DOWNLOAD
BJPC Form - (English)BJPC Form - (Burmese)
Referendum Survey in 2008
----------------------------
KNG mini drugs report
BNI Latest News
- Philipino activists set three conditions for polls in Burma
- Easy availability of national ID cards for polls
- First batch of Arakanese Rohingya boat-people reach Malaysia
- Karen IDPs protest dam projects on Salween River
- MD of Ministry of Industry One to contest polls from Arakan
- Castor oil projects fail in Arakan
- Sittwe University student raped and murdered
- Thai Princess visits Burma
- Weapon parts seized in Thailand
- More migrant workers heading home
Most Read in 7 days
- Thailand’s political unrest cuts down timber exports, traders in Three Pagodas Pass claim
- BUILDING AN EDUCATION: NGO WORKS WITH CHILDREN OF MIGRANT CONSTRUCTION WORKERS
- Junta reinforces troops in ceasefire regions
- Burma's electoral laws undemocratic: Indian experts
- Nasaka steps up harassment in Maungdaw
- Election analysis barred in Burmese publications
- KIO delegates meet junta brass for the twelfth time on BGF
- Amid growing unemployment rates, Burmese women turn to prostitution to survive
- Two NLD offices opened in Arakan
- Motorcycles to be back on Rangoon roads
ListServ Subscription
| Junta’s strategy is to leave Kachin, Wa till end | | Print | |
| News - Shan Herald Agency for News | |||
| Tuesday, 03 November 2009 15:51 | |||
|
The winning strategy of the Burmese military junta brass, ensconced in Naypyidaw, is to subdue smaller ceasefire groups first and deal with the strongest ones, namely, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and United Wa State Army (UWSA) later, according to an informed source from the country’s capital. Meanwhile, the two would be under siege in order to restrict their movements, cut their revenue and increase their expenditure. “Like Kokang in August and Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army in 1996, the regime will also try to create and exploit divisions within each group,” he said. Khun Sa decided to surrender after a mutiny broke out in mid 1995. Until then, he had been staunchly withstanding blockades imposed not only by the Burmese Army and the UWSA, but also by Thailand, where most of his supplies came from. “Among the four remaining ceasefire groups, Naypyidaw may not think much of the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) as both are small and isolated,” he explained. “But as for the two others, the Shan State Army (SSA) North and Mongla, they are considerably stronger and, more importantly, they cover the Wa’s western and southern flanks. The regime will therefore focus their efforts on the two.” The Wa’s northern border with Kokang has already been occupied by the Burmese Army in August. Since then, Mongla, officially Shan State Special Region #4, and the SSA North, officially Shan State Special Region #3, have been under pressure to accept the Border Guard Force (BGF) proposal and Home Guard Force (HGF) proposal respectively. Mongla, on October28, had been “advised” to resign itself to the BGF status. The media-shy SSA North, meanwhile, was recently told by Maj Gen Aung Than Tut, Commander of the Lashio-based Northeastern Region Command, to stand by their 23 June 2009 letter that said its leadership “appreciates” the ruling military council’s “good intentions” and had been meeting and persuading its lower ranks to “accept” the proposal, according to a report yet to be confirmed. The situation nevertheless might not turn out as planned, according to veteran border watchers. “Mongla territory, located in the triangle (China, Burma and Laos) is considered by the Wa as their lifeline,” said one. “It might not let it go, even if it wants to. That might trigger premature military confrontation with the Burmese Army.” Out of Burma’s 17 official ceasefire groups, five are no longer of ceasefire status. Six have already accepted the BGF proposals. For more information on this, please read The ceasefire armies: Once bitten, once shy? (19 October 2009)
|
