Demand of NCA signing

The common understanding of 21CPC convening joint committee and as well the Union Political Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) – the highest organ giving direction to the political dialogue – is that while non-NCA signatory groups were permitted to attend the 21CPC, they will not be allowed to take part in the national-level peace talks, if they failed to sign the NCA.

Echoing Khin Zaw Oo, UPDJC member Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong of Chin National Front (CNF) and as well, Khun Okker of Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization (PNLO), both also said that signing of the NCA is essential for the continued participation of national-level political dialogue, which is to start soon and tasked with collection of data, gathering opinions and suggestions at grass-root level to be tabled in the second round of 21CPC within the next six months.

Practically and effectively, this means that members of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), as well as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) also known as Kokang, the Arakan Army (AA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), are not included in the coming steps of the peace process, including the United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) or Mongla and National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Kaplang (NSCN-K).

Government officials encouraged ethnic armed groups to find ways to sign the NCA in the interim period. If they cannot sign within this period, it is not yet clear if they will be invited to attend the upcoming second session of the 21CPC.

General Gun Maw from the Kachin Independence Organisation said no one wants to see any groups left behind, and so negotiations over signing the NCA must begin as a matter of urgency.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said that while the government prioritises making the process as inclusive as possible, it cannot wait indefinitely to start the political dialogue.

“They (the non-signatories) have to think about it in this coming period. But it is impossible to wait and hold up the process … without knowing when they will sign,” Khin Zaw Oo said.

Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing also made it clear in his opening speech during 21CPC that NCA signing would be the necessary condition to participate in the peace process.

UNFC amendment proposal of NCA

The government side has always maintained that the NCA is the handiwork of all EAOs, including the UNFC. For the drafting of it involved the UNFC all along from the start and thus should not be a problem to sign it, is partly true but not all encompassing. As core outstanding issues were not allowed to be ironed out, prior to the 15 October NCA signing, to UNFC’s satisfaction, this has led its members not to ink the document. The situation, in turn, has resulted in only eight EAOs signing the document from a total of twenty-one EAOs countrywide.

Nai Han Thar during the 21CPC told reporters that the UNFC inability to sign the NCA is due to the fact that the document has been unable to be amended because of the government blockage and rejection to do so.

Nai Hong Sar recently said that because the government at that time had rejected UNFC demands to amend some points in the draft agreement, only eight EAOs went on to sign the government’s hijacked, finalised NCA version on 15 October 2015, with all the current members of the UNFC refusing to comply to it.

The seven EAOs that haven’t signed the NCA are: the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), the Arakan National Council (ANC), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), and the Wa National Organisation (WNO).

The main issue that has held back the UNFC then to sign the NCA was the lack of all-inclusiveness, which the government and military today is still implementing by excluding the MNDAA, TNLA and AA. But other than that proposal designed to overcome this hurdle and lead to more comprehensive tackling of the 21CPC is explained by the UNFC in its eight point guidelines.

UNFC eight point proposal guidelines

According to Htun Zaw, also known as Twan Zaw, secretary of the UNFC, an eight-point proposal, also identical with the agreement of Mai Ja Yang ethnic leadership summit meeting, in Kachin State, involving all signatory and non-signatory EAOs during the last week of July, can be divided into three categories of military, political, and transitional tasks to be fulfilled for the process to continue.

Militarily there are four points to ponder.

The first is achieving nationwide ceasefire, whether through unilateral ceasefire declaration of the government first, followed by the EAOs’ declaration, or declaration of ceasefire simultaneously together by the military and EAOs.

The second is to agree upon political agenda and ceasefire arrangement, including prior understanding of Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) undertakings, like military Code of Conduct (CoC) and Terms of Reference (ToR) among others.

The third is the inclusion of international organizations in JMC related issues and undertakings.

The fourth one is an establishment of independent, neutral enforcement tribunal with international judiciary experts to oversee the ceasefire, with the mandate to take action if either party wouldn’t follow or breach the ceasefire agreement.

Politically, there are three points, which includes agreeing to the Federal Union Army (FUA) formation; tripartite dialogue which would involve the government-parliament-military, EAOs and political parties, as decades-long endorsed by the United Nations; and the “Union Accord” that would be achieved through UPC be implemented in the amendment of 2008, military-drawn constitution or rewriting it altogether.

The last one is the transitional period arrangement, which emphasizes the point that the government should discuss and negotiate with the EAOs concerning developmental projects in the ethnic areas.

Buttressing its position, on 11 September, the UNFC issued a five point statement after its members met from 10 to 11 September, for emergency meeting. The statement thanked President Htin Kyaw and the government for the successful, historical 21CPC and transparency shown to the public. But pointed out that all-inclusiveness and termination of all military offensives still need to be implemented, adding that the culture of resolving political problems through political means should be practised to achieve solution.

Tin Myo Win’s official response

Regarding the UNFC proposal, especially the genuinely enforcible nationwide ceasefire agreement on the ground, Dr Tin Myo Win, Aung San Suu Kyi’s top peace negotiator’s official reply has not been positive, according to Htun Zaw. He said: “There is an official reply from Dr Tin Myo Win, which said that regarding nationwide ceasefire declaration, there has been no such declaration made during the previous NCA signing (with the eight EAOs), implying that they also have no intention to do otherwise with the non-signatory EAOs (proposal).”

He added: “We still need to negotiate on this. The Tatmadaw (military) needs to declare nationwide ceasefire. If they do, the concerned EAOs will do likewise. Alternatively, fixing a date to declare (ceasefire) altogether at once is also acceptable.”

He also stressed: “To be able to conduct political dialogue smoothly, there must be no military offensive.”

Analysis

And so it seems, we are all back to the square one. The first NCA signing was not all-inclusive and thus the first UPC held in January this year was also not inclusive. But the new regime headed by Suu Kyi again comes up with the commitment, vowing to make it all-inclusive, inviting all non-signatory EAOs to attend the opening of 21CPC, which nearly almost all heeding the call, except for the three EAOs that the military opted to sideline for various reasons. Again, it was not all-inclusive, but Suu Kyi initiated UPC or 21CPC was far more better then just eight EAOs attending the first conference, as some seventeen EAOs participated at the second UPC.

People were really in the upbeat mood and looking forward for a comprehensive, all-inclusive gathering for the next round of conference, due to be held within six months, when the government peace negotiators began pressing for immediate NCA signing from the non-signatories or risk being sidelined. One could hardly understand why this has to happen immediately on the heels of the 21CPC, which Suu Kyi has put a lot of energy and efforts to woo the non-signatory EAOs to participate. The non-signatory were even invited and allowed to participate in the amendment and fine-tuning of the Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD) prior to the 21CPC, so that a sense of ownership of the peace process could be instilled, according to the government.

Now it is not clear, whether the non-signatory EAOs could participate in the soon to be started  national  level political dialogue, if they refused to sign the NCA immediately first. This position of exclusion threat is, at least, what Khin Zaw Oo has being driving at, with CNF and PNLP leaders endorsing it.

The sequence normally should be deliberation of the UNFC eight points proposal between stakeholders; followed by FPD amendments that would in turn correct some flaws or disagreement in the NCA text; the signing of NCA by all the non-signatory EAOs; conducting  national level political dialogue; and finally tabling the findings to the next 21CPC  for further negotiations.

Given the convoluted nature of the peace process, mainly due to the present scenario of “cart before the horse”, a workable solution should be to at least let the non-signatory EAOs participate in the different levels of FPD, NCA amendments and national-level political dialogue, while parallel adjusting of different outlooks and finding ways to be able to sign the NCA. Because prohibiting the non-signatory EAOs to participate in national level political dialogue for failing to sign the NCA, as it is formulated, immediately would do away with the dream of all-inclusiveness peace process and only heighten the ongoing ethnic armed conflict. Thus pushing further back the so far achieved peace talks progress  and national reconciliation deliberations down the drain.

Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports said that the Delegation for Political Dialogue (DPN), an UNFC peace negotiation team, has been asked whether it would attend the 15-17 September FPD meeting. The first day is said to be scheduled for the meeting between the government and DPN alone to negotiate the eight point joint statement proposal, and the next two days to discuss the Terms of Reference (TOR) for national level political dialogues. The DPN was said to reply that it wasn’t ready to attend it yet for unknown reason. But one inside source reported that the three preconditions needed to be met first by the government side were all-inclusiveness, joint statement on the eight point proposal, and tripartite dialogue. However, it is not at all clear if this is a demand or just a proposal to actually conduct discussions on the said topics.

In a nut shell, it is advisable that the government and also the military should be reminded that the whole peace process should be a jointly owned one of all stakeholders and excluding one or the other from participation doesn’t really look like a co-ownership at all, but only exclusively dominated by the government.

Besides, pushing the parties to sign the document which they are not totally in agreement is not a wise approach. The government, especially the military faction, should not be rigid but open and ready to alter the document that all could agree and live with. There is even a saying in peace negotiation that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”

Another argument of  CNF Vice Chairman Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong in a SHAN report on 9 September is also noteworthy. On 7 September, he reportedly said the 21CPC that has just finished was an undertaking outside the jurisdiction of parliament and the 2008 military-drawn constitution.

He said: “When the 2008 constitution was drawn and also when it was promulgated, the EAOs were not involved. That is why due to the country’s need for essential peace, political dialogue is being conducted outside of the 2008 constitutional law.”

And finally, even a child knows that conducting peace negotiation while waging war is a recipe for failure and disaster. There is no such thing as a just war. The military faction within the government would be well advised to accommodate this earnest request of nationwide ceasefire, by all the EAOs and hundreds of civil society organizations, and bringing in the three excluded EAOs, so that different levels of peace process could be pulled through, paving way for the absence of war, development and reconciliation for the benefit of the people.