

Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process A Reference Guide (2023 - 2024)



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Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process - A Reference Guide (2023-2024)

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About Us

Myanmar Peace Monitor (MPM) is a program run by Burma News International (BNI), a network of 15 ethnic media organizations. The program aims to publish timely, reliable, and accurate information and analytical reports and research papers on peace process and conflict-related issues and latest developments in Myanmar.

MPM monitors and documents conflict-related incidents and data, as well as track progress in peace processes through independent and reliable local and foreign media sources on a daily basis and publishes the news and interviews on peace and conflicts by deploying field reporters in various regions and states.

To provide a deeper understanding of issues, events, actors and organizations directly involved in Myanmar's complex peace and conflict processes, directions of peace process and shifts, BNI-MPM has been annually publishing reference guides titled "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process" since 2013. "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process"—A Reference Guide (2023-2024) is the 9th publication.

BNI-MPM publishes daily news and interviews on its website at www.mmpeacemonitor.org. Updates are also shared on Facebook at <https://www.facebook.com/mmpeacemonitor> and on Telegram at https://t.me/bni_mmpeacemonitor. In addition, BNI-MPM regularly publishes bi-weekly news reviews, monthly dashboards on peace and conflict, research papers and content-based infographics.

CONTENTS

Printing record	1
About Us	2
Table of Contents	3
Acknowledgements	4
Note to the reader	5
Summary	7
The year of the end of NCA-led peace process	11
The new Spring Revolution actors to watch	20
A year of escalating intensity and an expanding scope of conflict	44
With the escalation of armed conflict, a rising death toll across the country	49
Increasing IDP numbers	55
Military airstrikes	60
A year with more interest-based talks than conflict resolution	64
ERO Profiles	72
Incidents of massacres involving five or more people after the military coup	115
Nationwide mine operations	136
Captures of towns	141
The role of international community	144
Weekly News Reviews	164
Acronyms	217

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We sincerely extend our respect and recognition to all BNI staff members who have supported us in every aspect, whether verbally or personally, throughout the challenges and difficulties encountered in each phase of the BNI-MPM processes. Furthermore, we would like to sincerely express our gratitude to all donors who have supported the implementation of BNI-MPM's work plans.

Note to the Reader

Burma News International- Myanmar Peace Monitor (BNI-MPM) has compiled and published “Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process: A Reference Guide” annually since 2013, documenting conflict events and findings from the peace process. The reference guide documents relevant events and data based on the evolving political, military and peace landscape over different time periods.

This "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process: A Reference Guide (2023-2024)" is the third publication after the military coup. Compared to the previous publications (2021-2022 and 2022-2023), this reference guide covers more events and data and provides clearer insights into the evolving roles, significance, positions and aspirations of stakeholders involved in the conflict and peace process.

In this book, information and events related to the revolutionary forces and shifts during the military coup are presented based on factual data for each group. According to the BNI - Myanmar Peace Monitor's findings, this book describes the years 2023-2024 as a period of intense military activity and an expansion of the scope of the armed conflict.

The intensifying armed resistance has visibly taken its toll on the military regime through battlefield losses and losses of military camps. At the same time, the book systematically documents the military's increasing airstrikes, the growing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing violence, military and civilian fatalities resulting from clashes, and reports of mass killings across the country.

The book also looks at the stalled peace process, the directions of Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), international governments and organizations that are increasingly leaning towards the regime such as China, Russia, India, Thailand and ASEAN, as well as those supporting the revolutionary forces, such as the United States, Japan, the United Nations and the European Union.

In compiling the details of the peace process and armed conflict in Myanmar, we have strived to be comprehensive by relying on credible sources. However, we would like to inform readers in advance that there may still be some gaps.

The military strength of the EROs is gathered through daily news, interviews, and confirmations from relevant organizations through BNI member news organizations.

We hope that this book will be helpful to researchers, academics, journalists, and international organizations interested in the political, military and peace process dynamics of the coup period in Myanmar.

Summary

This book "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process – A Reference Guide (2022 – 2023) summarizes topics including armed conflict, political landscape, peace situation, civilians affected by the conflict, foreign governments and international organizations. It focuses in particular on the military attempting to seize power and revolutionary forces resisting the 2021 coup while striving to build a federal democratic union, as well as groups caught between the military and the revolutionary forces, drawing on events and factual data.

Since the military coup on 1 February 2021, its peace talks aimed at gaining domestic and international recognition by prioritizing the peace process have essentially stalled. The peace process, or the path of dialogue, under the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) can be said to have reached an impasse.

Among the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) that had signed a ceasefire, some have now fully aligned themselves militarily and politically with the Spring Revolution forces fighting for an end to the military dictatorship. The Peace Process Steering Team (PPST), formed by 10 NCA-signatory EROs, also became disorganized and has transformed into the 7 Ethnic Armed Organizations Alliance (7 EAO Alliance). At the same time, the military's National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) has undergone many changes and is struggling to revive the NCA peace process. Therefore, examining the peace process and transitions in 2023 and 2024, it can be concluded that these years mark the end of the NCA peace path.

On the other hand, we have clearly seen military cooperation and joint operations between the existing EROs and the newly formed People's Defense Forces-Local Defense Forces (PDFs-LDFs), including the National Unity Government (NUG), that emerged after the coup across various highland and lowland regions of Myanmar. There have been many offensives against the military, including "Operation 1027" by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) in northern Shan State, "Operation 0307" by the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA) in Kachin State, "Operation 1111" by Karenni resistance forces, including the Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) and the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) in Karenni (Kayah) State, as well as "Operation CB" by the Chin Brotherhood (CB) in Chin State. In Arakan State, the resistance offensives led by the United League of Arakan/Arakha Army (ULA/AA) have demonstrated coordination, synchronization and momentum. Similarly, the activities of the Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C), formed by the Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA), the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), the Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA), the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), and the National Unity Government (NUG), have spread across military regions and have put pressure on the military across the country. The years 2023 and 2024 can be described as years of intensified military conflict and expanded scope of armed conflicts.

From June 2023 to 25 July 2024, over a period of more than a year, resistance forces took as many as 73 towns from the military's control. These include 21 towns in northern Shan State, 14 in Arakan State, 13 in Chin State, seven in Kachin State, five in Karenni (Kayah) State, five in Sagaing Region, two in Karen State, and one each in eastern Bago and

Mandalay Regions. At the same time, the resistance forces are in the process of establishing administrative and security mechanisms to administer these captured towns.

On various battlefronts across the country, the military has lost positions, including police stations, outposts, bases, strategic hilltop outposts, and even a regional military command to the resistance forces. It is faced with dwindling ground troops, demoralization, and numerous instances of mass surrenders, including generals and majors. In response, the military has indiscriminately carried out aerial bombings on towns, wards and villages over which it has lost control on a daily basis.

According to BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor records, as of 14 July 2024, there have been 1,254 events of aerial bombings by the military, with 1,021 of these attacks occurring in 2023 and 2024, indicating that it primarily resorts to bombing tactics.¹ Due to the ongoing armed clashes across the country, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has exceeded 3.1 million (3,125,570) since the 2021 coup, of which nearly two million were displaced in 2023 and 2024.

According to the BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor's records from 1 April 2022 to 31 March 2024, conflicts and related incidents have claimed nearly 20,000 deaths across the country, including junta soldiers, PDF members, and civilians.² This figure includes 14,739 soldiers, 1,058 PDF members, and 3,869 civilians.

Furthermore, over a period of more than two years, from 1 April 2022 and 31 May 2024, there were 160 events of mass killings of five or more people. These incidents occurred in 95 townships across 14 states and regions. Analysing these incidents by cause, 69 events of mass

¹ Military Regime's Airstrikes in Myanmar, BNI-MPM, 16 July 2024

² People's Défense Force Dashboard (Fatalities), BNI-MPM, 31 March 2024

killings were targeted arrests and killings of civilians, accounting for 43 percent of the total. The second most common cause was aerial bombings, resulting in 40 events of mass fatalities.

In summary, during 2023 and 2024, the peace process and peace path under the NCA have become virtually invisible. In the meantime, the military and political cooperation among resistance forces has strengthened, indicating a consolidation of the resistance forces aimed at ending the military dictatorship. However, it is notable that achieving a common political stance and goal among all revolutionary forces is becoming a crisis.

This book examines some key actors of the Spring Revolution after the military coup by examining the role of each grouping. It also presents, as far as possible, the focused actions taken by the United Nations, ASEAN, the European Union, and other foreign governments on the situation in Myanmar.

We believe that this book will serve as a guiding reference for individuals, organizations, researchers, students, youth, international organizations, and media personnel involved in or interested in the peace process as it reveals the current military, political, and peace landscape of today's Myanmar.



The year of the end of NCA-led peace process

The year of the end of NCA-led peace process

It could even be said that military-sponsored talks or the path towards a peace process, currently being pursued under the military leadership, has come to an end. Even some Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), typically participants in Nay Pyi Taw talks organized by the military, are hesitant to continue engaging in further discussions. This hesitation comes after it suffered significant losses in arms, ammunition, military positions, and territories due to offensives by resistance forces nationwide.

According to the BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor's Reference Guide (2022-2023), the choices made by EROs for the new landscape of the peace process have become more visible. While some groups continue to adhere to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), others believe that the military itself has nullified the NCA.

"Following the 2021 coup, the NCA is null and void. We can no longer proceed with the NCA to achieve peace in the country. Because there are only 10 NCA signatories. There are many groups outside the NCA. Now the PDFs and NUG have emerged after the 2021 coup. They cannot be completely neglected," said Ye Baw Salai Yaw Aung, ex-Central Executive Committee member of the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF).¹

¹ An interview with Ye Baw Salai Yaw Aung, CEC member of the ABSDF, BNI-MPM, 18 November 2022

Pado Saw Tardo Hmu, the General Secretary of the Karen National Union (KNU), stated, "We have no reasons to adhere to the NCA." He contends that the essence of the NCA lies in the fundamental principles of Chapter one, which, in his view, has been violated by the 2021 military coup.²

After the coup, the military has been weakened on all fronts, including military, political, and diplomacy. It has only invited EROs for "peace talks". The military seems determined to destroy the forces of the Spring Revolution, including the NUG which emerged in April 2021.

Military leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing said, "In accordance with the five-point roadmap set by the government, the Armed Forces will place emphasis on the safety of the socio-economic lives of the people throughout the country, and as well as ensuring the peace and stability and the full implementation of rule of law nationwide. In this regard, we will take decisive action against the NUG and terrorist organizations and any organization supporting them."³


On 31 January 2024, allied organizations comprising the KNU, KIO, KNPP, and NUG issued a joint position statement aimed at ending the military dictatorship and establishing a federal democratic union. The statement outlined objectives, goals, positions, and action plans. Notably, it emphasized a critical stance that "the military must be barred from participating in any future political processes," marking a significant aspect of the statement.

"The facts stated in this joint position statement reflect solid consensus among ethnic alliance groups - K3C, namely the KIO, KNU, KNPP, and CNF. We must continue our efforts to achieve unified

² "First 100 Days: KNU in New Era" press conference, KNU's facebook page, 10 October 2023

³ SAC chair threatens to take action against EAOs supporting the NUG and PDFs, RFA, 27 March 2023

agreement among ethnic alliance organizations. Among them, the role of 3BHA is crucial,” said the NUG Acting President Duwa Lashi La.⁴



In conjunction with "Operation 1027" launched by the 3 Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), the military has lost over 60 towns, numerous outposts and weapons in northern Shan State and other parts of the country. China's intervention slowed the momentum of resistance groups. It is evident that the military remains resolute in its campaign to suppress the PDFs/LDFs, as well as the NUG and the EROs that lead them.

As the military targets EROs to secure its power and facilitate an election as a political exit. But EROs, including the NUG, steadfastly oppose the military and are preparing to broaden the resistance to the coup. The aim is to bring an end to military dictatorship.

⁴ KIO included in the joint position statement, and the role of 3BHA is crucial, NUG Acting President says, Mizzima, 6 February 2024

Along with the NCA, the EROs which are members of the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) have transformed into an alliance, while still adhering to the NCA.

Therefore, the military's efforts at the peace process, adhering to the NCA, have come to an end. It must be acknowledged that a new landscape for the peace process, capable of putting an end to the decades-long civil wars, has yet to be envisioned.

Myanmar's peace process will witness a new landscape only when there is strong unity, harmony, cooperation, and mutual trust among all forces, including the NUG and EROs, to end military dictatorship and establish a federal democratic union.

Reviewing the peace process and dynamics under the NCA in 2023 and the first four months of 2024, it appears to mark the conclusion of the NCA peace process era.

Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC)		
Established	-	15-19 April 2017
Members	-	UWSP/UWSA, KIO/KIA, SSPP/SSA, MNTJP/MNDAA, NDAA/ESS, PSLF/TNLA, ULA/AA
Chairman (1)	-	U Bao Youxiang (UWSP/UWSA)
Chairman (2)	-	General N'Ban La (KIO/KIA)
Secretary	-	U Bao Youyi

On 15 and 16 March 2023, a meeting of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) took place in Panghsang, Wa State. All leaders from its seven member organizations attended the meeting, which concluded with the issuance of a seven-point statement.⁵

In the seven-point statement, it read “regarding Myanmar's internal affairs, we assume that the minority ethnic groups in border regions aim to establish a federal democratic union through comprehensive peace with the Bamar central plains. There are several ways to implement that assumption, but ultimately, we must rely on the strength and power of our ethnic minorities.” In addition, the statement welcomed and supported the intervention of the Chinese government to resolve the conflicts in Myanmar reflects the relationship between the FPNCC and China.

During Operation 1027 initiated by the 3BHA, members of the FPNCC saw the strength and ability of the ethnic minorities. The 3BHA captured 17 towns in northern Shan State. Even Hopang and Pan Lon were handed over to the United Wa State Party (UWSP), which is the chair of the FPNCC.

⁵ The statement on the meeting of FPNCC, Arakan Army, 16 March 2023

Although anti- and pro-military groups are included in the FPNCC, which has established a policy for all members to discuss together and seek alternative avenues outside the NCA. Mutual trust and understanding have been established among the members.

7 Ethnic Armed Organizations Alliance – 7 EAO Alliance

Established - 18 March 2024

Headquarters - Chiang Mai

General Secretary - Colonel Sai Ngin (RCSS)

Joint General Secretary - Colonel Saw Kyaw Nyunt (KPC)

Coordinator - U Myo Win

Representative groups - RSSS/SSA, NMSP, KPC, DKBA, LDU, ALP, PNLO

The Peace Process Steering Team (PPST), established on 26 March 2016, has not been officially dissolved, but the 7 Ethnic Armed Organizations Alliance (7 EAO Alliance) that signed the NCA was formed at a plenary meeting of the 7 EAOs.

The 7 EAO Alliance released a political statement, which outlines its aims to establish a federal democratic union equipped with democratic rights, full national equality and the right to self-determination. It aims to achieve durable peace through a process of federal democratic transition. It also stated that it will try to resolve the current political crisis in Myanmar through political means, advocating negotiations with relevant stakeholders until a federal democratic union is established.

General Yawd Serk, who chaired the plenary meeting of the 7 EAOs held from 17 to 19 March 2024, said: “We will initiate governance in our respective territories based on our self-determination. At the same

time, it is imperative for our seven groups to collaborate on common goals while maintaining autonomy in specific endeavors.”

Disagreements took place during the plenary meeting of the 7 EAOs.⁶ The Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) objected to the inclusion of the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) in the newly-formed 7 EAO Alliance.⁷ Therefore, it remains to be seen how the 7 EAO Alliance will be able to progress towards their goals and aspirations if internal fragmentation continues.

State Administration Council (SAC)

Chair	-	Senior General Min Aung Hlaing
Vice Chair	-	Vice-Senior General Soe Win
Secretary	-	Lt-Gen Aung Lin Dwe

The military, which forcibly seized power on 1 February 2021, extended a six-month state of emergency for the fifth time on 31 January 2024. After the extension, the military made numerous transfers, dismissals, and appointments within both the SAC and the union government under its control. The military is preparing to extend its unsuccessful coup attempt.

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing appointed himself as chair of the SAC and as prime minister. Finally, he even assumed the role of acting president, citing the poor health of Vice President Former General U Myint Swe, on 22 July 2024. Given these actions, it raises questions about whether there are indeed no people more trustworthy than Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.

⁶ PNLO leaders disagree about attending Chiang Mai meeting, RFA, 18 March 2024

⁷ LDU objects to the inclusion of the PNLO in Chiang Mai meeting, RFA, 19 March 2024

The newly-formed National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) chair Lt-Gen Yar Pyae was added as a member of the SAC on 1 February 2021. On 3 August 2023, Lt-Gen Yar Pyae who was appointed as the Union Minister for Government Office and the National Security Advisor to the SAC was transferred to the Union Home Affairs Ministry. Union Minister for Border Affairs Lt-Gen Tun Tun Naung has been appointed as the chair of the NSPNC, tasked with leading the crucial peace process—a cornerstone of the SAC's five-point roadmap.

The SAC has been unsuccessful in its efforts to kickstart the peace process under the NCA following the 2021 coup. The SAC engaged in informal discussions with seven EAOs that signed the NCA and three non-NCA signatories. However, these efforts have not curbed the escalation and geographic expansion of armed conflict across the nation, as these EAOs do not represent groups directly involved in armed conflict with the military.

The China-brokered ceasefire Haigeng Agreement signed by the 3BHA and the military on 11 January 2024 in northern Shan State broke down on 25 June 2024 as fighting resumed.

The new Spring Revolution actors to watch

Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw - CRPH

National Unity Consultative Council - NUCC

Transitional National Unity Government - T-NUG

Karenni State Consultative Council - KSCC

Pa-O National Federal Council - PNFC

Ta'ang Political Consultative Committee -TPCC

Mon State Federal Council - MSFC

Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team - KPICT

Interim Chin National Consultative Council - ICNCC

Chinland Council - CC

Chin Brotherhood - CB

Central Command and Coordination Committee – C3C

Three Brotherhood Alliance's "Operation 1027" grouping - 3BHA



The previous edition of the BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor's "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process - A Reference Guide (2022-2023)", focused on information about the groupings at the forefront of the Spring Revolution such as their positions, and goals as "the new actors after the military coup."

More than three years into the Spring Revolution, formation of alliances, priority activities and directional shifts of the resistance forces have expanded. In this edition, to the extent possible, we have presented the Spring Revolution actors to be watched in terms of their efforts to put pressure on the military junta through military and political means, as they work towards ending all forms of dictatorship and building a federal democratic union.

Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw – CRPH	
Established	- 5 February 2021
Chairman	- U Aung Kyi Nyunt
Secretariat members	- U Tun Myint, Daw Phyu Phyu Thin, Mai Lamin Tun
Members	- 20
Participating groupings	- Elected parliament representatives of NUCC
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/crph.official.mm
Website	- https://crphmyanmar.org/my/

On 5 March 2021, the CRPH announced four political objectives: ending the military dictatorship, freeing all detainees, including President and State Counsellor, achieving full democracy, abolishing the 2008 Constitution, and developing a new federal-based constitution.

On 31 March 2021, the committee declared the military council a terrorist group. It announced the removal of Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) from terrorist and unlawful association lists to ensure all ethnic groups can participate in building a future federal democratic nation. The CRPH went on to form the National Unity Government (NUG) on 16 April.

Currently, the committee operates with 11 sector-specific committees, including judicial affairs, federal affairs, security and defense, international relations, and National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) affairs, after reorganizing the information committee into a working group.

The committee has held six Union Parliament sessions after the 2021 coup, presenting and discussing reports from the NUG and other committees. In the statement released after the sixth session of the

Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Day 1) on 1 February 2024, the committee stated their commitment to working with political, revolutionary, and ethnic forces, as well as other groups with common goals, to achieve a swift revolution and political system change.

In 2023, the CRPH reported to the sixth session of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw that it had held up to 22 meetings with the various ministries under the NUG, while the CRPH's sector-specific committees organized 786 meetings with EROs and revolutionary forces.¹ CRPH's activities, as a member of the NUCC, remain an actor to be watched during the Spring Revolution.

National Unity Consultative Council- NUCC	
Established	- 8 March 2021
Sector-specific groupings	- 5
Member organizations	- 27
Special observers	- 1
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/nucc.federal
Website	- NUCC Myanmar/Burma (nucc-federal.org)

The NUCC, formed with the vision of building a peaceful federal democratic union guaranteeing freedom, justice, and equality, includes representatives from various groups such as the CRPH, elected parliamentarians, political party members, Spring Revolution forces, EROs, and Interim State/Federal Unit Councils.

Although the NUCC approved the Federal Democracy Charter on 30 March 2021, it drew criticisms for being incomplete. After further

¹ The report submitted by CRPH to six regular session of Union Parliament, CRPH, 1 February 2024

discussions, both parts of the Federal Democracy Charter were re-approved at the First People's Assembly in January 2022.

In April 2024, the second People's Assembly was held, where reports from the NUCC and NUG ministries were submitted, and representatives from various groupings presented reviews, proposals, and recommendations. On 9 April, after the assembly, 21 proposals and recommendations were released under the title "Recording proposals and recommendations to be implemented in accordance with the Federal Democracy Charter."

The proposals and recommendations, numbered from 1 to 5, include: Reviewing and reforming the NUCC and NUG to strengthen political leadership and improve policy in alignment with the revolution, and reporting to the Third People's Assembly; Engaging with all revolutionary forces and initiating discussions with political and revolutionary forces which are not yet part of the NUCC; Discussing the Form of State clearly; And setting fundamental policies for the emergence of new states, including a Bamar State.

The report also notably included a point warning the NUG to avoid repeat occurrences such as violations of the Federal Democracy Charter by issuing a China policy statement, joint political position statements, and forming the State/Federal Units Cooperation Commission (FSCC) without consulting the NUCC. It also recommends that the NUG strictly adheres to the provisions of the Federal Democracy Charter in carrying out political matters and respects the political leadership and check and balance mechanism of the NUCC.

The absence of CRPH and NUG representatives on the last day of the Second People's Assembly led to disagreements, revealing friction between groupings within the NUCC and its limited ability to maintain checks and balances over the NUG.

It remains to be seen whether the upcoming Third People's Assembly, agreed to be held every six months, will report to the public on political progress such as reviewing and reforming the NUCC and the NUG, while achieving political consensus among various forces.

Transitional National Unity Government - T-NUG	
Established	- 16 April 2021
President	- U Win Myint (Detained by military junta)
Vice-President (Acting President)	- Duwa Lashi La
State Counsellor	- Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (Detained by military junta)
Prime Minister	- Mahn Winn Khaing Than
Union Ministers	- 16
Deputy Union Ministers	- 17
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/NUGmyanmar
Website	- https://nugmyanmar.org/

The T-NUG is widely referred to as the National Unity Government (NUG). The NUG is responsible for implementing the political objectives, goals, and a political roadmap outlined in the Federal Democracy Charter. It has to work with partner political parties, EROs, and civil society organizations to implement the agenda set by the NUCC.²

The NUG has formed People's Administration Teams (PATs, known locally as Pa Ah Pha) in 173 townships across 7 regions and district-level PATs in 10 districts; People's Security Teams (PSTs, known locally as Pa La Pha) in 41 townships, and People's Police Forces in eight townships. In late 2023, the defense forces under the command of the NUG and allied

² Federal Democracy Charter, Part-2, Chapter-4, Para (20,21)

forces seized control of Maw Lu town in Indaw Township in Kawlin District, Shwe Pyi Aye town in Homalin Township, and Khampat town in Tamu District, Sagaing Region. It declared them as “seized territories” and established district coordination teams to manage defense, public security, public services, and humanitarian work.³

The NUG has reported to the sixth Pyidaungsu Hluttaw session conducted by the CRPH that is coordinating political and administrative processes for states/federal units through the State/Federal Units Cooperation Commission (FSCC); that the respective ministries, including the Alliance Relations Committee (ARC), are working together with various organizations representing the public, and all ethnic leaders. The year 2023 marked a turning point in the revolution, as it was the year when they were able to shift from a strategic defensive position to a strategic offensive position.

For the year 2024, the NUG has pledged to continue putting pressure on the military on multiple fronts and work in coordinated manner with the parliament, political parties representing the public, leaders working on the ground and organizations. The NUG's role has been crucial over the span of more than three years, facing both criticism and praise for its actions.

³ Report on the progress of the National Unity Government's operations and its plans for future continuation, which was submitted to the sixth regular session of the Union Parliament, CRPH, 2 February 2024

Karenni State Consultative Council- KSCC	
Established	- 9 April 2023
Members of Council	- 11
Executive members	- 7
Participating groupings	- Representative committees/organizations of interim state/federal units of NUCC
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100069442572761
Website	- kscc.karennistate.com - Home

The KSCC's political objectives and goals include abolishing the 2008 Constitution, eradicating all forms of dictatorship, adopting a state constitution, and building a federal democratic union. The KSCC was formed with the aim to coexist with other ethnic groups in a federal union with full national equality, justice, democracy, and self-determination. According to the “Interim Arrangements of Karenni State” released on 18 January 2022, which is set to remain in effect from the current revolutionary period until the end of dictatorship, the KSCC holds the highest political leadership role in Karenni State during the interim revolutionary period of federal union building.⁴

The KSCC formed the Interim Executive Council of Karenni State (IEC) on 6 June 2023 under its political leadership and policy guidelines.⁵ On 24 October 2023, the KSCC formed the Karenni State Transitional Constitution Drafting Committee with 15 members. After forming the Karenni State Interim Parliament with 15 parliamentary representatives from the National League for the Democracy (NLD) party, the Karenni

⁴ Interim arrangement of Karenni State, Page-4, KSCC, 18 January 2022

⁵ Introduction to the formation of IEC, KSCC, 12 June 2023

State Democratic Party and the Kayan National Party, the KSCC passed the Karenni State Police Law and Karenni State Interim Judiciary Law. The Karenni State Police, initially formed with over 300 Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) police officers. It now has 585 police officers operating 15 police stations and 10 police outposts across Karenni State and it is carrying out public security and law enforcement operations.⁶

On 11 November 2023, Karenni resistance and allied forces launched “Operation 1111” with the aim of ending all forms of dictatorship. The resistance forces that participated in the military operation were the Karenni Army (KA), the Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF), the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), the People's Defense Force-Demoso, the People's Defense Force-Loikaw, the People's Defense Force-Moebye, the People's Defense Force-Hpruso, United Resistance Force (URF) and battalions of the southern Shan State Sub-Regional Command and Karenni Sub-Regional Command of the Central Regional Command. In the border townships of Moebye and Pekon between Shan and Karenni States, a coalition of various forces is reportedly operating together. This includes battalions of the Tactical Operations Command 1 in southern Shan State such as 1001 (MB-1), 1002 (PK-1), 1006 (PK-2), 1007 (MB-2), and 1004 (PKS PDF); battalions of the Tactical Operations Command 2 in southern Shan State such as Battalions 1003, 1005, 1008, 1009-2 and 1011; and battalions of the KNDF's Tactical Operations Command 1 such as KNDF BO-3, KNDF BO-11, KNDF BO-22; and the URF.⁷

⁶ By 2024, Karenni State Police Department is expected to have 1,000 policemen, Kantarawaddy Times, 6 June 2024

⁷ Operation 1111, battle to capture Loikaw, significant events, WNR-Issue 131 BNI-MPM

On 21 June 2024 – the 149th Karenni National Day - the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) announced that Karenni resistance forces had taken more than 90 percent of Karenni State. Under the Karenni State interim arrangement, the KSCC, under the interim arrangements, formed the Karenni State Interim Parliament (KSIP), Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC) and Karenni State Interim Judiciary (KSIJ) and is working with other political forces and parties towards ending all forms of dictatorship and building a federal democratic union.⁸

Observers note that the military and political cooperation among revolutionary forces in Karenni State throughout the Spring Revolution serves as a valuable lesson and example for revolutionary forces in other states and regions.

Pa-O National Federal Council- PNFC	
Established	- 11 December 2021
Chairman	- Khun Myint Tun
Members of council	- 15
Participating groupings	- Representative committees/organizations of interim state/federal units of NUCC
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/Paonationalfederalcouncilpnfc

The PNFC was formed at the Pa-O National Federal Conference held on the 72nd Revolution Day. The PNFC has stated that it will cooperate with the multi-ethnic public to end all forms of dictatorship, protect

⁸ NUG expresses wish for quickest establishment of Karenni State; KNPP claims 90 percent of state under control, DVB, 21 June 2024

people's lives and property, defend against human rights violations and destruction of land and natural resources, and work towards building a federal democratic system guaranteeing equality, self-determination, and the emergence of new states.

During the first plenary meeting of the PNFC from 7 to 11 February 2024, the organization's constitution was provisionally approved. Discussions included issues concerning internally displaced persons (IDPs), including women and children, how to stop Pa-O people from being used as human shields by the military, preventing conflict between Pa-O people, and efforts to promote unity not only between Kham Dom and Kham KOUNG but also among all Pa-O peoples,

The conference established a joint military coordination committee between the Pa-O People's Defense Force-Kham Dom (PPDF-KD) Cantonment Area 1 and 2, which fully accept PNFC's political leadership, and the Pa-O National Defense Force-Kham KOUNG (PNDF-KK) Cantonment Area 3. The plenary meeting announced their commitment to end all forms of military dictatorship with other forces in the Spring Revolution.⁹

On the other hand, the PNFC welcomed the military actions taken by the Pa-O National Liberation Organization/ Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLO/PNLA), a signatory to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), against the military. The PNFC also stated that it would cooperate with the PNLO/PNLA.

During the Spring Revolution, which aimed to end the military dictatorship and build a federal democratic union, the PNFC's political engagement can be described as active. However, the status of military integration remains to be observed.

⁹ Statement of 1st PNFC's plenary meeting, PNFC, 12 February 2024

Ta'ang Political Consultative Committee-TPCC	
Established	- 25 March 2021
Members of committee - 15	
General secretary	- Mai Naing Gawng Jar(aka)Mai Naing Aung Moe
Participating groupings - Representative committees/organizations of interim state/federal units of NUCC	
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100072494673782

The TPCC was formed in February and March 2021 after discussions among Ta'ang political forces to represent the Ta'ang people's political leadership role. The TPCC aims to work with all partner organizations to end all forms of military dictatorship, liberate the Ta'ang people from oppression, and build a federal democratic union with full ethnic equality and self-determination.¹⁰

As part of its agenda, the TPCC has established the Ta'ang Region Administration in accordance with CRPH guidelines. In addition, the TPCC led workshops on the federal charter and state constitution in Namhkan, Muse, Manton, Namhsan, Namtu, Kyaukme, Nam Hpat Kar, Mongngawt and Kutkai Townships to gather recommendations and amendments for the state constitution (third draft).

The Ta'ang State Constitution (Third Draft) was approved at the Federal and Constitutional Seminar – Ta'ang State held from 11-12 March 2023. The seminar, organized by the TPCC, was attended by over 150 people from civil society organizations, political parties and EROs. As for the first and second drafts, the former was passed at the

¹⁰ Statement by Ta'ang Political Consultative Committee, No.01/2021, <http://rb.gy/1dgt1>

semiannual meeting of the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) Central Committee in 2015 and the latter was passed by the TPCC in May 2021.¹¹

With the launch of “Operation 1027” on 27 October 2023, the PSLF/TNLA’s role has become militarily very strong in their struggle to liberate the Ta’ang region. At the same time, it remains to be seen whether the PSLF/TNLA’s political capabilities regarding state-building and leadership for the people in the Ta'ang region will become more prominent alongside the TPCC.

Mon State Federal Council- MSFC	
Established	- February 2021
Members of council	- 25
Participating groupings	- Representative committees/organizations of interim state/federal units of NUCC
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/monstatefederalcouncil
Website	- MSFC – Mon State Federal Council (msfc-mon.org)

On 15 January 2023, the Mon State Interim Coordinating Committee (MSICC) was reformed as the Mon State Federal Council (MSFC) with the aim of becoming a federal state unit. During the first MSFC conference, the political objectives, political roadmap, and constitution of the MSFC were approved. They also established measures for uniting anti-dictatorship forces in Mon State opposing during the revolutionary

¹¹ The third draft of the Constitution of Ta'ang State, BNI, 15 March 2023

interim period and for implementing legislative, judicial, and administrative arrangements.¹²

In April 2024, the MSFC, Mon State Revolutionary Force (MSRF), and Mon State Defense Force (MSDF) met and agreed to collaborate in fighting against all forms of dictatorship, and to achieve unity among Mon political and revolutionary forces.¹³ Moreover, on 22 April, the MSFC met with the New Mon State Party- Anti-Dictatorship (NMSP-AD), a splinter group from the New Mon State Party (NMSP), and reached agreement on cooperation in political, military, social relief, and other sectors.¹⁴

To sum up, the military cooperation agreements between the MSFC, MSRF, MSDF, and NMSP-AD has manifested the revolutionary strength of forces in Mon State. The MSRF has also pledged to fight alongside various allied forces in the Mon State, including All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF) Battalion 1, Dawna Column, Ye Guerrilla Force, Dawna Company 3 - (YGF), Ye Air Force (YAF), Mon State Revolutionary Organization (MSRO), and Ye Defense Force (YDF), to end military dictatorship, and the military regime in a coordinated manner.¹⁵

Looking at the revolutionary momentum of the forces operating in Mon State, military cooperation appears more vigorous, while political and administrative cooperation remains to be observed.

¹² Mon State Federal Council Conference (First) Statement, MSICC, 22 January 2023
<http://rb.gy/2vh0d>

¹³ Statement about the agreement between MSFC, MSRF and MSDF, MSDF, 7 April 2024

¹⁴ Statement about the meeting between (NMSP – AD) and MSFC, MSFC, 23 April 2024

¹⁵ Allied forces make pledge to fight junta, MSRF, 2 December 2023

Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team- KPICT	
Established	- 11 March 2021
Secretary	- Gum Sam Nsang
Members	- 5
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/KachinPICT

The KPICT was formed with the objectives "to affirm that sovereignty derives from the people, to completely eradicate the dictatorship and build a genuine federal democratic union, and to collaborate with domestic and international organizations that share the same political goals."

According to the "Interim Agreement" signed between the CRPH and the KPICT on 27 May 2021, both parties will coordinate on matters related to forming an interim government in Kachin State during the interim period. They will also continue to implement the verbal agreements made between the two parties.¹⁶

In July 2022, the KPICT suspended its permanent membership in the NUCC, citing reasons such as the need to revisit some points regarding the definition of terms in the Federal Democracy Charter and the necessity to consult with the Kachin people.¹⁷ However, some KPICT representatives continue to participate in the NUG, and according to KPICT Secretary Gum Sam Nsang, they will rejoin the NUCC when ready.

On 16 April 2024, in a message commemorating the NUG's third anniversary, the KPICT acknowledged the NUG's work during the three-year revolutionary period and pledged to continue collaborating with

¹⁶ The KIO/KIA: Political Unknowns, Issue 144, BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor, 13 May 2024

¹⁷ An interview with KPICT Secretary Salang Nsang Gum San, DVB, 12 July 2022

the NUG on behalf of all people residing in Kachin State until the military dictatorship is overthrown.¹⁸ Despite KPICT's suspension from the NUCC, the relationship between the CRPH, NUG, and KPICT appears to remain strong. Observing whether the KPICT's political movements become more visible in 2024 is worthwhile.

Interim Chin National Consultative Council – ICNCC	
Established	- 13 April 2021
Participating groupings	- Committees representing NUCC's interim state/federal units
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61558259765374

The ICNCC was formed as a Chin national political grouping during the Spring Revolution to work towards ending the military dictatorship, establishing a federal democratic union, and building Chin State. The committee has collaborated with the NUCC and NUG, along with other states, federal units, and revolutionary organizations. It also participated in the drafting and approval of the Federal Democracy Charter.

In April 2023, it was agreed to reform the ICNCC to strengthen the revolution and provide more practical leadership on the ground. In early 2024, a reform committee was formed to review and revise the Chin Charter through representatives from each township, with plans to restructure ICNCC's organization, leadership, and responsibilities.¹⁹

¹⁸ The message sent to the 3rd anniversary of the formation of the NUG, KPICT, 16 April 2024

¹⁹ ICNCC rotating chair Dr. Kenton Linn, Khonumthung, 22 January 2024

The ICNCC, originally formed by some elected Chin parliamentary representatives from the 2020 general election, and the Chin National Front (CNF), experienced a decline in unity after CNF's withdrawal on 4 April 2023. Subsequently, the Chinland Council emerged, led by the CNF leader as its chair, which later evolved into the Chinland Government. The ICNCC opposed and rejected this development. The ICNCC claims that after the emergence of the Chinland Council, disunity among Chin people and conflicts between Chin armed groups worsened.²⁰

The Chin Brotherhood, formed in the first week of December 2023, continues to follow ICNCC's political direction, while military chief of the Chinland Defense Force – Mindat, a member of the Chin Brotherhood, serves as the chairman of the Chin Defense Committee established by the ICNCC. This committee is said to be open to collaborating with any group fighting in the revolution.²¹

In summary, the ICNCC, which emerged at the beginning of the Spring Revolution, has experienced a breakdown in unity among its constituent groupings over three years. Now, with its remaining strength, the ICNCC is striving for reform and reorganization. Whether it can regain its position as a political leadership representing the entire Chin State and all Chin people remains to be seen.

²⁰ ICNCC opposes formation of Chinland Council and Chinland Government, Khonumthung, 3 February 2024

²¹ ICNCC rotating chair Dr. Kenton Linn, Khonumthung, 22 January 2024

Chinland Council	- CC
Established	- 6 December 2023
Chairman	- Pu Zing Cung
Secretary	- Salai Paul
Participating groupings	- 3
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61554240905507

The first Chinland Council Conference was held from 4-7 December 2023, in Chinlung town, where the headquarters of the Chin National Front (CNF) is located. Representatives from the CNF, representatives from Chin parliamentary grouping, and representatives from township and regional grouping attended. On 6 December, the conference approved the Chinland Constitution and established the Chinland Council.

The Chinland Council aims to build a Chinland that guarantees political and national equality, construct a federal union that guarantees political and national equality, and establish a democratic system.

On 1 February 2024, the council formed the Chinland Government with 14 ministries, the Chinland Supreme Court, and the Chinland Auditor General. It continued to establish the Chinland Parliament with 15 elected representatives on 2 February. The Chinland Government plans to cooperate with federal unit governments, including the NUG, and build partnerships with international organizations, including the United Nations (UN), regional organizations, and neighboring countries' governments.²²

²²The statement released by Chinland government (1/2024), Chinland Council, 3 February 2024

On 17 May 2024, an online meeting was held between the State/Federal Units Cooperation Commission (FSCC) and the Chinland Council. Attendees included FSCC Chairman Acting President Duwa Lashi La, Vice-Chairman Union Prime Minister Mahn Win Khaing Than, and FSCC members. After the meeting, both sides agreed on four work plans for cooperation.

The formation of the Chinland Council emerged amidst disputes and frictions between military and political forces within Chin State. There are concerns about potential armed conflicts with other resistance forces in Chin State not participating in the council. The future dynamics of the Chinland Council in the military and political landscape of Chin State remains a situation to be closely monitored.

Chin Brotherhood	- CB
Established	- 30 December 2024
Participating groupings	- CNO/CNDF, ZFU/PDF – Zoland, CNC – Mindat/CDF–Mindat, Maraland Territorial Council/MDF, Chinland Defense Force-Kanpetlet
Facebook	- https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61558228563337

The Chin Brotherhood was formed to collaborate on political and military matters concerning Chin State and Chin national affairs. They have declared their commitment to work with any organization or individual who shares their values of justice, equality, and self-determination. Their goal is to completely eradicate the military dictatorship and establish a government based on a federal democratic system, focusing on both Chin national interests and Union affairs.

In 2024, with the military objective of clearing the presence of the military from Chin State, the Chin Brotherhood launched “Operation CB” on 9 June 2024. They captured Matupi town on 29 June. During the battle for Matupi, the Chin Brotherhood was joined by allied forces including the Arakan Army (AA), the Yaw Army (YA), and the Yaw Defense Force (YDF). On the evening of 29 April, the Chin Brotherhood and allied forces also captured Kyin Dway town in Kanpetlet Township.²³

The Chin Brotherhood is militarily cooperating with regional allied forces, including the AA, while politically aligning with the ICNCC. However, they do not recognize the Chinland Council led by the CNF leader. There have been armed conflicts between the Chin Brotherhood and CNF-led forces in Chin State.

In the military and political landscape of Chin State, the Chin Brotherhood's role is becoming increasingly prominent with their military operations leading to the capture of military camps and towns, making it an actor which is worth monitoring.

²³ Chin resistance forces say Kyin Dway town has been captured, RFA, 30 April 2024

Central Command and Coordination Committee – C3C	
Established	- September 2021
Top commander of a regional command	- Regional military commander (Top military officials from allied EROs serve as regional military commanders for their respective regions)
Participating groupings	- KIO/KIA , KNU/KNLA, KNPP/KA , CNF/CNA , NUG
Military collaborations	- Collaborative activities of armed resistance forces according to military regions and territories, including ABSDF and BPLA.

The C3C was formed with the NUG Ministry of Defense and four allied EROs. These four EROs include the KIO/KIA, KNU/KNLA, KNPP/KA, and CNF/CNA, also known as K3C. Therefore, it's understood that the Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) was established between the K3C and NUG. The K3C includes political and military decision-makers from member organizations, such as chairpersons and commanders-in-chief. The NUG is represented by the Union Minister and Deputy Minister of Defense, and the Union Minister of Home Affairs and Immigration.

In the armed resistance against the military, the country is divided into three "military regions." Military Region 1 includes Kachin, Sagaing, Chin, Shan (North), Magway, and Mandalay, covering northern and western Myanmar, with the KIA Commander-in-Chief serving as the regional commander. Military Region 2 includes Karen, Karenni, Mon, Tanintharyi, Ayeyarwady, Yangon, and Bago, covering southern Myanmar. Military Region 3 covers central Myanmar, including Nay Pyi Taw and surrounding areas.

Later, Military Region 2 and 3 were combined to form the "Southern Military Region." Within this region, the KNU, KNPP, and NUG formed the Joint Coordination Committee (J2C) and Joint Operation Command (JOC), involving key political and military figures from member organizations. The J2C sets political and military strategies and policies, while Joint Operation Command (JOC) handles ground-level military coordination and operations.²⁴

In the context of the armed resistance against military dictatorship and for federal democracy, the role of the C3C can be seen as the highest level of military collaboration. However, there are still other ethnic armed resistance forces and urban resistance groups not yet included in C3C. For instance, the Mandalay People's Defense Force (MDY-PDF), a battalion under NUG, is participating in the "Operation 1027" launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance in northern Shan State. Therefore, the direction of the C3C alliance and that of the 3BHA do not seem to be significantly different at present.

In the "joint statement of forces fighting together to end military dictatorship and build a federal democratic union" issued on 31 January 2024, NUG Acting President Duwa Lashi La mentioned the K3C's involvement. Therefore, the military momentum and strategic military operations of C3C, as a collaboration between K3C and NUG, are worth watching.

²⁴ National Unity Government, Ministry of Defense, State of People's Defense, Page-37-38, 28 May 2023

Three Brotherhood Alliance's "Operation 1027" grouping- 3BHA	
Start date of operation - 27 October 2023	
Leading groups	- MNDAA, TNLA, AA
Participating groups	- BPLA, PLA, KNDF, MDY-PDF, DPLA, BNRA, YDF
Telegram	- https://t.me/threebrotherhoodalliance

The 3BHA stated that "Operation 1027" was launched with the following objectives: to protect people's lives and property, enable self-defense, increase control over their territories, deter the military's airstrikes and artillery attacks, root out the military dictatorship, eliminate online gambling fraud along the China-Myanmar border, and suppress the military and pro-military militias involved in operating online gambling (Kyar Phyant) companies.

A notable aspect of "Operation 1027" is the participation of Spring Revolution resistance forces, under the leadership of the 3BH, such as the Bamar People's Liberation Army (BPLA), the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the Mandalay People's Defense Force (MDY-PDF), which is under the NUG.

A temporary ceasefire was reached in northern Shan State under the Haigeng Agreement brokered by the Chinese government. The 3BHA captured 16 towns in northern Shan State. It also seized a large amount of military equipment between 27 October 2023 and 10 January 2024. On 25 June 2024, fighting resumed in Naungcho and Kyaukme townships of northern Shan State, effectively breaking the Haigeng Agreement.

Since the launch of the "Second Wave of Operation 1027," areas in northern Shan State such as Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Nawngkhio, Momeik, Lashio, as well as townships in Mandalay Region such as Pyin Oo Lwin, Mogok, Madaya, and Singu have become battlegrounds where the

MNDAA, the TNLA, the MDY-PDF and other local resistance forces carry out offensives against the military. In addition, the Danu People Liberation Army (DPLA) and Northern Shan State Alliance Army (NSSAA) have also joined, fighting alongside the TNLA.

"Operation 1027," led by the 3BHA has demonstrated revolutionary strength characterizing "unity, solidarity, and cooperation." It has been crucial not only for the Spring Revolution forces but also for EROs and the people of Myanmar seeking liberation from military dictatorship.

The momentum of the second round of "Operation 1027" or the "Second Wave of Operation 1027" and how far it will spread across Myanmar is something to watch closely.



A year of

escalating intensity
and an expanding
scope of conflict

A year of escalating intensity and an expanding scope of conflict

In the more than 40 months which have elapsed from 1 February 2021 to 31 March 2024, following the military coup, a total of 4,318 conflict events have occurred across Myanmar. Of the country's 330 townships, armed clashes took place in 222 of them, meaning that the scope of armed conflict has expanded to over 67 percent of the country.

According to the BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor's records, there were 1,781 armed clash events across the country over the one-year period from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, which is 232 events up from the corresponding period in the previous year.




Looking at the monthly breakdown of conflict events over the one-year period from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, March 2024 saw the highest number of events with 195, followed by February 2024 with 189. Notably, the months in 2024 each recorded more than 150 conflict events.

This chart shows the number of armed clash events per month between MA and PDFs, Ma and EROs, Between EROs



Over the one-year period, the highest number of armed conflict events, 908, occurred between the military and the EROs. The second highest number of events, 853, occurred between the military and PDFs/LDFs. There were also 20 clash events between EROs.

Regionally, Sagaing Region, where most of the PDFs/LDFs are based, saw most clash events with 372. Shan State had the second highest number of events with 227, followed by Kachin State with 186.



According to the BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor's findings, cooperation between the resistance forces in military operations significantly increased during 2023-2024. The MPM also observed that the military was expanding its battle fronts throughout the country. It can be observed that the EROs and revolutionary forces aiming to end the military dictatorship were able to exert immense pressure on the military.

The revolutionary call of 7 September 2021 for a nationwide armed resistance has now turned into an offensive against the military in 2023. More offensive attacks on the military were observed after "Operation 1027", which began on 27 October 2023, and in early 2024.


While the military's ground and air offensive capabilities have visibly diminished across Myanmar, there have been instances of internal friction and territorial disputes between certain EROs as the armed conflict landscape expands.

It is crucial that the revolutionary forces striving to end all forms of dictatorship and build a federal democratic union seek greater military cooperation, political understanding, and trust. However, the overall military intensity across Myanmar is expected to remain high.


(As Myanmar Peace Monitor records armed clash events as one event per day by township, the actual number of armed clashes may be higher.)

Armed clash events by year (January 2020 - June 2024)


January 2020-December 2020




January 2021-December 2021





January 2022-December 2022




January 2023-December 2023



January 2024-June 2024





With the escalation
of armed conflict,
a rising death toll
across the country

With the escalation of armed conflict, a rising death toll across the country

According to the BNI – MPM records, during the two years from 1 April 2022 and 31 March 2024, the number of military soldiers, PDF members and civilians killed by armed conflict, and subsequent events, reached nearly 20,000.¹ The death toll included 14,739 military soldiers, 1,058 PDF members and 3,869 civilians.


Military soldier deaths

The deaths of military soldiers, primarily resulting from clashes between two armed groups, constitute over 79 percent of the total.

As a significant event, between 2 and 7 December 2023, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and its allied forces launched an attack on military camps in

Mone, Kyaukkyi Township, resulting in the deaths of 120 soldiers.²

Mine attacks, which resulted in the second-highest number of soldiers killed, comprised more than 12 percent of the total fatalities. Additionally, fatalities among soldiers from other causes accounted for nearly nine percent of the total deaths.




¹ People's Defense Force Dashboard (Fatalities), BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor, 31 March 2024

² 120 junta soldiers killed in Mone battle, KNU says, Myitkyina News Journal, 9 December 2023

Looking at the deaths of soldiers by region and state, Sagaing Region recorded the highest death toll with 4,730, followed by Magway Region with 1,528. Soldiers were killed in Bago, Karen, Chin, Tanintharyi, Mon, Shan, Karenni, Mandalay, Kachin, Arakan, Yangon, Ayeyarwaddy and Nay Pyi Taw.



Reviewing the deaths of soldiers by month over two years from 1 April 2022 to 31 March 2024, July 2022 had the highest death toll with 981. On average, approximately 614 soldiers died each month during this period.



PDF member deaths

The majority of PDF members who died as a result of clashes between the both armed groups, account for nearly 75 percent of the total fatalities. Armed conflict and associated skirmishes led to the second-highest number of fatalities among the PDF, comprising over 17 percent of the total. As a significant event, the military massacred 25 PDF members near Chay Yar Taw village in Myinmu Township on 22 September 2023.³

³ At least 25 PDF members massacred in Myinmu, RFA, 23 September 2023




Additionally, deaths of PDF members due to other causes accounted for nearly eight percent. Looking at the deaths of PDF members by regions and states, Sagaing Region saw the highest toll, with 466, followed by Magway Region with 126.

Deaths of PDF members were also reported in Chin, Shan, Karenni, Tanintharyi, Bago, Karen, Mandalay, Mon, Kachin, Yangon, Ayeyarwady and Nay Pyi Taw.

Reviewing the deaths of PDF members by month from 1 April 2022 to 31 March 2024, April 2023 recorded the highest number of PDF deaths with 73. On average, approximately 44 PDF members died each month during this period.

Civilian deaths

Violence against civilians constituted over 45 percent of civilian deaths, with airstrikes accounting for nearly 18 percent of the total. As a significant event, the airstrike on Pa Zi Gyi village in Kanbalu Township of Sagaing Region resulted in the deaths of 168 people. Among them, 18 were members of the PDF and the People's Administration, while the remaining 90 percent were civilians.⁴



The civilian death toll from artillery shelling accounts for nearly 13 percent while the civilian death toll from armed clashes between the two armed groups accounts for nearly 13 percent. The civilian death toll from other causes constitutes nearly 11 percent.

Sagaing Region recorded the highest number of civilian deaths among regions and states, with 1,100 fatalities, followed by Shan State with 393. The civilian deaths were also reported in Kachin, Mandalay, Arakan, Bago, Tanintharyi, Magway, Karen, Yangon, Mon, Chin, Karenni, Ayeyarwady and Nay Pyi Taw.

⁴ Among those killed in an attack on Pazigy village are 18 members of People's Security Team and People's Administration Team. Most of victims are civilians, Mizzima, 16 April 2023

Looking at civilian deaths by month over a two-year period from 1 April 2022 to 31 March 2024, April had the highest number of civilian deaths with 271. On average, 161 people died each month during this period.

Findings

The one-year period from April 2023 to March 2024, is considered the peak period of armed conflict throughout Myanmar. During this period, there was a significant decline in the military's ground forces, accompanied by frequent losses of camps and territories.

Subsequently, as the area of armed conflict expands across the country, there is also an increasing number of soldier deaths among the armed forces directly engaged in the conflict. Similarly, the survival and security of the civilian population in the conflict areas is also in a very critical situation.

In any case, Myanmar will continue to experience armed conflict that results in the death of military soldiers, PDF members, and civilians.




Increasing IDP numbers

Increasing IDP numbers

From 1 February 2021 to 25 May 2024, Myanmar witnessed over three million (3,076,250) internally displaced persons (IDPs) across the country. In 2023, Myanmar recorded the highest number of IDPs. The figures show over 250,000 IDPs in 2021, nearly 900,000 in 2022, and over 500,000 within the first five months of 2024.¹

The number of IDPs by year following the coup
(1 February 2021 - 25 May 2024)



Given that the highest number of IDPs was recorded in 2023, during which the resistance forces shifted from defensive to offensive tactics with the goal of ending all forms of military dictatorship. As conflict zones have expanded, the security and survival of the civilian population is under threat.

¹ Internally Displaced Persons Situation in Myanmar, BNI-MPM, 28 May 2024

According to BNI-MPM findings, it is evident that most displacement cases were caused by military raids on villages, the use of light and heavy weapons, as well as airstrikes. Additionally, there are incidents where civilians have had to flee due to clashes between the military and resistance forces.

Region and State	Number of IDPs
Sagaing	1373750
Bago (East)	360328
Magway	278400
Kayin	274532
Kayah	156277
Shan (South)	147344
Tanintharyi	104240
Mon	101750
Chin	81590
Shan (North)	62809
Kachin	57190
Mandalay	45900
Rakhine	26540
Bago (West)	5600
Grand Total	3076250

Looking at the IDPs across Myanmar by region, Sagaing Region has the highest number with over 1.3 million, while Bago Region (East), Magway Region, Karen State, Karenni (Kayah) State, Shan State (South), Tanintharyi Region and Mon State, have each seen hundreds of thousands of IDPs.

Between June and August 2024, 2.7 million people are projected to face emergency levels of acute food insecurity, the World Food Program (WFP) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have reported.

According to their joint statement released on 5 June 2024, with the military conflict in Myanmar intensifying, the number of people fleeing their homes is increasing daily, while access to food and aid is becoming increasingly limited. By 2024, around three million people in Myanmar may face food shortages, it warned.² According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) on 4 March, there are 18.6 million people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance across Myanmar, which is about one third of the country's total population.³

As resistance and revolutionary efforts to eliminate the military dictatorship have gained momentum, the conflict zone gradually expands. It must be acknowledged that the safe havens for Myanmar people fleeing from the military have become increasingly limited,

² Around 3 million people in Myanmar may face food shortages, RFA, 5 June 2024

³ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), March 2024 <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-36-3-march-2024>,

despite frequent captures of camps and towns by resistance forces. It is crucial to provide tangible assistance to both victims of war, who are facing dwindling safe havens, and the displaced civilian population who have fled their homes.

The issue of the civilian population fleeing from their homes is a matter that must be addressed seriously by various revolutionary forces, including the NUG. International organizations, including the UN, should urgently explore ways to provide direct emergency humanitarian assistance to those in need.




Military airstrikes

Military airstrikes

According to the BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor records, there were as many as 973 airstrike events carried out by the military across the country over a period of more than three years, from 1 February 2021 to 31 March 2024.

Looking at these airstrike events, March 2024 saw the highest number, followed by February 2024 with the second highest number.

Airstrike Events By Month




BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor has categorized these airstrike events into three main categories: Attacks on civilians, attacks on the PDFs/LDFs, and attacks on EROs.

According to the findings, the attacks targeted civilian areas such as towns, villages, and wards, as well as schools, hospitals, clinics, and IDP camps. This accounts for almost 40 percent of all airstrike events, making it the most frequent target of airstrikes.

Incidents such as the bombing of Pa Zi Gyi village in Kanbalu Township, Sagaing Region, and the incident in ANang Pa area in Bhamo Township, Kachin State, in which civilians were killed en masse, indicate deliberate aerial attacks on civilians by the military. In addition, around 40 percent of the aerial attacks targeted territory under the control of EROs.

The military carried out airstrikes on the areas controlled by the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA), the Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA), the Pa-O National Liberation Organization/Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLO/PNLA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Northern Alliance-Burma (NA-B), the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF), the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), and the Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF). Of these, the KNU/KNLA and KIO/KIA were the most affected by the aerial attacks.




Attacks on the PDFs/LDFs, which have emerged after the 2021 military coup, accounted for over 20 percent of all airstrike events. This indicates that the military has primarily targeted civilians across the country who support the PDFs/LDFs and EROs.

Sagaing Region, where armed resistance is strong, was most affected by airstrikes with 205 events. This is followed by Karen State with the second highest at 147 events. Arakan State, Kachin State, Karenni (Kayah) State, Shan State, Chin State, Bago Region, Magway Region, Mon State,

Tanintharyi Region, Mandalay Region, and Nay Pyi Taw Council Area were also targeted by aerial strikes. Notably, Yangon and Ayeyarwady were the only regions that did not experience aerial attacks by the military following the coup.


The Spring Revolution's armed resistance is growing throughout the country and the military's ground forces appear to be losing strength, as proven by the increased use of airstrikes. Although the revolutionary forces, bolstered by public support, may not yet have adequate defense against the military's aerial threat, they should prepare to vigilantly evade the indiscriminate bombings and airstrikes. The UN and

Airstrike Events By State and Region



international governments should also make concerted efforts to stop the military's aerial attacks and bombings.

(Note: As BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor records the airstrike events as one event per day by region, the actual number of airstrikes may be higher.)



A year with
more interest-based
talks than
conflict resolution



A year with more interest-based talks than conflict resolution

The meetings documented by BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor cover those that took place between April 2023 and March 2024. Very few peace-focused talks happened during the one-year period of documentation.

The talks include those that took place between EROs and the military, between EROs and international delegations, and between the military junta and international delegations.

Meetings between EROs and the military

On 18 March, during a two-day plenary meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, seven EAOs that had signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) formed a new alliance called the "7 Ethnic Armed Organizations Alliance" (7 EAO Alliance).

The 7 EAO Alliance appointed General Yawd Serk, the chair of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), as its leader, and Nai Aung Min, the vice chair of the New Mon State Party (NMSP), as its deputy leader. A secretariat team was also formed with one representative from each armed group to implement the set objectives.¹

Colonel Saw Kyaw Nyunt of the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC), who serves as the joint secretary of the 7 EAO Alliance, said that the purpose of forming the alliance is to strive for a political solution through inclusive dialogue, and to focus on protecting civilians and providing humanitarian assistance.

During the observation period, there were two meetings between five ceasefire-signatory EROs and the military's National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC). Two meetings took place between the seven ceasefire-signatory EROs and the military. These meetings were about the peace conference and the general elections that the military wanted to hold rather than the implementation of the peace process.

On 26 June, representatives from five NCA-signatory EROs - the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the KNU/KNLA-PC, the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), and the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) - met with the NSPNC in Nay Pyi Taw and discussed holding a peace conference.²

¹ Why did NCA signatories reorganize as "7 EAO Alliance", Shan News, 20 March 2024

² Junta meets with five ceasefire groups to discuss holding peace conference, DVB, 27 June 2023

Representatives of the NMSP- one of the NCA signatories- met with the military council's peace negotiation team in Nay Pyi Taw on 5 July. The meeting continued until 6 June but the details of their discussions were not disclosed.³



The RCSS and the NSPNC met on 12 July

Similarly, the RCSS/SSA met with the NSPNC in Nay Pyi Taw on 11 July 2023 and discussed holding a peace conference and amending the 2008 Constitution.⁴ They met again on 21 September and discussed holding elections in areas controlled by EAOs.⁵

³ NMSP and junta's peace negotiation team meet, Mon News Agency, 6 July 2023

⁴ RCSS and NSPNC meet in Nay Pyi Taw to discuss holding peace conference, Shan News, 12 July 2023

⁵ RCSS and NSPNC discuss holding elections in areas under armed groups' control, CNI, 21 September 2023



On 22 March 2023, the SAC's peace team met with the UWSA, the NDAA and the SSPP.

On 22 March, the NSPNC met with powerful northern ethnic armed groups - the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP)- in Nay Pyi Taw to discuss regional development, stability, holding general elections, organizing a peace conference, and amending key sections of the 2008 Constitution.⁶

After the "7 EAO Alliance" reorganized, the seven NCA-signatories met with the NSPNC in Nay Pyi Taw on 29 March 2024 and discussed ending armed conflicts.

China-brokered meetings in Kunming

The year 2023 was a remarkable year for the EROs. It was the year when resistance forces fighting against all forms of military dictatorship were able to shift from defensive resistance to offensive operations against the military.

⁶ NSPNC discusses holding elections with UWSA, SSPP, NDAA, CNI, 22 March 2023

During 2023, the EROs notably launched major "military operations," frequently capturing camps and towns.

Launched by the 3BHA, comprising the TNLA, the MNDAA, and the AA, on 27 October 2023, "Operation 1027" culminated in the capture of 15 townships and nearly 400 military bases and outposts in northern Shan State.

This included the capture of towns such as Chinshwehaw, Kunlong, Mone Koe, Kyu Koke (Pang Hseng), Konkyan, and Theinni by the MNDAA, the AA, and forces such as the KNDF, the PLA, and the BPLA. The UWSA took over Hopang and Pan Lon towns. The TNLA and its allies captured towns in the Ta'ang region such as Namhsan and Mantong, as well as border towns including Namkham, Kutkai, Monglon, Mongngawt, and Namtu.⁷

The Chinese government became concerned about developments during "Operation 1027," which saw the 3BHA capture major border towns crucial for China-Myanmar trade and hundreds of military bases and outposts. China then intervened as a mediator.

Through the mediation of the Chinese government, the military and the 3BHA met for two days on 10 and 11 January 2024, in Kunming, China. They agreed to a temporary ceasefire known as the "Haigeng Agreement", consisting of three points.⁸

These three points include an immediate ceasefire between both sides' forces, avoiding confrontation and firing between the forces, and resolving disputes and incidents of firing through dialogue.

⁷ 3BHA says they will continue to take major camps, towns in northern Shan, RFA, 10 January 2024

⁸ Temporary ceasefire reached between 3BHA and junta, RFA, 12 January 2024

To summarize, despite China's intervention to reduce the intensity of armed conflict in northern Shan State and the three rounds of talks between the military and the 3BHA in Kunming, resulted in the Haigeng Agreement. This achieved a temporary ceasefire.

Meetings between EROs and international delegations

On 10 January, seven NCA-signatories, which are members of the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST), received the ASEAN Special Envoy on Myanmar Alounkeo Kittikhoun and his delegation in Nay Pyi Taw.

During this meeting, PPST member U Khun Okkar stated that the seven NCA-signatories would continue to cooperate in implementing ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus to resolve Myanmar's political crisis.⁹

However, observers noted that even more than three years after the 2021 military coup, ASEAN has not been able to effectively implement the Five-Point Consensus.



Derek Chollet, the Counselor of the U.S. Department of State, was seen at a press conference in Jakarta of Indonesia, on 22 March 2023.

On 28 March, the K3C alliance met with U.S. State Department Counselor Derek Chollet and discussed military and political situations, according to U Aung San Myint, Secretary-1 of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). In addition to the KNPP, the meeting also included the KIA, and KNU.

⁹ Seven NCA signatories will continue to cooperate on ASEAN's 5-point consensus, Shan News, 11 January 2024

Derek Chollet later wrote on X (formerly Twitter) that he met with leaders of the K3C and that they discussed steps to increase aid to those in need and to create a better future for the people of Myanmar.¹⁰

During the one-year period from April 2023 to March 2024, there were meetings between the NCA-signatories and the military, as well as China-mediated meetings in Kunming between the military and the 3BHA. However, these talks focused more on their own interests rather than on reducing armed conflict in Myanmar, or building the federal democratic union which is desired by the people of Myanmar.

¹⁰ KNPP says they discussed military, political issues with US State Department Counselor, RFA, 31 March 2024



ERO Profiles

All Burma Students' Democratic Front - ABSDF

Arakan Liberation Party - ALP/ALA

Arakan National Council - ANC/AA

Chin National Front - CNF/CNA

Democratic Karen Benevolent Army - DKBA

Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army - KIO/KIA

Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army - KNPP/KA

Karen National Union - KNU

Karen National Liberation Army (Peace Council) - KNLA-PC

Lahu Democratic Union - LDU

Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/

Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Army) - MNTJP/MNDAA

National Democratic Alliance Army - Eastern Shan State (Mongla) - NDAA/ESS

New Mon State Party/Mon National Liberation Army - NMSP/MNLA

Pa-O National Liberation Organization/Pa-O National Liberation Army - PNLO/PNLA

Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta'ang National Liberation Army - PSLF/TNLA

Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army - RCSS/SSA

Shan State Progress Party / Shan State Army - SSPP / SSA

United League of Arakan / Arakha Army - ULA / AA

United Wa State Party / United Wa State Army - UWSP/UWSA



All Burma Students' Democratic Front - ABSDF

Founded	1 November 1988
Headquarters	Within the KNU-controlled territories
Active Territories	Within the KIA and KNU-controlled territories
Size	Over 1,500
Chair	Comrade Than Khae
Vice Chair	Comrade La Hsaing
General Secretary	Comrade Sonny
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/theabsdf
Website	https://absdf.org/

The ABSDF signed the NCA on 15 October 2015 and participated in the peace process. However, the direction of the ABSDF following the 2021 military coup on 1 February 2021 changed. It has since established connections with the NUG and other EROs.

In the 12th conference of the ABSDF, held from 1 to 17 November 2023, it was firmly decided that the ABSDF's main approach to armed conflict would be through direct combat, supplemented by other methods of warfare.

At the conference, the ABSDF set its political goals as ending the military's involvement in politics by reversing the coup, reorganizing the military and placing it fully under an elected civilian government, drafting and enacting a new constitution based on a federal and democratic system acceptable to all stakeholders, and developing a process to bring truth and transitional justice for victims of the conflict.

In its statement following the conference, the ABSDF declared that it would refrain from engaging in any negotiations with the military as long as the council continued to perpetrate violence against civilians. The ABSDF wants the system changed. Even a change from a military dictatorship to a civilian dictatorship is unacceptable.¹ In order to totally


¹ Statement about the 12th Conference, ABSDF, 17 November 2023

eradicate all forms of dictatorship, efforts will be made to step up the implementation of political, military, diplomatic and alliance affairs and to conduct joint military operations in collaboration with the armed resistance forces.

On 27 December 2023, the ABSDF also participated in the battle to take over Natthankwin town in Kyaukkyi Township in Bago Region, in cooperation with KNU/KNLA and local PDFs. On 21 January 2024, the ABSDF also participated in the battle to capture Mabein in northern Shan State, together with the KIA and the KPDF. According to BNI-MPM records, the ABSDF has been engaging in the fight against the military in cooperation with local revolutionary forces in Mongmit in northern Shan State, Gangaw Township in Magway Region, Indaw and Katha Townships in Sagaing Region, Ye Township in Mon State and Yebyu Township in Tanintharyi Region.

Clashes with the military	Between January 2020 and June 2024, there were 15 armed clash events. ² The ABSDF primarily conducts its combat operations in collaboration with other EROs and PDFs/LDFs, resulting in relatively few independent engagements. According to the ABSDF's statement, there were more than 280 armed clash events during the three year period of the Spring Revolution.
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Map and table showing the conflict-affected townships and armed clashes by year



² Myanmar Armed Conflict Dashboard, BNI-MPM, 30 June 2024



Arakan Liberation Party - ALP/ALA

Founded	9 April 1967 (first time), 1 June 1974 (second time)
Headquarters	India-Myanmar border
Active Territories	Northern Arakan State and Karen State
Size	Around 100
Chair	Khaing Ye Khaing
Commander-in-Chief	Brig-Gen Khaing Min Soe
General Secretary	Khaing Kyaw Khaing
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091146005481

Although the ALP/ALA actively participated in the peace process after signing the NCA on 15 October 2015, the military coup on 1 February 2021 had a huge impact on the ALP. It resulted in a division within the ALP into two groups: one opposing the coup and advocating for continued dialogue with the junta while adhering to the NCA.

On 19 March 2023, the ALP announced that Daw Saw Mra Raza Lin, Vice-Chair of the ALP, assumed leadership and reorganized the party. This splinter group is engaging with the military, focusing on the NCA-led peace process, maintaining participation in the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST), and continuing representation of the ALP within the 7-EOs Alliance.

On 20 March 2023, Chairman Khaing Ye Khaing of the ALP declared the reorganization led by Daw Saw Mra Raza Lin illegal. On 1 September 2023, the ALP released its position statement on the NCA. In its statement, the ALP said following the military coup, almost all the processes of the NCA have come to a halt, and Myanmar's hopes for peace have been shattered. Meanwhile, the meeting between Daw Saw Mra Raza Lin's faction, which has split from the ALP, and the military, is

unrelated to the ALP.¹

The ALP holds the belief that the NCA processes will not achieve the self-determination rights aspired by ethnic groups, nor will it effectively end the civil war and establish a federal democratic union. The ALP announced that it would continue to advance the armed revolution to shape the future of Arakan State by building national unity with revolutionary forces and political groups in Arakan State.

The ALP has experienced internal division due to disagreements over military and politics since the coup. Now, the ALP is now concentrating on the reconstruction of internal unity and is committed to participating in the revolution alongside revolutionary forces to bring an end to military dictatorship.

Clashes with the military	Clashes with the military During the three years of the Spring Revolution, there have been no clashes between the ALP/ALA and the military. There have been no joint military operations between the resistance forces and the ALP.
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¹ ALP's position statement on NCA, ALP Information Bureau, 1 September 2023



Arakan National Council - ANC/AA

Founded	2004, 2010
Headquarters	KNU Brigade-5 Territory, Karen State
Active territories	Karen State
Size	Over 350
Chair, Commander-in-Chief	Colonel Min Tun (aka) Min Zan Wai
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/anc.hq1

The objectives of the ANC/AA include enabling all Arakanese people to have the right to self-determination, preserving their national identity and cultural heritage, and liberating all ethnic groups and citizens in Myanmar from tyranny.

Since the coup, the ANC/AA has been engaging in the fight against the military in collaboration with the KNU's Brigade-5. In addition, the commander-in-chief of the ANC/AA said that the ANC/AA welcomed the formation of the NUG and was ready to collaborate with any organization for the establishment of a federal democratic union and the formation of a federal army.

The ANC/AA is a member of the Arakan National Policy Coordination Committee (ANPCC), which includes ALP/ALA, Arakan National Party (ANP), Arakan League for Democracy (ALD), the Arakan Front Party (AFP) and civil society organizations.

Clashes with the military	Clashes with the military As the ANC/AA is fighting against the military in an alliance with the KNU/KNLA, the armed clash events cannot be expressed in terms of data.
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**Chin National Front - CNF/CNA**

Founded	20 March 1988
Headquarters	Thantlang (Camp Victoria) in Chin State
Active territories	Thantlang, Hakha, Teedim, Matupi and Paletwa Townships in Chin State
Size	Over 1500 (5 brigades)
Chair	Pu Zing Cung
Vice-Chair (1)	Pu Thang Ning Kee
General Secretary	Salai Thla Hei
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/cnfhq

The CNF convened its 8th conference in Chinlung at Victoria Base Headquarters, from 12 to 16 February 2024. The policies and action plans including the CNF's goal, grand strategy and tactics, Chin National Development Policy and Chin National Front Development Project (also known as the Seven Programs), were discussed and approved during the conference.

On 12 October 2023, the CNF along with the KNU and the ABSDF, released a joint position statement on the NCA. The military coup has brought a halt to the processes and dialogue channels established by the NCA, effectively undermining its principles, objectives, and nullifying the 2008 Constitution. The joint political objectives and positions were issued with the aim of ending the military's inclusion in politics, reversing the seizure of state power by the military, and restructuring the armed forces to operate exclusively under the command of an elected civilian government.¹

On 31 January 2024, a joint position statement was released by the CNF/CNA along with the NUG, KIO/KIA, KNU/KNLA and the KNPP/KA

¹ Joint statement on NCA, CNF, 12 October 2023

which are engaging in revolutionary struggle towards annihilation of military dictatorship and the establishment of a federal democratic union.

Coordination mechanisms will be established to practically implement the six objectives and nine positions step by step. The vision is to establish a federal democratic union that prioritizes democracy, national equality, and self-determination, while preserving and promoting the distinct characters and identities of diverse ethnic communities within the union.²

On the 76th Chin National Day, the CNF declared its commitment to supporting Chinland to the best of its abilities in establishing the operational frameworks of the Chinland Council, Chinland Government, Chinland Parliament, and Judiciary, as outlined in the Chinland Constitution 2023. The establishment of the Chinland Council and Chinland Government has been met with objections and a lack of recognition from other revolutionary forces in Chin State. Nevertheless, certain Chinland revolutionary forces are engaging in cooperative efforts despite these challenges.

Between 13 November 2023 and May 2024, the CNF/CNA and joint CDFs captured nine towns—Rikhawdar and Waibula in Falam Township, Lailenpi and Rezua in Matupi Township, Hnaring in Thantlang Township, Sukhwar in Hakha Township, M'kuiimnu in Mindat Township and Cikha and Tonzang in Tonzang Township.³ The CNF/CNA is collaborating on community-based public administration to manage administrative and security affairs in these townships.


² Joint position statement of organizations collaborating in struggle to end military dictatorship and build federal democratic union, CNF, 31 January 2024

³ 61 towns captured and controlled by resistance forces, BNI-MPM, 8 July 2024

The CNF/CNA is a member of the Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C), which was established between the NUG Ministry of Defense and four allied EROs. The CNF/CNA is actively engaging in military cooperation within the C3C framework. The CNF/CNA remains actively involved in the NUCC. Additionally, it holds key positions within the Chinland Council and Chinland Government, maintaining connections with the NUG. Furthermore, some leaders of the CNF/CNA are part of the NUG cabinet.

Clashes with the military	There were 43 armed clash events with the military between January 2021 and 9 July 2024. The CNF/CNA takes a leading role in the CJDC grouping and is fighting against the military in collaboration with the Chinland Defense Forces (CDFs) which are the members of the CJDC.
Clashes with EROs	There was one armed clash event with the Zomi Revolutionary Organization/Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRO/ZRA) in 2021 and one between the CNF/CNA and the Chin Brotherhood and CDF-Matupi in 2024.

Map and table showing the conflict-affected townships and armed clashes by year

	Year	Actor 1	Actor 2	Armed Clash Events
	2021 (Jan-Dec)	MA	CNF	1
	2023 (Jan-Dec)	MA	CNF	28
	2024 (Jan-June)	MA	CNF	14
	2021 (Jan-Dec)	ZRO/ZRA	CNF	1
	2024 (Jan-June)	CDF-Matupi	CNF	1
	2024 (Jan-June)	Chin Brotherhood	CNF	7



Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA)

Founded	8 November 2010
Headquarters	Sone See Myaing village in Myawaddy Township in Karen State
Active territories	Hlaingbwe Township, Kyainseikgyi-Phayathonesu valley, Kawkaik Township, Myawaddy Township
Size	Around 3,000
Commander-in-Chief	General Saw Steel
Adjutant General	Colonel Saw Sein Win
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/klohhtoobor/

At the ceremony to mark 29th anniversary of the founding DKBA on 21 December 2023, Commander-in-Chief General Saw Steel said that the DKBA would continue to adhere to the NCA to foster regional development and peace and consistently carry out education, health and regional development tasks in order that the people in areas under its control can live peacefully and enjoy a high standard of living.¹

Thousands of foreigners are reportedly being coerced into engaging in and held captive in casinos and online scams in Kyauk Khet village, an area under the control of the DKBA in Myawaddy District. Efforts are urgently needed to rescue them. As of 31 December 2023, casinos are still operating normally in Myawaddy, Shwe Kokko, Malhtawthalay, KK Park and Kyauk Khet, where Kyar Phyant (online gambling) gangs are active on the Thai-Myanmar border and near Myawaddy-Mae Sot.²

¹ DKBA military chief says they will continue to adhere to NCA for territorial peace, KIC, 21 December 2023

² Thousands of foreigners still detained by criminal gangs in DKBA-controlled territory, RFA, 31 December 2023

On 10 July 2024, the DKBA issued a statement that as drug and gambling activities have been completely prohibited, it would take effective actions against those who disobey this order. Copies of this statement were addressed to the office of Myawaddy District Police Chief, Myoma police station, the Border Guard Force (BGF) and the Karen Peace Council (KPC) liaison offices in addition to the battalions, units and members under the DKBA.³

The DKBA is an EAO that has been involved in informal talks with the military. On 18 March 2024, the DKBA became a member of the 7 EAO Alliance.

Clashes with military	There were four armed clash events between the military and DKBA, in 2021. There were no reports of armed clash events in 2022 and 2023.
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³ KNU/KNLA-PC and DKBA issue orders prohibiting members from engaging in drug and gambling activities, KIC, 10 December 2023



Kachin Independence Organisation/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA)

Founded	5 February 1961
Headquarters	Laiza, Kachin State
Active territories	Kachin State and northern Shan State
Size	Over 12,000 (8 brigades)
Chair	General N'Ban La
Vice Chair	General Gam Shawng
General Secretary	Kumhtat Hting Nan
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/thekachinnet
Website	https://www.kachinnet.net/

KIO Chair N'Ban La said that the KIO stands for Dhamma following the military coup. Lt-Gen Gun Maw, vice-chair of the KIC said that the KIO/KIA is cooperating with the CRPH and the NUG with full understanding as well as is engaging in C3C to end the dictatorship.¹ On the 48th Kachin Martyrs' Day observed on 10 August 2023, KIO Chair General N'Ban La said the current Spring Revolution is a struggle between the military and the public. The KIO/KIA decisively stands on the side of the public and other EROs. He warned individuals focused on their own interests to refrain from aiding the regime in finding a way out.²

The KIO/KIA also acts as Chairman-2 of the FPNCC, which consists of seven EROs.

The resistance forces working together under the leadership of KIO/ KIA - the Kachin Regional Defense Force (KPDF) in Kachin State and Mandalay Region, PDF under the NUG in Sagaing Region, ABSDF, ULA/

¹ Lieutenant General Sumlut Gun Maw says junta forces are finding it difficult to sustain in long term <http://rb.gy/675rv>

² KIO Chair General N'Ban La says the goal that people are hoping for is now sight <http://rb.gy/odk9s>

AA and MNDAA in northern Shan State—are cooperating militarily and putting pressure on the military.

On 6 November 2023, the joint operation of KIO/KIA and NUG-affiliated PDF battalions can be clearly evident during the battle to capture Kawlin town in Sagaing Region. The allied forces led by the KIA/KIO captured six towns—Injangyang in Kachin State on 20 November 2023, Mawlu in Indaw Township in Sagaing Region on 13 December 2023, Mabein in Mansi Township on 20 January 2024, Sinbo in Myitkyina Township on 10 February 2024, Lweje on the China-Myanmar border on 29 March 2024 and Sumprabum in Kachin State on 5 May 2024.

The KIO/KIA also takes a leading role in the C3C formed by the NUG Ministry of Defense (MOD) in cooperation with the four allied EROs. The KIO/KIA is leading the military operations in No.1 military region which includes Kachin, Sagaing, Chin, northern Shan, Magway and Mandalay.


“Operation 0307” was launched by the KIO/KIA and allied forces on 7 March 2024. KIO/KIA spokesperson Colonel Naw Bu said that the operation cleared all military camps in Kachin State. During that operation, the KIO/KIA and allied forces captured nearly 80 small and large military camps, including Sein Lon strategic camp and Yaw Yone camp, Lawmun, Lawdan, Shangtai, Hpalang Bum along Moemauk and Lwegel, Gi Don strategic camp in Waingmaw Township, Dawthponeyan-based Light Infantry Battalion-142 which threatens the KIO headquarters in Laiza, Ntap Bum, Shadan Pa, where a helipad is located, Hpun Pyen Bum and Masen Kawng.³

The years 2023 and 2024 are considered the peak of military operations conducted by the KIO/KIA and allied forces against the military.

³ Around 80 large and small junta positions seized in two months of KIA offensive, Myitkyina News Journal, 7 May 2024

Clashes with military	There were 13 armed clash events with the military in 2019 and seven in 2020. Between January 2021 and 9 July 2024, the number of armed clash events between the military and the allied forces led by KIO/KIA, reached 602.
Clashes with EROs	There was one armed clash event with SNA in 2022 and one in 2023.

Map and table showing the conflict-affected townships and armed clashes by year





Karenni National Progressive Party/ Karenni Army - KNPP/KA

Founded (KA)	17 August 1948
Founded (KNPP)	2 May 1957
Headquarters	Nyar Mu, Shadaw Township, Karenni (Kayah) State
Active territories	Loikaw, Demoso, Hpruso, Shadaw, Hpasawng, Mawchi and Bawlake Townships in Karenni (Kayah) State.
Size	Over 2,000
Chairman	Khu Oo Reh
Vice-Chairman	Khun Abel Tweed
General Secretary	Khu Plu Reh
Commander-in-Chief (KA)	Major General Aung Myat
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/KNPPHQ

The KNPP/KA is part of the ERO grouping within the NUCC and plays a leading role in the Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC). In addition, KNPP Chairman Khu Oo Reh serves as the chairman of the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC), which was formed under the interim arrangements of the KSCC.

They welcome "Operation 1027" launched by the 3BHA and have called on other remaining EROs to intensify their participation in the revolution. On 28 October 2023, the KNPP issued a statement saying that they are working together with other revolutionary forces, both within the Karenni State and throughout Myanmar, on military and political cooperation to build a federal democratic union through collective leadership.¹

¹ KNPP welcomes 3BHA's Operation 1027, calls for all to intensify participation in revolution," Kantarawaddy Times, 25 July 2024

The KNPP/KA is also part of the C3C, formed by the NUG MOD, Ministry of Home Affairs, and four allied EROs. Along with the KNU/KNLA and NUG, they are involved in the Joint Command and Coordination (J2C) and Joint Operations Command (JOC) for the Southern Military Region, which includes Karen State, Karenni (Kayah) State, Mon State, Tanintharyi Region, Ayeyarwady Region, Yangon Region, and Bago Region, as well as areas connected to Nay Pyi Taw in central Myanmar. Key political and military officials from the member organizations work on political and military strategies and policies, with J2C focusing on discussions and policy-making, while JOC handles on-ground military coordination and operations.²

Furthermore, the KNPP/KA, along with the NUG, KIO/KIA, KNU/KNLA, and CNF/CNA, jointly issued a "Joint Position Statement by Allied Organizations Engaged in Revolutionary Struggle towards Annihilation of Military Dictatorship and Establishment of a Federal Democratic Union" on 31 January 2024. It also states that coordination mechanisms will be established to implement six objectives, nine positions, and a phased action plan to build a federal democratic union with states that have full self-determination, national equality, and democracy, protecting the identities of ethnic groups within the union.³

On 21 June 2024, the 149th Karenni National Day, the KNPP claimed that the resistance forces in Karenni State had taken control of 90 percent of the territory in Karenni State. Between 24 June 2023 and the end of June 2024, the KNPP/KA, Karenni, KNDF and local Karenni

² "All Roads to Nay Pyi Taw" or A Study of Southern Military Regional Command"
<http://rb.gy/kcpoe>


³ "Joint position statement of groups fighting together for end of military dictatorship and establishment of federal democratic union," KNPP, 31 January 2024

resistance forces captured six towns: Mese, Nan Mei Khon, Moebye, Mawchi, Ywar Thit, and Shadaw.⁴

The KNPP/KA leads and guides the armed groups resisting the military in the Karenni Region. They also collaborate with women's organizations, youth groups, and political groupings on administrative matters.

Clashes with the military	Between 2020 and 9 July 2024, there were 70 armed clash events with the military. Although the number of direct armed clash events between KNPP/KA and the military appears to be relatively low, the KNPP/KA leads and coordinates the KNDF and other local resistance forces in Karenni State.
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Map and table showing the conflict-affected townships and armed clashes by year

	Year	Actor 1	Actor 2	Armed Clash Events
	2020 (Jan-Dec)	MA	KNPP/KA	1
	2021 (Jan-Dec)	MA	KNPP/KA	8
	2022 (Jan-Dec)	MA	KNPP/KA	4
	2023 (Jan-Dec)	MA	KNPP/KA	45
	2024 (Jan-9 July)	MA	KNPP/KA	12

⁴ 71 towns captured and controlled by resistance forces, BNI-MPM, 22 July 2024



Karen National Union - KNU

Founded	5 February 1947
Headquarters	Klo Yaw Lay, Hpa-An District, Karen State
Active territories	Throughout Karen State, Thaton, Bilin and Kyaikto Townships in Mon State, Kyaukkyi, Shwegyin and Mone Townships in Bago Region and Myeik and Dawei Townships in Tanintharyi Region.
Size	Over 10,000
Chair	Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win
Vice-chair	Padoh Saw Hser Gay
General Secretary	Padoh Saw Tadoh Moo
KNLA Commander-in-Chief	General Saw Johnny
KNLA Deputy Commander-in-Chief	Lt-Gen Baw Kyaw Heh
KNDO Command-in-Chief	Brig-Gen Saw Shee Lay
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/KNUHQQTL
Website	https://knuhq.org/mm

The KNU opposed the military coup and joined the EROs grouping of the NUCC. The KNU is collaborating with the CNF/CNA, KIO/KIA and KNPP/KA through the Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) formed with the NUG Defense and Home Affairs ministries.

The KNU formed the Joint Coordination Committee (J2C) and the Joint Operations Command (JOC) in collaboration with the KNPP/KA and NUG, in southern parts of Myanmar such as Karen, Karenni (Kayah), Mon, Tanintharyi, Ayeyarwaddy, Yangon and Bago and the southern military area which includes Nay Pyi Taw and adjacent regions in the central Myanmar, involving member organizations and key political and military figures in active engagement. Political and military strategies

and policies are negotiated and established by J2C while joint ground military commands and military operations are carried out by the JOC.¹

At a press conference titled “First 100 Days: KNU in New Era” on 10 August 2023, the KNU General Secretary Padoh Saw Tadoh Moo announced four political objectives: to restructure the military to disengage from Myanmar's political landscape, to draft a new constitution based on federal democracy, to reach agreements and implement processes for transitional justice, and to involve international participation at all stages of establishing a new country.”.

In addition, the KNU declared the NCA null and void in response to the 2021 military coup. It continues to adhere to justice, equality, self-determination and the emergence of a federal democratic system across the country, and to make efforts for the emergence of a Kawthoolei federal unit which exercises federal democracy with self-determination rights.²

In collaboration with the CNF/CNA and the ABSDF, the essence of the NCA and eight factors that invalidate the NCA are included in its open letter sent to the witnesses who participated in the signing of the NCA and to the international community. On 27 October 2023, the KNU sent open letters to the UN Office for Myanmar, UN Special Delegation, ASEAN countries, and the Joint Peace Fund (JPF), proposing that the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), established through the NCA process, be transformed into a "neutral humanitarian aid organization." The letters highlight the military's use of humanitarian aid as a weapon.

On 31 January 2024, the KNU/KNLA issued a joint position statement alongside the NUG, the CNF/CNA, the KIO/KIA, and the KNPP/KA. The statement was issued by armed forces working towards ending the military dictatorship and establishing a federal democratic union. The objective is to establish a federal democratic union composed of states that ensure comprehensive democracy, national equality, and complete

¹ “All Roads to Nay Pyi Taw” or A Study of Southern Military Regional Command.
<http://rb.gy/kcpoe>


² KNU says the NCA null and void due to the military coup, KIC, 10 August 2023

self-determination, while also safeguarding and promoting the distinctive characteristics of ethnic groups residing within the union. Coordination mechanisms will be put in place to efficiently implement six goals, nine positions, and step-by-step processes towards this aim.³

In December 2023, the allied resistance forces led by KNU/KNLA seized control of Mone town in Kyaukkyi Township, Hpapun in Hpapun District, Kyaikdone in Kawkareik Township and Myawaddy in Myawaddy District. On 11 April 2024, the allied forces withdrew from Myawaddy. On the Karen New Year Day in January 2024, KNU Chair Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win said that armed resistance is perceived as the sole remaining option to achieve the overthrow of the military dictatorship.

Clashes with military	There were seven armed clash events in 2020. Between January 2021 and 9 July 2024, there were 577 armed clash events with the military.
Clashes with EROs	There were two armed clash events with the KTLA led by Major General Ner Dah Mya, former Commander-in-Chief of KNDO in 2023.

Map and table showing the conflict-affected townships and armed clashes by year



³ The issuance of joint position statement by resistance forces working towards ending the military dictatorship and building a federal democratic union, CNF, 31 January 2024



Karen National Liberation Army (Peace Council) - KNLA-PC

Founded	11 February 2007
Headquarters	Kawkareik Township, Karen State
Active territories	Kawkareik and Hlaingbwe Townships, Karen State
Size	Over 500
Chairman	General Saw Htaw Lay
Vice-Chairman	Dr Naw Kapaw Htoo
General Secretary	Colonel Saw Kyaw Nyunt
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/p/KnuKnla-PC-Media-100064488230298/?locale=th_TH

The KNU/KNLA-PC, a signatory to the NCA, has continued to adhere to it and has held informal meetings with the military. The group has consistently participated in the PPST formed under the NCA and is now a member of the 7 EAO Alliance, which was reformed on 18 March 2024.

Colonel Saw Kyaw Nyunt, the General Secretary of KNU/KNLA-PC, serves as the joint general secretary in the 7 EAO Alliance and has stated that it will resolve the current political crisis only through negotiation with relevant stakeholders.

On 10 July 2024, the KNU/KNLA-PC issued a statement prohibiting any involvement in drug-related activities and gambling, warning that those who disobey and violate this order will face severe consequences. Copies of the statement were addressed not only to their battalions, units and members but also to the chief of the Myawaddy District Police Force under the military, the township police station, and the liaison offices of the BGF and the DKBA.¹

Armed clash events with the military	There were no armed clash events between the military and KNU/KNLA-PC from 2009 to the end of March 2023.
Armed clash events with EROs	There was one armed clash event between the KNU/KNLA-PC and New Mon State Party (NMSP) in 2020.

¹ KNU/KNLA-PC and DKBA issue orders prohibiting members from engaging in drug and gambling activities, KIC, 10 December 2023

Lahu Democratic Union - LDU

Founded	10 January 1973, 1987, 1997, April 2008
Headquarters	Loi Lan in Mong Hsat District, Shan State
Size	Unknown
The original LDU was led by Chairman Kyar Khun Sar and Vice-Chairman Kyarr Har.	
The new LDU is led by Chairman Kyar Solomon and Vice Chairman Kyar Phu.	

The military coup had a significant impact on the LDU. The military's invitation to peace talks caused disagreements among LDU leadership. Since late July 2022, the LDU has been seen as two factions: the original LDU led by Chair Kyar Khun Sar and the new LDU led by General Secretary Kyar Solomon.

On 7 July 2022, despite Chair Kyar Khun Sar and Vice Chair Kyar Har's announcement not to attend the Nay Pyi Taw peace talks, General Secretary Kyar Solomon and some executive members met with Min Aung Hlaing. Consequently, the original LDU led by Kyar Khun Sar announced the dismissal of Kyar Solomon, Kyar Jacob, and Kyar Phu from their duties starting 8 July 2022. The statement indicated that they would only continue to follow the revolutionary path as a revolutionary organization.

On 27 and 28 July, a Central Committee meeting was held via Zoom without the attendance of Chair Kyar Khun Sar and Vice Chair Kyar Har. The meeting elected Kyar Solomon as chair, Kyar Phu as vice chair, Kyar Jacob as general secretary, and nine central committee members. The new LDU led by Kyar Solomon continues to participate in the PPST and remains part of the 7 EAO Alliance.

However, in a message on the 63rd anniversary of the founding of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) on 25 October 2023, the

original LDU led by Kyar Khun Sar declared that it would not seek dialogue with the military and would stand with the KIO until a federal democracy is achieved. They also expressed their gratitude for the support given to armed Lahu ethnic groups aspiring for federal democracy.

In a statement regarding the attack on Mon Lai Hket IDP camp in Laiza, Kachin State, on 9 October 2023, the original LDU pledged to continue fighting alongside the people until all forms of dictatorship is ended.

LDU Chairman Kyar Har has stated that unity among all ethnic groups is crucial, and believes that success can be achieved if all EROs fight together with a shared goal.¹

¹ "We need to revitalize the Lahu Revolution", Irrawaddy, 15 January 2024



**Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
(Kokang Army) - MNTJP/MNDAA**

Founded	11 March 1989
Headquarters	Mobile headquarters
Active territories	Mone Koe and Laukkaing in Kokang area; Kutkai, Lashio, Theinni, Muse, and Pang Hseng Townships
Size	Over 10000 (4 brigades)
Party's General Secretary/ Kokang Army's Commander-in-Chief/ Special Region (1) Administrative Committee Chairman	Peng Daxun (Peng Deren)
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/Kokang311

After the death of Peng Jiasheng, the leader of the MNTJP/MNDAA, on 16 February 2022, his son U Peng Daxun (U Peng Deren) took over as the leader. Although they participate in the FPNC led by the UWSP/UWSA and keep the political dialogue channel open, they have formed a strong military alliance with the PSLF/TNLA and the ULA/AA.

Due to intervention by the Chinese government, the MNTJP/MNDAA met with the delegation of the NSPNC under the military on 1 June 2023, in Mongla, a territory controlled by the NDAA. However, the talks ended on 2 June without reaching any agreement.

The MNTJP/MNDAA played a leading role in "Operation 1027," which began in northern Shan State on 27 October 2023. They launched offensives against the military alongside its allied forces. Within just over two months, from the start of the operation until the Haigeng Agreement

was reached on 11 January 2024, they took control of more than 250 large and small military camps and checkpoints. They seized full control of nine towns: Chinshwehaw, Hpawng Hseng, Kyu Koke (Pang Hseng) and Theinni on 2 November 2023; Mone Koe on 7 November; Kunlong on 12 November; Konkyan and Maw Hteik on 28 November; and Laukkaing on 4 January 2024.

The MNDA Command-in-Chief and Chair of the Special Region 1 Administrative Committee, U Peng Daxun (U Peng Deren), has stated that "Operation 1027" will not be completely halted. He said that gaining power in Shan State Special Region 1 is the first step in their national agenda, and they will strive for regional development based on the "Special Region 1 Constitution."¹

On 14 January 2024, the MNDA announced the abolition of all orders and directives and administrative mechanisms issued by the military and its subordinate Kokang group and Shan State's Special Region 1, including Laukkaing. They stated that they would fully reinstate the original laws and rules of the Special Region 1. On 22 May 2023, the MNDA announced that they had imposed death sentences, life imprisonment, and sentences not exceeding 10 years for crimes such as murder, causing death through cruel methods, and kidnapping and killing. Also on 24 April 2024, the MNDA publicly executed three of its members in Laukkaing, including one at the district chief level, accusing them of involvement in murders and kidnappings. This action led to criticism against the MNDA.²


Then, the Haigeng Agreement broke down on 25 June 2024 and the MNDA led the second round of "Operation 1027" along with allied forces in Lashio Township of northern Shan State. On 14 July 2024, the MNDA department of political affairs issued rules for rewarding all those who defect from the military. These rules included guarantees of

¹ 2024 New Year's message from U Peng Deren, Chair of Shan State's Special Region (1) Administrative Committee, The Kokang, 1 January 2024


² MNDA announces crimes punishable by death, life imprisonment, RFA, 23 May 2024

At present, the MNTJP/MNDAA, led by U Peng Daxun (U Peng Deren), has established the Special Region 1 Administrative Committee based on the territories they have recaptured. They are carrying out administrative, judicial, and public service functions. At the same time, they continue to intensify their armed resistance against the military.

Armed clash events with the military	A total of over 90 armed clash events took place between the military and the MNDAAs between January 2020 and the end of June 2024. The MNDAAs have often taken part in the battles against the military in alliance with the TNLA and the KIA.
Armed clash events between EROs	In 2024, two armed clash events took place between the SSPP/SSA and MNDAAs.



Year	Actor 1	Actor 2	Armed Clash Events
2020 (Jan-Dec)	MA	MNDAA	1
2021 (Jan-Dec)	MA	MNDAA	47
2022 (Jan-Dec)	MA	MNDAA	14
2023 (Jan-Dec)	MA	MNDAA	20
2024 (Jan-June)	MA	MNDAA	11
2024 (Jan-June)	SSPP/SSA	MNDAA	2



Year	Actor 1	Actor 2	Armed Clash Events
2020 (Jan-Dec)	MA	MNDAA	1
2021 (Jan-Dec)	MA	MNDAA	47
2022 (Jan-Dec)	MA	MNDAA	14
2023 (Jan-Dec)	MA	MNDAA	20
2024 (Jan-June)	MA	MNDAA	11
2024 (Jan-June)	SSPP/SSA	MNDAA	2



National Democratic Alliance Army - Eastern Shan State (Mongla) - NDAA/ESS

Founded	1989
Headquarters	Mongla, Eastern Shan State
Active territories	Mongla, Shan State (Special Region 4)
Size	Over 5000
Chairman	Sai Lin (Passed away on 8 August 2024)
Vice-Chairman	San Pei (San Pae)
General Secretary	Sao Hsengla
Spokesperson	U Kyi Myint
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/monglanewscna1976
Website	http://www.4tzx.com/

The NDAA-ESS, which is part of the FPNCC led by the UWSP/UWSA, held talks with the military after the 2021 coup. They even facilitated a meeting between the 3BHA and the military in Mongla – an area under its control from 1 to 3 June 2023. However, the talks ended on the second day of the meeting. Although the Chinese government mediated this meeting, it ended without reaching any agreement.

When "Operation 1027" by the 3BHA emerged in northern Shan State, the NDAA-ESS announced on 1 November 2023 that it would maintain its neutral political stance, not participating or interfering in any conflict, and would continue to maintain peace and stability in the border region.¹

The NDAA-ESS, adhering to the principle of "Peace, Unity, Development," maintains a neutral political stance. Chair Sai Lin, in his New Year's message for 2024, stated that they are working to protect and maintain peace in the border region, safeguard the fundamental

¹ Statement, Peace and Solidarity Committee, 1 November 2023

interests of ethnic groups in the area, maintain unity with partner organizations to strive for the political goal of achieving an ethnic self-administered zone.

After the 2021 military coup, there have been at least three informal meetings between the military and the NDAA-ESS. In a meeting with Min Aung Hlaing on 26 September 2022, the NDAA-ESS reportedly requested that their Special Region 4 in eastern Shan State be designated as a self-administered area.



**New Mon State Party/
Mon National Liberation Army - NMSP/MNLA**

Founded	20 July 1958
Headquarters	Ye Chaung Phyar, Mon State
Active territories	Thaton, Paung, Chaungsone, Mawlamyine, Kyaikmaraw, Mudon, Thanphyuzayat and Ye in Mon State; Hpa-An, Kawkareik, Payathonzu valley and Kyainseikgyi in Karen State; and Yebyu, Myeik and Dawei in Tanintharyi Region
Size	Over 1500
Chairman	Nai Han Thar
Vice Chairman	Nai Aung Min
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/newmonstateparty

The NMSP has been actively participating in the peace process after the signing of the NCA, took the leadership position in the PPST and then held informal talks with the military since the 2021 coup. In April 2023, the NMSP submitted its resignation from the PPST and reduced its participation in talks.

In the statement by the NMSP on the 76th Anniversary of Mon National Day, the NMSP said it would join hands with all ethnic groups in self-determination. It believes that trying to hold elections without addressing the political crisis could lead to more conflict. In addition, the NMSP pointed out that even though it is holding talks with the military, the rights of ethnic peoples are still far away due to its adherence to the 2008 Constitution.¹

¹ Political stance of NMSP after talks with junta, RFA, 9 February 2023

In June 2023, NMSP's Chair Nai Han Thar said that if all EROs joined the Spring Revolution to eradicate the military dictatorship, they would join them.² At the 11th party conference which began on 25 December 2023, Nai Han Thar was re-elected as the chair.³

On 14 February 2024, a faction of individuals who share similar beliefs and positions, led by General Secretary Nai Zeya and Brig-Gen Sa Lun Htaw, broke away from the NMSP and established a splinter group known as the New Mon State Party-Anti-Dictatorship (NMSP-AD). The NMSP-AD expressed its belief that the only way is to end all forms of dictatorship, for the emergence of a federal union which fully guarantees the rights to national equality and self-determination.

The NMSP-AD is engaging in political and military collaboration with the Mon State Federal Council (MSFC). Furthermore, it is undertaking military cooperation with other resistance forces in the Mon region, including the NUG.

The Central Executive Committee of the NMSP announced on 31 May 2024 that NMSP-AD has no affiliation with the parent party. The NMSP continued its membership in the restructured 7 EAO Alliance.

² NMSP chair says they will join Spring Revolution if all EAOs engage in it, BNI, 29 June 2023

³ Nai Han Thar re-elected as NMSP Chair, no changes in top party leadership, Than Lwin Times, 12 January 2024



**Pa-O National Liberation Organization/
Pa-O National Liberation Army - PNLO/PNLA**

Founded	11 December 1949 (First time), 7- 9 December 2009 (Second time)
Headquarters	Ka Du Gyi area of Mawmai Township, southern Shan State
Active territories	Hsihseng, Ho Pong, Nansang, Langkho and Mawmai Townships, Shan State
Size	Over 400
Chairman	General Khun Thurein
Vice-Chairman	Khun Tun Tin
General Secretary	Khun Aung Mann
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/paohnationalliberationorganization

On 7 May 2023, a convoy including ASEAN diplomats, officials from the Indonesian and Singaporean embassies, representatives from the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), PNLO representatives, and officials from the military's Shan State Administration Council was attacked while traveling from Taunggyi to Hsihseng to provide aid to PNLO-controlled areas.

In the last week of June 2023, Colonel Khun Okkar, patron of the PNLO, led a meeting between the military and five ceasefire-signatory EAOs. They discussed four points, including amendments to the 2008 Constitution and holding a peace conference.¹

In early November of the same year, the PNLO invited IDPs from Loikaw, Karenni (Kayah) State, to seek refuge in their areas as fighting intensified in Loikaw. The PNLO also urged local Pa-O people to provide humanitarian assistance to the IDPs.²

¹ Peace talks between representatives of 5 PPST member organizations and State Peace Talks Team, 7 EAO Alliance, 28 June 2023

² PNLO announces displaced people from Loikaw can seek refuge in Pa-O areas, Kantarawaddy Times, 17 November 2023

In January 2024, fighting broke out between the PNLA and military in Hsihseng Township. On 28 January, the PNLA took control of Hsihseng town. The PNLO/PNLA stated they would continue to advance with other EROs until the military dictatorship is completely uprooted.³

The Southern Shan Local Revolutionary Union (SSLRU) pledged to wage revolutionary war alongside the PNLO/PNLA until the military's administrative mechanism in Southern Shan State becomes inoperable. Moreover, the Pa-O National Federal Council (PNFC), led by the former PNLO Vice Chairman, welcomed the PNLO/PNLA's stance to "continue the struggle with like-minded allies until a federal democratic system is achieved." ⁴

The PNLO signed the NCA and actively participated in the resulting internal peace process. However, the PNLO/PNLA Chairman General Khun Thurein objected to the PNLO's inclusion as a representative in the 7 EAO Alliance.

Armed clash events with the military	Since January 2024, there have been 27 armed clash events between PNLO and the military.
Armed clash events with EROs	In 2023, there were two armed clash events between PNLO and RCSS/SSA. In 2024, there were two armed clash events between PNLO/PNLA and the Pa-O National Organization/ Pa-O National Army (PNO/PNA).

Map and table showing the conflict-affected townships and armed clashes by year



³ PNLA vows to continue fight until military dictatorship is uprooted, Shan News, 4 February 2024

⁴ SSLRU says it will collaborate with PNLO to stop junta administration from functioning, Shan News, 28 January 2024



**Palaung State Liberation Front/
Ta'ang National Liberation Army - PSLF/TNLA**

Founded	1963, 1976, January 1992, January 2009
Headquarters	Mobile
Active territories	Naungcho, Kyaukme, Thibaw, Kutkai, Namtu, Mongton, Namhsan, Namkhan, Muse and Mongmit in northern Shan State and Mogok in Mandalay Region
Size	Over 8,000
Chair	Major General Tar Aik Phone
Vice-Chair	Brig-Gen Tar Jaw Kyar
General Secretary	Brig-Gen Tar Bone Kyaw
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100064235945809
Website	https://www.taangland.org/

The PSLF/TNLA is one of the 3BHA members along with the MNDAA and the ULA/AA. It is cooperating militarily and politically with the MNDAA and the ULA/AA. The PSLF/TNLA is a member of the FPNCC led by the UWSP/UWSA and the KIO/KIA.

Although the PSLF/TNLA is not directly involved in the NUCC, there are engagements and exchanges of information between the PSLF/TNLA and the Ta'ang Political Consultative Committee (TPCC), which is a member of the NUCC. Their voices are included in the TPCC, said PSLF/TNLA general secretary. On 11 and 12 March 2023, the PSLF/TNLA also participated in the discussion on the third draft of the Ta'ang State Constitution led by the TPCC, and the Ta'ang State Constitution (Third) Draft was approved.

On 27 October 2023, the 3BHA declared Operation 1027 and launched an offensive against the military in northern Shan State. Due to the Haigeng Agreement mediated by the Chinese government, the PSLF/TNLA reached a ceasefire with the military in northern Shan State on 11 January 2024. On 25 June

2024, the PSLF/TNLA launched “Operation 1027” Part-2 together with local allied resistance forces. During the military campaign of "Operation 1027" Part (2), the PSLF/TNLA conducted military offensives in Mandalay Region, in collaboration with the regional resistance forces, including the Mandalay-PDF under the NUG.

In collaboration with its allied resistance forces, the PSLF/TNLA captured nine towns from the military—Monglon in Kyaukme Township on 5 December 2023, Namhsan on 15 December, Manton on 22 December, Namtu on 28 December, Mongngaw on 29 December, Kutkai on 7 January 2024, Nawngkhio on 26 June and Mongmit on 16 July.

At the ceremony to mark the 61st Anniversary of Ta’ang National Liberation Revolution Day, PSLF Chair Lt-Gen Tar Aik Phone said it would totally eliminate administrative mechanisms under the military in the captured townships and carry out the practical implementation to start operating new administrative and security mechanisms based on a fair and just legal system without discrimination of local ethnic groups. It will continue to join hands with the public which is resisting the military in order to root out dictatorship, protect the lives and property of the public and to gain more control over the region.


Clashes with the military

There were 15 armed clash events in 2020. The number of armed clash events reached 125 from January 2021 to 9 July 2024.

Clashes with EROs

There were armed clash events with the RCSS/SSA and with the SSPP/SSA.

Map and table showing the conflict-affected townships and armed clashes by year



Year	Actor 1	Actor 2	Armed Clash Events
2020 (Jan-Dec)	MA	TNLA	15
2021 (Jan-Dec)	MA	TNLA	11
2022 (Jan-Dec)	MA	TNLA	7
2023 (Jan-Dec)	MA	TNLA	74
2024 (Jan-9 July)	MA	TNLA	33
2020 (Jan-Dec)	TNLA	RCSS/SSA	2
2021 (Jan-Dec)	TNLA	RCSS/SSA	9
2023 (Jan-Dec)	TNLA	SSPP/SSA	2
2024 (Jan-9 July)	TNLA	SSPP/SSA	2



Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan State Army - RCSS/SSA

Founded	1964, 1996
Headquarters	Loi Tai Leng, southern Shan State
Active territories	Mong Ton and Mong Hsat Townships in eastern Shan State, Mong Pan, Mong Nai, Lai Kha, Kun Hein, Lwel Sit, Mawksai, Moegaung and Namhsan in southern Shan State and Kyaukse and Namkham Townships in northern Shan State.
Size	Over 14,000
Chairman	General Yawd Serk
Vice-Chairman (1)	Lt-Gen Sai Yee
Vice-Chairman (2), Commander-in-Chief	Major General Khay Ngin
Secretary (1)	Colonel Sai Ngin
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/ TaiFreedomBurmese
Website	https://burmese.taifreedom.com/

After the bi-annual meeting of the RCSS held from 18 to 20 August 2023, the RCSS announced its continued adherence to the essence of the NCA. At the 8th Anniversary of the NCA in Nay Pyi Taw on 15 October 2023, RCSS Chair General Yawd Serk, delivered a speech on behalf of seven other EROs which signed the NCA.


General Yawd Serk said: “The 2020 election-related political crises occurred. As the political problem could not be resolved through political means, the implementation of the NCA was also halted. Time for political and peace affairs was wasted.”

Colonel Sai Ngin from RCSS/SSA assumed the role of General Secretary of the 7 EAO Alliance.

On the 66th Anniversary of Shan National Revolution Day, the RCSS announced that it will meet and resolve all issues through peaceful dialogue with relevant organizations and will strive to reform the administrative system in their controlled areas and hold talks with all parties to establish a federal democratic union.

Clashes with the military	There were eight-armed clash events in 2020, eight in 2021. There were no armed clash events in 2022 and 2023.
Clashes with EROs	The RCSS/SSA clashed with NA-B comprised of KIA, AA, MNDAA and TNLA, SSPP/SSA, PSLF/TNLA, UWSP/UWSA and PNLO/PNLA. There are seven EROs which clashed with the RCSS/SSA. Of them, the number of clashes with the SSPP/SSA is the highest.

Map and table showing the conflict-affected townships and armed clashes by year





Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army - SSPP / SSA

Founded	24 April 1964, 16 August 1971
Headquarters	Wan Hai, Kyethi Township, northern Shan State
Active territories	Langkho, Monghsu, Kyethi, Mongkaing, Laihka, Pinlon, Loilen, Hopong and Lawksawk Townships in southern Shan State; Mongyai, Tangyan, Lashio, Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Nawngkhio, Mongmit, Namtu, Namhsan, Manton, Hseni, Kutkai, Muse and Namhkan in northern Shan State
Size	Over 10,000
Chairman	General Sao Pang Fa
Vice-Chairman	Lieutenant General Sao Khun Hseng
General Secretary	Colonel Kyaw Hla

After the 2021 military coup, there were informal meetings between the military and SSPP/SSA. However, on 9 and 11 June 2023, the military pressured the SSPP/SSA to withdraw from 10 of their camps in Laihka Township, southern Shan State. These camps were strategically important for the security of SSPP/SSA's Kho Lam military command and there were no plans to withdraw.¹

After meetings between the UWSA, NDAA, SSPP/SSA, and the military from 20 to 21 July 2023, the three groups reportedly informed the military that they were not ready to attend the peace conference that it was trying to organize.²

On 3 May 2024, the SSPP/SSA announced its decision to fight against the military, stating that there was no longer a way to find solutions through political dialogue to achieve a genuine democratic union." Successive military regimes have swallowed up ethnic minorities and failed to comply with the points agreed upon and signed in the Panglong Agreement. After the 2021 military coup, Myanmar's political situation has reached a point where it's impossible to find solutions through negotiation at the table. With no other options left, we chose

¹ Junta pressures SSPP/SSA troops to withdraw from Laihka Township, RFA, 13 June 2023

² Interview with SSPP Spokesperson Lt. Col. Sai Su, BNI-MPM, 1 August 2023


the path of armed revolution,” said Vice-Chair Lieutenant General Sao Khun Hseng.³

The SSPP/SSA has engaged in battles with both the military and the RCSS/SSA - another Shan resistance group. However, on 29 November 2023, the two sides announced a ceasefire based on the will of their respective leaders.⁴

In addition, due to territorial overlaps and disputes in the region, there have been clashes with allied resistance forces such as the TNLA and MNDAA. To resolve conflicts among allies, they have often used the platform of the FPNCC, of which SSPP/SSA is a member.

Armed clashes with the military	There were ten armed clash events between the SSPP/SSA and the military from 2022 to the end of June 2024.
Armed clashes with EROs	There were 35 armed clash events between the SSPP/SSA and RCSS/SSA from 2020 to 9 July 2024. There were also clashes with allied resistance forces such as TNLA and MNDA over the territorial overlaps and disputes in the region.

Map and table showing the conflict-affected townships and armed clashes by year



³ SSPP declares war on junta, RFA, 3 May 2024

⁴ SSPP and RCSS announce ceasefire after prolonged fighting, RFA, 29 November 2023



United League of Arakan/Arakha Army - ULA/AA

Founded	10 April 2009
Headquarters	KIO-controlled territory, Kachin State
Active territories	Kachin State, Shan State (North), Paletwa Township in Chin State, and throughout Arakan State
Size	Around 40,000 ¹
Commander-in-Chief	Major General Twan Mrat Naing
Deputy Commander-in-Chief	Dr. Nyo Twan Awng
Secretary (1)	Colonel Kyaw Han
Telegram	https://t.me/aainfodesk
Website	https://www.arakanarmy.net/

The conflicts between the ULA/AA and the military in Arakan State, which had been ongoing since early 2019, came to an abrupt ceasefire following talks between the two sides on 30 December 2020. After the 2021 military coup, the military removed the ULA/AA from its list of terrorist groups on 11 March 2021. As various forces across the country began to resist the coup, the ULA/AA itself started to assume control of administrative and judicial sectors within Arakan State.

Fighting flared up between the military and the ULA/AA in June 2021 and it lasted until early November 2022. However, on 26 November 2022, the military and ULA/AA once again agreed to a humanitarian pause, a temporary ceasefire for humanitarian reasons. ²

¹ AA planning offensive on all remaining towns in Arakan, DMG, 3 June 2024

² Junta and AA agree temporary truce in Arakan State, The Irrawaddy, 28 November 2022

It can be said that the ULA/AA's activities within the sphere of the Spring Revolution, which aims to end all forms of dictatorship and build a federal democratic union, have been progressing while maintaining information security and preparing strategies and timing to reach their ultimate goal.

The ULA/AA took a leading role alongside the MNDAA and TNLA in "Operation 1027," which began in the northern Shan State on 27 October 2023. On 13 November 2023, the ULA/AA offensive targeted the military, including capturing camps and towns. This occurred in Paletwa Township of Chin State and throughout Arakan State. Although the momentum of "Operation 1027" in the northern Shan State halted after the Haigeng Agreement reached through the mediation of the Chinese government in January 2024, the ULA/AA's front in Arakan State remains steadfast. The ULA/AA's offensive, including capturing camps and towns across Arakan State, continues.

The ULA/AA has so far seized control of 16 towns from the military's control: Paletwa and Samee in Chin State on 14 and 16 January 2024; Pauktaw in Arakan State on 19 January; Minbya, Taungpyoletwea, and Kyauktaw on 6 February; Mrauk-U on 8 February; Myebon and Kanhtaunggyi on 15 February; Ma-Ei on 16 February; Ponnagyun on 4 March; Ramree and Sa Ne on 11 March; Rathedaung on 17 March; Buthidaung on 20 March; and Thandwe on 16 July.³

At the same time, the ULA/AA is implementing administrative, security, and demining operations for these captured towns.


On 10 April 2024, marking the 15th anniversary of the Arakan Army's founding, the ULA/AA announced that they would change the name of the "Arakan Army" to "Arakha Army (AA)" to represent all residents of Arakan State. They also stated that the soldiers serving in ULA/AA would now be referred to as "Arakha soldiers."

³ Towns captured and controlled by resistance forces, BNI-MPM, 20 July 2024

The ULA/AA has been engaging in discussions with the NUG and fully participating in "Operation 1027" alongside the 3BHA. Moreover, they are providing support for the military activities of the Chin Brotherhood (CB) in the Chin State. Therefore, it can be said that the ideological movement of the ULA/AA, which started with the Arakanese national agenda called the "Way of Rakhita" or Arakan's goals, is now moving towards the liberation of all ethnic nationalities, equal and fair rights for all ethnic nationalities without discrimination, and unity among all ethnic groups.

Armed clashes with the military	A total of 452 armed clash events took place between the AA and the military between January 2020 and the end of June 2024.
Armed clash events with EROs	In 2023, a total of two armed clash events took place between the AA and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).

Map and table showing the conflict-affected townships and armed clashes by year



**United Wa State Party/****United Wa State Army - UWSP/UWSA**

Founded	17 April 1989
Headquarters	Pangkham (Pangsang)
Active territories	Pangsang, Mongma, Pangwai, Namphan, Mongpauk, Mongyan, Hopang, Matman, Mongton, Mong Hsat, Tachileik, Mong Pan and Mong Yawng.
Size	Over 30,000
Chairman	Bao Youxiang
Commander-in-Chief	Bao Junpiang (aka) U Bao Ai Chan
Secretary	U Bao Ai Kham
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/WaStateTV2011318/

Since the military coup, the UWSP/UWSA, which has been holding talks with the military, called for the designation of the "Wa" region as an autonomous state. The military has agreed in principle to this demand. Following the meeting of the FPNCC on 15 and 16 March 2023, where the UWSP/UWSA plays a prominent role, it released a seven-point statement.¹

Among its points was an expression of appreciation for the Chinese government's mediation efforts aimed at resolving Myanmar's internal conflict and collaborating to stabilize the border region.

Regarding "Operation 1027" of the 3BHA that started on 27 October 2023, the UWSP/UWSA urged all conflicting forces to exercise restraint and implement a ceasefire as soon as possible. The UWSP/UWSA allowed the people displaced by the armed conflict in northern Shan State to

¹ The statement released by FPNCC after its meeting, WSTV, 16 March 2023

stay in the Wa Self-Administered Division and issued temporary residency permits to them.²


On 5 January 2024, the UWSA troops entered and took positions in Hopang and Panlong, where the military was based. The MNDAA and allied forces launched an offensive against military camps near Hopang.³

According to the 2008 Constitution, Hopang and Panlong towns were designated within the Wa Self-Administered Division. These towns were under the control of the military. On 10 January 2024, the military council officially handed over the two towns seized during Operation 1027, to the UWSP/UWSA in Wa State. It can be said that the UWSP/UWSA could capture the two towns from the military without firing a single shot.

As Chair-1 of the FPNCC, the UWSP/UWSA is resolving frictions, disputes and armed conflicts among the EROs in northern Shan State.


Clashes with the military	There have been no armed clash events with the military.
Clashes with EROs	In April 2022, there were armed clash events between the UWSA and RCSS/SSA.

Map and table showing the conflict-affected townships and armed clashes by year

	Year	Actor 1	Actor 2	Armed Clash Events
	2022	UWSA	RCSS/SSA	1

² UWSA releases statement urging IDPs in Wa to apply for temporary resident permits, Shan News, 6 December 2023

³ UWSA takes positions in Hopang and Panlong, RFA, 5 January 2024



Incidents of massacres involving five or more people after the military coup




Incidents of massacres involving five or more people after the military coup




Magway Region, Bago Region (East), Karen State, Chin State, Shan State (South) and Tanintharyi Region.

According to the BNI-MPM records, out of 160 massacre incidents involving five or more people, 69 incidents specifically targeted civilians, accounting for 43 percent of all documented incidents. A total of 40 deaths resulted from airstrikes, making it the second most frequent cause of massacre incidents.

Additionally, 23 massacre incidents occurred during battles between the military and armed resistance groups, ranking as the third highest incident category. Shelling attacks accounted for 17 massacre incidents, with 11 incidents attributed to other causes.



Civilian fatalities were categorized as follows by cause: 539 deaths from targeted arrests and killings, 552 from airstrikes, 112 from artillery shelling, and 193 from battles.



Even during the five-month period between January 1 and 31 May 2024, there were 53 massacre incidents, with the majority caused by airstrikes. There were 50 massacre incidents resulting in 474 deaths

from April 2022 to March 2023, and 94 massacre events resulting in 873 deaths from April 2023 to March 2024. The civilian death toll surged dramatically, marking an increase of more than 84 percent during this period.

The coup has entered its fourth year. The armed resistance by the EROs and PDFs/LDFs has now shifted into an offensive. The military, confronted with multiple military fronts nationwide, is openly engaging in acts such as targeted attacks on defenceless civilians, as well as arrests and killings of civilians.

The military, which has not received any public support since the 2021 coup, can be expected to show no mercy towards the public. The respective revolutionary forces are responsible for mitigating the military's arrests and killings targeting the public. We must all seek justice for those who have lost their lives. The lives of civilians must be taken into consideration amidst the expanding conflict areas and the intensifying armed resistance, including battles to capture military camps and towns.

Table showing the mass killings of five or more civilians by region and state

Sagaing Region
On 20 April 2022, about 10 displaced civilians from Ahshey See and Doenwe villages in Kale Township were killed as the bridge collapsed while crossing the river. ¹
On 19 May 2022, the military's shelling killed five residents from Tar Taing village in KhinU Township. ²
On 14 June 2022, six local people were killed when the military and Pyu Saw Htee stormed and burned Taw Kyaung Lay village in Chaung U Township. ³
On 18 July 2022, the military brutally killed 10 residents of Kyi Su village in Kanbalu Township. ⁴
On 26 July 2022, the military brutally killed five residents of Yae Mein village in Salingyi Township. ⁵
On 6 August 2022, the military raided Depayin Township and killed 8 residents of Kaing Kan, Hlyaw Hpyu and In Pin Gyi villages. ⁶
On 15 August 2022, the military arrested and killed seven gold miners who went to Bhamo from Wungyi village in KhinU Township, at the checkpoint in Shwebo. ⁷

¹ At least 10 IDP members from southern Kale Township killed due to the collapse of the bridge while crossing the river. <https://tinyurl.com/69T1>

² 10 civilians killed in KhinU in two days, houses burned down. <https://tinyurl.com/2oyc4sa9>

³ The army burns houses in the villages in ChaungU and Kale Townships, six dead bodies found. <https://tinyurl.com/2jnf3pmd>

⁴ Around 500 houses burned down in Kyi Su village in Kanbalu, 10 civilians killed. <https://tinyurl.com/2gf42ulw>

⁵ Bodies of five civilians killed by the military council found in Salingyi. <https://tinyurl.com/2n-bhq4ng>

⁶ Around 5,000 IDPs are in urgent need of ration in Depayin. <https://tinyurl.com/2z8m62e8>

⁷ The army arrests and kills seven civilians who went to the gold mining site in KhinU. <https://tinyurl.com/2o3qxufm>

On 5 November 2022, the military council arrested, tortured and burned 14 civilians to death from Koetaungboet station in Kanbalu Township.⁸

On 12 December 2022, the military raided Pay Pin Chaung village in Kawlin Township and killed five local men.⁹

On 25 December 2022, the bodies of eight residents abducted and killed by the military from Natmahoke village in Indaw Township, were discovered.¹⁰

On 13 January 2023, the military bombed Moe Tar Lay village in Katha Township with a jet fighter, killing 7 residents.¹¹

On 15 February 2023, the military raided Inn Gyi village in Katha Township and shot seven residents dead.¹²

On 1 and 2 March 2023, the military brutally killed 16 local men including a leader of PDF in Tar Taing village in Sagaing Township, and raped and killed three women.¹³

Around 8 am on 25 March 2023, the military set fire to Son Kone village in Budalin Township and burned seven elderly persons to death.¹⁴

⁸ The army arrests 14 villagers in Kanbalu Township and burns them to death.
<https://tinyurl.com/2gchvct3>

⁹ The army burns houses and kills five civilians in Kawlin Township.
<https://tinyurl.com/2ksrn9b2>

¹⁰ The bodies of eight civilians abducted and killed by the military council in Indaw found.
<https://tinyurl.com/2ooh6qf6>

¹¹ The military council's airstrike kills seven innocent civilians and injures at least five others in Katha. <https://tinyurl.com/2zp6f3or>

¹² The burnt bodies of seven people found in Inn Gyi village in Katha Township.
<https://tinyurl.com/2zcuaqgz>

¹³ Three women raped and killed in Tar Taing village. <https://tinyurl.com/2m5hpf3b>

¹⁴ Seven elderly persons from Son Kone village in Budalin Township burnt to death by the army. <https://tinyurl.com/2kp6wpac>

On 11 April 2023, around 170 local residents were killed due to the military's aerial bombardment of Pa Zi Gyi village in Kanbalu Township.¹⁵

At around 7 am on 30 April 2023, the military burned Ahlelsho village in KhinU Township and shot eight residents dead.¹⁶

On 4 May 2023, the military's airstrike killed seven residents including three children in Peik Kayar village in Minkin Township.¹⁷

On 28 May 2023, the military raided Khanthar station in Kawlin Township, arresting 16 locals and brutally killing eight locals.¹⁸

On 27 June 2023, the military attacked Nyaung Kone village in Pale Township with fighter jets, killing a total of 10 local residents, including a monk.¹⁹

On 6 July 2023, the military entered Shwe Pan Kone village in Wetlet Township and killed seven vendors at the entrance of Thama Yoe village.²⁰

At around 2 am on 21 July 2023, the military suddenly entered Sone Chaung village in Yinmarbin Township and killed 12 PDF members.²¹

On 13 August 2023, an unknown group killed five family members from a house at ward No.2 in Kanbalu.²²

¹⁵ The death toll from the Pa Zi Gyi bombing surpasses 170. <https://tinyurl.com/22olxorg>

¹⁶ The junta's indiscriminate shelling hits and kills seven residents in Ywarma village in Sagaing Township. <https://tinyurl.com/2kq4tobw>

¹⁷ Aerial bombing kills seven including children and injures 10 in Minkin. <https://tinyurl.com/2fqhxxgog>

¹⁸ The military council violently kills eight villagers in Kawlin Township. <https://tinyurl.com/2n2yh4y8>

¹⁹ The junta's airstrike kills nine civilians including a monk in Nyaung Gone village. <https://tinyurl.com/2absuz45>

²⁰ The military council kills seven vendors in Wetlet. <https://tinyurl.com/2aqspkef>

²¹ The military council force kills at least 12 civilians during a raid in Sone Chaung village. <https://tinyurl.com/27fvgtmz>

²² Five family members killed in Kanbalu. <https://tinyurl.com/2dfx39r7>

On 14 August 2023, the military stormed the Shwe Nyaung Bin gold mining site in Pinlebu Township and shot six gold miners dead.²³

On 16 August 2023, seven people abducted as human shields were shot dead by the military near Yamar bridge and Wardaing agriculture office in Yinmarbin Township.²⁴

On 18 September 2023, the military violently killed 8 residents of Toke Gyi village in Katha Township.²⁵

On 26 September 2023, at least nine residents were killed due to the military's airstrikes and ground offensive near Magyigwa village in ChaungU Township.²⁶

On 27 September 2023, five local residents were killed when a heavy weapon shell indiscriminately fired by the military hit a house in Sharpho village in Kale Township and exploded.²⁷

On 14 and 15 October 2023, the military brutally killed six local youths including three aged 17 in Yinmarbin Township.²⁸

On 19 October 2023, six bodies were found, including the body of a woman who had been burned to death, in Thonesintkan village in Wetlet Township, where the military was stationed.²⁹

²³ Six men who were doing gold mining in Pinlebu killed. <https://tinyurl.com/25yszs>

²⁴ Seven locals abducted by the military council as human shields shot dead in Yinmarbin Township. <https://tinyurl.com/25kxoy53>

²⁵ The military council kills eight civilians and burns down 34 houses in Katha. <https://tinyurl.com/yk7csq9>

²⁶ At least nine people including three PDF members and one young girl killed in a raid on the village in ChaungU. <https://tinyurl.com/2cn5kjk>

²⁷ Heavy shelling kills five family members in Kale Township. <https://tinyurl.com/2dfc8rtz>

²⁸ Two PDF members and six men brutally killed by junta soldiers. (video file) <https://tinyurl.com/yu95utkx>

²⁹ Bodies of six people burnt to death found in Wetlet. <https://tinyurl.com/2gettu4u>

On 18 October 2023, the military conducted an offensive in Depayin Township and violently killed eight men and women.³⁰

During three days from 12 to 14 November 2023, 17 civilians including a pregnant woman and three children under six were killed in the military's airstrikes in Tha Khut Chaung, Koe Te, Ahlel Taw and Inn Tein villages in Tigyain Township.³¹

On 2 December 2023, the military and Pyu Saw Htee raided Kyar Pyin (Kya Paing) village in Monywa Township and burnt at least 11 men aged 20 to 53 to death.³²

On 12 December 2023, the military bombarded a temporary court in Min Taing Pin village in Pale Township, killing five civilians including a child.³³

On 2 January 2024, the heavy shell fired by the military landed in Ashae Zay in the middle of Kawlin, resulting in the deaths of six locals.³⁴

On 4 January 2024, the military's airstrike killed five locals including a six-year-old child in Sein Nan village in Taze Township.³⁵

On 7 January 2024, the military conducted aerial strikes near a school and Baptist church in Kanan village on Kalay-Tamu road, killing 17 civilians including children.³⁶

³⁰ The military column kills 13 civilians in Depayin. <https://tinyurl.com/2ne52j3m>

³¹ Junta's airstrike kills 17 civilians including three children in Htigyaing. <https://tinyurl.com/2nrhbp7>

³² IDPs dare not to return home due to junta's killings in Kya Paing village. <https://tinyurl.com/2ldur5vp>

³³ Junta's bombing on temporary court in Pale Township kills five civilians including a one-year-old child. <https://tinyurl.com/2ztzxdjn>

³⁴ Heavy shell lands near Kawlin myoma market, killing six civilians. <https://tinyurl.com/2qhr2gfh>

³⁵ Junta's airstrikes kill eight civilians in Taze and Htigyaing. <https://tinyurl.com/2lst2ycr>

³⁶ Junta's airstrike in Kanan village kills 17 civilians. <https://tinyurl.com/2hpfjgm6>

On 7 January 2024, the bodies of 19 local people, including women, from Kawlin and Wuntho Townships, who were arrested and killed by the military, were found.³⁷

On 23 January 2024, six locals from Zar Di village who were armed by the military were killed in the fighting between the military and PDF near Zar Di village in Kanbalu Township.³⁸

On 19 February 2024, the military's Belu column and Pyu Saw Htee column led by U Wathawa brutally killed 11 local men from Taze Township.³⁹

On 13 February 2024, the military arrested and killed seven locals from the cattle breeding zone in Industrial Zone-2 in Monywa.⁴⁰

Kachin State

On 9 August 2022, in Se Zin village in Hpakant Township, where fierce fighting is ongoing, about 30 locals were killed when military and the Shanni troops burned houses, bombed the village with incendiary bombs from air, and arrested and killed residents.⁴¹

On 22 August 2022, the military arrested six residents of Se Zin village in Hpakant Township, and shot them dead on 24 August.⁴²

³⁷ 19 civilians massacred in Kawlin and Wuntho. <https://tinyurl.com/2ogh4hgq>

³⁸ Six residents killed in fighting in Zar Di village in Kanbalu Township. <https://tinyurl.com/yymawav7>

³⁹ 11 men brutally murdered in Taze. <https://tinyurl.com/ylwxwubb>

⁴⁰ The army arrests and kills seven residents in Monywa. <https://tinyurl.com/266rns7f>

⁴¹ Junta troops burn over 400 homes in Se Zin, around 30 locals killed <https://tinyurl.com/2ke2ac4g>

⁴² Junta troops force six trapped civilians in Se Zin village to work, execute them <https://tinyurl.com/2lawpx7p>

On 23 October 2022, over 80 civilians were killed when the military bombed the music concert celebrating the 62nd anniversary of KIO's founding in A Nang Pa (Kan Si village) in KIA Brigade 9 in Hpakant Township. ⁴³

On 18 March 2023, six civilians were fatally shot in a crossfire between the military and joint KIA-PDF forces near a religious area (known locally as Myauk Kone) near Lone Khin village in Hpakant Township. ⁴⁴

On 9 October 2023, around 11pm, at least 27 IDPs, including children, were killed when the military attacked the Mung Lai Hkyet IDP Camp near Laiza from the air. ⁴⁵

On 17 February 2024, six locals, including children, were killed when the military attacked Si Hkam Gyi and Than Ta Dar villages in Mansi Township, where fierce fighting was ongoing between the military and joint KIA-PDF forces. ⁴⁶

On 12 March 2024, five locals, including three children under ten years old, were killed by artillery shelling by the military in Bhamo Township. ⁴⁷

Arakan State On 10 November 2022, the military brutally killed nine residents of Sin Inn Gyi village, including women, in Ponnagyun Township. ⁴⁸

On 16 November 2022, 11 residents were killed when artillery fired by the military hit Gyeik Chaung (Mro) village, in Maungdaw Township. ⁴⁹

⁴³ Rescue access still blocked for severely injured in Hpakant, over 80 bodies found
<https://tinyurl.com/2aownvew>

⁴⁴ Three police officers, six civilians killed fighting near Lone Khin village
<https://tinyurl.com/2rxvjtae>

⁴⁵ Several killed, injured in junta attacks on IDP camp near Laiza <https://tinyurl.com/ym526crh>

⁴⁶ Junta conducts airstrikes as fierce fighting continues in Mansi; about 6 killed including children <https://tinyurl.com/29ekc7sm>

⁴⁷ Junta shelling kills five including three children in Bhamo <https://tinyurl.com/26uf25th>

⁴⁸ Nine bodies killed junta troops found in Sin Inn Gyi village <https://tinyurl.com/2d7uu9jq>

⁴⁹ Junta shelling on Gyeik Chaung (Mro) village in Maungdaw kills 11, injures about 30
<https://tinyurl.com/25xr343s>

On 28 December 2023, around 9pm, six family members were killed when artillery fired by the military hit a house in Zay Di Taung village, Buthidaung Township.⁵⁰

On 30 December 2023, five residents of Kaing Taw, Bu Ta Lone, and Paung Tote villages in Mrauk-U Township were killed due to artillery shelling and airstrikes by the military.⁵¹

On 17 January 2024, six people, including children and women, were killed when the military shelled Lint Sin Ywar Thit village in Kyauktaw Township, where no fighting was taking place.⁵²

On 31 January 2024, the military shot and killed nine political prisoners, including a journalist detained in the jail in Mrauk-U.⁵³

On 29 February 2024, around 11am, at least 12 locals were killed when artillery fired by the military hit the vendor area of the Korean Jetty in Sittwe's Myoma Market.⁵⁴

On 9 March 2024, around 11pm, five residents were killed when artillery fired by the military hit a residential area of Sittwe.⁵⁵

On 18 March 2024, over 20 residents were killed when the military attacked Thar Dar (Muslim) village in Minbya Township from the air.⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Junta shelling kills 10 Rohingya, injures 17 <https://tinyurl.com/2lqk8b4u>

⁵¹ AA captures Myaung Bway police station in Mrauk-U <https://tinyurl.com/2flwtebu>

⁵² Junta MOC-9's shelling on Lint Sin village in Kyauktaw kills six including two children, injures six others <https://tinyurl.com/2p5tu8l2>

⁵³ Junta soldiers shoot dead nine political prisoners facing trial <https://tinyurl.com/2ydbbj3m>

⁵⁴ Death toll from junta shelling on Sittwe's Myoma Market rises to 12
<http://tinyurl.com/26uzv2be>

⁵⁵ Junta shelling on residential area in Sittwe kills five Muslims, injures over 10 including children <https://tinyurl.com/23vcn49m>

⁵⁶ Junta airstrike kills over 20 civilians, injures 25 in Minbya <https://tinyurl.com/27h7uwlw>

On 21 March 2024, around 8am, five residents, including women and children, were killed when the military attacked Ah Htet Lay Hnyin Taung village in Mrauk-U Township. ⁵⁷

On 22 March 2024, about 10 residents were killed when the military attacked Tha Yet Taung village near Kan Htaung Gyi town, Myebon Township. ⁵⁸

Shan State

On 11 March 2023, the military massacred 28 civilians, including a monk, who were taking shelter in a monastery in Nam Nein village, Pinlaung Township. ⁵⁹

On 6 June 2023, 5 locals were killed by heavy and light weapons fired by the military in Moebye town. ⁶⁰

On 4 and 5 November 2023, six civilians, including children, were killed when the military conducted airstrikes on the Kokang region. ⁶¹

On 11 November 2023, over 10 IDPs were killed when the junta attacked the IDPs trapped on the Laukkaing side of Laukkaing-Chinshwehaw road. ⁶²

On 22 November 2023, six civilians were killed when artillery shells fired by the military hit Ton Chan and Se Tan gates at the exit point of Laukkaing. ⁶³

⁵⁷ Junta bombing on Lay Hnyin Taung village in Mrauk-U kills five including four children, injures about 10 <https://tinyurl.com/292cywfy>

⁵⁸ Junta bombing on Tha Yet Taung village in Myebon kills two 50-year-old men, injures one <https://tinyurl.com/2amxp5aw>

⁵⁹ Junta troops massacre people sheltering in Nam Nein village monastery, 28 bodies found <https://tinyurl.com/2nwdqpypa>

⁶⁰ Junta shelling kills five civilians including children in Moebye <https://tinyurl.com/2k8qqlen>

⁶¹ Junta bombing kills six including three children in Kokang <https://bit.ly/49mgiew>

⁶² Junta airstrikes kill tens of civilians fleeing Laukkaing <https://bit.ly/3QUUHCz>

⁶³ Junta shelling kills six, injures several others in Laukkaing <https://bit.ly/47Kucpe>

On 7 December 2023, around 1am, five residents, including two children, were killed when the military bombed Ho Nar village in Namhkam Township from the air. ⁶⁴

On 7 January 2024, six civilians, including women and children, were killed when the junta attacked Ywar Thit village in Namhsan Township from the air. ⁶⁵

On the evening of 2 February 2024, junta troops arrested and shot dead five civilians in Shwe Zar Li village in Momeik Township. ⁶⁶

On 4 February 2024, the military shot and killed 12 young people from the Aung Hsu Bway drug rehab centre in Hsihseng Township for refusing to be sent to the front lines. ⁶⁷

On 19 February 2024, around 6am, seven civilians were killed when the military attacked a convoy of local vehicles returning to Hsihseng town to collect supplies, using artillery and drones. ⁶⁸

Mandalay Region

On 3 October 2022, the military arrested and killed five locals from Natogyi town. ⁶⁹

On 13 December 2022, members of the pro-military Pyu Saw Htee militia arrested and killed six men in Myingyan Township. ⁷⁰

⁶⁴ Junta airstrikes kill five including 2 children in Namkham <https://bit.ly/4acxPpO>

⁶⁵ Junta airstrikes kill six civilians including one child, three women Namhsan <https://bit.ly/4aQyttl>

⁶⁶ Junta troops shoots dead five civilians, arrest at least 40 including five women in Momeik <http://tinyurl.com/23tehdw4>

⁶⁷ Around 60 killed including junta soldiers in over 20 days of fighting in Hsihseng <http://tinyurl.com/265aga4t>

⁶⁸ Junta shelling kills seven civilians in Hsihseng <http://tinyurl.com/27ulaes2>

⁶⁹ "Thway Thauk" name tags found affixed to bodies found in Natogyi <https://tinyurl.com/2lxalclp>

⁷⁰ Bodies of six men found in Myingyan; junta arrests, kills one youth in Gangaw <https://tinyurl.com/2mjqhper>

On 26 May 2023, five members of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), including the party's village/ward chairman, were shot dead by unidentified armed men in Tada-U Township. ⁷¹

On 4 June 2023, seven burned bodies were found in Kyet Tu Yway village and Thea Inn village, Singu Township, after the military conducted raids in the area. ⁷²

On 14 and 15 June 2023, bodies of six civilians with gunshot wounds to their heads were found in Thabeikkyin Township. ⁷³

On 29 July 2023, five family members of the village administrator were killed when joint PDF forces attacked the administrator's home in Thet Kei Kyin village, Mahlaing Township. ⁷⁴

On 16 November 2023, the military raided a tea shop in Aung Kan Thar village, Madaya Township, and shot dead 11 civilians, including the tea shop owner. ⁷⁵

On 22 November 2023, an unidentified group of people killed seven residents, including two women, in Than Kone village in Ngazun Township. ⁷⁶

On 30 December 2023, the military shot and killed six people, including one woman, in Shan Myaung village in Madaya Township. ⁷⁷

⁷¹ Five USDP members shot dead in Tada-U <https://tinyurl.com/2faarv7e>

⁷² Seven bodies of civilians killed junta troops found in Singu; two youths shot dead in Wetlet <https://tinyurl.com/2kxqnp7d>

⁷³ Bodies three men with gunshot wounds found in Thabeikkyin <https://tinyurl.com/2b46pyyq>

⁷⁴ Village administrator's house attacked in Mahlaing, five killed including three family members <https://tinyurl.com/29wwrrbw>

⁷⁵ Junta troops shoot dead 11 people in tea shop in Madaya <https://bit.ly/3sCA8Sc>

⁷⁶ Seven including two women killed in Than Kone village in Ngazun <https://bbc.in/3MXqP6u>

⁷⁷ Six locals shot dead in Shan Myaung village in Madaya <https://bit.ly/48BiopB>

Bago Region

On 10 May 2023, the military massacred 18 civilians, including women and children, by burning them alive in Nyaung Pin Thar village, Htantabin Township.⁷⁸

On 27 June 2023, 5 inmates were killed when they were shot for allegedly attempting to escape during their transfer from Kyaik Sa Kaw Prison in Daik-U Township to Thayawady Prison.⁷⁹

On 9 August 2023, the military killed seven locals from Kyar Inn village (Lower), Phyu Township, where fierce fighting was taking place.⁸⁰

On 25 December 2023, the military burned and killed seven civilians at the edge of the Bago Yoma, northeast of Nattalin Township.⁸¹

On 16 February 2024, passersby discovered the bodies of three women and three men who had been brutally murdered between La Pat village and Kan Kyay Seik village in Kyaukkyi Township.⁸²

On 14 March 2024, the PDF-Shwe Tan Myay stated that they had eliminated five people who were notorious as military informants in Letpadan Township.⁸³

⁷⁸ Junta troops massacre 18 civilians including children by burning in Nyaung Pin Thar village <https://tinyurl.com/2egzaysr>

⁷⁹ Family members say five of missing political prisoners shot dead <https://tinyurl.com/22f7mn5w>

⁸⁰ Junta troops set fire to village, kills seven villagers after heavy losses in Kyar Inn battle <https://tinyurl.com/23c5x6pn>

⁸¹ Junta troops massacres seven civilians by burning in Nattalin <https://bit.ly/3S5st95>

⁸² Six people killed in Kyaukkyi <http://tinyurl.com/22hpepl8>

⁸³ Five junta informants, including non-CDM teacher, killed in one night <https://tinyurl.com/24oshkvc>

Karen State

On 21 October 2022, six locals were killed in the clashes between the military and joint KNU-PDF forces in Kawkareik town. ⁸⁴

On 7 June 2023, six civilians were killed when the military conducted airstrikes on the Lay Htoo Hpo area of Me Thu village tract in Dwe Loe Township, Mutraw (Hpapun) District. ⁸⁵

On 12 January 2023, five residents, including a pastor, were killed when the military bombed a church in Lay War village, Pay Kay village tract, Luthaw Township, Mutraw (Hpapun) District. ⁸⁶

On 1 February 2024, five locals, including a child, were killed when the military conducted airstrikes and artillery shelling near Mong Lun village in the Leik Tho area of Thandaunggyi Township. ⁸⁷

On 13 March 2024, at least five civilians were killed in the clashes between the military and joint KNU-PDF forces in Thin Gan Nyi Naung, Myawaddy Township. ⁸⁸

On 31 March 2024, about eight IDPs were killed when the military attacked Shwe Kyaung Monastery in Hpapun Township from the air, where displaced people were sheltering. ⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Junta IB-97's shelling injures two locals in Kawkareik, two trucks burned on Asia Highway
<https://tinyurl.com/24zlvjtc>

⁸⁵ Junta airstrikes kills six locals in KNU-controlled Mutraw (Hpapun) District
<https://tinyurl.com/2zcl2ngq>

⁸⁶ Junta bombing on church kills five including pastor, injures seven
<https://tinyurl.com/2gtl9yzo>

⁸⁷ Junta airstrikes kill five Leik Tho locals , including child <http://tinyurl.com/2b8mm773>

⁸⁸ Concerns among Myawaddy residents as battles approach <https://tinyurl.com/2ca4eejv>

⁸⁹ Junta attacks IDP area from air after losing key Battalion 19 in Hpapun
<https://tinyurl.com/2d6w4782>

Magway Region

On 12 April 2022, nine displaced people, including women, were killed en masse when the military fired indiscriminately at the surrounding areas of Tan Su village, Pauk Township. ⁹⁰

On 4 July 2022, the military raped and killed a woman and also brutally murdered seven men as they carried out raids in Gangaw Township. ⁹¹

On 9 July 2022, two residents of Taung Yoe village in Myaing Township and five residents of Ka Bar Phyu village in Pauk Township were brutally killed inside Myaing Industrial Zone 2. ⁹²

On 26 November 2023, around 7pm, unidentified gunmen shot dead six village administrators in their homes in Upper Minhla and Mindon Townships. ⁹³

On 14 February 2024, at 4am, the military and Pyu Saw Htee members arrested and massacred 10 local men aged between 20-40 from Thin Taw village, Shwe Bo village, and Ywar Thar villages in Gangaw Township. ⁹⁴

Chin State

On 6 August 2022, about 150 the military entered the Zotung area of Matupi Township and brutally killed six locals. ⁹⁵

⁹⁰ Junta shelling kills nine IDPs in Pauk <https://tinyurl.com/yxpn2g75>

⁹¹ Seven men killed, woman raped during junta clearance operation in Gangaw <https://tinyurl.com/2lztezs>

⁹² Junta troops arrest, kill seven civilians in Myaing and Pauk <https://tinyurl.com/28nut73q>

⁹³ Six village administrators simultaneously killed in Upper Minhla and Mindon <https://bit.ly/47RxAvv>

⁹⁴ Junta troops, Pyu Saw Htee members kill 10 civilians, burn over 40 homes in Gangaw <http://tinyurl.com/26tmapkw>

⁹⁵ Junta troops commit atrocities against civilians during raids in Chin State's villages <https://tinyurl.com/2nx9hny5>

On 30 March 2023, eight civilians, including two children under 10, were killed en masse when the military bombed Khuafo village in Thantlang Township with fighter jets.⁹⁶

On 10 April 2023, nine civilians, including a reverend, were killed when the military bombed a site prepared for a Summer Bible Camp in Webula town, Falam Township.⁹⁷

On 15 November 2023, at least 13 civilians, including a child, were killed when the military attacked Wei Lu village in Matupi Township with fighter jets.⁹⁸

On 29 January 2024, seven civilians were killed when the military bombed Hone village in the Daai (Chin) area, Paletwa Township.⁹⁹

Yangon Region

On 19 August 2022, six young people were killed when an explosion occurred at a fermented rice wine stall southwest of Set San Ward in Kyeemyindaing Township.¹⁰⁰

On the evening of 22 August 2022, six people were killed when the Urban Guerrilla Force (Twantay) shot at a vehicle carrying 100-household heads and 10-household heads, including the administrator of Zee Hpyu Kone village on their way back from a meeting in Twantay town.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ Junta bombing kills eight civilians, including two children under 10, in Thantlang
<https://tinyurl.com/2ou6y5bl>

⁹⁷ Junta bombs site prepared for Summer Bible Camp in Webula
<https://tinyurl.com/255trmus>

⁹⁸ Junta airstrike kills at least 13 civilians, including child, injures many in Matupi
<https://bit.ly/3syuwsd>

⁹⁹ Junta bombing on Hone village in Paletwa kills seven civilians <http://tinyurl.com/yls633mu>

¹⁰⁰ Bodies of youths killed in explosion not returned, families threatened...
<https://tinyurl.com/2jhbyh49>

¹⁰¹ Junta troops arrest, torture civilians in Twantay after six junta administration members killed
<https://tinyurl.com/2hdp55nm>

On 5 December 2022, at 7am, locals discovered the bodies of 13 Rohingya people beside Ta Pin Shwe Htee Road in Bar Lar village, Hlegu Township. ¹⁰²

On 22 February 2023, unidentified gunmen entered a house on 4th May Ga Wadi Street in Yeik Thar Ward in Hlegu town and killed five people, including a three-year-old child. ¹⁰³

Karenni State

On 24 May 2023, five civilians, including women, when the military bombarded the western part of Demoso town. ¹⁰⁴

On 14 November 2023, at least five civilians, including a child, were killed when artillery fired by the military hit Poe Zar Chan and Mong Long Wards in Loikaw city. ¹⁰⁵

On 5 February 2024, five civilians, including four children who were studying, were killed when the military bombed two schools in western Demoso Township. ¹⁰⁶

On 5 February 2024, the military shot dead three displaced women and three children, including a pregnant woman, in Shadaw Township. ¹⁰⁷

Tanintharyi Region

On 6 January 2023, locals discovered the bodies of eight men who had been killed and dumped near Ywar Hayt Lu village in Bokepyin Township. ¹⁰⁸

¹⁰² Thirteen bodies found in Hlegu <https://tinyurl.com/2p9h8xrg>

¹⁰³ Five people, including 3-year-old, shot dead in Hlegu <https://tinyurl.com/2jroyn6u>

¹⁰⁴ Junta conducts airstrikes for two consecutive days in western Demoso <https://tinyurl.com/2ry6yoh6>

¹⁰⁵ Casualties including children reported as junta shelling hit residential areas in Loikaw <https://bit.ly/46hmzp9>

¹⁰⁶ Junta bombing on school in Karenni kills five, including four children <http://tinyurl.com/25rmvnx4>

¹⁰⁷ Junta troops shoot dead three women, including displaced pregnant woman, and three children <http://tinyurl.com/2aklczo7>

¹⁰⁸ Bodies of eight men found Ywar Hayt Lu village in Bokepyin <https://tinyurl.com/2gsgjh5h>

On 11 February 2023, an unidentified group of armed men killed seven family members of a military-appointed administrator in Nyaung Shin Kone village, Palauk town, Palaw Township.¹⁰⁹

On 4 March 2023, the military and Pyu Saw Htee members arrested and killed five residents of Kyauk Wut village (Lower) in Launglon Township.¹¹⁰

On 22 May 2023, military troops shot dead eight people, including a minor, from Kawthoung town and villages in Kawthoung Township.¹¹¹

Mon State On 25 June 2022, the military set fire to Htone Bo Lay village in Thaton Township and killed five civilians, including a woman, in the village.¹¹²

On 3 August 2022, 5 staff members, the township staff officer, were killed when Ye Balu- a local resistance force- attacked the immigration office in Ye Township.¹¹³

On 1 June 2023, five locals were killed in the crossfire between the military and resistance forces at the Don Tha Mi River Bridge in Du Yin Seik village, on the border between Hpa-An and Thaton Townships.¹¹⁴

Ayeyarwady Region

On 23 March 2023, five Rohingya people died in Pathein Prison due to beatings and lack of food within the prison.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁹ Junta tightens security in Palauk after seven family members of junta administrator killed
<https://tinyurl.com/2jrwuwz4>

¹¹⁰ Five civilians killed, one critically injured by junta troops, Pyu Saw Htee members in Launglon
<https://tinyurl.com/2qjnx22q>

¹¹¹ Junta soldiers shoot dead eight people, including minor, during interrogation in Kawthoung
<https://tinyurl.com/2o33pfmm>

¹¹² At least five civilians including woman killed, nearly 7,000 displaced during arson attack on Htone Bo Lay village
<https://tinyurl.com/2dp2rh73>

¹¹³ Immigration office in Ye attacked, five killed including staff officer
<https://tinyurl.com/2bcg2txo>

¹¹⁴ Two checkpoints at Don Tha Mi Bridge simultaneously attacked, over 30 military, police personnel killed, weapons seized
<https://tinyurl.com/2k6y7ymp>

¹¹⁵ Five Rohingya people die this month in Pathein prison amid reports of torture
<https://tinyurl.com/2e3h7n8q>



Nationwide

mine operations





Nationwide mine operations

According to the BNI-MPM records, between 1 February 2021 and 31 March 2024, the resistance forces carried out 442 mine attacks targeting the military across Myanmar.

Looking at the mine attacks by year, there were 74 cases in 2021, 167 in 2022 and 173 in 2023. The number of mine attacks has risen steadily each year.


A total of 1,540 military soldiers were killed in mine attacks by resistance forces. In Sagaing Region alone, mine attacks resulted in the deaths of 776 soldiers, accounting for nearly 50 percent of the total fatalities. Mine attacks in Magway Region, Chin State, and Mandalay Region resulted in the deaths of hundreds of soldiers.





There were two extraordinary events involving mine attacks on the convoy of the military-appointed Sagaing Region Chief Minister. Additionally, the convoys of the Chief Ministers of Magway Region and Karen State were also attacked with mines.

According to the BNI-MPM findings, PDFs/LDFs were responsible for nearly 90 percent of the mine attacks against the military, totalling 393 incidents.



During the same period, EROs carried out mine attacks on the military. The attacks included 19 attributed to the KNU/KNLA, 17 to the KIO/KIA, five to the ULA/AA, and seven to other armed groups.

Looking at the mine attacks by resistance forces by region, Sagaing Region, which hosts the highest number of PDFs/LDFs, led with 178 incidents, followed by Magway Region with 73 and Mandalay Region with 43.



Throughout the Spring Revolution, over 66 percent of the landmine attacks targeting the military occurred in Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay Regions. More than 10 incidents of landmine attacks were documented in 11 townships: Monywa, Yesagyo, Myinmu, Shwebo, ChaungU, Wetlet, Khin U, Madaya, Yinmarbin, Pakokku, and Myaing.

The Myaung Women Warriors (M2W) in Sagaing Region are well-known for actively engaging in the production of handmade mines, which constitutes a fundamental part of their operational activities. The evidence demonstrates that while there are limitations in preventing the military's aerial bombing, mine operations from central Myanmar effectively cripple the military's ground strength by disrupting their columns. Therefore, it can be said that mine action strategy or mine operations are crucial in the history of the Spring Revolution, serving as a pivotal military strategy aimed at ultimately ending the military coup.

(As MPM records mine attacks as one incident per day by region, the actual figures may be higher.)



Records of mine attacks on junta troops

1 February 2021 -31 March 2024

1540

Total number of junta soldier deaths

Throughout the Spring Revolution, **over 66 percent** of the landmine attacks on the military took place in the Dry Zone or Anyar including Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay Regions.




The PDF's mine attacks on junta troops account for nearly **90 percent** of all landmine attacks.


73 towns captured and controlled by resistance forces

Between 24 June 2023 and the end of July 2024, resistance forces captured and controlled 73 towns from the junta. Following the launch of Operation 1027 on 27 October 2023, the frequency of town captures increased significantly. Sixteen towns were captured by the ULA/AA, 10 by MNTJP/MNDAA and 10 by the PSLF/TNLA. The KIO/KIA, CNF/CDF and allied forces, Chin Brotherhood and allied forces, Karenni revolutionary forces including the KNPP/KA and the KNDF, the KNU, the PDFs under the NUG, the UWSP/UWSA and the PNLO/PNLA, also took control of towns in their respective areas. Looking at the administrative levels of captured towns, we find that 10 were district-level towns, 22 townships, 40 towns and a sub-township. Despite the junta's extensive efforts to recapture lost towns, it succeeded in recapturing only Kawlin, a district-level town in the Sagaing Region.


(The events and figures related to town captures presented here are based solely on our collected data and, as well as what we verified through ground reporters.)



Number of towns captured and controlled by resistance forces



Administrative levels of the towns captured and controlled by resistance forces.



24-July-2021	24-Jun-2023	2-Nov-2023	2-Nov-2023	2-Nov-2023	2-Nov-2023	7-Nov-2023	7-Nov-2023	12-Nov-2023	13-Nov-2023	13-Nov-2023	13-Nov-2023	15-Nov-2023	20-Nov-2023	22-Nov-2023
M'kuilimnu	Mese	Chinshwehaw	Hpawnghseng	Kyukoke (Pang Hseng)	Theinni	Khampat	Monekoe	Kunlong	Rikhawdar	Nan Mei Khon	Moebye	Mawhtike	Injangyan	Shwepyithay
The CNF/CNA and CDF-Mindat seized control of M'kuilimnu town in Mindat Township on 30 November 2023 after the military council troops withdrew from the area.	The joint force of the 4K consisting of KA, KNDF, KNPLF, KNU/TNLAA and PDFs launched attacks on all military junta camps in Mese Township on 13 June and seized control of the town on 24 June.	The Three Brotherhood Alliance—MNDAA,TNLAA and AA — launched Operation 1027 on 27 October, and seized complete control of Chinshwehaw, Hpawnghseng, Kyukoke (Pang Hseng) and Theinni towns on 2 November.	The Three Brotherhood Alliance—MNDAA,TNLAA and AA — launched Operation 1027 on 27 October, and seized complete control of Chinshwehaw, Hpawnghseng, Kyukoke (Pang Hseng) and Theinni towns on 2 November.	The Three Brotherhood Alliance—MNDAA,TNLAA and AA — launched Operation 1027 on 27 October, and seized complete control of Chinshwehaw, Hpawnghseng, Kyukoke (Pang Hseng) and Theinni towns on 2 November.	The Three Brotherhood Alliance—MNDAA,TNLAA and AA — launched Operation 1027 on 27 October, and seized complete control of Chinshwehaw, Hpawnghseng, Kyukoke (Pang Hseng) and Theinni towns on 2 November.	PDFs launched attacks on junta troops in Khampat in Tamu Township on 4 November and seized complete control of the town on 7 November.	The MNDAA and AA attacked the Monekoe strategic hilltop outpost on 5 November and seized complete control of the town in Muse Township on 7 November.	The MNDAA launched the military operation to capture Kunglong in northern Shan State on 1 November, attacking military junta camps and its administrative offices. The ethnic army seized control of the town on 12 November.	On 13 November, the joint force of CNF/CNA, CDF- Zanniatram, PDA – Tedim, CDF – Thantlang and CDF – Hualingoram attacked and captured two military outposts based in Rikhawdar on Trade Route 2 on the India-Myanmar border and seized complete control of the town.	The KNDF launched attacks on Nan Mei Khon in Demoso Township on 11 November and seized control of the town on 13 November.	The KNDF launched attacks on Moebye in Pekon Township on 11 November and seized control of the town on 13 November.	On 15 November 2023, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) captured Mawhtike in Kone Kyan Township in northern Shan State.	On 20 November, junta soldiers and police members from two military junta camps and a police station in Injangyan Township withdrew from the town.	Joint PDF forces launched attacks on Shwepyithay town in Homalin Township on 21 November. The joint forces seized control of the town and captured eight junta soldiers on 22 November.
28-Nov-2023	29-Nov-2023	30-Nov-2023	30-Nov-2023	30-Nov-2023	4-Dec-2023	5-Dec-2023	13-Dec-2023	15-Dec-2023	18-Dec-2023	22-Dec-2023	28-Dec-2023	31-Dec-2023	4-Jan-2024	7-Jan-2024
Konegyan	Rezua	Waibula	Hnaring	Surkhua	Mone	Monglon	Maw Luu	Namhsan	Namkham	Mantong	Namtu	Mongngaw	Laukkai	Kutkai
On 28 November, the MNDAA seized control of Konegyan town on Myanmar-China border in northern Shan State after the entire Infantry Battalion 125 based in the town surrendered by raising a white flag.	The CNF/CNA, CDF- Zotung, CDF- Zophei, CDF-Lautu, CDF-Mara, CDF- Senthang and CDF- Matupi launched “Operation ZZLMS” on Rezua town in the Zotung area of Chin State on 26 November and seized control of the town on 29 November.	The CNF/CNA and CNDF seized control of Weblu town in Falam Township on 30 November 2023 after the military junta troops withdrew from the area.	The CNF/CNA and the locally-based CDF- Thantlang seized control of the town of Hnaring town in Thantlang Township on 30 November 2023 after the military council troops withdrew from the area.	The CNF/CNA and the locally-based CDF- Hakha seized control of the town of Surkhua in Hakha Township on 30 November 2023 after the military council troops withdrew from the area.	The KNLA and allied resistance forces launched attacks on military junta camps in Mone town in Kyaukkyi Township on 2 December and seized control of the town on 4 December.	On 5 December, joint TNLA forces seized control of Monglon town in Kyaukme Township.	Joint forces of KIA, ABSDF, and PDF-Indaw seized control of Maw Luu town on 13 December.	On 15 December, joint TNLA forces seized control of Namhsan town.	The TNLA and allied forces launched attacks on Namkham town on 27 October and seized control of the town on 18 December.	On 22 December, the TNLA and allied forces seized control of Mantong town.	The TNLA launched attacks on Namtu town on 25 December and seized control of the town on 28 December.	The TNLA launched attacks on Mongngaw town in Kyaukme Township on 29 December and seized control of the town on 31 December.	The MNDAA seized control of Laukkai town.	On 7 January, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (MNDAA, TNLA, AA) seized control of Kutkai town.
10-Jan-2024	10-Jan-2024	14-Jan-2024	16-Jan-2024	21-Jan-2024	24-Jan-2024	28-Jan-2024	28-Jan-2024	28-Jan-2024	6-Feb-2024	6-Feb-2024	7-Feb-2024	8-Feb-2024	10-Feb-2024	12-Feb-2024
Hopang	Panglong	Paletwa	Samee	Mabein	Pauktaw	Mawchi	Hsihseng	Ywarthit	Minbya	Taungpyo	Kyauktaw	Mrauk-U	Sinbo	Shadaw
The Three Brotherhood Alliance handed over Hopang and Panglong, the towns they seized on 5 January, to the UWSA on 10 January.	The Three Brotherhood Alliance handed over Hopang and Panglong, the towns they seized on 5 January, to the UWSA on 10 January.	The ULA/AA launched attacks on Paletwa town on 13 November and seized control of the town on 14 January.	On 16 January, the AA seized control of Samee town in Paletwa Township.	The KIO and allied PDFs launched attacks on Mabein town on 20 January 2024 and seized control of the town on 21 January.	The AA launched attacks on Pauktaw town on 19 January 2024 and seized control of the town on 24 January.	On 28 January, the KNDF announced that it had seized control of Mawchi town without having to fight after the military junta abandoned its camps in the town on 26 January 2024.	On 28 January, the PNLO/PNLA announced that it had captured LIB 424 and seized control of entire Hsihseng town.	On 28 January, the KNDF announced that it had seized control of Ywarthit town in Bawlahe Township.	On 6 February, the ULA/AA announced that it had seized control of Minbya town.	The AA launched attacks on both Taungpyo (Let Wae) and Taungpyo (Let Yar) camps of the military junta on 4 February 2024, and seized control of the town on 6 February.	On 7 February 2024, the AA seized control of Kyauktaw town.	On 8 February, the AA seized control of Mrauk-U town in Arakan State.	On 10 February, the KIA seized control of Sibo town in Myitkyina Township.	On 12 February 2024, the KNDF seized control of Shadaw town in Karenni (Kayah) State.
15-Feb-2024	15-Feb-2024	16-Feb-2024	22-Feb-2024	4-Mar-2024	6-Mar-2024	8-Mar-2024	11-Mar-2024	14-Mar-2024	17-Mar-2024	28-Mar-2024	29-Mar-2024	29-Apr-2024	5-May-2024	7-May-2024
Myebon	Kanhtaunggyi	Mael	Myohla	Ponnagyun	Kani	Dawthponeyan	Ramree	Kyalkdon	Rathedaung	Hpapun	Lwegel	Kyindwe	Sumprabum	Myothit
On 15 February 2024, the AA seized control of Myebon town in Arakan State.	On 15 February 2024, the ULA/AA captured Kanhtaunggyi in Arakan State.	On 16 February 2024, the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) captured Mael in Arakan State after the withdrawal of junta troops from the town.	On 22 February 2024, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and allied forces captured the town after junta soldiers withdrew from the strategic hill camp in Myohla town in Shwegu Township.	On 4 March 2024, the AA seized control of Ponnagyun town in Arakan State.	On 6 March 2024, joint resistance forces seized control of Kani town in Sagaing Region.	On 8 March 2024, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and allied forces captured Dawthponeyan town in Waingmaw Township after the surrender of junta soldiers from Infantry Battalion-142 in the town.	On 11 March 2024, the AA seized control of Ramree town in Arakan State.	The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and joint resistance forces launched attacks on military junta camps in Kyalkdon town, Kaw-kareik Township on 13-14 March 2024 and seized control of the town on 14 March.	On 17 March 2024, the AA seized control of Rathedaung town in Arakan State.	On 28 March 2024, the KNLA and allied resistance forces seized control of Hpapun town in Karen State.	On 29 March 2024, the KNLA and allied resistance forces seized control of Lwegel town in Kachin State.	The Chin Brotherhood Alliance and the AA jointly seized control of Kyindwe town in Kanpetlet Township on 29 April 2024.	On 5 May 2024, Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and allied forces successfully took control of Sumprabum town.	On 7 May 2024, the joint People's Defense Forces (PDFs) launched an offensive against the military council's camps in Myothit town in Tamu Township. The joint PDFs took control of the town on 11 May.
9-May-2024	18-May-2024	19-May-2024	21-May-2024	11-June-2024	26-June-2024	29-June-2024	11-July-2024	16-July-2024	16-July-2024	17-July-2024	24-July-2024	25-July-2024		
Sane	Buthidaung	Cikha	Tonzang	Sadon	Nawngkhio	Matupi	Lailenpi	Thandwe	Mongmit	Singu	Mogok	Lashio		
Before 9 May 2024, the ULA/AA captured Sane in Arakan State.	The Arakan Army (AA) seized complete control of Buthidaung town in Arakan State on 18 May 2024.	The CNF/CNA and allied Chin defense forces seized control of Cikha town in Tonzang Township on 19 May 2024.	The CNF/CNA, CDF- Thantlang, CDF- Tedim, CDF CDM-Siyin, CDF- Hualingoram, YDF (Yaw), CDF- Asho, CDF-KKG, CDF- Hakha, CDF-Zanniatram, CDF-Matupi and CDF- Paletwa seized control of Tonzang town in Tonzang Township on 21 May 2024.	On 11 June 2024, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and allied forces attacked and captured the military council's camps in Sadon.	On 26 June 2024, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) successfully took control of Nawngkhio.	On 29 June 2024, a combined force of Chin Brotherhood, Arakan Army (AA), Yaw Army (YA) and Yaw Defense Force (YDF) successfully took control of Matupi.	The CNF/CNA, CDF- Mara, CDF-Matupi, CDF-Lautu and CDF- Zophei launched a joint attack on military junta camps in Lailenpi town in Matupi Township on 20 November and seized control of the town on 24 November. On 11 July 2024, Maraland Defense Force/ Maraland Territorial Council (MDF/ MTC) retook Lailenpi with the help of the ULA/AA.	On 16 July 2024, the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) captured Thandwe in Arakan State.	On 16 July 2024, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and allied forces captured Mongmit in northern Shan State.	On 17 July 2024, People's Defense Force (PDF) captured Singu in Mandalay Region.	On 24 July 2024, Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and allied forces took control of Mogok in Mandalay Region.	On 25 July 2024, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) took control of Lashio in northern Shan State.		



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The role of international community

China's Interest-Based Approach to Myanmar

China, known for approaching issues based on its own interests and those of Chinese nationals, has obviously sided with the military since the 2021 military coup, shielding it from international pressure and also treating it with great importance.

Keeping silent over the military's targeted violence on civilians through the use of artillery, naval strikes and airstrikes, China has instead focused on pouring investments into numerous business ventures in Myanmar and attempting to revive stalled major economic projects.

However, in 2022 and 2023, the resistance forces pressure on the military suddenly intensified. After the 3BHA "Operation 1027" launched on 27 October 2023, which saw more frequent capture of towns and bases, China's role on the Myanmar issue became more active.

The suppression of Kyar Phyant (online scamming businesses)- one of the objectives of Operation 1027- is of interest to China. It put China in a distressing situation between the 3BHA and the military council. After witnessing the losses for the military it had steadfastly supported, China mediated the Haigeng Agreement to halt the offensive in northern Shan State.

To summarize, China, which has always defended the military at the UN saying what is happening in Myanmar is an internal affair, has manipulated the conflict actors in Myanmar to suit its short and long-term interests. Acting as a peace envoy or mediator between the military and EROs using its "fire in one hand and water in the other" approach, China's role may not hold sway over all the new revolutionary forces that have emerged during the Spring Revolution.

Date	Subject
16-19 April 2023	Peng Xiubin, head of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC), met with former military dictator Senior General Than Shwe and former President Thein Sein at their respective homes in Nay Pyi Taw during his four-day visit to Myanmar. ¹
18 April 2023	Despite the rise in violence in Myanmar, the Chinese government has invested over US\$113 million since the February 2021 military coup. ²
2 May 2023	Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang met with military leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Nay Pyi Taw during his Myanmar trip. During the meeting, he stated that his visit demonstrates the friendship between the two countries and shows China's support for Myanmar on the international stage. ³
17 May 2023	Since the 2021 military coup, the military has imported at least US\$1 billion worth of military weapons and raw materials from foreign countries, including Russia and China. ⁴
1 June 2023	A delegation led by a top Chinese intelligence official discussed military cooperation with the military. ⁵
10 June 2023	Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar, Mr. Chen Hai, and his team met privately with military-appointed Kachin State Chief Minister U Khet Htein Nan at the State Government Office in Myitkyina. ⁶
25 July 2023	The People's Liberation Army (PLA) provided military training to officers of the Myanmar military at the Shweli Government Guest House in Muse Township in northern Shan State. ⁷

¹ Chinese Communist Party meets with U Than Shwe and U Thein Sein, The Irrawaddy, 22 April 2023

² China invests over US\$113 million in Myanmar after coup despite rising violence, Mizzima, 18 April 2023

³ Junta says China is standing with Myanmar, RFA, 2 May 2023

⁴ Junta buys \$1 billion worth of military equipment including from Russia and China after coup, Mizzima, 18 May 2023

⁵ Junta and top Chinese intelligence officials meet for military cooperation, Mizzima, 1 June 2023

⁶ Chinese Ambassador Mr. Chen Hai meets quietly with Kachin State government in Myitkyina, Mizzima, 10 June 2023

⁷ Chinese military officers training militia groups in Muse, DVB, 25 July 2023

23-24 October 2023	Chinese Ambassador Mr. Chen Hai met with the military to discuss combating online fraud groups operating along the Myanmar-China border. The ambassador also had separate meetings with the military's home affairs minister Lt-Gen Yar Pyae, and foreign affairs minister U Than Swe. ⁸
26 December 2023	While intense fighting continued in Arakan State, the military signed an addendum to the Concession Agreement with China for the implementation of the deep-sea port project, which is part of the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone. ⁹
5 January 2024	A delegation led by Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Sun Weidong met with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Nay Pyi Taw during their visit to Myanmar, discussing peace and stability in the border areas. The minister's visit coincided with the surrender of the Laukkaing Regional Operations Command during Operation 1027. ¹⁰
28 January 2024	Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh, Yao Wen, stated that the Chinese government is making efforts to mediate a ceasefire in Arakan State. The ambassador also mentioned that China is working towards the repatriation of Rohingya refugees. ¹¹

⁸ Chinese Ambassador and junta discuss combating online fraud groups, Shan News, 25 October 2023

⁹ Junta signs Addendum to deep-sea port agreement with China amid intense fighting in Arakan, Narinjara, 27 December 2023

¹⁰ Chinese delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister meets with junta leader in Nay Pyi Taw, Tanintharyi Times, 6 January 2024

¹¹ China mediating ceasefire efforts in Arakan State, VOA, 29 January 2024

India: Quietly Aiding the Military

Surprisingly, India, which likes to portray itself as a leading democracy among world nations, has engaged with Myanmar's military, including selling arms and pursuing economic cooperation.

In October 2022, India delivered components for 122mm howitzer artillery systems, and it continues to sell other military hardware to the Myanmar military.¹² Alongside selling arms to the military, seven Indian companies were added to an international list for their links to human rights violations by the military in Myanmar.¹³

While profiting from arms sales to the military, the Indian government is concerned about increasing armed activities along the India-Myanmar border and an influx of Myanmar refugees into India. The Indian Home Affairs Minister Amit Anil Chandra Shah stated intentions to fence the entire 1,000-mile India-Myanmar border.¹⁴ In addition, to "maintain internal security and demographic data of India's northeastern states," the Indian central government decided to abolish the Free Movement Regime (FMR) allowing free cross-border movement between the two countries.¹⁵

Meanwhile, Pu Valalvena, Member of Parliament of Mizoram State, met with the ULA/AA along the border to discuss building a road connecting Mizoram to Paletwa in Myanmar's Chin State.¹⁶

¹² India exporting military equipment to Myanmar military, Myanmar Now, 1 March 2023

¹³ Seven Indian companies selling arms to Myanmar military blacklisted, Mizzima, 29 August 2023

¹⁴ Indian Home Minister says India-Myanmar border will be fenced, VOA, 08 February 2024

¹⁵ Indian Home Minister calls for immediate suspension of Free Movement Regime (FMR) with Myanmar, 8 February 2024

¹⁶ Mizoram MP and AA discuss India-Myanmar road construction, RFA, 1 March 2024

To sum up, regarding the situation in Myanmar, although the Indian government led by Prime Minister Modi is working to promote democracy, it is taking a stance more in favor of the Myanmar military.

Date	Subject
16 July 2023	Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and the military's Foreign Minister U Than Swe met on the sidelines of the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) cooperation meeting held in Bangkok. During the meeting, Jaishankar expressed India's concerns about the humanitarian situation in Myanmar and proposed a "people-centric approach" to address Myanmar's urgent challenges. ¹⁷
4 January 2024	Home Affairs Minister Amit Shah informed the Chief Minister of Mizoram state that Myanmar nationals who have sought refuge after the military coup will not be sent back until the situation in the neighboring country returns to normal. ¹⁸
7 March 2024	After announcing the end of the visa-free border policy with Myanmar, the Indian government repatriated the first batch of some Myanmar refugees who had been sheltering in India since the 2021 military coup. ¹⁹
22 March 2024	Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar received ASEAN Special Envoy on Myanmar, Alounkeo Kittikhoun, in New Delhi and discussed the Myanmar issue. ²⁰

¹⁷ India proposes 'people-centered approach' to address Myanmar's challenges, Mizzima, 18 July 2023

¹⁸ "Myanmar Refugees Won't Be Sent Back Until...": Amit Shah, NDTV, 5 January 2024

¹⁹ First batch of Myanmar refugees in India sent back, DVB, 9 March 2024

²⁰ ASEAN Special Envoy on Myanmar meets with Indian Foreign Minister, DVB, 25 March 2024

Russia : The closest partner for military council

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, has become closer to the Russian government led by Vladimir Putin. The two countries are speeding up negotiations and cooperation for nuclear energy and a deep-sea port project in Myanmar. In addition, Russia conducted joint military exercises and joint naval exercises with the military.

Russia and Myanmar plan to hold over 50 joint military events in 2024.²¹ As for the military, the Russian government under Vladimir Putin is considered the most reliable and closest partner for military, security, and business affairs, as well as on the international stage.

Date	Subject
27-28 June 2023	Myanmar military and Russian government officials met for the first time to discuss cooperation in nuclear energy. ²²
11 September 2023	Myanmar is planning to implement direct kyat-ruble transaction. Currently, Myanmar is using Yuan for the payment of Russian oil. ²³
26-29 September 2023	The field training exercise of ASEAN Plus Counter-Terrorism Expert Task Force, was jointly organized by Myanmar and Russia in Vladivostok, Russia. ²⁴
1 October 2023	Trade between Russia and Myanmar increased more than twenty-five times in 2023 compared to 2021. The trade value increased to 400 million US dollars. ²⁵

²¹ Russia and Myanmar plan to hold over 50 joint military events, RFA, 28 March 2024

²² Russia and Myanmar discuss the construction of a nuclear power plant, RFA, 30 June 2023

²³ Myanmar is planning to implement direct kyat-ruble transaction, RFA, 11 September 2023

²⁴ ASEAN joint military exercise led by Russia-Myanmar held in eastern Russia, VOA, 3 October 2024

²⁵ Trade between Russia and Myanmar increases more than twenty-five times, RFA, 1 October 2023

11 October 2023	Top energy officials from Russia and Myanmar held discussions in Moscow on Russian participation in the construction of a gas pipeline. ²⁶
7-9 November 2023	The first Russian-Myanmar joint maritime exercise was held in Myanmar waters west of Myeik, Tanintharyi Region, involving three Russian warships and a total of nearly 800 Russian military officers and soldiers. ²⁷
5 December 2023	A consultation on law enforcement and security was held in Nay Pyi Taw between Home Affairs Minister and security adviser to the military Lt. Gen. Yar Pyae, and Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Russian Security Council. ²⁸
20 February 2024	Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko met in Nay Pyi Taw and discussed the matters relating to further strengthening relations and cooperation, including nuclear technology. ²⁹
27 March 2024	Senior General Min Aung Hlaing conferred international military cooperation honorary titles on 27 Russian military officers. ³⁰

²⁶ Military council holds discussion with Russia on the construction of gas pipeline, RFA, 11 October 2023

²⁷ Russia and Myanmar start first maritime exercises, RFA, 7 November 2023

²⁸ Military council and Russian officials discuss security and military matters, Irrawaddy, 8 November 2023

²⁹ Russian Deputy Foreign Minister meets Myanmar junta leader, VOA, 22 February 2024

³⁰ Junta leader confers honorary titles on 27 Russian military officers, Mizzima, 27 March 2024

Thailand: Myanmar's neighbor, which requires close monitoring regarding Myanmar's affairs.

The Thai government, as a neighbor, has maintained close ties with the military in Myanmar and often brought the voices of the Myanmar military to the international stage.

Until the end of his tenure, Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand Mr. Don Pramudwinai, who also serves as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, invited officials from ASEAN member countries to meet with representatives of the military, purportedly in the interest of Myanmar. He even had the opportunity to meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the State Counselor who was arrested and imprisoned by the military,³¹ and conveyed a message to the international community for dialogue.

The new Prime Minister of Thailand, Srettha Thavisin, has stated that he is assisting at the informal request of China and the United States to act as a middle man between conflicting groups in Myanmar, aiming to resolve the crisis,³² it is questionable whether the Thai government is genuinely acting as a mediator in addressing the Myanmar issue.

The arrests and repatriation of the Myanmar people who sought refuge in Thailand due to armed conflicts and violence by the military³³ and the handover of three resistance members, who were undergoing medical treatment in Mae Sot to the military-backed Karen BGF³⁴ smeared the image of the Thai government. Thailand's close relations with the Myanmar military and its engagement with governments such

³¹ Thai Foreign Minister meets Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, VOA, 12 July 2023

³² Thailand intervenes in Myanmar issue at the request of both US and China, VOA, 31 March 2024

³³ Thai authorities sent back more than 2,000 Myanmar refugees who fled from Shwe Kokko, VOA, 10 April 2023

³⁴ Three Lion Battalion soldiers undergoing treatment handed over to the BGF by Thai authorities, VOA, 7 April 2023

as the US, EU, and ASEAN, under the pretext of resolving the Myanmar crisis, serve as signals to closely monitor the Thai government's actions.

The Thai government's close ties with the Myanmar military under the pretext of addressing the Myanmar crisis, and its engagement with governments that are putting pressure on the military such as the US, EU and ASEAN, serves as a warning signal for the global community to closely monitor the actions of the Thai government.

Date	Subject
22 April 2023	Thailand's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai met with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and discussed border issues. ³⁵
19 June 2023	With the aim of solving the problem as soon as possible, Thailand hosted an informal meeting among countries affected by the situation in Myanmar, said the Thai Prime Minister. ³⁶
8 October 2023	Thailand contributed 3.6 million Thai Baht, equivalent to 100,000 US dollars, to UNICEF to support Public Health Programmes in border areas of Myanmar. ³⁷
22 November 2023	The military reported that Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Punpakdee Pattanakul of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), arrived in Nay Pyi Taw at the invitation of the Chief of the Air Force of Myanmar. ³⁸
21 February 2024	Kannavee Suebsang, a member of parliament from the Thai opposition FAIR party, suggested that the Thai government grant temporary work permits to Myanmar nationals who have fled to Thailand, on humanitarian grounds. ³⁹
25 March 2024	Thailand has sent its first batch of humanitarian aid to the military-ruled Myanmar. ⁴⁰

³⁵ Thailand, Myanmar discuss border security, VOA, 22 April 2023

³⁶ Thailand once again advocates for organization of informal talks on Myanmar issues, VOA, 19 June 2023

³⁷ Thai government donates more than 3.5 million baht for Myanmar border health services, VOA, 8 October 2023

³⁸ Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal of the Royal Thai Air Force arrives in Nay Pyi Taw, VOA, 22 November 2023

³⁹ Thai MP requests Thai government to allow Myanmar refugees to work temporarily, VOA, 21 February 2024

⁴⁰ Thailand starts delivery of humanitarian aid to Myanmar, VOA, 25 March 2024

Myanmar's Spring Revolution and the US's Shift

The US government, known for prioritizing democracy and human rights, has consistently opposed and denounced the 2021 military coup led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. The US has expressed support for revolutionary forces aiming to dismantle the military dictatorship.

The BURMA Act was integrated into the US government's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to provide non-lethal technical assistance to resistance forces, including EROs and the PDFs. In 2024, both houses of the US legislature approved the BURMA Act, and President Joe Biden signed it into law, allocating a budget of USD \$121 million for its implementation.⁴¹

The US government stands by the people of Myanmar and engages closely with ERO representatives, civil society organizations and political groups, including the NUG. The US continues to seek ways to exert pressure on the military and implement impactful measures against them.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned the military's Defense Ministry, Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB).⁴² The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a determination that allows sanctions to be imposed on any foreign individual or entity that operates in the jet fuel sector of Myanmar.⁴³

The US government's push and move for Myanmar's Spring Revolution and Myanmar people, who are moving towards ending the military

⁴¹ The US has allocated a budget of USD 121 million for Burma affairs under the Burma Act, DVB, 30 July 2023

⁴² US sanctions Defense Ministry, MFTB and MICB, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 21 June 2023

⁴³ OFAC issued a determination that allows sanctions to be imposed on any foreign individual or entity that operates in the jet fuel sector of Myanmar, Irrawaddy, 23 Aug 2023

dictatorship and building a federal democratic union, call for close monitoring.

Date	Subject
27 July 2023	The US says it supports a UN report on China's arms sales to the Myanmar military. ⁴⁴
23 August 2023	The US State Department has announced that it will work with allies to hold the military accountable for crimes committed. ⁴⁵
25 August 2023	U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stressed that the US will persist in taking action against the Myanmar military, which perpetrated genocidal violence against the Rohingya. ⁴⁶
6 September 2023	U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris said that the US will continue to pressure Myanmar's military to restore a democratic path, release all those who have been unjustly detained and stop the horrific violence. ⁴⁷
7 February 2024	The US extended the national emergency against Myanmar for one more year, White House says. ⁴⁸
22 March 2024	The Department of Homeland Security announced the extension and redesignation of Burma (Myanmar) for Temporary Protected Status (TPS). ⁴⁹
28 March 2024	US Foreign Policy Advisor Derek Chollet met with Myanmar's revolutionary forces and discussed humanitarian aid. The meeting was attended by KNU, KIA, KNPP, CNF and NUG officials. ⁵⁰

⁴⁴ US supports UN's report on China's arms sales to Myanmar military council, Mizzima, 27 July 2023

⁴⁵ The US says it will work with its allies to ensure accountability for the crimes committed by the council, Mizzima, 3 Aug 2023

⁴⁶ US will persist in its efforts to pursue legal action against Myanmar military for its involvement in genocide and violence against Rohingya community, DVB, 25 August 2023

⁴⁷ US will continue to pressure military council to return the country to the path of democracy, Mizzima, 6 September 2023

⁴⁸ US extends the national emergency against Myanmar for one more year, DVB, 7 February 2024

⁴⁹ US extends the designation of Myanmar for Temporary Protected Status, DVB, 22 March 2024

⁵⁰ KNPP reports discussions with US Foreign Policy Advisor on humanitarian aid, Kantarawaddy Times, 3 April 2024

Japan's actions and direction

The Japanese government's actions and direction regarding the Myanmar issue can be considered similar to that of the US government. The Japanese government, which had consistently encouraged a peaceful and proper resolution to the Myanmar crisis, was concerned about the military's actions purging the National League for Democracy (NLD) from the political process. It stated that such actions would only make it more difficult to improve the current situation.⁵¹

At a meeting with the Myanmar community in Japan, Deputy Foreign Minister Komura Masahiro said Japan will continue to listen to the voices of the Myanmar people, engage with relevant parties, and work towards the progress of a democratic political system and peace in Myanmar.⁵²

Although not completely cutting ties with the military, the Japanese government appears to be making efforts to increase pressure on the military for the cause of democracy, human rights, and restoring democracy in Myanmar. Japan's moves observed in 2024 indicate an increase in exerting pressure on the military as well as more overt engagement with revolutionary forces.

⁵¹ The Situation in Myanmar (Deregistration of the National League for Democracy), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 29 May 2023

⁵² Japanese Deputy Minister pledges to continue listening to public voices for Myanmar's democracy and peace, DVB, 6 February 2024

Date	Subject
26 April 2023	The Japanese government protested against the military's actions after confirming that two passenger vessels they had provided were used to transport troops and weapons to Arakan State in September 2022. ⁵³
8 March 2024	The Japanese Foreign Ministry stated that they will provide an additional US\$37 million in humanitarian aid for Myanmar people affected by the military coup. Since the coup, Japan has already provided over US\$109.5 million through international organizations and non-governmental civil society organizations. ⁵⁴
14 May 2024	Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Komura Masahiro met with KNU Chairman Padoh Kwe Htoo Win and KNPP and IEC Chairman Khu Oo Reh in Japan. They agreed on close cooperation between ethnic organizations and the Japanese government to resolve the Myanmar crisis. ⁵⁵
31 May 2023	Japan suspended its Official Development Assistance (ODA), which was to provide billions of dollars for the Yangon-Mandalay railway upgrade project, a symbol of Japan-Myanmar cooperation for over a decade. ⁵⁶ The Japanese news agency Asahi Shimbun reported that the suspension of financial support for the railway upgrade project has become a sign of opposition to the military's overthrow of the civilian government and seizure of power.

⁵³ Tokyo confirms Myanmar military's misuse of Japan-supplied ships, Human Rights Watch, 26 April 2023

⁵⁴ Japanese government donates additional US\$37 million in humanitarian aid for Myanmar, DVB, 13 March 2024

⁵⁵ Japan receives some ethnic armed group leaders, RFA, 14 May 2024

⁵⁶ Japan suspends loan for Yangon-Mandalay railway project, Myanmar Now, 1 June 2023

The ASEAN and its ineffective Five-Point Consensus

ASEAN's image has significantly deteriorated since allowing Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to attend the ASEAN Summit in April 2021. The Five-Point Consensus reached at that summit has failed to be effectively implemented even after more than three years of the military coup, raising questions about the regional bloc's approaches and actions.

The revolutionary forces in Myanmar seeking to break free from the military rule view ASEAN's engagement and meetings solely with the military, disregarding the people of Myanmar, as complicating efforts to resolve the crisis and only prolonging the military's grip on power.

During Indonesia's ASEAN rotating chairmanship, there was a glimpse of hope for progress on the Myanmar issue and for the people, the Five-Point Consensus it upheld ultimately could not be implemented by the end of its term.

The ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) has urged ASEAN and the international community to focus on the plight of displaced people inside Myanmar and refugees along the Thai-Myanmar border, and provide effective assistance.⁵⁷

To sum up, ASEAN has shown no significant ability to convince Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to implement the Five-Point Consensus agreed at its summit. Constrained by the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, ASEAN's actions have been disappointing for the people of Myanmar.

After over three years since the military coup, with no tangible progress made in implementing the ineffective Five-Point Consensus, it is imperative to reassess its efficacy.

⁵⁷ ASEAN MPs say localized approach needed for aid to reach Myanmar people in need, Mizzima, 20 November 2023

Date	Subject
6 April 2023	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Myanmar Ms. Noeleen Heyzer and ASEAN Secretary-General Dr. Kao Kim Hourn met at the ASEAN Secretariat. During the meeting, they discussed the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus and cooperation with ASEAN's Special Envoy on Myanmar. ⁵⁸
5 September 2023	Indonesian President Joko Widodo, as the rotating ASEAN Chair, stated during the 43rd Summit that the peace plan outlined in the ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus will continue to serve as a guideline for resolving the conflict in Myanmar. ⁵⁹
13 September 2023	Four major ASEAN countries - Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines - did not attend in person the ASEAN Air Chiefs Conference organized by the military, which is primarily responsible for airstrikes against civilians. Only five other countries attended. ⁶⁰
1 January 2024	The ASEAN rotating chair, the President of Laos, appointed veteran politician and former Minister of the Prime Minister's Office, Alounkeo Kittikhoun, as Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar. ⁶¹
29 January 2024	Although Daw Malar Than Htike, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the military, was allowed to attend the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Laos, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi stated that ASEAN's stance on restricting the military in ASEAN meetings remains unchanged. ⁶²
5 March 2024	During the ASEAN-Australia Summit in Melbourne, the situation in Myanmar and ASEAN's role in helping achieve peace and stability in Myanmar were discussed. ⁶³

⁵⁸ ASEAN Secretary-General and UN Special Envoy discuss Myanmar issue, VOA, 06 April 2023

⁵⁹ Indonesian President says Five-Point Consensus will remain as guide to resolve Myanmar issue, DVB, 5 September 2023

⁶⁰ Only five ASEAN countries attend military council's Air Force conference, RFA, 14 September 2023

⁶¹ Laos appoints ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar, DVB, 9 January 2024

⁶² Indonesian Minister says ASEAN stance unchanged despite junta representative attending meeting, DVB, 30 January 2024

⁶³ Myanmar issue discussed at ASEAN-Australia Summit, RFA, 4 March 2024

The European Union putting constant pressure on the military

The EU, which has condemned the military coup led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and is closely monitoring the situation in Myanmar, consistently demonstrates its support for the people of Myanmar after the 2021 military coup.

The EU has also condemned the military's attacks targeting civilians and often imposes targeted sanctions on top military officials. In July and December 2023, the EU imposed sanctions on the military's ministers and some business entities. The European Commission approved €19 million in humanitarian aid for vulnerable people in Myanmar for 2024. Therefore, the EU plays a crucial role for the people of Myanmar and the revolutionary forces who aim to liberate themselves from the military. The EU is also seen as an international organization which consistently exerts pressure on the junta.

Date	Subject
10 July 2023	The EU allocated 4.5 million euros to meet humanitarian needs to support food and health in Myanmar. ⁶⁴
20 July 2023	The EU sanctioned the military's Union Minister for Immigration and Population, Union Minister for Labour, Union Health Minister, two members of SAC, the Quartermaster General and No.2 Mining Enterprise. ⁶⁵
23 July 2023	The EU continues to stand up for the people of Myanmar, in defense of their human rights and democratic aspirations, said in a statement on the one-year anniversary of those unjustly executed in Myanmar. ⁶⁶

⁶⁴ EU allocates 4.5 million euros for humanitarian aid, EU official page, 10 July 2023

⁶⁵ EU imposes sanctions on 6 individuals and one entity, European Council, 20 July 2023

⁶⁶ Statement on 1st anniversary of the execution of democracy activists, EU Facebook, 23 July 2023

11 December 2023	The Council of the European Union has sanctioned Minister Lt-Gen Nyo Saw, former Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin, Dr. Mu Htan, Commander of Eastern Command Major General Hla Moe, Star Sapphire Group of Companies and Royal Shune Lei Company Limited. ⁶⁷
31 January 2024	In 2024, over 19 million euros in humanitarian aid was approved for Myanmar. ⁶⁸

Effectiveness of UN Actions in Myanmar

The UN has consistently called for the restoration of democracy in Myanmar, condemning the human rights violations across the country by the military led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. It has urged the military to end the oppression of civilians.

However, the revolutionary forces in Myanmar, including the NUG, fighting to end the military dictatorship, have often questioned the actions of UN-affiliated organizations cooperating with the military. They particularly call for exploration of ways to ensure international humanitarian aid intended for the people of Myanmar genuinely reaches the people in need through the revolutionary forces.

The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) was established to collect evidence and monitor human rights violations by all parties, including the military and armed resistance groups. Since the coup, the IIMM works to ensure accountability and justice for international crimes in Myanmar. This shows a clear indication of the UN's focus on the Myanmar issue.

Therefore, while the UN maintains a firm stance on the Myanmar issue, there are significant challenges and obstacles in implementing its decisions.

⁶⁷ EU sanctions 3 junta members, including the military leader's advisor, and two companies, Irrawaddy, 11 December 2023

⁶⁸ In 2024, over 19 million euros in humanitarian aid was approved for Myanmar, EU Facebook, 31 January 2024

Date	Subject
6 April 2023	Ms. Noeleen Heyzer, the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Myanmar, and Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, the ASEAN Secretary-General, met at the ASEAN Secretariat. During the meeting, they discussed the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus and cooperation with the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Rotating Chair on Myanmar. ⁶⁹
27 April 2023	The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) rebuilt 292 shelters for about 2,600 families in four Muslim refugee camps in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu Townships, Arakan State. ⁷⁰
1 May 2023	Ms. Noeleen Heyzer, the UN Special Envoy on Myanmar, and Qin Gang, the Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister, met in Beijing to discuss Myanmar issues. During the meeting, Qin Gang stated that while China, as Myanmar's neighbor, hopes for stability and progress in Myanmar more than other countries, the complex historical background of Myanmar means that problems cannot be solved in a short time. ⁷¹
9 May 2023	Ms. Noeleen Heyzer, the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Myanmar, and S. Jaishankar, the Indian Minister of External Affairs, met in New Delhi to discuss Myanmar issues. During the meeting, Minister Jaishankar expressed support for Ms. Noeleen Heyzer's efforts regarding Myanmar. ⁷²
15 August 2023	Martin Griffiths, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator UNOCHA, visited Myanmar and met with military leaders including Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw. During the meeting, they discussed increased cooperation on humanitarian aid issues. ⁷³

⁶⁹ ASEAN Secretary-General and UN Special Envoy discuss Myanmar issue, VOA, 6 April 2023

⁷⁰ UNHCR builds shelters in 4 Muslim refugee camps, DMG, 27 April 2023

⁷¹ Chinese Foreign Minister and UN Special Envoy discuss Myanmar issue, Mizzima, 1 May 2023

⁷² UN Special Envoy and Indian Foreign Minister discuss Myanmar issue, RFA, 11 May 2023

⁷³ UN Humanitarian Chief Martin Griffiths arrives in Myanmar, VOA, 16 August 2023

21 August 2023	NUG Foreign Affairs Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung, NUG Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Minister Dr. Win Myat Aye, and Mr. Martin Griffiths, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator UNOCHA, met online. During the meeting, the Union Minister warned that it is necessary to be cautious as the military always considers misusing humanitarian aid processes to gain legitimacy. ⁷⁴
21 September 2023	A UN official confirmed that Ambassador U Kyaw Moe Tun will continue as Myanmar's representative to the UN, as decided by the "UN Credentials Committee". ⁷⁵
5 December 2023	The UN Central Emergency Response Fund allocated US\$7 million to aid people displaced by ongoing conflicts in Myanmar. ⁷⁶

⁷⁴ UNOCHA Chief meets online with NUG ministers after meeting with junta leader, Mizzima, 24 August 2023

⁷⁵ UN official confirms U Kyaw Moe Tun remains as Myanmar's UN ambassador, RFA, 21 September 2023

⁷⁶ Myanmar receives US\$7 million from UN Emergency Fund, RFA, 6 December 2023



Weekly News Reviews



Introduction

Male	– 118
Female	– 46
Unidentified	– 4
Total	– 168

The list above shows the 168 civilians who were massacred at the same place and time in aerial bombardments perpetrated by the

Myanmar military regime. Of the victims, 118 were male, 46 were female, and 4 were unidentified. The brutality of the attack was so severe that some of the victims could not be identified due to their dismembered state. Children and pregnant mothers were among those who lost their lives, and even body parts that could not be attributed to a specific age group were found.

Incident

On 11 April 2023, at around 7:45 am, the military council conducted airstrikes on Pazigy village, Pazigy village tract, Kanbalu Township, Kanbalu District, Sagaing Region, massacring 168 people. Among them were six children under the age of five, 19 children between the ages of five and 14, five children between the ages of 14 and 18, 10 children whose ages could not be determined, 97 adults over the age of 18, and 31 adults whose ages could not be determined, according to the statement released at the press conference of the National Unity Government (NUG) on 16 April. According to the statement, 16 people are under serious treatment, including an 8-year-old child, five children under 18 and 11 adults over 18.

According to U Nay Phone Latt, spokesman for the Prime Minister's Office of the National Unity Government (NUG), the junta airstrikes also killed 12 members of the People's Defense Forces, two members of the People's Security Forces, and four members of the People's Administrative Team.¹

¹ 18 PDF members among victims of airstrikes on Pazigy village <https://rb.gy/nrif5>

Related news events

A rescue worker said on the afternoon of 12 April that they had not been able to compile the list of bodies and cremate them as the military council continued to attack the rescue workers from the air and fire heavy weapons at them.²

The incident of the airstrike on Pazigyí village was discussed in the closed session of the United Nations Security Council on 13 April. However, the UN Security Council, alternately chaired by Russia, which is on friendly terms with the Myanmar military council, failed to condemn the massacre of hundreds of civilians.

"We believe that the Security Council should condemn this and call for the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 2669. It is of concern to us that the Council has been unable to do so," said British Ambassador Barbara Woodward.³

Canada and the United Nations Secretary-General condemned the military council's airstrikes on the village of Pazigyí as targeted attacks on civilians and a violation of international humanitarian law. The United States, Norway, the European Union (EU), and Indonesia, the rotating chair of ASEAN, also condemned the regime's actions.

Junta forces stationed in Malel village, four miles from Pazigyí, also entered Pazigyí and conducted a "area clearance operation" with about 300 soldiers at about 2:30 pm on 19 April, apparently with the aim of destroying evidence of the massacre. In addition, the deployment of ambush patrols and continued advance near Pazigyí forced hundreds

² Continuing junta airstrikes prevent recovery of bodies in Pazigyí village
<http://rb.gy/jzr2o>

³ Security Council failed to condemn junta's attack on Pazigyí due to Russia, China
<http://rb.gy/mjnvI>

of residents from villages such as Mezataw, Ywatharyar, Htantaw, Chaungthar, and Chaunggyi to flee to safety.⁴

Review

The Myanmar military regime's airstrike on Pazigy village was the deadliest massacre in the more than two years since the military coup and can be described as one of the regime's most senseless acts. The regime had carried out similar airstrikes on civilians, most notably the airstrike on ANang Pa village in Hpakant Township, Kachin State, and another on the school in Let Yet Kone village in Depayin Township, Sagaing Region. In addition, the military regime has also frequently targeted airstrikes on IDP camps in Karenni (Kayah) State.

The junta commits barbaric acts of terror on a daily basis, such as burning entire villages, arresting and killing civilians, and using them as human shields. It has systematically engaged in psychological warfare against the people, using brutality and disinformation to unsettle them. As for the Pazigy incident, the military council has spread propaganda that the village was attacked because of construction work for the NUG headquarters.

The Spring Revolution forces - the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), the People's Defense Forces (PDF) and the Local Defense Forces (LDF), the anti-coup forces and the entire Myanmar people have expressed their condolences in various ways for the airstrike on Pazigy village that killed 168 civilians.

⁴ Myanmar Army advances into Pazigy village <http://rb.gy/9elgs>

The horrific massacres perpetrated by the Myanmar junta across the country have not brought it any gains, but have strengthened the unity and cooperation among the Spring Revolution forces. More remarkably, the hatred of the people of Myanmar against the military council has increased exponentially.


The people of Myanmar are frustrated with the actions of international governments, including the United Nations, against the military council led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, which is allowed to carry out all kinds of terrorist attacks against its own people on a daily basis.

At the same time, questions are being raised about the unity and cooperation among the Spring Revolution forces, including the NUG, and their ability to protect civilians from the threats of the military regime.

Therefore, preventing targeted attacks by the junta on civilians, such as the tragedy in Pazigy village, is an issue that must be addressed and resolved by all forces of the Spring Revolution. On the one hand, efforts should be made to bring justice for the terrorist acts committed by the regime, such as the Pazigy air strike.

On 17 April 17, Myanmar New Year's Day, participants in the anti-coup activities performed meritorious deeds and prayers for the fallen civilians of Pazigy village in Kanbalu Township.

" May Pazigy be blessed with merits shared by the whole country."



The attack on humanitarian convoy, a lesson to be taken

Introduction

Due to the wider civil war caused by the military coup, millions of Myanmar people have already fled their homes. There is a huge demand for humanitarian aid for those who were really hurt and those whose lives were truly destroyed during the competition between the military council and the Spring Revolution forces.

However, international humanitarian aid is far from being available to the people of Myanmar who really need it. In the past few days, a convoy of the ASEAN Humanitarian Coordination Center (AHA Center) was attacked.

Our BNI – Myanmar Peace Monitor’s weekly news review for this week highlights the recent attack on a convoy of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) and other related matters.

Incident

On 7 May, the convoy of AHA Centre was shot while travelling to the liaison office of the Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLO) based on Hsihseng-Sikekhaung road in Hsihseng Township of southern Shan State, to provide aid to the Internally Displaced People (IDPs).

The convoy, carrying diplomats from Indonesia and Singapore and officials from the AHA Center, came under fire. The military council, military-backed Pa-O National Organization/Pa-O National Army (PNO/PNA) and the PNLO which signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) claimed no responsibility for the shooting. They themselves are making accusations of shooting each other.

According to the statement by the PNLO on 11 May, this is the process led by the PNLO through coordination between the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) delegation, the Office of the ASEAN Special Representative for Myanmar and the AHA Center. It condemns any individual or any organization which commits such violence. The shooting, which took place 200 meters north of Nanaw village in Hsihseng Township, was carried out by five terrorists who were waiting, a military official of the military-backed PNO told the Radio Free Asia (RFA).

"The incident took place in the PNO-active area. They invaded and shot it. There was no problem. I don't know why they fired." ¹

Related News

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is finalizing a "comprehensive" needs assessment in Myanmar as it continues to provide humanitarian assistance to the crisis-hit country. ASEAN hopes this assessment can be completed when leaders from the group meet in Labuan Bajo, Indonesia during their annual summit from May 9 to 11. ASEAN's needs assessment will include the number of people who need assistance, which locations such help is needed at, and what aid is required, said Secretary-General of ASEAN Kao Kim Hourn. ²

"There are people who because of the violence on the ground, have to move. People who really are not able to get access to the things that they need to survive. And I think those are the people we will focus on," said Kao Kim Hourn.

Regarding the attack on the convoy of AHA Centre, Indonesian President Joko Widodo who arrived in East Nusa Tenggara of Indonesia to attend the ASEAN Summit, said at a press conference on 8 May that it is disappointing that such an attack occurred when ASEAN's aid work was about to begin in Myanmar. ³

Indonesian President Joko Widodo also said the "shootout" would not deter efforts by Indonesia and ASEAN to push for peace in Myanmar. ⁴

¹ Convoy carrying diplomats was attacked in Hsihseng Township. <http://rb.gy/b7jqd>

² ASEAN finalising 'comprehensive' humanitarian needs assessment in Myanmar <http://rb.gy/5v55i>

³ International condemns ASEAN diplomatic convoy. <http://rb.gy/3z1kc>

⁴ Indonesia's Jokowi calls for end to violence in Myanmar after attack on ASEAN convoy <http://rb.gy/5q2pj>

Regarding the attack on the convoy of the AHA Center, the United States Department of State announced that we are deeply concerned by reports that unknown assailants in Myanmar shot at an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) convoy under military escort. These attacks in Shan State come as the regime's violence and disregard for the rule of law have led to greater instability on the ground, all while the regime has continued to neglect its commitments under the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.

The United States Department of State also warned that the military regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including rules on the protection of diplomatic personnel and civilians.⁵

Review

The recent attack on a military convoy carrying the officials from the AHA Center and diplomats from Singapore and Indonesia in the area controlled by the military council, military-backed PNO and the PNLO which signed the NCA is a lesson which should be taken by the ASEAN, UN agencies and INGOs, which are making management of international humanitarian aid.

The military council and its allies are no longer in a position to guarantee even their own security. They are facing the resistances by the Spring Revolution forces all over the country. During the two years of the military coup, the areas that they can actually rule have gradually narrowed. It will be a long time before international humanitarian aid reaches the people of Myanmar who are really in need if international organizations are making approaches based on their interest by making

⁵ The Attack on AHA Centre Convoy <http://rb.gy/6jspd>

cooperation and affiliation only with the junta and obtaining the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the existence of organizations and employees' residence permit,

Now, there are 1.8 million people who have been displaced by the war in all parts of Myanmar. Among them, there are more than 1.2 million refugees in Sagaing and Magway Regions. The time has come to find new methods and approaches in order that international humanitarian aid may reach to the Myanmar people in real need from Karenni (Kayah) State, Mon State and Tanintharyi Region along the Thai-Myanmar border, India-Myanmar border in Chin State and Sagaing Region and Magway Region.

Instead of muttering incessantly the impractical words "the cessation of violence and seeking solution through dialogues", the ASEAN and UN member countries should continue working with various groups that are in the closest situation to the public. It is viewed that efforts should be made to reach humanitarian aid to the war-affected people in the areas controlled by the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (ERO) and the National Unity Government (NUG).

International community is required to urgently seek a solution to the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Myanmar people who are in real need by taking a lesson from the attack on the convoy of the AHA Center in Hsihseng Township of Shan State.



Regime's True Colors Amidst Cyclone Mocha

Introduction

The Cyclone Mocha which had formed in the Bay of Bengal made landfall in Arakan State at 12.30 pm on 14 May, packing winds of 120-155 mph. The cyclonic storm at the wind speed of over 120 mph was felt in Chin State and Magway Region at around 6.30 pm that day and it continued until 6.30 pm on 15 May. From there, the storm progressed to Sagaing Region and Kachin State at a decreased wind speed. Mocha was also felt in varying degree in Ayeyarwady Region, Yangon, Bago, and

Mandalay regions, and northern Shan State. Cyclone Mocha caused the most of damage and loss of life in the Myanmar's western state of Arakan, followed in varying degree by Chin, Magway, and Sagaing.

Preparations ahead of Mocha's landfall

Prior warnings about the Cyclone Mocha had been circulated among the forces of the Spring Revolution which have been resisting to the Myanmar military's attempted coup for more than two years.

In Arakan State, Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, Maungdaw, Rathedaung, Myebon, Pauktaw and Manaung Townships were set at the highest red level of danger, while local civil society groups and the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) evacuated the local residents to safety before the cyclonic storm made its landfall.

In the days leading up to the landfall of the cyclonic storm, ULA/AA's spokesperson U Khaing Thukka said "more than 100,000 people had been evacuated".¹ In addition, the military council-appointed Kyaukphyu Township administer also said they had set up ten cyclone shelters in downtown areas where about 20,000 people taking shelter from the incoming storm.² World Food Program (WFP) also issued an announcement on 13 May that it had made arrangement for one month's food rations for 400,000 people in Arakan State and bordering areas.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced on 11 May that it was prepared to provide emergency response assistance to the Mocha disaster. The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management of National Unity Government (NUG)

¹ Thousands of Muslim refugees from Hnget and Sin Tet Maw IDP camps in Pauktaw take shelter in Kyine Ni Pyin <http://rb.gy/8gpp5>

² Ten relief centers opened in Kyaukpyu, sheltering up to 20,000 people <http://rb.gy/pausz>

also announced on 13 May that it had made preparations in conjunction with local civil society groups in order to reduce the risk of the incoming storm in Arakan State, Chin State, Yangon Region, Ayeyarwady Region, Bago Region, Magway Region, Sagaing Region, and Tanintharyi Region, which were forecasted to be hardest hit. The Myanmar's parallel government further said in the announcement that special preparations for disaster prevention and rescue operations were underway together with locally based Arakan Heritage Foundation.

In a sense, it would be safe to say that preparedness, including the flow information, for the population of Arakan State and other vulnerable states and regions was strong until the arrival of Cyclone Mocha. However, the inhumane actions of the Myanmar military council turned out to be far worse than Mocha itself.

Regime's inhumane true colours revealed

On 14 May – the day when the Cyclone Mocha made landfall in Arakan State, the Myanmar military regime conducted aerial bombardments in Na Bu Lel area in Yaybyu Township, Dawei District, Tanintharyi Region, where Dawei Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is located. Without there being any fighting on the ground, the military council perpetrated the bombing in the area with fighter jets.³

Also in the west of Khin-U Township in Sagaing Region, more than 3000 people from Innpat, Chantharkone, and Konethar villages were forced to flee to safety in the heavy rain carried by Mocha at around 6.30 am on 14 May when junta troops advanced into the villages for no apparent reason. Indiscriminate artillery fire and shooting by the regime troops left a 4-year-old child wounded in Innpat village.⁴

³ Regime carries out airstrikes in Na Bu Le area near Dawei SEZ <http://rb.gy/7alyi>

⁴ Junta's advance forces 30000 residents to flee in rain in western Khin-U
<http://rb.gy/vxty1>

After the Cyclone Mocha passed, the Myanmar army advanced into the rural administrative area of Htankone in Kanbalu District, Sagaing Region, with four military columns on 17 May, forcing more than 30,000 local residents from 30 villages to flee to safety. On the morning that day, a combined force of more than 300 soldiers from Light Infantry Battalions 361 and 368 and members of pro-military Pyu Saw Htee militia entered the area, Kyunhla Activists Group told Mizzima News.⁵

The people of Myanmar were faced simultaneously with the inhumane actions of the Myanmar's military regime coupled with the danger of natural disasters.

Related news

Approximately 90 percent of Sittwe – the Arakan State's capital – was devastated by the Cyclone Mocha and the local population are in urgent need of assistance. For that, the ULA/AA formed an emergency relief and resettlement committee for storm-affected people in Arakan State on 17 May.

" Rakhine People's Government is trying to mobilize all the resources to the best of our ability, but it's still not enough to cover the devastation caused by the disaster. Above all, I'd like to make a special request to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international NGOs, and local society organizations to work closely with Rakhine People's Government to provide necessary assistance," said Major General Twan Mrat Naing, chairman of United League of Arakan and military chief of the Arakan Army.

The National Unity Government, the Kachin Independence Organization, and the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/

⁵ Regime's advance forces over 30000 people to flee homes after storm
<http://rb.gy/ihts9>

Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA) respectively donated 100 million kyats, 300 million kyats, and 100 million kyats for emergency relief operations on the humanitarian grounds.

The NUG stated on 17 May that it had provided over 640 million to storm-affected population in Arakan State, Chin State, Magway Region, Sagaing Region, Yangon Region, and refugee camps in Cox's Baza, Bangladesh. The parallel government said the Cyclone Mocha claimed the lives of 455 people in seven states and regions, while the military council said in its 18 May statement that only 47 people local residents, including recuse members, died during the catastrophic disaster.⁶

The discrepancy in figures is attributable to the fact NUG had included the number of deaths in the refugee camps in Sittwe Township, while it had been overlooked by the regime's report.

Review

The coup leader said he would visit Sittwe after Cyclone Mocha and provide seven billion kyats. Additionally, he said they had received more than 13 billion kyats from donors and is open to offers of international aid. Local civil society groups said the Myanmar regime did not make any significant efforts during the storm and had not conducted any rescue operations until 15 May.⁷

⁶ NUG: Mocha claim 455 lives in seven states and regions; regime's 16 May statement says only 47 people died <http://rb.gy/f3by7>

⁷ Junta chief arrive in storm-affected Sittwe, provide supplies worth 7 billion kyats <http://rb.gy/ccq3t>

Hence, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing's rhetoric proved to be disconnected from the regime's actual actions on the ground. The actions taken by the junta revealed a deliberate dissemination of propaganda within and outside the military, as well as among civil servants, in an unethical attempt to cling to the power they had seized through the coup.

This is because the military junta has burned more than 60,000 civilians' homes and buildings in its arson attacks on villages in areas throughout the country that it no longer controls. In addition, the regime has carried out hundreds of airstrikes on civilians and millions of people have been forced to flee their homes due to indiscriminate small arms and heavy weapons fire.

Analysts have blamed junta leader Min Aung Hlaing and his associates of being unwilling to help the cyclone-affected people, despite the fact that the regime has spent billions of dollars to acquire weapons that can be used to kill its own people. In addition, the regime has kept international humanitarian organisations waiting for government permission to provide emergency aid to people affected by Cyclone Mocha.

It can be concluded that the Myanmar regime's relentless advance into villages and continued aerial bombardment, undeterred by the storm, is a clear testimony to its inhumane true colours.



Flower strike movement which alarms the junta

Introduction

By honouring the birthday of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on 19 June, the people joined the "flower strike" as a revolutionary movement against the junta together with the forces of the Spring Revolution. Starting on 15 June, the slogan of "To reach the goal, dear flower Baydar, make an effort and endeavour," had spread all over the country. Sagaing Region Monywa People's Strike Leading Committee explained that it called for the flower strike movement with many reasons such as honouring State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and forcibly-detained monks, students and the people and showing the dignity of women who

have been active in revolutionary history, including the current Spring Revolution. We will put new flowers in the vases and decorate and hang flowers indoors and outdoors and in front of every house in order to reflect the image of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who is often seen together with flowers by the people of the world and the people of Myanmar. We will organize the flower strike campaign online and offline. All the people moving forever on the roads will wear flowers on their heads and chests. We will develop a variety of flower-related activities with their own intelligence and innovation, the committee announced.

Colorful flower strike movements

The Sagaing Region Tanze Anti-Junta Protest Column and locals jointly held a flower strike on 19 June, carrying cotton banners reading: "Flying revolutionary flowers, Women's strength". The Monywa University Students' Union and the Lepandaungtaung Main Strike Column held a flower strike in cooperation with local people from three villages in Salin Township and honour Daw Aung San Suu Kyi by singing famous singer Khin Maung Toe's song titled "Khun Arr Phya Mi Nge". People from various villages in Pale Township also held a flower strike to root out the dictator by praying for the good health of all detained heroes, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

Male and female comrades of Magway District No.1 Battalion, Magway Region No.1 military area, who are fighting against the junta, participated in the flower strike by wearing roses on their heads. Male and female comrades of Thabeikkyin People's Defense Force (PDF) from Mandalay Region under the National Unity Government (NUG) participated in the flower strike movement by honouring the people's leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all detained political prisoners. Comrades from Pakokku District Battalion No.10 participated in the flower strike movement by wearing roses on their chests.



Photo-Magway District-1 Battalion

In Welet Township, Sagaing Region, local children gathered together to celebrate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's birthday and held a flower strike, which was led by the Welet Township Public Strike Leading Committee. Along with the flower strike by the displaced students in Depayin Township, the S&C Assistance Group for fire and war hazards and education provided nutritional donations with vermicelli soup.

The revolutionary forces in Yangon hung a cotton banner reading "We Miss You" on a pedestrian overpass as a celebration of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's birthday amid tight security.

Mr. Christian Lechervy, Ambassador of France to Myanmar, also participated in the flower strike to commemorate the birthday of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and demanded the unconditional release of all political prisoners detained since the coup. The European Union (EU) took part in the flower strike by replacing its Facebook cover with the photo of various flowers, including roses.

We have seen hundreds of collective movements to honour the 78th Birthday of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in areas like Sagaing and Magway Regions where the junta has lost territorial controls. In the big cities like Yangon and Mandalay, the people participated in the guerrilla flower strikes in their own ways. It was recorded that there were many people participating in the flower strike by uploading the photos with flowers and recorded video files with birthday wishes on social media.

Flower strike which alarms the junta

It is surprising to see that the flower strike movement across the country on 19 June greatly alarmed the junta. In particular, the junta soldiers chased, arrested, beat and scolded the persons who wore, sold and held the flowers.

Junta soldiers arrested 50 women and nearly 30 men for allegedly organizing a flower strike in Mawlamyinegyun of Ayeyarwady Region. Junta soldiers entered and searched the houses at Ward No.9, 10 and 11 in Mawlamyinegyun.¹

Police and soldiers arrested around 40 women who wore and sold flowers at the crowded areas of the city, including Myoma market in Kalay of Sagaing Region.²

Military council soldiers arrested 28 women and one man for participating in the flower strike in Kamayut, Pabedan and Tamwe Townships in Yangon. Military council soldiers also arrested Daw Sandar Myint and two men who returned from Yamaethin prison in Mandalay Region after the prison visit by accusing them of participating in the flower strike.

¹ Nearly 80 people who were arrested for allegedly organizing a flower strike released in Mawgyun <http://rb.gy/e5hpk>

² Around 40 women wearing flowers arrested in Kalay. <http://rb.gy/3ix5h>


It is said that the junta, which relies on weapons to oppress and restrict the people throughout the country, is afraid of even the flower strike commemorating Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's birthday. Across the country, more than 150 people, mostly women, have been arrested for allegedly participating in the flower strike on 19 June.

Review

Throughout the Spring Revolution period, this flower strike is the second movement. On 19 June, 2021, on the 76th birthday of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a similar flower strike was held to show opposition to the junta. It can be said that the flower strike movement was able to give some kind of fear to the junta that seized power using weapons just by looking at the use of various methods such as the arrests and threatening of women who wear flowers to commemorate the 78th birthday of State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

This flower strike is to commemorate the birthday of State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and to honour all those who were forcibly arrested by the junta. It depicts the dignity of women who have been active in the history of revolution, including the current Spring Revolution. In addition, it is one of the methods of non-violent peaceful demonstrations against the junta that was used throughout the Spring Revolution.

The junta, which is committing inhumane acts such as arsons, mass killings and airstrikes every day, every time and everywhere, has reached a situation where it cannot accept even the flower strike movement in which women wear the flowers. It is considered that the junta is afraid of any movement of the people against its coup attempt.



More and more extrajudicial killings inside junta-run prisons

Introduction

The military council is carrying out the arrests and detention of Myanmar people, regardless of classes, gender, children. Then, the detainees are taken to police stations and prisons, with no evidence to prove that they committed the crimes. From there, there is no limit to the case changes and the opening of cases and lawsuits.

Now, the military council is committing extrajudicial killings of political prisoners who were arbitrarily arrested in prisons. Prisons and jails in Myanmar may be thought of as a place of detention for criminals and lawbreakers. However, it seems to be regarded as a cage that can be used as needed by the junta.

Killings inside the prisons

The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) confirmed that eight of 37 political prisoners who disappeared from DaikU (Kyaikzakaw) prison in Bago Region since 27 June 2023 had died.

According to the AAPP's statement titled "Extrajudicial killings that require urgent investigation" on 19 July, those who were arbitrarily arrested by the military group and died due to torture during interrogation.

These days, the country sees more killings of civilians and burning of houses by the junta's military council and offensives in the towns and villages and deaths inside prisons. The military council's killings of people at will poses a challenge not only for Myanmar but also for the international judicial pillars.

The AAPP has called on international governments including the United Nations and international judicial pillars to urgently investigate the extrajudicial killings of the military council against the people of Myanmar and take effective actions immediately.¹ On 25 May 2023, 24 political prisoners were taken out of DaikU prison separately and beaten and interrogated. Three political prisoners including Ko Thant Zin Win were killed during the interrogation.² Eight prison staff, including the jailor from DaikU prison, were detained and interrogated by the military council in the last week of June, claiming that they helped political prisoners communicate with the outside world.³

¹ Extrajudicial killings that require urgent investigation. <http://rb.gy/9bnqy>

² 15 political prisoners were killed in two months. <http://rb.gy/an8pr>

³ DaikU jailor and some prison staff are being detained and interrogated. <http://rb.gy/3a906>

On 6 July 2023, the military council soldiers shot and killed two youths who were arrested on suspicion of killing singer Li Li Naing Kyaw while taking them to the interrogation center, citing that they tried to escape on Maungmakan road at No.29 ward in North Dagon Township in Yangon.⁴

Date	Prison, Interrogation Camp/ police station	People killed/ victims
27 June 2023	DaikU Prison	Ko Yar Lay (aka) Zin Myint Tun
27 June 2023	DaikU Prison	Jar Gyi (aka) Wai Yan Lwin
27 June 2023	DaikU Prison	Zin Htut Win (aka) Bala Gyi
27 June 2023	DaikU Prison	Aung Myo Thu
27 June 2023	DaikU Prison	Bo Bo Win (aka) Htan Taw Gyi
27 June 2023	DaikU Prison	Nay Aye (aka) Akar Htet Paing Myo
2 July 2023	Myaingyan Prison	U Sein Win
6 July 2023	Yangon interrogation center	Ko Kaung Zarni Hein (aka) La Pyae
6 July 2023	Yangon interrogation center	Ko Kyaw Thura
7-8 July 2023	DaikU Prison	Ko Khant Lin Naing (aka) Ko Khant
7-8 July 2023	DaikU Prison	Pyae Phyoe Hein (aka) Ko Pyae
13 July 2023	Magway Police Station	Tu Tu (aka) Nagar Man
16-17 July 2023	DaikU Prison Mae Lone	Ko Aung Soe Moe (aka)
16-17 July 2023	DaikU Prison	U Maung Di
Sources: July 10, 19 Statements, AAPP		

⁴ Two youths arrested on suspicion of killing Li Li Naing Kyaw were shot and killed by the army. <http://rb.gy/rg35n>

Related News Findings

Prison authorities beat and locked up nine political prisoners citing that they gave a political talk in Insein prison in Yangon to mark the 61st Anniversary of the Seventh July Student Uprising on 7 July 2023. Of them, political activist Ko Tin Htut Paing who was seriously injured, was admitted to the prison hospital.⁵

More than 80 political prisoners who were arbitrarily detained in Myingyan prison in Mandalay Region, were beaten and locked up on the grounds that they had contact with the People's Defense Forces (PDFs). They were denied medical treatment and family visits.

Regarding the Myingyan prison case, the Anti-coup Forces Coordination Committee–Mandalay (AFCC) and the General Strike Coordination Body (GSCB) announced that they are concerned about the lives of political prisoners and stands with their comrades in prison.⁶

Review

In order to become a successful coup attempt, the junta detained the government leaders including the President and the State Counsellor and everybody who were likely to oppose the coup such as veteran political prisoners, student leaders, political activists, prominent writers and philanthropists since the early morning of 1 February 2021, for no apparent reason. In addition, the junta also detained hundreds of winning candidates from the 2020 General Election in the compound of Sabin guesthouse.

From 1 February 2022 to 20 July 2023, the total number of the detainees reached nearly 24,000. Of them, nearly 20,000 people are still being detained in prisons, jails and interrogation centers. As many as

⁵ Nine political prisoners were beaten and locked up in Insein prison.
<http://rb.gy/fmhk6>

⁶ More than 80 political prisoners have been beaten and locked up in Myingyan prison. <http://rb.gy/gygff>

158 people have been sentenced to death in connection with the Spring Revolution, which is marching towards the overthrow of the military dictatorship.⁷

The military council is facing a nationwide armed resistance by the Spring Revolution Forces, especially People's Defense Forces/Local Defense Forces (PDFs/LDFs), Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) and the battalions and units under the National Unity Government (NUG) as long as the coup attempt takes a longer period of time. The military council is also facing isolations and huge pressures in the international arena.

Although the people who have been arbitrarily arrested with no evidence to prove that they committed crimes, are being released on bail and under the guise of amnesty, the military council is carrying out different forms of oppression in prisons across the country. As a result, there were frequent prison protests in Insein prison in Yangon, Mandalay Obo prison, Hpa-An prison in Karen state, Bago, Pyay and Thayawaddy prisons in Bago Region, Kalay prison in Sagaing Region and Patheingyi prison in Ayeyarwaddy Region.

In order to get out of the crisis it is facing, the military council hopes to even want Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who is imprisoned in Nay Pyi Taw prison to persuade the National Unity Government (NUG) and PDFs/LDFs. Jails, prisons and interrogation centers across Myanmar are seen as part of the coup attempt process. Spring Revolution forces and the international governments supporting the Spring Revolution are duty-bound to find ways to liberate all the people who have been arbitrarily detained by the military council.

Efforts should be made to urgently investigate and take action against those who are blatantly committing extrajudicial killings of arbitrarily-arrested people and political prisoners from prisons, jails and interrogation centers.

⁷ A daily summary of the current situation after the military coup.

<http://rb.gy/dq8pk>



Deadly bombing of Munglai Hkyet IDP camp

Introduction



Either dropped by the plane or fired at a distance,
The truth is the lives of the sleeping civilians were lost.
Their lives were destroyed.
The majority of those killed are children and women.



Incident

The midnight bombing on 9 October 2023 killed 29 civilians—11 underage children, 15 women and three men— and severely wounded 57 others from Munglai Hkyet IDP camp near Laiza. The bodies of those killed in the incident were buried in Inkharwatkaung in Laiza on 10 October. The wounded were admitted to Laiza People's Hospital. Most of the wounded have now been discharged from the hospital. The remaining 20 people including eight children remain in the hospital. The BNI-MPM's ground reporter confirmed these figures on the afternoon of 12 October.

Munglai Hkyet IDP camp is more than an IDP camp. It is a village with 168 households in Laiza Township in the KIO-controlled territory. The Munglai Hkyet IDP camp where 658 IDPs and local residents are taking shelter, is located beside Namhsamyan-Laiza road in the KIO-controlled territory.

“The explosion was so huge that the people thought the bomb was dropped by a plane. But when I asked the local people, they said that no one heard the sound of the plane. They replied that they heard three explosions. Almost all the houses in the village were destroyed,” the BNI-MPM's ground reporter recounted his experience.

According to his experience of covering the news by living in the KIO-controlled territory of Laiza Township for more than two years, our ground reporter said no explosives were seen in the vicinity of Munglai Hkyet IDP camp located beside Namhsamyan-Laiza road.

Related findings

Colonel Naw Bu, spokesperson of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) reviewed based on the findings on the ground that we could not hear the sound of the plane, but the condition is an airstrike. If not, it is a drone attack. It may also be an attack with a long-

range rocket. Colonel Naw Bu said the KIO has formed an investigation committee to collect the detailed information about the incident.¹

Major General Zaw Min Tun, spokesperson of the military council said the people need to think about whether bombing and heavy shelling is possible at midnight as Munglai Hkyet IDP camp is close to the border area. He also accused that the incident could only be the explosion of the KIO's arms depot.

“They (military) said that they are not responsible for every attack. Giving various reasons is a common behavior of Myanmar military leaders. In this case, blaming others without taking responsibility is their usual pattern,” Tom Andrews, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar said.²

The military council's spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun denied the brutal attack. He said the military has to carefully deal with the situations in the places close to the border area. His denial reminds us of the aerial bombardment of the headquarters of the Chin National Front/ Chin National Army (CNF/CNA) located near the India-Myanmar border, with jet fighters on 10 and 11 January, 2023. The Indian army carried out a field inspection as a bomb fell and exploded on the Indian soil. The world has witnessed the military council's heavy shells and grenades which fell on the soils of neighbouring countries like China and Thailand. Take a look at the above-mentioned huge shell hole, it can be assumed that the shell hole occurred due to the explosion of a powerful military weapon fired at a distance or dropped from the sky rather than an armoury explosion. In addition, the place where the explosion occurred is next to the main road. So, the military council's accusation is not reasonable.

¹ 29 people were killed, 57 wounded in an attack on Munglai Hkyet IDP camp in Laiza, KIO says. <http://rb.gy/mtj9g>

² The attack on Kachin IDP camp is part of a wider operation by the army, Tom Andrews said. <http://rb.gy/mv45j>

On 10 October, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield issued a statement denouncing the military regime's attack on Munglai Hkyet IDP camp. This latest attack by the military regime is yet another example of its disregard for human life and underscores the need for the UN Security Council to act beyond Resolution 2669, the statement said.³

Review

The deadly bombing of Munglai Hkyet IDP camp, which killed 29 civilians including children and women reminds the junta's brutal incidents like the Pazigy incident in Kanbalu Township, the A Nang Pa incident in Hpakant Township and Letyetskone village incident in Depayin Township following the military coup. The incidents of aerial bombardments targeting the villages, schools and IDP camps are reported all over the country, including Karenni (Kayah) State.

With the intensification of the resistance war of Spring Revolution, the military council has stepped up airstrikes. According to the record of the BNI-MPM, 2023 has seen more airstrikes than 2021 and 2022.⁴ The National Unity Government (NUG), the forces of Spring Revolution and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) such as the Karen National Union (KNU), the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Chin National Front (CNF) condemned the deadly bombing of Munglai Hkyet IDP camp. The Three Brotherhood Alliance issued a statement saying that the military council which is facing losses on all fronts including the military and political fronts, is blatantly carrying out heavy

³ Statement by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield on the Burma Military Regime's October 9 Attack on Munglai Hkyet, Kachin State. <http://rb.gy/7yq32>


⁴ Military Regime's Airstrikes in Myanmar. (1 Feb 2021 – Current) <http://rb.gy/yl4cy>

shelling and aerial attacks on the public which oppose it, all over the country with a grudge.⁵

It can be said that the bombing of Munglai Hkyet IDP camp may not be the last act of the military junta. It is worth noting that the EROs including the public which are supporting the forces of Spring Revolution may face the junta's targeted attacks at any time. It is required to document each and every brutal and inhumane act committed by the military council following the military coup. In addition, there is a special need for us to bring justice to children, women and each and every person who lost their lives.

**“Either dropped by the plane or fired at a distance,
The truth is the lives of the sleeping civilians were lost.
Their lives were destroyed.
The majority of those killed are children and women.”**

⁵ Three Brotherhood Alliance announced that it is deeply saddened for those killed in the attack on Munglai Hkyet IDP camp and synonymous with KIO/KIA.
<http://rb.gy/cismp>



Introduction

Along with the question 'Where are the women?', the faces of 155 men were used in the design of the '#Manels Exhibition.' This design created for the manel exhibition sparked both support and opposition from individuals approaching the issue of manels from various perspectives.

All-male panels, or manels on various news media and social media platforms reflect the prevailing patriarchy in Myanmar's society and societies worldwide.

Manel exhibition

The first manel exhibition, co-organized by the Women's League of Burma (WLB) and the Salween Institute, took place in Chiang Mai, Thailand from 5-7 March 2023. The second exhibition is currently being held by the same organizations in collaboration with the Sea Junction group at the Bangkok Art and Culture Centre from 17-29 October 2023.

During the exhibition, these four points were given as rationale for stopping manels: Manels are an obstacle to pluralism and inclusive dialogue, which is central to a democratic society; the complete exclusion of women perpetuates patriarchy and gender-based discrimination; they suggest that only men can be experts, politicians, or individuals who can discuss important issues; and they fail to recognize that for a quality panel, 'diverse perspectives are needed, and more inclusive panels and discussions can be held through dialogue between those with different views and perspectives.

According to Burma's Manels Watch, a collaboration between WLB and the Salween Institute, a total of 16 manels were identified in January and February 2023, along with 47 in 2022, 25 in 2021, and 70 in 2020, with Radio Free Asia (RFA) being identified as having the highest number of manels.

Manels and related findings

After the first manel exhibition in Chiang Mai, the University Students' Unions Alumni Force announced on 8 March 2023 – International Women's Day – that they would actively promote gender equality. They said they would not organize or participate in panels with only male participants, nor would they promote or broadcast such manel events through their media platforms. They would advocate for women's representation on panels organized with partner organizations.¹

¹ International Women's Day statement <http://rb.gy/icb41>

The first Manel Exhibition, which was broadcast on various media and social media platforms attracted considerable public interest, including among media professionals, and received recognition and appreciation.

However, the second exhibition in Bangkok, designed with the faces of men found on manels, has sparked a debate between supporters and opponents from different perspectives.

The systematic use of faces of individuals who participated in manels was viewed as personal pressure, humiliation, and accusation, leading even some female supporters of no manel campaigns to oppose the provocative exhibition design.

WLB's General Secretary Nan Moh Moh said: "The purpose of this manel exhibition is not to shame or attack the men who participated in them."

She added that ending the manels is crucial to dismantling patriarchy for a future federal democratic union, and that the responsibility lies not only with panel organizers and respective organizations but also with the individual participants of manels.


Review

Male-dominated panels or "manels" are a deep-rooted feature of patriarchy in Myanmar's society that needs to be addressed collectively. Therefore, it is necessary to find the root causes of the problem and address them, not just the symptoms. While the organizers and respective organizations behind the manels bear a significant responsibility, the challenges they face should be discussed empathetically rather than dismissed as 'excuses.' It is imperative to consider their need for the support of NoManel campaigners and women. Similarly, it is essential to refrain from subjecting those participating in manels to personal attacks.

While the underrepresentation of women's voices, views, perspectives, and analyses in panels on politics, economy, peace, and conflict within the Myanmar's society, where the female population exceeds the male population, may not be intentional exclusion, continued tolerance of such circumstances as the norm may effectively result in intentional exclusion.

Manels are symptoms of a patriarchal disease, rather than the cause. Eliminating them will take time, just like treating any disease, and they are a significant obstacle that must be removed to achieve gender equality. While manel exhibitions also provide an opportunity to discuss or debate gender equality from various perspectives, a more in-depth analysis and collaborative approach to these issues are likely to be more effective.

It is important to note that the inclusion of diverse participants is a crucial criterion for fostering dynamic and meaningful panels.



The 16-Day White Ribbon Campaign: Female Victims of the Military Junta's Arrests and Killings

Introduction

As of 27 November 2023, the 1030th day since the military coup, women and girls in Myanmar are killed by the military junta at a rate of one in every one and a half days. In addition, a woman or girl is arrested by the military council every five days. Everyone has a responsibility to protect women and girls in Myanmar.

To mark the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, various groups in Myanmar are conducting awareness-raising,

discussions and advocacy activities in their own ways from 25 November to 10 December. The theme of this year's 16-day campaign, announced by UN Women, is "UNITE! Invest to prevent violence against women and girls". It also points out that one in three women worldwide has experienced physical violence at least once in their lives.

16-Day White Ribbon Campaigns

The 'International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women', commonly marked with a white ribbon, was designated at the 54th session of the United Nations General Assembly by Resolution 54/134.

It was based on the murder of three politically active sisters by the President of the Dominican Republic on 25 November 1960 and symbolizes with a white ribbon as the pledge to do everything possible to prevent violence against women. The 16-Day Campaign runs for 16 days from 25 November to 10 December, International Human Rights Day.

Initiated in 1991 by the Women's Global Leadership Initiative (WGLI), the 16-Day White Ribbon Campaign is now used by individuals and organizations around the world as an advocacy strategy to call for the prevention and elimination of violence against women and girls.¹

Ministries under the National Unity Government (NUG), People's Defense Force (PDF) battalions, Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) and women's organizations are also conducting awareness raising, advocacy and discussions on the root causes of gender-based violence in their respective states, regions, townships and rural areas as part of the 16-Day White Ribbon Campaign.

After the military takeover, some local women's organizations said they could no longer hold the 16-Day White Ribbon Campaign in

¹ 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence <https://bit.ly/46EK6R9>

southern Shan State in public, but only in secret. "In the past, we wore white ribbons on these days. Wearing the white ribbons means that we pledge not to commit violence against women and to prevent such violence. But if we show white ribbons now, we will surely be interrogated and arrested because they themselves are the ones committing violence." ²

Female Victims of the Military Junta's Arrests and Killings

According to a statement issued by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) on 29 November, 674 women and girls have been killed in various acts of violence by the military junta since the beginning of the military coup on 1 February 2021 until 27 November 2023 - a total of 1,030 days since the coup.³ The ages of these victims range from under 1 year to 105 years.

Looking at the military junta's killing patterns, the number of women killed in clashes by heavy artillery fire, gunfire and airstrikes is in the hundreds. More than ninety women were arrested and killed, more than 60 burned alive, more than 30 shot in the head, more than 20 killed in the violent suppression of strikes, 16 sexually assaulted and 14 taken hostage and killed, according to AAPP records.

There are also many cases of women and girls dying after being arrested and interrogated in military camps and used as human shields.⁴

Daw Ram Taluan (105 years old) from C.Zamual village in Falam Township, Chin State, was killed after she was hit by an artillery shell from Light Infantry Battalion 268 stationed in Falam. She was fatally hit by a Myanmar Army artillery shell at around 2 am on 27 November 2023,

2 White ribbon campaign cannot be publicly held after coup <https://bit.ly/3uEU5Zi>

3 Daily briefing on current situation after coup, 29 November 2023
<https://bit.ly/3RIC6jg>

4 AAPP database of total casualties <https://bit.ly/3uJN0Xe>

although there was no fighting. The indiscriminate shelling also wounded her daughter Daw Zo Tuai (64 years old) and she is being treated at Falam Township Hospital.⁵

An analysis of the list of detained women and girls detained the military junta shows that 20% (5,102 people) of the total 25,474 people arrested by 27 November 2023 were women and girls aged between one year and 90 years old.⁶ This means that a woman or girl is arrested by the military junta in Myanmar every five days.

The Burma Women's Union's analysis paper "Sexual Violence Faced By Women Amid Political Instability" documents 59 cases, including 36 cases of sexual violence and 23 cases of domestic violence and sexual abuse faced by women in conflict areas and under military rule.⁷ According to the paper, cases of violence against women can be divided into three categories: Violence by the military council's army, by other armed groups and between civilians.

Review

UN Women has stated that four out of five women worldwide live in countries with poor legal protection against violence.⁸ Women in Myanmar facing the military coup have encountered all kinds of violence, including extrajudicial killings and arrests by the junta.

In Myanmar's society, while women are at the forefront of fighting against patriarchy, they are also actively involved in armed resistance and civil movements to end the military dictatorship during the Spring Revolution. In building a future federal democratic union, it is imperative

5 Elderly woman over 100 dies from artillery shelling in Falam
<https://bit.ly/49WIRAG>

6 AAPP database of total detainees <https://bit.ly/3T3L2va>

7 "Sexual Violence Faced By Women Amid Political Instability" analysis paper
<https://bit.ly/47B27B0>

8 "UNITE! Invest to prevent violence against women and girls"
<https://bit.ly/3GqwMFk>

to consider gender issues, especially women's physical and mental capabilities.

It is necessary to eliminate the deep-rooted patriarchy in society, and one of the objectives of the White Ribbon Campaign is to ensure that violence against women does not go unpunished by holding perpetrators accountable. Therefore, just as obtaining justice and legal accountability for women and young girls illegally detained and killed by the military regime is important, it is crucial to note that eliminating violence against women in society is also an important campaign.



Introduction

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by Daw Zin Mar Aung, released a statement on 1 January 2024, on the National Unity Government's (NUG) position on China.

The statement highlights China's role and importance among the activities such as military, political and international affairs of the Spring Revolution which aims to end all forms of tyrants, including the military dictatorship, and build a federal democratic union.

The NUG's position on China

In the 10-point statement of the NUG on "position on China", eight pledges to please the Chinese government are clearly found.

Myanmar remains committed to fostering a genuine “Pauk-Phaw” relationship between the two countries and endeavors to be a good neighbour to China. The one-China principle will be upheld and supported in a sustained manner. Valuing the people-to-people relationship between China and Myanmar, efforts will be made to foster mutual respect, trust and cooperation in the most effective manner. Endeavours will be made to promote and sustain cooperation grounded in shared socio-economic interests between the two countries.

Aspiring to foster the interests of the people of the two countries, measures will be taken to safeguard Chinese economic investments and other socio-economic enterprises within Myanmar. Myanmar remains committed to upholding its obligations under any treaties or agreements, including boundary treaties, signed between the two countries before the attempted military coup in 2021. Any organisation that poses a threat to the national security of neighbouring countries shall not be

NUG's 8-point pledge to China

1. Myanmar remains committed to fostering a genuine “Pauk-Phaw” relationship between the two countries and endeavors to be a good neighbour to China.
2. The one-China principle will be upheld and supported in a sustained manner.
3. Valuing the people-to-people relationship between China and Myanmar, efforts will be made to foster mutual respect, trust and cooperation in the most effective manner.
4. Endeavours will be made to promote and sustain cooperation grounded in shared socio-economic interests between the two countries.
5. Aspiring to foster the interests of the people of the two countries, measures will be taken to safeguard Chinese economic investments and other socio-economic enterprises within Myanmar.
6. Myanmar remains committed to upholding its obligations under any treaties or agreements, including boundary treaties, signed between the two countries before the attempted military coup in 2021.
7. Any organisation that poses a threat to the national security of neighbouring countries shall not be permitted to establish a presence within the territory of Myanmar.
8. Myanmar remains committed to engaging in close cooperation with China and other countries in the region to combat transnational crimes, including online scams and gambling, human trafficking and drug-related activities, which pose threats not only to the border stability of the two countries but also to the stability and security of the whole region.

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Looking at the NUG's 8 points of commitment to China, the points 5 to 8 are found to be key features. It will be interesting to see if it can reduce China's concerns about a future federal democratic union.

China's activities

Take a look at the recent events, the Chinese government's activities regarding the "1027 Operation" which started on 27 October 2023 can be seen as a neutral position like a "referee".

"Operation 1027" initiated by Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army (AA) in cooperation with the resistance forces born during the Spring Revolution, has spread from the northern Myanmar to the Arakan State in the southwest of Myanmar. It must be said that it is getting the support of the entire public who have a burning desire to end the military dictatorship. However, the Chinese government urged a ceasefire and dialogue between the parties involved in the armed conflict and the military council. The Chinese government arranged a meeting between the Northern Alliance (MNDAA, TNLA and AA) and the military council in 2023. From 7 to 9 December, 2023, the first meeting was held at Haigeng Hotel in Kunming, Yunnan Province. From 22 to 24 December, the Chinese government held a second meeting in Kunming. The meeting between the representatives of the Northern Alliance and

¹ The National Unity Government's position on China. <https://bit.ly/3RJCJCn>

the representatives of the military council, ended without any result due to the large gap between the demands of the two sides. The third meeting is scheduled to be held in January 2024.²

Chinese Foreign Ministry's Spokesperson Wang Wenbin at a regular press conference on 21 December, 2023 said China will continue its effort in helping to stop the fighting and promote talks in northern Myanmar and jointly work for a soft landing of the situation in northern Myanmar. We also hope that parties concerned in Myanmar will keep the China-Myanmar border area peaceful and stable and protect the safety and security of Chinese projects and personnel in Myanmar.³

Spring Revolution's shift

The various forces of the Spring Revolution which are marching towards the end of all tyranny, including the military dictatorship, and the establishment of a federal democratic union, have been putting pressure on the junta on all fronts in different forms and by various means. Now the revolution is going to enter third year on 1 February this year.

From pot-and-pan-banging that spread to the world, to the "22222 Popular Uprising", the people took to the streets. Now, the integrations and joint movements between the resistance and revolutionary forces, which took up arms to defend themselves from the threat of violent crackdowns by the military, PDF battalions and units under the NUG, People's Defense Forces/Local Defense Forces (PDFs/LDFs) and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), have led to a shift.

"Operation 1027" in northern Myanmar, "Operation 1111" in southern Shan State and Karenni (Kayah) State and military operations

² Meeting between the military council and the Northern Alliance failed to reach an agreement. <https://bit.ly/3vpLOsE>

³ Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin's Regular Press Conference on December 21, 2023 <https://bit.ly/41NmAQN>

across the country led by the "Central Command and Coordination Committee" (C3C) organized by the EROs and the NUG led to the abandonment of hundreds of military bases and the loss of more than 20 towns. A large number of military equipment belonging to the military was also confiscated by the resistance forces. It is observed that the military coup attempt led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing could become almost futile if coordinated operations such as unity and cooperation between the NUG, EROs and the PDFs/LDFs gain momentum. It will also find justice for the people by taking advantage.

Review

Chinshwehaw, Namkham, Theinni and Kunglong towns were surrendered by the military to the Northern Alliance during the Operation 1027. Plans are under way to build cross-border economic cooperation zones which are the parts of the Chinese government's economic corridor project in these towns. Hpawnghseng, Kyukoke (Pang Hseng), Konekyan and Monekoe are important border towns for the Chinese government. In addition, the implementation of the Kyauk Phyu deep sea port and Special Economic Zone, which has been agreed upon since the U Thein Sein's administration, is also worth considering the importance of the Arakan Army (AA) even though it is cooperating with the military.

Suppression of rampant online fraud and gambling in Laukkai, which greatly affects China's economy, is also a priority interest of the Chinese government. China is putting constant pressure on the military council. Therefore, it can be said that the Chinese government is still monitoring the capabilities of Operation 1027. The stability of the border region and the guarantee for the protection and security of their businesses in Myanmar have become the priority interests of the Chinese government. It is also monitoring the activities of the military council and EROs for the

suppression of gambling. For their own priority interests, the Chinese government is still monitoring all EROs and Spring Revolution forces, including the military council.

Therefore, the commitments of the National Unity Government in the statement about "position on China" can be regarded as favorable offers to the Chinese government. It is also seen as a timely statement at a time when military, political and international affairs put the junta in a tight corner. Even so, while trying to gain recognition as a government that represents the people on the international front, some assurances and commitments should not be given lightly and the opinions of relevant stakeholders should be sought. Especially, the Chinese government's projects such as the Myitsone Dam project and Letpadaungtaung copper mining project, China, which always defends the current military group on the international front, must be approached more cautiously.

The Spring Revolution is going to enter third year. The international government, including neighboring China and all organizations are monitoring the strength and unity of the Spring Revolution and still mindful of the role of the military council.

The National Unity Government (NUG) should strive to unite the Spring Revolution forces, who are marching towards the end of the military dictatorship and the construction of a federal democratic union. Efforts should be made to strengthen unity by providing commitments and assurances to build trust. In addition, statements sent to the international community, including China, actions and cooperation must be mindful of representing all the forces of the Spring Revolution.

Only then will it be more effective in organizing the Chinese government, which is preparing to bet on the winning horse. It is considered that only the strength of unity among the forces of the Spring Revolution can be a persuasive attempt that will cause the Chinese government to change sides.



White campaign, Common Positions and Declining Signs of Military Council

Introduction

Nationwide public movements which marked the third anniversary of the military coup on 1 February 2024 took place in two ways- “Silent strike” and “White campaign”.

The country has seen various forms of peaceful public movements against the coup, over the past three years. The Spring Revolution (or) the People’s Revolution, which began with the anti-coup protests with the slogan "Return the power to the people," has long been putting pressure on the junta, ranging from the non-violent public strikes to military, political and international affairs and marching with the aim of

ending all dictatorships, including the military dictatorship and building a federal democratic union.

This week, Burma News International (BNi) - Myanmar Peace Monitor's bi-weekly news review will approach the peaceful public movements found during the three-year period of the military coup and the stances which lead to the military and political shifts, significant events and the signs of declining military council.

Silent Strike and White Campaign

From 10 am to 4 pm on 1 February 2024, the silent strikes took place in cities such as Yangon, Mandalay, Mogoke, Monywa, Salingyi, Yinmarbin, Kani, Shwebo, Myaing, Mudon, Kawa, Ywangan and Hpakant.¹ As a non-violent public movement against the junta, the people also organized the White Campaign by wearing white shirts, ribbons, headbands and wristbands.

A Yinmarbin-Salingyi multi-village strike column in Sagaing Region, held an anti-dictatorship strike in cooperation with local strike forces. It was also joined by Women Alliance Burma (WAB), Magway Public Strike Committee, Kani Township Strike Leading Committee and Monywa People's Strike Leading Committee.²

General Strike Coordination Body (GSCB) said it has three objectives pertaining to the White Movement on the third anniversary of the coup. The first objective is to urge the international community and countries to stop selling transport and aviation fuel to Myanmar's military. The second objective is to urge Myanmar expats to refrain from paying blood taxes forcibly imposed by the military regime. The third objective is to urge every soldier at every level in the chain of command to defect and

¹ Silent strikes to mark 3rd anniversary of coup were held in some cities, including Yangon. <https://bit.ly/49hvLM5>

² Sagaing villagers stage anti-regime protest on third anniversary of coup <https://bit.ly/3vXYcQX>

stop sacrificing their own lives to protect the wealth of a handful of generals as soon as possible. The GSCB announced that the White Movement would be carried out every Monday.

Joint Position Statement

On 31 January 2024, a joint position statement was issued by Chin National Front (CNF), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Karen National Union (KNU) and National Unity Government (NUG), which are allied organizations engaged in revolutionary struggle towards annihilation of military dictatorship and establishment of a federal democratic union. The joint position statement covers one vision, six objectives, nine positions and six action plans. It is evident that the fact that “Negotiations with the responsible leadership of the Myanmar military to terminate military rule and for peaceful transition of power, subject to their unconditional acceptance of the six political objectives” opens a door for talk. Six political objectives are: (a) to overturn the usurpation of state power by the military, and to terminate the involvement of the armed forces in politics, (b) to ensure that all armed forces operate solely under the command of a civilian government elected through democratic processes, (c) to abrogate the constitution of 2008 in its entirety, and to quash all attempts to reinstate its provisions, (d) to draft and promulgate a new constitution that embodies federalism and democratic values, garnering the consensus of all relevant parties, (e) to establish a new federal democratic union in accordance with the proposed federal democratic constitution and (f) to institute a system of transitional justice in order to address and remedy the injustices inflicted upon innocent parties throughout the conflict.³

³ Declaration of Common Positions. <https://bit.ly/42kvkOR>

So, the officials within the military group which has been under military, political and international pressures must decide themselves whether or not they can accept six political objectives.

Significant events

After "Operation 1027 " that began in the northern Shan State, coordinated offensives by the revolutionary forces engaging in intensifying resistance war against the junta have gained momentum and intensified.

Revolutionary forces have controlled and captured up to 39 towns in northern Shan State, Kachin State, Sagaing Region, Chin State, Karenni (Kayah) State, Karen State and Arakan State.⁴ In addition, they seized more than 400 small and big military camps and a large quantity of military equipment including armoured tanks.⁵

Although the "Haigeng Agreements"⁶ obtained through the mediation of the Chinese government may halt the momentum of the military campaign for the junta in northern Shan State, the junta is facing strong offensives in Arakan State and Karen State, Karenni (Kayah) State and southern Shan State in southern Myanmar.

The junta lost Pauktaw in Arakan State and Paletwa in Chin State to the Arakan Army (AA) while the Pa-O National Liberation Organization/ Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLO/PNLA) captured Hsihseng town in southern Shan State. The joint Karenni forces have taken control of Mawchi and Ywar Thit town in Karenni (Kayah) State.

A Euro copter 365 military transport helicopter was shot down in Myawaddy Township of Karen State, killing five junta soldiers including

⁴ 39 towns occupied and controlled by revolutionary forces. <https://bit.ly/47X7tpI>

⁵ Myanmar's Operation 1027 Against The Junta Two Months On. <https://bit.ly/3uhl3pU>

⁶ Operation 1027: The Ceasefire Paradox. <https://bit.ly/3w404aU>

Brigadier General Aye Min Naung. The revolutionary forces shot up to three airplanes down in this year's January alone.⁷

In the recent statement by the PNLO/PNLA, which held talks with the military junta during the coup by adhering to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), the PNLO/PNLA said it would join hands with its alliances in the fight against Myanmar's military until the end of the military dictatorship and the establishment of the federal democratic system the entire public is longing for. The statement is significant.

Collapse signs of military council

On 30 January 2024, the junta handed over 10 criminal suspects including Bai Suo Cheng who was ex-chair of Kokang Self-Administered Zone and ex-MP of Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), to the Chinese government. Arrests warrants were issued for him for allegedly running Kyar Phyant or online fraud.

The Myanmar police handed over six key leaders involved in Kokang telecom fraud gangs, namely Bai Suo Cheng, Bai Ying Cang, Wei Huai Ren, Liu Zheng Xiang, Liu Zheng Mao and Xu Lao Fa and four other major criminal suspects in Kokang in northern Myanmar, over to China in accord with the law. They all were transported to China the same night, according to the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar.⁸

The military council sent Daw Malar Than Htike, permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to attend the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Luang Prabang, Laos. The junta did not attend the ASEAN meetings by rejecting the ASEAN's invitation to send a "non-political" representative to meetings. Now, it can be said that the junta no longer bear the isolations of the international community.

⁷ Five were killed in helicopter crash in Karen State. <https://bit.ly/3HEumU9>

⁸ Military council handed over the Kokang leaders who had been issued arrest warrants, to China. <https://bit.ly/3w6MjYI>

The military council has been facing military pressure from the revolutionary forces in the country and has not received any public support during the three-year military coup. As it is simultaneously experiencing not only isolations by international governments but also influence by neighbouring countries, the junta's declining signs have gradually become more prominent.

On 31 January 2024, the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) meeting declared the extension of a state of emergency for another six months for 5th time. It is found that the NDSC gave an account that the country is not in a normal condition. Plans are under way to take census and hold election.

Review

Three years after the coup, anti-coup movements are still active in different forms and means. The people are calling for an end to the military dictatorship and building the federal democratic union with the slogans of "return the people's power to the people" and "make all-out efforts for the final victory with the public's strength."

As non-violent peaceful protest continues to be enshrined among the people, the armed resistance war has gained momentum. However, even though revolutionary forces have the common position, the disputes between the revolutionary forces and conflict events are also known through news reports. There is a need to increase the integrated strength by respecting those who sacrificed their lives during the Spring Revolution. It is observed that the revolutionary forces must always be careful to strengthen the common agreements between them.

Taking a look at the situations three years after the Spring Revolution, public strike movements may become stronger, and the momentum of the armed resistance has shown no signs of slowing down. It is observed that territorial losses, abandonments of military camps, dwindling military strength and declining signs of military junta become more evident.



Acronyms

3BHA	- Three Brotherhood Alliance
7 EAO Alliance-	7 Ethnic Armed Organizations Alliance
AAPP	- Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
ABSDF	- All Burma Students' Democratic Front
AFP	- Arakan Front Party
AHA Center	- ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management
ALD	- Arakan League for Democracy
ALP/ALA	- Arakan Liberation Party /Arakan Liberation Army
ANC/AA	- Arakan National Council/Arakan Army
ANP	- Arakan National Party
APHR	- ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
ARC	- Alliance Relations Committee
BNI	- Burma News International
BNI-MPM	- BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor
BPLA	- Bamar People's Liberation Army
BURMA Act	- Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability
BWU	- Burmese Women's Union
C3C	- Central Command and Coordination Committee
CB	- Chin Brotherhood
CC	- Chinland Council
CDM	- Civil Disobedience Movement
CNF/CNA	- Chin National Front/Chin National Army

CRPH	- Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
DKBA	- Democratic Karen Benevolent Army
DPLA-PDF	- Danu People's Liberation Front
EAO	- Ethnic Armed Organisations
ERO	- Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations
EU	- European Union
FAO	- Food and Agriculture Organization
FMR	- Free Movement Regime
FPNCC	- Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee
FSCC	- State/Federal Unit Cooperation Commission
GSCB	- General Strike Coordination Body
HP	- Humanitarian Pause
ICNCC	- Interim Chin National Consultative Council
IEC	- Karenni State Interim Executive Council
IIMM	- Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
J2C	- Joint Coordination Committee
JMC	- Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee
JOC	- Joint Operations Command
JPF	- Joint Peace Fund
K3C	- KIO/KIA, KNU/KNLA, KNPP/KA and CNF/CNA
KIO/KIA	- Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army
KNDF	- Karenni Nationalities Defence Force
KNLA	- Karen National Liberation Army
KNPLF	- Karenni National People's Liberation Front

KNPP/KA	-	Karen National Progressive Party/Karen Army
KNU	-	Karen National Union
KNU/KNLA-PC	-	Karen National Union/ Karen National People's Liberation Front-Peace Council
KPDF	-	Kachin Regional Defense Force
KPICT	-	Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team
KSCC	-	Karen State Consultative Council
LDU	-	Lahu Democratic Union
M2W	-	Myaung Women Warriors
MDY-PDF	-	Mandalay-People's Defense Force
MFTB	-	Myanma Foreign Trade Bank
MGC	-	Mekong-Ganga Cooperation
MICB	-	Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank
MNTJP/MNDAA	-	Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/ Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
MSDF	-	Mon State Defense Force
MSFC	-	Mon State Federal Council
MSICC	-	Mon State Interim Coordinating Committee
MSRF	-	Mon State Revolutionary Force
MSRO	-	Mon State Revolutionary Organization
N.S.S.A.A	-	Northern Shan State Alliance Army
NA-B	-	Northern Alliance – Burma
NCA	-	Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
NDAA	-	National Defense Authorization Act

NDAA/ESS	- National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State
NLD	- National League for Democracy
NMSP	- New Mon State Party
NMSP-AD	- New Mon State Party (Anti-Dictatorship)
NMSP/MNLA	- New Mon State Party/Mon National Liberation Army
NSPNC	- National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee
NUCC	- National Unity Consultative Council
NUG	- National Unity Government
PDF-LDF	- People's Defense Forces-Local Defense Forces
PLA	- People's Liberation Army
PNDF-KK	- Pa-O National Defense Force- Kham Kaung
PNFC	- Pa-O National Federal Council
PNLO/PNLA	- Pa-O National Liberation Organization/Pa-O National Liberation Army
PPDF-KD	- Pa-O People's Defence Force- Kham Dom
PPST	- Peace Process Steering Team
PSLF/TNLA	- Palaung State Liberation Front /Ta'ang National Liberation Army
RCSS/SSA	- Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army
S.S.L.R.U	- Southern Shan Local Revolution Union
SAC	- State Administration Council
SSPP/SSA	- Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army
T-NUG	- Transitional National Unity Government
TPCC	- Ta'ang Political Consultative Committee
ULA/AA	- United League of Arakan/Arakha Army

UN Women - United Nations Women

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF - United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UNOCHA - United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs

UWSP - United Wa State Party

WAB - Women Alliance Burma

WFP - World Food Programme

WGLI - Women's Global Leadership Initiative

WLB - Women's League of Burma

