ceasefire did not break-down until government troops attacked the KIO’s Sang Gang outpost on June 9, 2011.

**Leadership:**

Chairman of KIO and President of Kachin Independence Council: Lanyaw Zawng Hra
Vice-President 1: General N’Ban La
Vice-President 2 (KIC): Major Gen Gunmaw
General Secretary: U La Nan
Joint Gen Secretary: Col Waw Hkyung Sin Wa
Commander in Chief: Lt Gen. Gun Htang Gam Shawng
Deputy C-in-C 1: Brig Gen. Yuk Hkayawng Hkawng Lum
Deputy C-in-C 2: Brig Gen. Awng Seng La

KIA’s 8 brigades:
- Brigade 1 (Puta-O area)
- Brigade 2 (Tanine area)
- Brigade 3 (Bhamao area)
- Brigade 4 (northern Shan state - Kutkai)
- Brigade 5 (Sadon area)
- Brigade 6 (northern Shan state - Mongkoe)
- Brigade 7 (Pangwa area)
- Brigade 8 (Indawgyi area)

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**Peace Creation Group**

Website: http://peace-talkcreationgroup.com/
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/PeaceTalkCreationGroup
Email: welcometopcg@gmail.com

The Peace-talk Creation Group is made up of Kachin businessmen. They have been instrumental in assisting peace talks between the KIO and government by mediating between the two sides to schedule and make necessary arrangements. They occasionally provide financial assistance for meetings.

Membership includes:
- Yup ZawHkaung of Jade land company
- Lamai Gum Ja
- Hkapra KhunAwng Nshan San Awng.

The group also has a 7-member official documentation team.
**Karenni National Progressive Party - KNPP**

**UNFC and DPN member**

**SUMMARY**

Founded: 1957  
Headquarters: Nyar Mu, Shardaw Township, Kayah state (also known as Karenni)  
Operational Area: Mawchi, Phasaung Loikaw, Shar Daw, Hoyar (Pharu So township), Daw Tamagyi (Dee Maw So township)  
Estimated strength: 600+

KNPP’s armed wing the Karenni army has fought the Myanmar military for the self-determination of its people. Decades long war has resulted in thousands of civilians being displaced from their homes, many of whom have sought shelter in Thai refugee camps.

**Leadership:**  
Chairman: Abel Tweed  
Vice-Chairman: Khu Oo Reh  
Secretary 1: Aung San Myint  
Secretary 2: Shwe Myo Thant  
Khu Hte Bu  
Khu Daniel  
Khu Plu Reh  
Brig. Gen. Aung Myat  
Khu Taw Reh  
Khu Shar Reh  
Maw Day Day Phaw  
Khu Nyay Reh

**Ceasefire & Peace Process**  
Preliminary Peace Talks  
10th resistance group to sign ceasefire with the new government  
**Stage 1:** State level ceasefire  
7 March 2012  
**Stage 2:** Union level ceasefire  
9 June 2012  
**Official delegation team:**  
Rotational

**Military leaders:**  
Commander-in-Chief: Gen. Bee Htoo  
Deputy Commander-in-Chief: Maj. Gen. Aung Myat

**Liaison offices:**  
1. Loikaw 25/07/2012  
2. Shadaw 01/08/2012  
3. Hpa-saung 27/07/2012

Alliances: UNFC, NCCT, SD, and DPN member

**Contact:**  
Website: https://www.knpphq.org/  
Email: knpphq2013@gmail.com  
Phone:(+66) 847447243, (+66) 898526619, (+66) 84 805 1344
**Karen National Union - KNU**

PPST, PPWT/CT, UPDJC, JMC member

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Founded:</strong> 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Headquarters:</strong> Mobile HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Area:</strong> Than Taung, Taungoo, Nyaung Lay Bin, HlaingBwe, Hpa-an, Hpa-pun, Kawkareik, Kyar-Inn Seik Gyi, Kyeik-don, Northern part of Tanintharyi region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated strength:</strong> 5,000+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The KNU has been fighting for self determination and autonomy in one of the world’s longest civil wars. Following Myanmar’s independence from the British in 1948, the Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO) was formed to fight against the central government. This name was later changed to the KNU.

**Arm wings:** KNLA

**Leadership**
- **Chairperson:** Gen. Saw Mutu Say Poe
- **Vice-Chairperson:** Naw Zipporah Sein
- **General Secretary:** Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win
- **Secretary-1:** Padoh Saw Thawthi Bwe
- **Secretary-2:** Padoh Mahn Mahn Mahn
- **Defence department:** Maj. Saw Roger Khin
- **Commander-in-chief:** Gen. Saw Johnny
- **Deputy Commander-in-chief:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ceasefire &amp; Peace Process:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th ceasefire agreement signing group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stage 1:</strong> State level ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jan 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stage 2:</strong> Union level ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Apr 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stage 3:</strong> NCA signed 15 Oct 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Official delegation team:** Rotational

**Liaison offices:**
1. Pa-an - 29 September 2012  
3. Dawei – 12 Apr 2012  
5. Kyauk Gyi – 09 Apr 2012  
6. Thaton - 5 Mar 2013

**Economic liaison office**
1. Mawlamyine (22/11/13)  
2. Pa-an  
3. Yangon
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Saw Baw Kyaw Hae</td>
<td>Alliances: Karen armed groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padoh Saw Thamein Tun, CEC Member</td>
<td>Contact:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padoh Mahn Nyein Maung, CEC Member</td>
<td>Website: <a href="http://www.knuhq.org/">http://www.knuhq.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padoh Ta Doh Moo, CEC Member</td>
<td>Facebook: <a href="https://www.facebook.com/KarenNationalUnionHQ">https://www.facebook.com/KarenNationalUnionHQ</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Department heads:**
- Padoh Mahn Ba Tun, Forestry Department
- Padoh Kawkasar Saw Nay Soe, Transportation Department
- Padoh Saw Eh K’lu, Shwe Oo, Health and Welfare Department
- Padoh Saw Hla Tun, Organizing and Information Department
- Padoh Saw Lah Say, Education and Cultural Department
- Padoh Saw Mya Maung, Breeding and Watery Department
- Padoh Saw Roger Khin, Defense Department
- Padoh Saw Kae Le, Mining Department
- Padoh Saw Eh K’lu Say, Justice Department
- Padoh Saw David Thakabaw, Alliance Affairs Department
- Padoh Saw Aung Win Shwe, Foreign Affairs Department
- Padoh Saw Ah Toe, Interior and Religion Department
- Padoh Saw Khay Hsur, Finance Department
- Padoh Saw Dot Lay Mu, Agriculture Department
- Padoh Saw Dot Lay Mu, Chief Judge

**Contact:**
- Email: info@knuhq.org
- Phone: 05822723/ 09425032747

Karen Peace Support Team (KPST)
8 April 2012
Address: No.410, 3rd Street (South), East Gyo Gone, Insein Township, Yangon, Myanmar.
Telephone Number: +95-9-8575 225

**Contact Persons:**
1. Rev. Mathew Aye, coordinator of Karen Peace Support Team
2. Susanna Hla Hla Soe, Co-Coordinator of Karen Peace Support Team
### KNU/KNLA Peace Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KNU/KNLA Peace Council</th>
<th>PPWT/CT, UPDJC, JMC Member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### SUMMARY

**Founded:** 31 Jan. 2007  
**Headquarters:** Tokawko, Kawkareik Township, Karen state  
**Operational Area:** Tokawko village, Kawkareik Township, and Mae Hla Hta village in Hlaing Bwe Township, Karen state  
**Strength:** <200

The KNU/KNLA Peace Council was formed after the former KNLA brigade 7 commander Maj. Gen. Saw Htay Maung was dismissed by the KNU for initiating peace talks with the Myanmar army without the approval of the KNU central committee in 2007. Maj. Gen. Saw Htay Maung signed a peace deal with the Myanmar junta on January 31 that year and transformed his brigade 7 into the KNU/KNLA Peace Council.

### Leadership

**Leader:** Maj. Gen. Saw Htay Maung (also known as Maj. Gen. Saw Htein Maung)  
**Foreign Affairs Dept:** Dr. Timothy Laklem  
**CEC member:** Brig. Gen. Yin Nu

#### Ceasefire & Peace Process:

- **9th ceasefire signing group.**  
  - **Stage 1:** State level ceasefire  
  - **7 Feb 2012**  
  - **Stage 2:**  
  - **NCA signed 15 October 2015**  
  - **Previous ceasefire: 11 Feb 2017**

**Official delegation team:**  
Saw Htay Maung  
Dr. Timothy Laklem  
Saw Yin Nu  
Dr. Naw Ka Paw Htoo  
Saw Eh Kaw Htoo  
Saw Joseph  
Dr. Saw Aung Than  
Naw Karen Na

#### Liaison offices:

1. Myawaddy  
2. Paya Thone Sue

**Alliances:** Karen armed groups
**Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party**

**SUMMARY**

Founded: 11 March 1989  
Headquarters: Mobile headquarters  
Operational area: Mong Koe and Laukkai in Kokang region  
Estimated strength: 2,000+  
Leader:  

Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army was established after the Kokang army led by Peng Jiasheng split from Burma Communist Party and signed a ceasefire agreement with State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1989. Kokang region became Shan state special region (1) after MNDAA signed a ceasefire agreement. However, when 20 years later, Myanmar army attacked MNDAA in Laukkai on 27 September 2009 after MNDAA rejected to transform into Border Guard Force (BGF). Kokang army split two factions after Myanmar army captured Laukkai. One faction could successfully transform into BGF 1006 and another faction led by Peng Jiasheng went underground. MNDAA has become a UNFC and NCCT member in 2013.  

**Armed wing: Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army**  
(MNDAA) (aka Kokang army)  
Government name: Shan state special region  

**Ceasefire & Peace Process:**  
Non-ceasefire group  
# Clashes:  
2015: fighting with Tatmadaw but unknown exact battle number.  
2016: fighting alongside northern alliance - Burma.  

**Alliance:** UNFC, NCCT, Northern Alliance - Burma  

**Political Demands:**  
Restoring self-administration in Kokang region; Kokang people must have ethnic rights like other ethnics and citizen rights.  

**Leadership**  
U Peng Jiasheng (Patron)  
U Peng Deying (a) U Peng Daxun (General Secretary and Commander in Chief)  
Yan Win Zhong (Deputy commander in chief)  
Peng Dechun (chief of staff)  
U Tun Myat Lin (Spokesperson)  

**Contact:**  
Website: [http://www.kokang123.com](http://www.kokang123.com)
### National Democratic Alliance Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Ceasefire &amp; Peace Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Founded: 1989</td>
<td>2nd ceasefire signing group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters: Mongla, Eastern Shan state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled Area: Mongla, Shan state (Special Region # 4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated strength: 3,000+</td>
<td>Stage 1: State level ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Sept 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government name: Shan State (East) Special Region No. 4</td>
<td>Stage 2: Union level ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other names: Mongla group</td>
<td>27 Dec. 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Previous ceasefire: 30 June 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Official delegation team: Rational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liaison offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yangon, Taunggyi, Kengtung, Tachilek, and Mandalay (re-opened)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Alliances: unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman: Sai Leun aka Sai Lin and Lin Mingxian</td>
<td>Contact:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chairman: San Pae/ Hsan Per</td>
<td>Website:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General secretary: Sao Hsengla</td>
<td>Facebook:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Email:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phone:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## New Mon State Party

**SUMMARY**

Founded: July 1958  
Headquarters: Ye Chaung Phya, Mon state  
Operational Area: Thaton, Paung, Chaungsone, Mawlamyine, Hpa-an, Kawkareik, Kyeikmayaw, Mudon, Thanbyuzayap, Ye, Yayphyu, Three Pagoda Pass, Myeik-Dawei, and Kyar-Inn-Seik Gyi  
Estimated strength: 800+ (2,000 reserved)

Mon separatists formed the Mon Peoples Front (MPF). The group was later reformed and renamed as the New Mon State Party (NMSP). Since 1949, the eastern hills of the state (as well as portions of Thaninthayi Division) have been under NMSP control. In 1995, they agreed to a ceasefire with the Myanmar government.

The NMSP tried unsuccessfully to promote constitutional and political reform through the National Convention until 2008. Communications broke down in April, 2010 after refusing to transform into a Border Guard Force (BGF). However the situation did not deteriorate into outright armed conflict. Negotiations following reforms led to the renewal of the ceasefire agreement at the state-level and a commitment from the government to negotiate ceasefire agreements with all non-state armed groups before the end of 2012 so that inclusive political dialogue can commence at the Union level.

**Ceasefire & Peace Process**

**Preliminary Peace Talks**

**Stage 1. State Level Ceasefire**  
1 Feb 2012

Previous ceasefire: 29 June 1995

**Official delegation team:**

**Outside the country:**
1. Naing Hong Sa,  
2. Nai Tala Nyi, Nai Hong Sa Bun Thai  

**Inside the country:**
1. Nai Htaw Mon  
2. Nai Rawsa  
3. Nai Tala Nyi  
4. Gen. Zay Ya  
5. Nai Aung Min (S-1)  
6. Bri-Gen La Yi Kaung

**Liaison offices:**
1. Mudon  
2. Thanbyuzayat  
3. Ye  
4. Yaybyu (Yaphu village)  
5. Kyaik Mayaw  
6. Zin Kyeik (Paung township)  
7. Myeik (Mreuik)
On 5 August 2009, Mon Revolution Day, the NMSP announced that it would not transform its armed wing into a Border Guard Force (BGF).
Rejected the BGF scheme: April, 2010.

Central Committee members: 27
Chairman: Nai Htaw Mon
Vice-Chairman: Nai Han Thar (Nai Hongsar)
General Secretary: Nai Aung Min
Member: Nai Tala Nyi
Member: Lt. Col. M Seik Chan (in charge of Mawlamyine office)
Member: Maj. Kyi San (in charge of Mawlamyine liaison office)

Central Military Committee: 7
Commander in Chief: Maj. Gen. Layi Gakao
Deputy Commander in chief: Col. Banya Mae San
Member: Lt. Col. Hangsar
Member: Lt. Col. San Aye

Economic offices:
1. Myawaddy
2. Three Pagoda Pass
3. Mawlamyaing

Alliances: UNFC, NCCT, SD, and DPN member

Contact:
Website:
Facebook:
Email:
Phone:+66 80 503 0849
### National Reconciliation and Peace Center

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Chairperson - State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi  
2. Vice-Chairman 1- Union Minister for the Office of the State Counsellor U Kyaw Tint Swe  
3. Vice Chairman 2- Dr Tin Myo Win, Chairman of Preparatory Committee for Union Peace Conference-21st Century Panglong  |
| 4. Union Minister for Border Affairs, Lt-Gen Ye Aung  
5. Union Minister for Ethnic Affairs, Nai Thet Lwin  
6. Union Attorney-General U Tun Tun Oo  
7. Lt-Gen Yar Pyae - Commander of Bureau of Special Operation 2, Ministry of Defense  
8. Lt-Gen Min Naung - Commander of Bureau of Special Operation 4, Ministry of Defense |

### SUMMARY

Founded: 11 July, 2016  
The President’s Office formed the “National Reconciliation and Peace Center” with the release of Order 50/2016. The following is the full translation of the Order.

MPC – Myanmar Peace Center was replaced NRPC

Republic of the Union of Myanmar  
President’s Office  
Order 50/2016  
7th Waxing of Waso, 1378 ME

Formation of National Reconciliation and Peace Center

In order to set necessary policies and guidelines for ensuring the successful implementation of national reconciliation and peace process, the NRPC was formed with 10 members led by Union Minister for the Office of State Counsellor U Kyaw Tint Swe as chairman together with Union Minister for Border Affairs Lt-Gen Ye Aung as vice chairman and Director-General U Maung Maung Tint of Planning Department of the Ministry of Planning and Finance as secretary.
Operations and functions of the National Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC) are as follows:

- (a) to set policies and guidelines needed for national reconciliation process,
- (b) to set policies and guidelines needed for internal peace process,
- (c) to set policies for coordination with local and foreign donors, governments, international nongovernmental organizations and international institutions regarding assistance to national reconciliation and peace processes,
- (d) to lead and lay down guidelines paving the way to participation of the government, Hluttaw, Tatmadaw, ethnic organizations and ethnic armed groups, civil society organizations, international community and donors and local and foreign experts from various sectors in national reconciliation and peace processes,
- (e) to seek ways and means for turning the Republic of the Union of Myanmar into a Democratic Federal Union, and
- (f) to release procedures and directives needed for implementation of functions of the National Reconciliation and Peace Center-NRPC.

3. The NRPC shall form and appoint technical board and support team in order to ensure successful implementation of national reconciliation and peace processes in accord with rules and regulations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name and Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>U Khun Maung Thaung (Pinlaung Constituency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Chairman of Pyithu Hluttaw Ethnic Affairs and Internal Peace Implementation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Daw Shila Nan Taung (a) Daw M Nan Taung - (Kachin State Constituency 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Chairman of Amyotha Hluttaw Ethnic Affairs Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Deputy Minister for the Office of the State Counsellor U Khin Maung Tin – Secretary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Official delegation team
Rational

**Liaison offices**
Yangon, NayPayTaw

**Contact:** N/A

Peace Commision:
https://www.facebook.com/Peace-Commission-496571313874669/

Sd/ Htin Kyaw
President
Republic of the Union of Myanmar
### National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang

**SUMMARY**
- **Founded:** 1 Jan. 1980
- **Headquarters:** Unknown
- **Operational Area:** Lahe, Lay Shi and Nanyun in Sagaing Region
- **Estimated strength:** <500

The NSCN-K has been fighting to achieve a union between Naga living in the northeast states of India and the Sagaing Region in Myanmar. In 1988, the NSCN split into two fractions; the NSCN-K led by S. S. Khaplang based in northern Lahe and Nanyun townships in Sagaing Region, Myanmar and the NSCN-IM, led by Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah in India.

According to the 2008 Constitution, the Leshi, Lahe and Nanyun townships in Sagaing Region are described as a Naga Self-Administered Zone. Since 2010, the NSCN-K and the Myanmar government have not engaged in armed clashes. After the ceasefire in 2012, many of their soldiers deserted. No major developments since ceasefire agreement and also did not participate in the ethnic conferences. The group however did receive 15 cars for tax free and 30 car licenses with preferential tax rates.

- **Ceasefire & Peace Process:**
  - 12th ceasefire signing group.
  - Stage 1: State level ceasefire
  - 9 Apr 2012

- **Post ceasefire agreement:** none

- **Official delegation team:** N/A

- **Leadership**
  - **Chairman:** S. S. Khaplang
  - **General Secretary:** Dali Mangru Ao
  - **Commander-in-Chief:** Khole Konyak

- **Liaison offices:**
  - Khamti, Sagaing Region

- **Alliances:**

- **Contact:**

- **Website:**

- **Facebook:**

- **Email:**

- **Phone:**
### Pa-O National Liberation Organization - PNLO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Founded: 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters: Laybwer camp, Southern Shan State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Area: Hsi Hseng, Hopong, Namhsan, Lan Khur and Mawkmai, Shan State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated strength: 400+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The PNLO is the combined force of the Pa-O People’s Liberation Organization (PPLO) and the former PNLO. The PPLO was led by Col. Khun Okkar and formed on 18 June 1991 to continue the armed struggle after its mother organisation Pa-Oh National Organization (PNO) led by U Aung Kham Hti, signed a ceasefire with the government. The former PNLO was a SNPLO splinter group (Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization) led by Brig. Gen. Khun Ti Soung and formed on 10 June 2007.

The two groups were officially united at a Pa-O National Conference held on 7-9 Dec. 2009 that formed the newly structured PNLA and PNLO, and drafted the PNLO constitution. Attendees included the Pa-Oh Youth Organization, Pa-Oh Labor Union and individuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ceasefire &amp; Peace Process:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13th ceasefire signing group.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1: State level ceasefire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 Aug 2012</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 2: Union level ceasefire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 Mar 2013</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 3: NCA signed 15 Oct 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official delegation team:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State level: 7 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Khun Myint Tun (Team leader)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Col. Khun Thurein (Deputy Leader)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Brig. Gen. Khun Ti Saung (Member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Maj. Khun Kyaw Htin (Member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Khun Ooh (Member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Khun Tun Tin (Member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Maj. Khun Swe Hto (Member)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
such as U Khun Myint Tun (Thaton MP in 1990 election) and Khun Tin Swe (member of NCUB and PDC). Col. Khun Okker was elected as the chairman, and Brig. Gen. Khun Ti Soung as vice-chairman. The conference chose the name PNLO to honor the former PNLO’s initiation and commitment to the “third revolution”.

The first PNLO congress held in Laybwer military camp on 16-20 May 2013 elected new central committee members in which Khun Myint Tun was appointed the new chairman. Previous chairmen Col. Khun Okker and Brig. Gen. Khun Ti Soung have since become patrons.

The PNLO’s current headquarters is located near the Thai-Myanmar border opposite Mae Hong Son, Thailand.

Central Committee Members:
Patrons: Col. Hkun Okker, Brig-Gen Khun Ti Saung, Khun Tet Lu

Chairman: Khun Myint Tun
Vice-Chairman: Col. Khun Thurein
General Secretary: Col. Aung Kyaw
Joint General Secretary (1): Khun Thomas
Joint General Secretary (2): Nang Nwe Nwe
Commander in Chief: Col. Khun Thurein
Chief of Staff: Lt. Col. Khun Aung Mann
CEC Member: Khun Tin Shwe Oo
CEC Member: Lt. Col. Khun Ohn Maung
CC Member: Khun Tun Tin
CC Member: Lt. Col. Khun Kyaw Htin
CC Member: Lt. Col. Khun Swe Hto
CC Member: Nang Phyu Pyar

Union level: 12 members
1. Col. Hkun Okker - Team Leader
2. Khun Myint Tun - Deputy Leader
3. Col. Khun Thurein - Member
4. Col. Aung Kyaw - Member
5. Khun Ooh - Member
6. Khun Tin Shwe Oo - Member
7. Maj. Khun Swe Hto - Member
8. Khun Htee - Member
9. Khun Tun Tin - Member
10. Khun Thomus - Member
11. Nang Nwe Nwe - Member
12. Nang Myint - Member

Liaison offices
1. Taunggyi (26/01/2013)
2. Thaton (21/08/2013)
3. Maukmai (08/12/2013)
4. Hsi Hseng (To be opened soon)

Alliances: PPST, PPWT/CT, UPDJC, JMC member.

Contact:
Website:
Facebook:
Email: pnlopower@gmail.com
Phone:
### Restoration Council of Shan State – RCSS

- **PPST, PPWT/CT, UPDJC, JMC member**

#### SUMMARY

- **Founded:** 1964/1996
- **Headquarters:** Loi Tai Leng, Southern Shan State
- **Operational Area:** Mong Ton, Mong Hsat in Eastern Shan State, Mong Pan, Mong Nai, Laikha, Kunhing, Lawksawk, Maukmai, Mongkaung, Nam Hsan in Southern Shan State, Kyaukme and Nam Kham in Northern Shan State
- **Estimated Strength:** 8,000+
- **Leader:** Lt. Gen. Yawd Serk

RCSS also known as SSA-S was formed from the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) by Lt. Gen. Yawd Serk that opposed the ceasefire with the government made by the mainstream SSA. The SURA led by Sao Yawd Serk was a breakaway faction of the Mong Tai Army led by drug lord Khun Sa and previously the original Shan State Army. Shan State National Army (SSNA) led by Sao Sai Yee merged with RCSS on 21 May 2005. RCSS has been struggling for constructing a genuine federal union, political equality and self-determination.

| Stage 1: State level ceasefire 2 Dec 2011 |
| Stage 2: Union level ceasefire 16 Jan 2012 |
| Stage 3: NCA signed 15 Oct 2015 |

#### Post ceasefire conflict:

- 2012: 68
- 2013: 76
- 2014: 21
- 2015: 13
- 2016: 4

#### Official delegation team

- **Chief Negotiator:** Brig. Gen. Pawng Kherh

#### Liaison offices:

1. Taung Gyi (22/02/2012)
2. Keng Tung (22/02/2012)
3. Tachilek (29/02/2012)
4. Mongton (29/02/2012)
5. Kho Lam (21/03/2012)
6. Muse (Business liaison office)
7. Mong Pan (6/03/2014)
**Affiliations:** Former Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) and Mong Tai Army (MTA)

CEC members: 11 members  
Chairman and Commander-in-chief: Lt. Gen. Yawd Serk  
Vice chairman 1: Maj. Gen. Sai Yee  
Vice Chairman 2: Col. Kherh Ngeun  
General Secretary: Lt. Col. Siri  
Chief of Civil Administration and chief of peace delegation: Brig. Gen. Pawng Kherh  
Commander of eastern military command: Lt. Col. Gawn Zeun  
Spokesperson 1: Col. Sai Lao Hseng  
Spokesperson 2: Lt. Col. Sai Hseng Meung  
CEC: Col. Sai Nguen (peace delegation)

*RCSS is known as Shan State Army - South as well as a member of Committee for Shan State Unity (CSSU). The CSSU was established on Oct 15, 2013. The CSSU’s members include the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), Shan State Joint Action Committee (SSJAC- a coalition of SNLD and SSPP) and the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, as well as 13 civil society organizations.

**Alliances:** PPST, PPWT/CT, UPDJC, JMC member

**Contact:**  
Website: [http://www.taifreedom.com](http://www.taifreedom.com), [http://www.rcssanc.org](http://www.rcssanc.org)  
Facebook: [https://www.facebook.com/RCSSAND/](https://www.facebook.com/RCSSAND/)  
Email: rcssinfordepartment@gmail.com  
Phone:+95 9 4283 28715
**Shan State Progress Party**

**SUMMARY**

- **Founded:** 1964/1989
- **Headquarters:** HQ in Wan Hai, Kehsi Township, northern Shan state
- **Operational Area:** Nam Kham, Langkho, Hsipaw, Kyaunkpauk, Mong Hsu, Tang Yang, Mongyai, Kehsi, Lashio Township
- **Estimated strength:** 8,000+

The Shan resistance was born on May 21, 1958. On April 25, 1960 the Shan State Independence Army (SSIA) was formed in Loi La, Mong Yawn, Kengtung state with Hkun Maha as chairman and Sao Hso Hkarn as secretary general. On April 24, 1964 Shan resistance forces formed the Shan State Army (SSA) with Sao Nang Hearn Kham (Mahadevi of Yawnghwe) as chairman. In 1971, the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) was established and its first congress was held on August 16, 1971. The SSPP signed a ceasefire agreement with Myanmar government in 1989. Burma army gave a pressure on the SSPP to transform into BGF in 2010. The SSPP/SSA brigade 3 and 7 transformed into BGF in the following year but brigade 1 led by Col. Pang Fa (now Lt. Gen) rejuvenated the SSPP/SSA and have kept the ceasefire agreement even though the Shan army has been some clashes with Burma army.

**Ceasefire & Peace Process**

- **7th Ceasefire signing group.**
- **Stage 1:** State level ceasefire
  28 Jan 2012
- **Stage 2:** Union level peace talks (28 Jan. 2012)
- **Previous ceasefire:** September 02, 1989

**# Post-Ceasefire Clashes:**

- 2012: 130
- 2013: 71 clashes
- 2014: 100+
- 2015: 34 (media record)
- 2016: 10 (media record)

**Leader:** Lt.Gen Pang Fa
**Official delegation team:** National Liaison of accuses:

1. Lashio
2. Taung Yi
3. Kho Lam
4. Muse (not opened)
5. Tachileik (unconfirmed)

**Alliances:** UNFC, FUA, NCCT, DPN member
Central Committee Members: 31

Chairman: Lt. Gen. Pang Fa (C-in-C)
Vice-chairman 1: Maj. Gen. Khur Tai
Vice-chairman 2: Maj. Gen. Khun Hseng
Col. Mann Hong (CC)
Maj. Gen. Ngao Pha (deputy commander in chief)
Lt. Col. Kham Ti (political department)
Lt. Col. Lao Pein (commander of Brigade 74)
Lt. Col. Kyaw Hla (Secretary 1)
Lt. Col. Sai Su (Secretary 2)
Lt. Col. Ba Tun (Secretary 3)
Maj. Sai Han (Training)
Maj. Twan Kham (public affairs)

*Sao Sai Ba Tun was a representative in NCCT.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Contact:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Website:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facebook:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Website: https://www.facebook.com/SSPP-SSA-459567954219825/
Email: rcssinfordepartment@gmail.com, sspp.hq@gmail.com
Phone: (95) 090949579983, 0949579903
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Palaung State Liberation Front – PSLF</strong></th>
<th>![Image]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUMMARY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founded: 1992 (Jan)</td>
<td>Ceasefire &amp; Peace Process:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters: Mobile</td>
<td>Non-ceasefire group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Area: Naung Cho, Kyaukme,</td>
<td>#Clashes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsipaw, Kutkai, Namtu, Mann Ton, Namhsan,</td>
<td>2012: 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namh Kham, Muse, Mong Mit, Mongoke</td>
<td>2013: 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in northern Shan state</td>
<td>2014: 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated strength: 6,000+</td>
<td>2015: 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2016: 309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palaung State Liberation Organization</td>
<td>Clashes with Tatmadaw:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PSLO/A) made cease fire to the government</td>
<td>2012: 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palaung leaders Tar Aik Bong, Mai Tin Maung and other PSLO/A leaders formed the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) to fill the gap of armed struggles and continued to fight against the Myanmar military regime.</td>
<td>2014: 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015: 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2016: 309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) is the army wing of PSLF. Currently, TNLA are fighting alongside the KIA, SSPP/SSA and MNDAA against the government in northern Shan state. There are 3 brigades in TNLA.</td>
<td>Clashes with RCSS:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After the 2010 elections, the government recognized the areas that Palaung (also known as Ta’ang) inhabit in northern Shan state as an administration zone. However it remains very underdeveloped and there are very few schools and hospitals.</td>
<td>2015:17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2016: 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leader:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Tar Aik Bong (Chairman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Tar Jok Jar (vice-chairman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col. Tar Bone Kyaw (Gen Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief: Tar Hod Plarng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information Department: Mai Aik Kyaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign affair Department: Tar Parn La</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PSLF’s aims and Objective:

1. To obtain freedom for all Ta’ang Nationals from oppression.
2. To form Ta’ang autonomy that has a guarantee for Democracy and human rights.
3. To oppose and fight against dictatorship and any form of racial discrimination.
4. To attain national equality and self-determination.
5. To establish a genuine federal union that guarantees autonomy.

### Central Committee: 23

**Reserved Committee: ( 8 )**

Official delegation team: N/A

Liaison offices: N/A

Alliances: UNFC, NCCT, FUA, Northern Alliance - Burma.

### Contact:

Website: [http://www.pslftnla.org/](http://www.pslftnla.org/)

Facebook: [https://www.facebook.com/PslTnla/](https://www.facebook.com/PslTnla/)

Email: pslftnlanews@gmail.com

Phone:
United Nationalities Federal Council - UNFC

SUMMARY

Founded: 16 Feb. 2011
Headquarters: Chiang Mai, Thailand
The UNFC is the latest coalition of ethnic armed organizations. It was renamed and re-formed from the Committee for the Emergence of Federal Union (CEFU), founded in Nov. 2010. The UNFC wants to represent all of the ethnic armed forces during peace negotiations with the government.

Objectives:
- to build a genuine ethnic unity
- to build lasting peace in the country
- to establish a genuine multi-party system
- To build a federal union with peacefully living together

Previous Ethnic Alliances:
National Democratic Front (NDF), 1976-ongoing
Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC), 2001-ongoing

Objective:
The UNFC wants to establish a Federal Union in Myanmar. They have already formed the Federal Union Army (FUA) to protect ethnic areas.

Leadership

Chairman: Lt. Gen. N’Ban La
Vice-Chairman: Nai Hongsa
General Secretary: Khu Oo Reh
Joint Secretary 1: U Twan Zaw
Joint Secretary 2: Tar Pan La

Ceasefire & Peace Process
On going discussion on 9 points proposal
#Last meeting 9-10 November 2016

DPN team
Leader - Khu Oo Reh – KNPP
Joint leader 1- Maj Gen. Gun Maw (KIO/KIA)
Joint leader 2- Maj Gen. Sai Htoo (SSPP/SSA)
Member – Dr Nai Shwe Thein (NMSP)
Member – Nai Aung Ma Nge (NMSP)
Member – Sao Hsur Aon (SSPP/SSA)
Member – Col. Min Tun (ANC/AA)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNFC members</th>
<th>Member – Col. Solomon (LDU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kachin Independent Organization/ Kachin Independent Army</td>
<td>Member – Maj. Thar Nge Lu (WNO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Karenni National Progressive Party</td>
<td>Member – Tar Parn La (PSLF/TNLA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. New Mon State Party</td>
<td>Member – Phone Win Naing (MDNAA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army</td>
<td>Liaison offices: NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Arakan National Council/Arakan Army</td>
<td><strong>Alliances:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lahu Democratic Union</td>
<td><strong>Contact:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Wa National Organisation</td>
<td>Website:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army</td>
<td>Email: <a href="mailto:unityunfc@gmail.com">unityunfc@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suspended:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Chin National Front</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Karen National Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Pa-O National Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Ta’ang National Liberation Front (pending)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (pending)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Federal Union Army (Formed December, 2011)
**United Wa State Party - UWSP**

Army wing: United Wa State Army (UWSA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Founded:</strong> 17 April 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Headquarters:</strong> Pangkham (also known as Phangsang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Area:</strong> Pangsang, Mongma, Pangwai, Nahphan, Mongpawt, Hopan, Mak Marng, Mongton, Mong Hsat, Tachileik, Mong Pan, Mongyaung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated strength:</strong> 30,000 (reserve 30,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader:</strong> Bao You Xiang</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The UWSP administers 6 designated townships of the Wa Self-Administered Division as stipulated in the 2008 Constitution. Its official name was announced by decree on 20 Aug. 2010. The UWSP rejected the government’s Border Guard Force scheme in 2009. The group maintains close ties with China (both politically and economically) and uses Chinese as the party’s working language.

The UWSP military wing the Wa army is estimated to number 30,000 troops and 10,000 auxiliary members. They are the largest ethnic army in Myanmar and reported to be a major player in the opium, heroin and amphetamine drug trade. However the UWSA control area has been declared drug free and the group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ceasefire &amp; Peace Process:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st ceasefire signing group.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stage 1:</strong> State level ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sept 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stage 2:</strong> Union level ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Dec 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Previous ceasefire:</strong> 18 May 1989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Post-Ceasefire Clashes:
- none
  - Occasional tension with Tatmadaw.
  - UWSA troops occupied NDAA posts in 2016 after they had tension.

Official delegation team: unknown

Liaison offices

1. Lashio
2. Tang Yang
3. Keng Tung
4. Tachileik
5. Taung Gyi
6. Mandalay
7. Yangon
owns large business conglomerate Thawda Win Company, formerly known as the Hong Pang Group. It was originally formed from members of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) following its collapse in 1989.

With the 2008 constitution, UWSP/UWSA established Wa self-administration region composed of Hopang, Mongmau, Panwai, Nahpah, Metman and Panghsang (Pangkham) township in Shan state.

UWSA hosted ethnic summit two times in its headquarters Panghsang. UWSA attended the first Union Peace Conference and presented their proposal to recognize ‘autonomous Wa state’. UWSA representatives attended the 21st Century Panglong conference but they left the conference before the end.

The UWSA has 5 divisions deployed along the Thai-Myanmar border and 3 divisions on China-Myanmar border.

On Thai-Myanmar border:
1. 778th Division
2. 772nd Division
3. 775th Division
4. 248th Division
5. 518th Division

On China-Myanmar border:
1. 318th Division
2. 418th Division
3. 468th Division
4. 618th Division

CEC Members:
- Chairman: Bao You Xiang
- Vice-Chairman: Bao You Yi
- Vice-Chairman: Xiao Mingliang (Shauk Ming Lyan)
- Commander-in-chief: Bao You Xiang
- Deputy commander in chief: Zhao Zhongdang
- Spokesperson: Li Zhulie aka U Aung Myint
- In charge of external affairs: Zhao Guo-ann
- Deputy in charge of external affairs: Sam Khun
- Supreme court chief: Li Zhao Guo
- In charge of finance and business affairs: Bao You Liang
- Political wing: United Wa State Party (UWSP)
- Government Name: Shan State (North) Special Region-2
- Armed wing: United Wa State Army (UWSA)

Alliances:
- Contact:
- Website:
- Facebook:
- Email:
- Phone: